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Abstract 
 
 The aim of the present thesis is to develop a conceptual framework of how 
consumers' choice of products may be influenced by the human values that they 
endorse.  The framework combines a traditional model of human value influence 
based in expectancy-value theory (e.g., Scott and Lamont’s (1973), Gutman’s (1982) 
and Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s (1989) attribute-mediation approach), with 
a new approach based on product meanings, judgements and psychological 
functions.  From the union, a product meaning approach to value influence is 
suggested which outlines two structures of the value-attitude-behaviour system.  
Firstly, when consumers are evaluating a product’s utilitarian meaning and making a 
piecemeal judgement, human values may influence the importance of the product’s 
tangible attributes that in turn influence product preference.  Secondly, when 
consumers are evaluating a product’s symbolic meaning and making an affective 
judgement, human values may influence product preference directly. 
 
 The meaning and judgement elements of the conceptual framework and the 
traditional attribute-mediation approach were examined in three studies; Study 1 
found that the attribute-mediation approach could not fully account for the influence 
of human values on product preference (Hypothesis 1) and that the inability was 
greatest for products, such as red meat and overseas holiday destinations, which are 
likely evaluated on their intangible attributes of symbolic meanings and aesthetics 
(Hypothesis 2). The second and third studies tested whether the two routes of value 
influence uncovered in Study 1, that is, the route proposed in the attribute-mediation 
approach and the alternative, direct route, result from consumers evaluating different 
product meanings and making different types of judgements.  Study 2 developed 
scales that measure the general publics’ product meaning and judgement preferences, 
and Study 3 associated the meaning and judgement preference scales with the 
influences of human values on automobile and sunglasses ownerships; confirming 
the product meaning approach hypothesis that a consumer’s preference for utilitarian 
meaning and for a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement should be greater when his or her human values have an indirect influence 
on product preference (e.g., via the importance of the product’s tangible attributes) 
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than when his or her human values have a direct influence. 
 
 Besides modelling the cognitive structure through which human values operate 
when consumers attend to utilitarian and symbolic meanings and make piecemeal 
and affective judgements, several propositions were made that consumers have a 
cross-product tendency to prefer the same meanings, judgements and routes of value 
influence, and that each route of value influence serves a specific psychological 
function.  Concerning the latter, the propositions were made that when consumers 
attend to symbolic meaning and directly apply their human values, the application 
serves an expressive psychological function (e.g., self-consistency and social 
approval), and hence should be associated with greater psychological identification 
with the product, greater importance assigned to human values in general (e.g., value 
relevance), and a preference for terminal values to instrumental values.  Conversely, 
when consumers attend to utilitarian meaning and indirectly apply their human 
values via tangible attribute importances, the application serves an instrumental 
psychological function (e.g., utility maximisation and control of the environment), 
and hence should be associated with a weaker psychological identification with the 
product, weaker value relevance, and a preference for instrumental values to terminal 
values.  Study 4 assessed these propositions by examining the results of Studies 1-3 
in detail and by analysing a fourth data set.  Support was found for most of the 
propositions. 
 
 Qualifications and limitations of the product meaning approach to the influences 
of human values on consumer choices are discussed, as are the implications of the 
approach for human value theory and consumer research. 
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Chapter I.  Overview of Consumer Choices, Human Values and 
Course of Thesis 
 
 
 
 The aim of the present thesis is to develop a conceptual framework of how 
consumers’ choice of products may be influenced by the human values that they 
endorse.  An argument made throughout the thesis is that a comprehensive model of 
consumer choice should specify and integrate four elements: what criteria consumers 
use to evaluate products and where the criteria originate, the type of judgement that 
applies the criteria, the meaning that the product holds for consumers, and the 
psychological function the product serves.  Many current approaches to consumer 
choices only specify one or at most two elements; a shortcoming that can be 
remedied through a variety of approaches, but the course chosen for the present 
thesis is the roles of human values because human values, even by themselves, 
encapsulate criteria, judgement, meaning, psychological function, and other features. 
 
 The richness of human values has not been sufficiently exploited in existing 
consumer research or human value theory, and therefore the modest contributions the 
present thesis seeks to make are two-fold; firstly, the development of a conceptual 
model of consumer choice that defines and integrates criteria, meaning, judgement 
and psychological function, and secondly, the expansion of current scientific thought 
about what human values comprise, how they are understood by their holders, and 
how they ultimately influence or do not influence behaviour. 
 
 The current chapter briefly outlines several current approaches to consumer 
choices, general concepts and processes of human values, and the course of the 
thesis. 
 
CONSUMER CHOICESCHOICESCHOICESCHOICES 
 
 Whilst many conceptual models have been developed that detail how consumers 
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decide which products to purchase, the present thesis focuses on three primary 
approaches: expectancy-value theory and the multi-attribute model, the product 
meaning approach, and the functional approach.  Each of the approaches is briefly 
reviewed, particularly in light of the argument that a conceptual model of consumer 
choices should specify and integrate criteria, meaning, judgement and psychological 
function. 
 
 The most common, almost paradigmatic, approach to consumer choice is 
expectancy-value theory and the multi-attribute model (e.g., Fishbein, 1967; 
Rosenberg, 1956).  Expectancy-value theory and the multi-attribute model are 
discussed in depth in Part I, but briefly, the proponents of expectancy-value theory 
suggest that consumers determine their preferences for a product from their beliefs 
about what attributes the product contains and the importance of those attributes.  
For each attribute, consumers decide the importance of the attribute (e.g., an 
evaluation) and the extent the attribute is contained in the product (e.g., a belief).  
Consumers then summarise their beliefs and evaluations of all the product’s 
attributes to calculate an overall product preference.  Thus, for example, a 
consumer’s overall preference for Brand A computer could be a multiplication of the 
degree to which he or she believes that Brand A computer has a Large Hard Drive 
with the importance he or she gives to a Large Hard Drive, and that product is added 
to the multiplication of the degree to which he or she believes that Brand A computer 
has Multi-media Capabilities with the importance he or she gives to Multi-media 
Capabilities, and so on through all salient product attributes.  Consumers are 
suggested to use the formula to calculate an overall utility or preference for each 
brand and then select the one with the maximum utility.   
 
 Despite the extensive use of expectancy-value theory and the multi-attribute 
model in mapping out consumers’ decision processes, a recurring criticism of 
expectancy-value theory is that it cannot explain that portion of product preference 
derived from an evaluation of the product’s intangible attributes (e.g., Holbrook & 
Moore, 1981; Keaveney & Hunt, 1992; McCracken, 1988).  Attributes that are 
subjectively imbued onto the product by consumers, rather than “arising” from the 
product via the five senses, are “intangible” (e.g., Hirschman, 1980).  Intangible 
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attributes, such as symbolic meanings and aesthetics, can play a vital role in the 
evaluations of a wide range of goods; from clothing, to soft drinks, to furniture, and 
so on.  Holbrook and Moore (1981), Keaveney and Hunt (1992), and McCracken 
(1988) suggest that expectancy-value theory is inappropriate for intangible attributes 
because the theory assumes consumers evaluate products attribute-by-attribute, when 
with intangible attributes, consumers probably evaluate products in a Gestalt-like, 
holistic fashion.  Expectancy-value theory is more appropriate for tangible attributes 
because consumers probably do evaluate tangible attributes one at a time.  For 
example, the tangible attributes of a vacuum cleaner are the power of the motor, 
durability of construction, and proximity to the carpet, and although the precise 
combination rule may vary, the separate evaluations of these attributes contribute to 
the assessment of the product's ability to clean.  For intangible attributes, however, 
the product is likely to be evaluated in a Gestalt-like, holistic judgement because 
intangible attributes are tied to a specific configuration of tangible attributes, 
resulting in the instantaneous evaluation of the product.  
 
 A more recent approach to consumer preference, the “product meaning 
approach”, avoids the shortcomings of expectancy-value theory by shifting the 
investigation from how consumers decide to purchase a product to what meaning the 
product holds for them (e.g., Abelson & Prentice, 1989; Dittmar, 1992; Hirschman, 
1980; Kilbourne, 1991; Levy, 1959; Richins, 1994).  Most simply, meaning is the 
relation among mind, object and word (Odgen & Richards, 1923) and various 
theories have been offered to explain the relation, ranging from behaviourist to 
semiotics (e.g., Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957; Saussure, 1974).  These 
approaches are discussed at length in Part II, but what many of the theories have in 
common is the view that some meanings are suffused with affectivity, that some 
meanings are subjective, and that meaning can be either linguistic or non-linguistic.  
Meanings that are subjective and affectively charged are the focus of the product 
meaning approach, which attempts to qualify and classify such meanings.  Richins 
(1994), for example, outlines four major categories of such product meanings: 
utilitarian, enjoyment, representation of interpersonal ties, and identity and self-
expression.  In contrast, several other researchers propose a simple utilitarian-
symbolic distinction that is borne out empirically (e.g., Abelson, 1986; Abelson & 
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Prentice, 1989; Dittmar, 1992; Hirschman, 1980; Kilbourne, 1991).  Utilitarian 
meaning is the overt function the product serves in allowing users to control their 
environments, such as vacuum cleaner is for cleaning the carpet, a car is for getting 
from point A to point B, or a cellular phone is for talking to a business associate.  
Symbolic meaning is the culturally shared yet subjective meaning which consumers 
imbue onto the product based social convention, such as Pepsi symbolises 
“youthfulness” or a Mercedes-Benz symbolises “prestige”. 
 
 Importantly, unlike expectancy-value theory and the multi-attribute model, the 
product meaning approach can manage both tangible and intangible attributes.  As 
mentioned, symbolic meaning is an intangible attribute, and Sheth, Newman and 
Gross (1991) argue that utilitarian meaning tends to be located in tangible attributes 
for tangible attributes disclose the quality of the product’s physical performance, 
degree of functionality and ability to control the environment.  For example, the 
utilitarian meaning of a vacuum cleaner would be located in tangible attributes such 
as the power of the motor, durability of construction, and proximity to the carpet, all 
of which impact the product's ability to clean.  Nevertheless, though the product 
meaning approach is an improvement on expectancy-value theory because it can 
include both tangible and intangible attributes, a serious limitation of the product 
meaning approach is that it fails to address what criteria, or standard, consumers 
measure the product against.  Unlike expectancy-value theory and the multi-attribute 
model, mental structures such as attitudes, attribute importances, attribute beliefs, or 
any other criteria consumers may use to evaluate products are not of interest in the 
product meaning approach.  Moreover, also unlike expectancy-value theory in which 
consumers are suggested to evaluate products in an attribute-by-attribute, piecemeal 
type of judgement, researchers taking a product meaning approach to consumer 
preferences are not concerned about how products are judged.  
 
 In contrast to both the product meaning approach and expectancy-value theory, 
in the functional approach to consumer choices the criteria consumers use to evaluate 
products is of interest as are both tangible and intangible attributes (e.g., Shavitt, 
1990; Shavitt, Lowrey & Han, 1992; Snyder & DeBono, 1985; Spivey, Munson & 
Locander, 1983).  In the functional approach, the psychological functions underlying 
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consumers’ attitudes towards different types of product meanings are examined and 
classified.  The functional approach to consumer choices is based on the functional 
approach to attitudes in which attitudes are suggested to serve a variety of 
psychological functions depending on the psychological function the attitude object 
serves (e.g., Katz, 1960; Herek, 1987; Smith, Bruner & White, 1956).  Katz (1960), 
for example, outlined four such psychological functions: instrumental (the need to 
maximise the rewards and minimise the costs from objects in the environment), 
knowledge (the need to organise and give meaning to the chaotic world), ego-
defence (the need to protect oneself from acknowledging the most basic and difficult 
truths about themselves or about the world) and value-expressive (the need for self-
esteem and a desire to facilitate self-definition by giving positive expression of one’s 
self-concept and human values). 
 
 Researchers applying attitude function theory to the area of consumer choices 
generally investigate how the function that a consumer’s attitude serves affects his or 
her ability to be persuaded by two types of advertisements; those that focus on the 
product’s tangible attributes and utility versus those that focus on its image and 
symbolism (e.g., Shavitt, Lowrey & Han, 1992; Snyder & DeBono, 1985; Spivey, 
Munson & Locander, 1983).  Generally, the stream of research has found that those 
consumers holding a value-expressive attitude are more easily persuaded by 
symbolic advertisements whereas those consumers holding an instrumental attitude 
are more easily persuaded by utilitarian advertisements.   
 
 The strengths of the functional approach are that the criteria (e.g., attitudes) that 
consumers use to evaluate a product’s meanings are defined, as are the psychological 
functions underpinning the attitudes.  However, in contrast to the proposition in 
expectancy-value theory that consumers evaluate products in an attribute-by-
attribute, piecemeal judgement, the kind of judgement consumers use to apply their 
attitude criteria is not enumerated in the functional approach, and perhaps more 
central to the current thesis, also not specified is where the criteria originate.  The 
current thesis will argue that one source of attitude criteria may be the consumers’ 
longer-term goals and more general standards such as their human values. 
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HUMAN VALUESVALUESVALUESVALUES 
 
 Singularly, each of the three primary approaches to understanding consumer 
choices has its unique strengths and limitations, but taken together the major 
limitation of all the approaches is their failure to specify and integrate four elements: 
what criteria consumers are using to evaluate products and where these criteria 
originate, the type of judgement that applies the criteria, the meaning that the product 
holds for consumers, and the psychological function the product serves.  One way to 
rectify that failure is to investigate how consumers’ choices of products are 
influenced by the human values that they endorse.  Specific rationales for why 
investigating the roles of human values on consumer choices enables the 
consideration of criteria, meaning, judgement and psychological function, are offered 
in the course of the thesis, but presently some general concepts and processes of 
human values are laid out for foundation. 
 
 Schwartz (1994) defines human values as “desirable trans-situational goals, 
varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other 
social entity” (p.  21).  Human values promote the interests of individuals and social 
entities (e.g., institutions, groups and so on) by motivating action or serving as a 
standard with which individuals and groups can judge themselves and others.  
Schwartz (1994) continues; 
 
“In order to cope with reality in a social context, groups and individuals 
cognitively transform the necessities inherent in human existence and express 
them in the language of specific values about which they can then communicate.  
Specifically, values represent, in the form of conscious goals, responses to three 
universal requirements; needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites 
of co-ordinated social interaction, and requirements for the smooth functioning 
and survival of groups” (p. 21). 
 
 
 In Rokeach’s (1973) seminal work, Understanding Human Values, he defines a 
human value as an “enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of 
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existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence” (p.  5).  Beliefs about desired end-states are 
terminal values (e.g., Freedom, Comfortable Life, Mature Love), and beliefs about 
desired modes of action are instrumental values (e.g.  being Independent, Ambitious 
or Honest).  Rokeach suggested that instrumental values attempt to bring about the 
end-goals of terminal values, such as “being Independent” may lead to the end-state 
of “Freedom”.  Rokeach also suggests that as human values refer to an individual’s 
preferred modes of action and end-states of existence, human values are 
“prescriptive”, and that as human values are a focal point around which other, less 
important beliefs are organised, human values are “centrally-held”. 
 
 Human values comprise three components: belief, affect and behaviour.  Human 
values have a behavioural component “in the sense that it is an intervening variable 
that leads to action when activated” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 7).  The belief component 
represents an idea or conception, and the affect component represents subjective 
preference for the idea.  The affective component of human values is especially 
important because the abstractness of human values means that for many individuals 
values may connote little more than a ‘felt sense’ (c.f., Kilby, 1993).  An individual’s 
preference for “Freedom”, for instance, may be more of an affective response than a 
careful consideration of its specific meaning.  Nevertheless, as human values contain 
both an affective and a cognitive component, they can be applied in an affective 
judgement or in the kind of judgement outlined in expectancy-value theory (e.g., 
piecemeal, attribute-by-attribute analysis).  Precisely how human values may be 
applied in either an affective or expectancy-value type of judgement is described in a 
later chapter, but presently of note is that unlike expectancy-value theory and the 
multi-attribute model that are limited to a piecemeal, attribute-by-attribute 
judgement, and the product meaning and functional approaches which do not specify 
any judgement type, investigating the roles of human values on consumer choices 
allows the researcher to consider various types of judgements through which human 
value criteria may be applied. 
 
 According to leading human value theorists (e.g., Feather, 1975, 1982; Kahle, 
1983; Rokeach, 1968, 1973), two processes are central in the development of an 
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individual’s human values preferences: abstraction and generalisation.  The best 
known proponents of such processes are Rokeach and Feather who base their 
propositions in expectancy-value theory.  Rokeach and Feather suggest that when an 
individual has a positive or negative experience with an object he or she forms 
evaluative beliefs about the part of the object thought to be the cause of the 
experience.  For instance, if a business person felt tired and drained, and needed a 
boost he or she might drink a Pepsi and then credit the resulting feeling of alertness 
to Pepsi’s caffeine content.  Evaluative beliefs comprise a belief component (e.g., 
Pepsi has caffeine, or caffeine makes one feel alert ) and an evaluation (e.g., feeling 
alert is good.).  Rokeach and Feather suggest that the individual then summarise all 
his or her evaluative beliefs about the object to form a general attitude towards the 
object.  Rokeach’s and Feather’s suggestion is the same process outlined in 
expectancy-value theory; each belief has an associated evaluation and together these 
belief-evaluation dyads additively combine with other belief-evaluation dyads to 
form the attitude.  However, Rokeach and Feather take the abstraction process 
further than that taken in expectancy-value theory; Rokeach and Feather suggest that 
the individual then summarise his or her attitudes towards all objects that they 
perceive as similar.  Thus, continuing the same example, the business person may 
summarise his or her attitudes towards all products that have made him or her feel 
alert in the past (e.g., coffee, Coca-Cola and Pepsi make one feel alert and are good).  
The process of abstraction continues to summarise even broader classes of objects, 
which makes the abstraction at the level of “instrumental values”, and the abstraction 
process continues until it reaches the most abstract level of “terminal values”.  Thus, 
the business person might recognise that objects that make him or her stay alert (e.g., 
coffee, Coca-Cola and Pepsi) allow him or her to work hard and be ambitious (both 
instrumental values) and that working hard and being ambitious will bring about a 
sense of accomplishment (a terminal value). 
 
 Once the human value preferences are formed, they can then be generalised to 
new objects that were not the impetus for the abstraction process.  Human values 
influence attitudes and evaluative beliefs towards new objects based on an 
assumption that the object will bring about or will reinforce the human values in the 
same way as the original object had.  Thus, the business person might form a positive 
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attitude towards Jolt cola on the assumption that, like Pepsi, Jolt will make him or 
her feel alert and will enable him or her to work harder, be ambitious, and have a 
general sense of accomplishment.  Besides human values preferences being 
generalised to new attitudes and evaluative beliefs, human values may also be 
generalised to other human values that are similar semantically.  For instance, the 
business person’s preference for value of accomplishment may influence his or her 
preference for the value of “achievement” because of their similar semantic 
meanings.  Thus, whilst a process of abstraction created a hierarchical network 
between specific evaluative beliefs and specific human values, once formed, a 
process of generalisation expands the scope of the network at both the object end and 
at the human value end.  Thus, Rokeach’s (1968, 1973) description of human values 
as “centrally-held” means that human values are at the top of the abstraction and 
generalisation hierarchy and that other, less important, and more specific beliefs are 
organised around, and influenced by, human values.  The hierarchical network is also 
known as the value-attitude-behaviour system and is discussed throughout the 
current thesis. 
 
 Concerning what compels individuals to abstract their specific experiences into 
the broader goals and standards of human values, Kahle (1983) suggests that human 
values are adaptive.  Human values foster adaptation to the psychological and social 
environments, and because human values are the most abstract social cognition they 
represent the most basic form of adaptation.  Kahle (1983) notes: 
 
“Through experience, vicarious experience and thought, cognition serves to 
reduce the infinite number of stimuli, which constantly impinge on a person, to a 
manageable number of abstract generalisations.  During formative or 
transformative stages in the history of an abstraction, the abstraction will be 
tested, refined and clarified…  Adaptation abstractions emerge continuously 
from a process of assimilation, accommodation, organisation and integration of 
environmental information and thought, in order to promote interchanges 
between the individual and the environment that, from the individual’s 
perspective, are favourable to preservation and optimal functioning” (p. 51).   
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 Thus far, the review of some general concepts and processes of human values 
has illustrated that human value criteria may be applied in either an affective or a 
piecemeal, attribute-by-attribute type of judgement, and that human values are 
formed through a similar abstraction process outlined in expectancy-value theory.  
Thus, investigating the role of human values on consumer choices would enable the 
development of a conceptual model that includes judgement type and a wide range of 
criteria the product may be assessed against (e.g., attribute importance and belief, 
attitudes, and human values).  Expectedly, human values can also encapsulate the 
two remaining elements suggested to be important to understanding consumer 
choices: psychological function and product meaning.   
 
 The readers may recall that the functional approach to consumer choice is based 
on Katz’ (1960) and Smith, Bruner and White’s (1956) functional approach to 
attitudes, and importantly, Rokeach (1973) suggested that a functional approach was 
applicable to human values as well.  Rokeach and others (e.g., Epstein, 1989; 
Kristiansen, 1990; Williams, 1979) have described how human values serve various 
psychological functions such as knowledge, social-adjustment, value-expression, 
instrumentality, and ego-defence.  How human values serve a knowledge 
psychological function is perhaps best outlined by Williams (1979), who suggests 
that although human values direct action by giving psychic energy to meet subjective 
preferences, the direction of the action is dependent on the systems of knowledge the 
human value contains, that is, action results from concrete motivation in specific 
situations, but both the motivation and the definition of the situation are partly 
determined by human values.  As an example, Williams cites Lueptow’s (1968) study 
that found that an individual’s motivation for achievement per se was not an 
adequate predictor of occupational choice.  However, achievement motivation in 
combination with the individual’s value standard towards various occupational roles, 
that is, which occupation will provide achieving rewards, did predict occupational 
choice.  Thus, Williams argues that human values both define the gratification that 
will reinforce motivations, and define the source of the gratification.  Defining the 
source, or classification, is central to valuing. 
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 The knowledge psychological function of human values has also been 
investigated by Kristiansen and Zanna (1994) and Kristiansen (1990), who offer a 
knowledge function interpretation of some well-established human value processes 
and their effects.  One of these effects is brought about through Rokeach’s (1973) 
value self-confrontation procedure in which participants are informed that two of 
their important values are logically inconsistent and are different from those of an 
important reference group.  Rokeach argues that the information creates a state of 
self-dissatisfaction, and that consequently, participants will alter one of their values 
to make it consistent with the other value and similar to the values of the reference 
group.  Moreover, participants will alter specific attitudes and behaviours to bring 
them in line with the new value importance.  Such effects are usually interpreted 
based on Festinger’s (1957) cognitive consistency theory, which posits that 
individuals need consistency between their beliefs and behaviours and that any 
inconsistency creates an aversive cognitive dissonance.  Accordingly, individuals 
will alter their beliefs and behaviour to place any outlier more in line with the other 
elements in the system.  Thus, Rokeach suggests that because human values are at 
the top of the abstraction and generalisation hierarchy, when an individual’s human 
values preferences change their attitudes and behaviours will also change.  
Kristiansen and Zanna (1994), however, suggest that such change occurs because 
giving individuals information about the definition and meaning of human values 
serves a motivation for knowledge, which therefore reorganises their system of 
beliefs.  Nevertheless, Kristiansen and Zanna’s functional interpretation is 
concordant with Festinger’s cognitive dissonance theory.  A motivation for useful 
knowledge may be a driving force in the need for consistency. 
 
 Along with human values serving a knowledge psychological function, human 
values serve a social-adjustive function by mediating self-other relationships 
(Rokeach, 1973, Williams, 1979).  Human values serve a social-adjustive function in 
two ways: by fostering social identity through the internalisation of group values, 
and by ensuring that an individual’s action is normative (Williams, 1979).  As an 
example of the former process, Feather (1984) found that the degree to which 
individuals were sex-typed was also the degree that they believed the values of their 
gender role were preferable.  Thus, masculine males not only described themselves 
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as assertive and independent, but also believed those values were important.   
 
 Human values serve a value-expressive psychological function by giving 
positive expression to one’s self-concept and human values (Rokeach, 1968, 1973).  
Similar to Katz’ (1960) suggestion that a need for self-esteem underlies the value-
expressive function of attitudes, Rokeach suggests that a need for self-esteem 
underlies the value-expressive function of human values.  However, unlike Katz, 
Rokeach suggests that the value-expressive function of human values is super-
ordinate to all other psychological functions because human values always seek 
expression and maintenance of self-sentiment.  Nevertheless, Rokeach did concede 
that some human values are more closely tied to the self-concept than others are, and 
thus the value-expressive function could be separate and discrete.  The discreteness 
of the value-expressive function of human values not only means that some values 
serve to express one’s self-concept more than other values, but also that for some 
individuals human values in general serve an expressive function more so than for 
other individuals.  For instance, Wojciszke (1989) argues that people vary in the 
extent they incorporate human values into their ideal self-concept.  In particular, 
those whom he terms “idealists” are characterised by their claim that they use human 
values more frequently to judge themselves and others and make behavioural 
choices.  Idealists tend to agree with such statements as “I will never abandon my 
ideals” or “I engage in activities even if it has a poor chance of succeeding”.  
Evidence that idealists more closely tie human values into their ideal self-concept 
was shown by their highly differentiated value system, their greater number of self-
referent thoughts when thinking about human values, and their stronger value-
behaviour consistency. 
 
 Besides the knowledge, social adjustive and value-expressive psychological 
functions, human values serve an instrumental psychological function by directing 
behaviour towards specific goals that maximises goal attainment and minimise 
blockages, and human values serve an ego-defensive function by recasting 
personally and socially unacceptable needs and feelings into more acceptable terms.  
For instance, an individual’s desire for vengeance through use of the death penalty 
might be recast into a more acceptable value such as “Justice”.   
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 The feature that all of the above psychological functions have in common, that 
is, the instrumental, ego-defensive, value-expressive, knowledge, and social-
adjustive functions, is that any human value may serve any of the functions.  In 
contrast, other psychological functions are tied to specific human values.  The 
readers may recall that Schwartz (1992, 1994) suggested that human values are 
social responses to three universal requirements: needs of individuals as biological 
organisms, requisites of co-ordinated social interaction, and requirements for the 
smooth functioning and survival of groups.  From these individual and group needs, 
Schwartz proposes ten functions which specific human values serve: security, power, 
achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, 
conformity and tradition.  For instance, the values of “Politeness” and “Obedience”, 
though different in their manifest meanings, each restrain action likely to harm others 
and thus each serve a conformity function.  In a cross-cultural examination of the ten 
functional domains, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) found that the domains 
reduce to two dimensions: Self-transcendence versus Self-enhancement and 
Openness to Change versus Conservation.  The first dimension opposes the 
acceptance of others as equals and a concern for their welfare with a focus on one’s 
own success and dominance.  The second dimension opposes the independence of 
thought and action and the favouring of change with a desire for stability, self-
restraint and traditional practices. 
 
 Along with encapsulating criteria, psychological function and judgement type, 
human values also affect, and reflect, the meanings of products and other objects.  
How product meaning differs from attitudes and evaluative beliefs will be made 
clearer in the course of the thesis, as will how human values influence the 
evaluations of product meanings.  Briefly, however, like product meanings, human 
values are subjective and affectively charged, but unlike product meanings, human 
values are positioned at the top of the abstraction and generalisation hierarchy, which 
means they are centrally-held.  At lower positions in the hierarchy are beliefs and 
affectivity resulting from direct and indirect experiences with specific objects such as 
products.  So, human values are super-ordinate to product meanings and should 
direct attention to product meanings based on the dominance and similarity of each.  
 14
Human values and product meanings that are dominant in the system and are 
subjectively perceived as similar in content should result in the affect for the human 
value being transferred to the evaluation of the product meaning.  For example, an 
individual’s preference for the human value Prestige would not only direct their 
attention to products that have meanings similar to prestige, such as a Mercedes-
Benz, but would also contribute to his or her positive or negative evaluation of the 
automobile. 
 
OVERVIEW OF THESISOF THESISOF THESISOF THESIS 
 
 The brief review of some current approaches to consumer choices and general 
human values processes, illustrates that a useful avenue for developing a conceptual 
model of consumer choices is to address how those choices are influenced by the 
human values consumers endorse.  Essentially, the conceptual model developed in 
the present thesis attempts to combine the most successful features of current 
approaches to consumer choice (e.g., expectancy-value theory and the multi-attribute 
model, the product meaning approach, and the functional approach) with general 
human value features and processes (e.g., psychological function, relationships to 
object meanings, influence on attitudes and behaviours, and so on) to create a 
comprehensive conceptual model. 
 
 Several researchers have already made propositions about how consumer choices 
are influenced by human values (e.g., Corfman, Lehmann and Narayanan’s (1991) 
Product Utility Theory, Scott and Lamont’s (1973) Centrality of Beliefs Approach, 
Gutman’s (1982) Means-end Chain Theory, Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s 
(1989) Multi-attribute Approach, Homer and Kahle’s (1988) Attitude-mediation 
Approach and Prentice’s (1987) Functional Approach).  Most of these propositions 
can be classified under one of two general approaches.  The models of Homer and 
Kahle (1988) and Prentice (1987) take one of these approaches, which is that human 
values influence product preference through general product attitudes.   
 
 However, of interest to Part I of the present thesis is a second approach, the 
attribute-mediation approach, of which Scott and Lamont’s (1973) Centrality of 
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Beliefs Approach, Gutman’s (1982) Means-end Chain Theory, and Lindberg, Garling 
and Montgomery’s (1989) Multi-attribute Approach are variations.  As the attribute-
mediation approach has the clearest rationale of current approaches to the influences 
of human values on consumer choices, it makes a good starting point.  Part I reviews 
Scott and Lamont’s (1973), Gutman’s (1982), and Lindberg, Garling and 
Montgomery’s (1989) variations of the attribute-mediation approach in depth, but 
briefly, all three variations are founded in expectancy-value theory, which, as 
discussed, is that preferences for products are formed from beliefs about what 
attributes the products contain and the importance of those attributes.  On top of the 
expectancy-value proposition, the proponents of the attribute-mediation approach 
suggest that the importance of the attributes are based on the attributes’ abilities to 
reinforce longer-term goals and meet standards that are more general.  Thus, 
according to the attribute-mediation approach, human values do not influence 
product preference directly, but instead influence the importance of product attributes 
that in turn influence product preference.   
 
 However, as reviewed, a criticism of expectancy-value theory is that it offers 
only a partial explanation of product preference, specifically, expectancy-value 
theory cannot explain that portion of product preference that consumers derive from 
an evaluation of the product’s intangible attributes such as symbolic meaning and 
aesthetics.  The proponents of the attribute-mediation approach overlooked the fact 
that expectancy-value theory, and their own approach, cannot model intangible 
attributes.  Nevertheless, such a limitation may not necessarily damage the validity 
of the attribute-mediation approach because human values could always mediate 
through tangible attributes given that intangible attributes are located on the 
agglomeration of tangible ones.  Part I of the thesis, however, argues that the 
distinction between tangible and intangible attributes is of consequence to value 
influence, and hypothesises that 1) the attribute-mediation approach cannot fully 
account for the influence of human values on product preference, and 2) the inability 
increases as intangible attributes become more important to consumers’ evaluation of 
the product.   
 
 Study 1 tests these hypotheses for three products in which a reasonable 
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assumption could be made of whether most consumers evaluate the product on its 
tangible or intangible attributes.  The assumption was made that different makes and 
models of automobiles would be evaluated primarily on their tangible attributes, 
different overseas holiday destinations would be evaluated on an even mixture of 
their tangible and intangible attributes, and that different types of meat would be 
evaluated predominantly on their intangible attributes.  In accordance with 
Hypothesis 2, the expectation was that the attribute-mediation approach would have 
the most success accounting for the influence of human values on consumer 
preferences for different classes of automobiles, a moderate success with preferences 
for different overseas holiday destinations, and the least success with preferences for 
different types of meat.  Three-hundred and forty members of the general population 
were surveyed about their human values, the tangible attributes that were important 
to their evaluation of automobiles, overseas holiday destinations and red and white 
meat, and the extent they had purchased those products.  A series of regression 
analyses showed that for nearly all of the products, the degree that human values 
predicted product purchase could not be fully accounted for by consumer’s preferred 
tangible attributes.  Moreover, the inability was greatest for the products that 
intangible attributes were assumed important to consumer evaluations (e.g., red meat 
and overseas holiday destinations).  Thus, both hypotheses were supported. 
 
 Whilst Study 1 showed that the attribute-mediation approach could not fully 
account for the influence of human values on product purchase, Study 1 also showed 
that the approach accounted for a substantial share.  Thus, to build on the success of 
the attribute-mediation approach while overcoming its inability to account for the 
influence of human values on intangible attributes, Part II of the thesis develops a 
“product meaning approach to value influence” (a schematic representation of the 
approach is presented in Figure 1 on page 21 and a more detailed tabular form in 
Table 1 on page 22).  The product meaning approach to value influence combines the 
product meaning approach to consumer choice with the attribute-mediation approach 
to value influence, and takes a more comprehensive perspective of both human 
values and product meanings by specifying and integrating different types of 
judgements consumers may use to assess products, different psychological functions 
products may serve, and different routes through which values may influence product 
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preference. 
 
 Notwithstanding that important distinctions among different types of products 
and consumers are over-simplified, the product meaning approach to value influence 
is that the route of human value influence proposed in the attribute-mediation 
approach is generally only used when consumers are attending to products’ utilitarian 
meaning because utilitarian meaning is located in tangible attributes and is evaluated 
through a piecemeal judgement (e.g., an expectancy-value type of judgement in 
which each attribute is evaluated one at a time).  Thus, the influence of human values 
is indirect via the importance of the tangible attributes of the product.  An alternative 
and more direct route of human value influence is suggested to be used when 
consumers are attending to the product’s symbolic meaning because symbolic 
meaning has strong human value content and is evaluated through an affective 
judgement (e.g., Gestalt-like, holistic and subjective).  The direct route as shown in 
Study 1, increased in strength as the product’s intangible attributes, such as symbolic 
meaning and aesthetics, became more important to consumers’ evaluation of the 
product.  Besides these expectations, the suggestion was made that for many 
consumers the utility of the product would usually be more important than its 
symbolic meaning.  Moreover, rather than making an assumption about how most 
consumers evaluate a particular product, as Study 1 did, examining each consumer’s 
meaning and judgement preferences and then relating these preferences to his or her 
human value influence is preferable.  Accordingly, the product meaning approach to 
value influence hypothesis was that a consumer’s preference for utilitarian meaning 
and for a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement 
should be greater when his or her human values have an indirect influence on 
product preference (e.g., via the importance of the product’s tangible attributes) than 
when his or her human values have a direct influence.   
 
 To test predictions derived from the product meaning approach to value 
influence, Study 2 first developed and tested scales designed to measure each 
consumer’s meaning and judgement preferences.  The scales were tested on 106 
members of the general public who used the scales to indicate what kind of meaning 
they preferred to attend to, and what kind of judgement they preferred to make, when 
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evaluating automobiles and sunglasses.  Analyses showed that the factorial structures 
of the scales closely matched their conceptual structures, and that the scales were 
sensitive to the utilitarian and symbolic natures of the products.  Moreover, the 
analyses also showed that a preference for making a piecemeal judgement was 
strongly associated with a preference for attending to utilitarian meaning, that a 
preference for making an affective judgement was strongly associated with a 
preference for attending to symbolic meaning, and that utilitarian meaning and a 
piecemeal judgement were preferred to symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement.  
 
 Using the newly constructed meaning and judgement scales, Study 3 tested the 
product meaning approach to value influence hypothesis that a consumer’s 
preference for utilitarian meaning and for a piecemeal judgement to symbolic 
meaning and an affective judgement should be greater when his or her human values 
have an indirect influence on product preference (e.g., via the importance of the 
product’s tangible attributes) than when his or her human values have a direct 
influence.  Two hundred and fifty-six members of the general public were surveyed 
about their meaning and judgement preferences, human values, the tangible attributes 
that were important to their evaluations of automobiles and sunglasses, and the 
extent they had purchased those products.  Results showed that those respondents 
whose product purchases were more accurately predicted by the indirect influence of 
human values (e.g., via the importance of the product’s tangible attributes) than by 
the direct influence, preferred utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to 
symbolic meaning and an affective judgement to a greater extent than those whose 
product purchases were more accurately predicted by their direct influence of human 
values than their indirect influence.  The support for the product meaning approach 
to value influence hypothesis was found for each of the product purchases tested, that 
is, for Smaller Family Cars, Larger Family Cars and sunglasses. 
 
 Besides modelling the cognitive structure through which human values operate 
when consumers attend to utilitarian and symbolic meanings, several propositions 
were made concerning the psychological functions each type of meaning and route of 
human value influence may signify, and how those functions may manifest and be 
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measured.  The propositions were that when consumers attend to symbolic meaning 
and directly apply their human values, the application serves an expressive 
psychological function and so should be associated with a greater psychological 
identification with the product, a greater importance assigned to human values in 
general (e.g., value relevance), and a preference for terminal values to instrumental 
values.  Conversely, when consumers attend to utilitarian meaning and indirectly 
apply their human values via tangible attribute importances, the application serves an 
instrumental psychological function and so should be associated with a weaker 
psychological identification with the product, a weaker value relevance, and a 
preference for instrumental values to terminal values.  Beyond these propositions 
concerning psychological function, one other proposition was made that individuals 
have a tendency to prefer the same meanings, judgements and routes of value 
influence across different types of products. 
 
 Study 4 assessed these propositions by examining the results of Studies 1-3 in 
greater detail, by re-analysing the data collected in Studies 1-3, by analysing data 
collected in Studies 1-3 but not previously used, or by analysing a fourth data set.  
The results showed that greater psychological identification with red meat was 
associated with a stronger direct route of value influence on red meat consumption, 
whereas weaker psychological identification with red meat was associated with a 
stronger indirect route of value influence.  Moreover, the direct route was associated 
with terminal values and the indirect route with instrumental values, specifically, 
those individuals with a relative preference for terminal values tended to apply all 
their values (both instrumental and terminal combined) directly and those with a 
relative preference for instrumental values tended to apply all their values indirectly 
through tangible attribute importances.  A preference for terminal values was also 
associated with an overarching importance of all human values (e.g., value 
relevance).  Value relevance was also associated with a preference for symbolic 
meaning and an affective judgement to utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal 
judgement.  Finally, Study 4 found that individuals tended to prefer the same 
meanings and judgements for both automobiles and sunglasses, and individuals 
tended to use the same value influence route for both products.  Overall, Study 4 
found support for most of the propositions. 
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 The concluding chapter of the present thesis addresses methodological 
limitations of Studies 1-4, issues for conceptual and theoretical development of the 
product meaning approach to value influence, and implications that the approach 
may have for human value theory and consumer research. 
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Figure 1.  The correspondence between the levels of prescriptive and evaluative 
beliefs and the levels of product meaning. 
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Table 1.  Product meaning, type of judgement and psychological function associated 
with the direct and indirect influences of human values on product preference. 
 
 
    
  Routes of Human Value Influence  
on Product Preference 
 
    
  INDIRECT DIRECT 
  (via tangible attribute 
importances)  
 
   
 
 
Product Meaning  Utilitarian Symbolic 
Content  Overt function and utility Social categories and cultural 
principles (e.g., ideals, 
values, traits) 
Location  Separate Tangible Attributes Product Whole 
Focus  Objective: product-focused Subjective: self-focused 
Breadth  Specific/Narrow Abstract/Broad 
Conceptual Clarity  Clear Vague 
    
    
Judgement Type  Piecemeal Affective 
Reasoning  Logical, comprehensive, and 
systematic attribute-by-
attribute analysis 
Holistic, intuitive and 
approximate goodness of fit 
to exemplar 
Memory Representation  Uncertain-perhaps verbal Visual: multi-sensory imagery 
Affect Latency  Delayed Immediate 
Affect Intensity  Low: evaluative High: emotional states 
    
    
Psychological Function  Instrumental Expressive 
Source of Benefit  The product’s intrinsic 
qualities, means to an end, 
and ability to control the 
environment. 
The use of the product as a 
vehicle for self-expression. 
Value Relevance  Low High 
Product Identification  Weak Strong 
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PART ONE: THE INDIRECT INFLUENCE OF 
HUMAN VALUES ON PRODUCT PREFERENCE 
 
 
CHAPTER II.  THE ATTRIBUTE-MEDIATION APPROACH 
 
 
 
 As outlined in Chapter I, the proponents of the attribute-mediation approach 
suggest that human values have an indirect influence on product preference by 
influencing the importance of product attributes that in turn guide product evaluation 
and selection.  Compared with other approaches, the attribute-mediation approach 
has the clearest rationale, which makes it a good starting point for the development 
of a broad conceptual model of how consumers’ choice of products may be 
influenced by the human values that they endorse.  Three variations of the attribute-
mediation approach have been proposed: Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s 
(1989) Multi-attribute Approach, Gutman’s (1982) Means-end Chain Theory and 
Scott and Lamont’s (1973) Centrality of Beliefs Approach.  As each of these 
attribute-mediation approaches is founded in expectancy-value theory, expectancy-
value theory is reviewed in depth before the specific attribute-mediation approaches 
are discussed. 
 
EXPECTANCY-VALUE THEORY 
 
 Developers of expectancy-value theory suggest that an attitude towards an object 
is a joint function of the subjective probability the object will yield positive or 
negative consequences and the importance of those consequences (Fishbein, 1967; 
Rosenberg, 1956).  The conceptualisation includes the two major components of 
“evaluation” and “belief”.  Evaluations (or importances) are predispositions to 
respond favourably or unfavourably to objects and are learnt from experience both 
direct and vicarious in which the objects meet or block meaningful goals.  
Evaluations can vary in valence and intensity but variation is anchored to the content 
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of beliefs, which refer to the existence of certain characteristics of the attitude object 
(e.g., “God is omnipotent”) or the object’s relationship to other objects or goals (e.g., 
“Women are equal to men” or “Talking to women increases your life expectancy”).  
However, as Fishbein (1967) argues, these beliefs are subjective probabilities as they 
represent the certainty (or uncertainty) that the object comprises those features or is 
related to other objects and goals.   
 
 According to expectancy-value theory, attitudes are formed through an 
abstraction process that summarises specific evaluations and beliefs, as represented 
in the formula below (reprinted from Fishbein, 1967): 
 
A B ao i i
i
n
=
=
∑
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where A is the attitude towards object o, Bi is the strength of the belief (e.g., 
subjective probability) that the object is associated with concept i, ai is the evaluation 
of concept i and n is the number of beliefs about the object.  Thus, for example, an 
individual’s attitude towards the Navy could be a multiplication of the degree to 
which he or she believes that “the Navy protects us from harm” with the importance 
he or she gives to protection from harm, and that product is added to the 
multiplication of the degree to which he or she believes that “the Navy provides 
good job training” with the importance he or she assign to good job training, and so 
on through all object concepts.  Therefore, each belief has an associated evaluation 
and together these belief-evaluation dyads additively combine with other belief-
evaluation dyads to form the attitude.  Moreover, only salient beliefs determine the 
attitude as non-salient beliefs have low Bi weights.  In early tests of expectancy-value 
theory, Anderson and Fishbein (1965) found that although the sum of object beliefs 
and the sum of object evaluations each yielded good predictions of overall attitudes, 
the best prediction was obtained from multiplying each belief with each evaluation 
and then summing the belief-evaluation dyads. 
 
 Consumer researchers applying expectancy-value theory suggest that consumers 
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determine their overall preferences for products from their beliefs about what 
attributes the product contains and the importance of those attributes, as represented 
in the formula (reprinted from Bagozzi, 1988): 
 
A b ei i
i
n=
=
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1
 
 
where A is a consumer’s attitude towards a product, bi is the belief that the product 
contains attribute i, ei is the importance assigned to attribute i, and n is the number of 
attributes.  Thus, for example, a consumer’s overall preference for Brand A computer 
could be a multiplication of the degree to which he or she believes that Brand A 
computer has a Large Hard Drive with the importance he or she gives to a Large 
Hard Drive, and that product is added to the multiplication of the degree to which he 
or she believes that Brand A computer has Multi-media Capabilities with the 
importance he or she gives to Multi-media Capabilities, and so on through all salient 
product attributes.  Consumers are suggested to use the formula to calculate an 
overall utility or preference for each brand and then select the one with the maximum 
utility.   
 
 The application of expectancy-value theory to consumer choices is loosely 
termed the “multi-attribute model”, of which several sub-types have been proposed 
(Kotler, 1991).  In the ideal-point model, consumers are suggested to select the brand 
with attributes that most closely resemble the attributes of their ideal brand.  In the 
conjunctive model, a brand’s attributes must exceed minimum levels for the 
consumer to consider it.  In the lexicographic model, consumers are assumed to order 
attributes by importance and then judge products on the most important attribute.  If 
two or more products are equal on the attribute then the comparison shifts to the 
second most important attribute, and so on.  Finally, in the determinance model, the 
recognition is made that although an attribute may be important to the consumer, if 
all brands contain that attribute then the attribute has no part in product preference.  
Thus, instead of concentrating on attributes that are important, the determinance 
model focuses on attributes that actually influence preference. 
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 Regarding the roles of human values in expectancy-value theory and the multi-
attribute model, Fishbein (1967) and Rosenberg (1956) presume that a consumer’s 
human values, ideology and other general beliefs are either too far removed and 
abstract to influence the assessment of products and other objects, or that the 
influence is so minor that human values are not worthy of attention from researchers.  
Some human value theorists, however, dispute those assumptions and argue that 
whilst attribute importances and attribute beliefs combine to determine overall 
product preference (as suggested in expectancy-value theory), attribute importances 
are influenced by human values based on the attributes’ abilities to reinforce longer-
term goals and meet standards that are more general.  As reviewed in Chapter I, these 
approaches to the influences of human values on consumer choices founded in 
expectancy-value theory are termed “attribute-mediation approaches” of which three 
variations have been proposed: Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s (1989) Multi-
attribute Approach, Gutman’s (1982) Means-end Chain Theory, and Scott and 
Lamont’s (1973) Centrality of Beliefs Approach.  
 
LINDBERG, GARLING AND MONTGOMERY’S MULTI-ATTRIBUTE 
APPROACH 
 
 Of the three variations of the attribute-mediation approach, Lindberg, Garling 
and Montgomery’s (1989) Multi-attribute Approach is the most direct integration of 
expectancy-value theory into the role of human values.  Lindberg, Garling and 
Montgomery’s main hypothesis was that consumers derive their overall preferences 
for products from their beliefs about what human values the product’s attributes 
reinforce and the importance of those human values, as represented in Formula #1: 
 
 
 
 
where Ealt represents the overall preference for product i, PATTR is the extent to that 
attribute j will lead to the attainment of human value k, and Ev is the importance of 
human value k.  Thus, for example, a consumer’s preference for Brand A sports car 
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could be a multiplication of the degree to which he or she believes that the car’s 
attribute of High Speed Engine will lead to the attainment of the human value of 
Social Power with the importance he or she gives to Social Power, and that product 
is added to the multiplication of the degree to which he or she believes that the car’s 
attribute of Compact Size will lead to the attainment of the human value of Social 
Power with the importance he or she gives to Social Power, and so on through all 
permutations of human values and attributes.   
 
 Besides the main hypothesis, Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery tested two 
alternatives; the first was that human values did underlie attribute importances but 
not linearly nor additively and therefore no relationship to attributes could be 
inferred or modelled.  Thus, that alternative ignored the role of attributes and planned 
that human values influence product preference at a holistic level such as brand, 
class or category, as represented in Formula #2: 
 
 
 
 
 
where Ealt represents the overall preference for product i, PALT is the extent to that 
product i will lead to the attainment of human value k, and Ev is the importance of 
human value k.  Thus, continuing the same example, a consumer’s preference for 
Brand A sports car could be a multiplication of the degree to which he or she 
believes that the car (as a whole) will lead to the attainment of the human value of 
Social Power with the importance he or she gives to Social Power, and that product 
is added to the multiplication of the degree to which he or she believes that the car 
will lead to the attainment of the human value of A Sense of Accomplishment with 
the importance he or she gives to A Sense of Accomplishment, and so on through all 
human values. Thus, the difference between Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s 
main hypothesis (Formula #1) and Formula #2 is the level of the product (attribute 
versus product whole) that is the focal point of the belief human values will be 
reinforced. 
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 The second alternative Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery tested was that 
human values did not underlie attribute importance or overall product preference; 
product preference is simply a function of attribute importances, as represented in 
Formula #3: 
 
 
 
 
where Ealt represents the overall preference for product i, EATTRij is the importance of 
attribute j.  Thus, Formula #3 differs from expectancy-value theory and the multi-
attribute model by omitting the belief component. 
 
 In a test of the three formulations, Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery found that 
all three significantly predicted consumer preferences for different classes of houses, 
but contrary to the main hypothesis (Formula #1) Lindberg, Garling and 
Montgomery found that Formula #2 provided the best prediction.  Hence, human 
values did underlie product preference but did not combine additively with attribute 
importances to form that preference; product preference was simply a function of the 
beliefs that the product whole would reinforce human values and the importance of 
those human values (these findings are subjected to a critique in an upcoming 
section). 
 
GUTMAN’S MEANS-END CHAIN THEORY  
 
 In his Theory of Means-end Chains, Gutman (1982, 1990) suggests that 
consumers associate product attributes with consequences that reinforce human 
values.  Consequences are the outcomes of interactions with product attributes and 
can occur immediately, after a period, may be experienced directly or vicariously, 
and may be physiological (e.g., satiation of hunger, etc.), psychological (e.g., self-
esteem, etc.) or social-psychological (status, social identity, etc.).  Through 
experience with product attributes, consumers develop knowledge of products 
comprising the product’s attributes, consequences, and ultimately, the human values 
the consequences help attain.  Thus, Gutman (1982) accepts Rokeach’s (1968, 1973) 
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and Feather’s (1975) claims, discussed in Chapter I, that human values are formed 
through the abstraction of positive and negative experiences with specific objects, 
and that the process of abstraction results in a hierarchical network between human 
values and evaluative beliefs about the object.  Moreover, once the human value 
preferences are formed, the values can then be generalised to new human values, 
consequences and attributes, resulting in the expansion of the hierarchical network at 
both the object and human value extremities.  Most simply, what Rokeach and 
Feather term an “abstraction and generalisation hierarchy” is what Gutman terms a 
“means-end chain”. 
 
 Means-end chains may be uncovered through a “Laddering” interview in which 
an interviewer asks the participants what attributes they use to discriminate among 
brands and why those attributes are important.  When a participant tells why an 
attribute is important, the interviewer would then ask him or her to elaborate, and 
upon the response the interviewer would ask the participant to elaborate again.  An 
example, taken from Reynolds and Gutman (1988), is that if the researcher were 
interested in how human values are associated with a beer’s attribute of “low 
alcohol”, the interviewer would begin by asking the participant why low alcohol is 
important, to which the participant might reply that it makes him or her feel less 
drowsy (a consequence).  The interviewer would then ask why not feeling drowsy is 
important, to which the participant might reply that it allows him or her to spend 
more quality time with friends and family (a human value).  The interview continues 
until the participant reaches the most basic and abstract level, which Gutman (1982) 
claims is usually a terminal value.  Walker and Olson (1991) suggest that the most 
abstract level along the means-end chain a consumer elaborates shows the degree of 
his or her psychological involvement in the product.  For instance, some participants 
stated that they liked a particular greeting card because it expressed their personality, 
whereas other participants stated they liked the greeting card because it allowed them 
to make the recipient happy.  Walker and Olson suggest that the former is a more 
abstract reason and thus those participants should have greater psychological 
investment in the product, though they did not substantiate that particular claim. 
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SCOTT AND LAMONT’S CENTRALITY OF BELIEFS APPROACH 
 
 Scott and Lamont’s Centrality of Beliefs Approach (e.g., Scott & Lamont, 1973; 
Vinson, Scott & Lamont, 1977) is founded in Rokeach’s (1968, 1973) claim in 
particular, but also Feather’s (1975), that human values and evaluative beliefs about 
objects are connected through a hierarchical network, and that as human values are 
more abstract and centrally-held they influence and organise lower-level elements.  
Scott and Lamont suggest that two types of lower-level evaluative beliefs of interest 
to consumer researchers are consumption values and attribute evaluations (e.g., 
attribute importances).  Consumption values are generalised preferences in the realm 
of economic transactions and consumption choices, that is, they are characteristics of 
products consumers favour across a wide range of goods and services.  For example, 
some people may want products that are practical whereas others may want ones 
with greater aesthetic qualities; some consumers may demand that retailers provide 
prompt service whereas others may be more concerned about the retailer’s location.  
Attribute importances differ from consumption values because attribute importances 
centre on a specific product; a consumer might insist that Brand A sports car have a 
high-speed engine, anti-lock brakes, chrome detailing, and so on.  
 
 Scott and Lamont (1973) suggest that as consumption values are more abstract 
and centrally-held than attribute importances, but less so than human values, the 
theoretical flow of influence is from human values to consumption values to attribute 
importances.  Though Scott and Lamont never tested the flow of influence, they did 
find that the three levels of abstraction are correlated.  For example, Scott and 
Lamont found that a preference for an automobile attribute of Style was correlated 
with the consumption value of An Exciting Product, which was correlated with the 
human values of A Comfortable Life, An Exciting Life and A Pleasurable Life. 
 
 Though in Scott and Lamont’s Centrality of Beliefs Approach human values are 
suggested to influence consumption values that in turn influence attribute 
importances, what Scott and Lamont do not adequately describe is how the system 
influences consumer behaviours generally or product preference specifically.  Scott 
and Lamont simply suggest that the attribute importance construct in their approach 
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is the same as that outlined in expectancy-value theory.  Therefore, the assumption 
could be made that if Scott and Lamont were consulted, they would concur that 
product preference is a joint function of attribute importances and attribute beliefs. 
 
THE BASIC FORM OF THE ATTRIBUTE-MEDIATION APPROACH  
 
 The aim of Part I of the present thesis is to examine the attribute-mediation 
approach to the influence of human values on consumer choices, and in the interest 
of that aim, Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s (1989) Multi-attribute Approach, 
Gutman’s (1982) Means-end Chain Theory and Scott and Lamont’s (1973) Centrality 
of Beliefs Approach should be integrated to create a single, basic formulation of the 
attribute-mediation approach.  The basic attribute-mediation approach should retain 
the essential rationale, but should eliminate those aspects for which the three 
variations of the attribute-mediation approach are inconsistent.  The similarities and 
differences among the three approaches are in two areas: their cognitive structure and 
the roles of beliefs.  In the course of reviewing the two areas, a basic formulation of 
the attribute-mediation approach is developed. 
 
 As Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s (1989) Multi-attribute Approach, 
Gutman’s (1982) Means-end Chain Theory and Scott and Lamont’s (1973) Centrality 
of Beliefs Approach are each founded in expectancy-value theory and the multi-
attribute model, each outlines a cognitive structure in what the influence of human 
values on product preference is mediated by product attributes: 
 
Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery (1989):  human value ⇒attribute 
importance ⇒ product preference 
 
Gutman (1982): human value ⇒ consequence ⇒ attribute importance ⇒ 
product preference 
 
Scott and Lamont (1973): human value ⇒ consumption value ⇒ attribute 
importance ⇒ product preference 
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Although the attribute importance construct is explicit in Scott and Lamont’s model, 
the construct is implicit in Gutman’s suggestion that through a process of 
generalisation human values assign importance to consequences that in turn assign 
importance to product attributes.  Thus, when human values are being generalised, 
attributes would have a priori importances.  Similarly, Lindberg, Garling and 
Montgomery suggest that attributes are evaluated on their ability to reinforce 
important human values and thus must have an a priori importance.  
 
 Considering that the attribute-mediation approaches share some overlap in the 
structures they propose, their principal differences are whether they specify a 
component that mediates the influence of human values on attribute importances, and 
if they do specify such a component, the form that the component takes.  Gutman 
suggests consequences mediate the linkage, Scott and Lamont argue for consumption 
values, and Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery do not specify any intervening 
construct.  Considering the inconsistency, adopting Lindberg, Garling and 
Montgomery’s position is prudent because it allows the greatest flexibility in 
integrating the various perspectives.  Specifying an intervening construct would 
commit the research to either Gutman’s or Scott and Lamont’s propositions, whilst 
not specifying an intervening variable would, at least theoretically, allow for the 
validity of any one or all of the approaches to manifest.  The exclusion of the 
intervening variables only presents a problem if the upcoming test of the attribute-
mediation approach results in a weak or non-existent relation between human values 
and attribute importance, as it would be ambiguous whether the result is due to 
human values mediating through some variable not measured (e.g., consumption 
values or consequences), or to human values having no place in the development of 
attribute importances.  Nevertheless, human values and attribute importances are 
expected to have sufficient common variation as both are abstract criteria, are 
semantically similar, are formed through similar abstraction and generalisation 
processes, and so on. 
 
 Aside from the existence and form of the intervening variable between human 
values and attribute importances, Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery, Gutman, and 
Scott and Lamont generally outline similar cognitive structures through which 
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human values operate to influence product preference.  Furthermore, the approaches 
also offer a similar rationale for why super-ordinate levels in their models influence 
and organise lower ones, namely, the belief-importance combination.  In Lindberg, 
Garling and Montgomery’s Multi-attribute Approach the belief-importance rationale 
is employed in their main hypothesis (Formula #1) that product preference depends 
on the beliefs that the products’ attributes will lead to the reinforcement of human 
values and the importance of those human values.  Similarly, in Gutman’s Means-end 
Chain Theory consumers are suggested to associate product attributes with 
consequences that reinforce human values.  Thus, consumer knowledge comprises 
which attributes lead to which consequences and which consequences lead to the 
realisation of human values, and therefore each component in the means-end chain is 
mediated by beliefs.   
 
 In Scott and Lamont’s Centrality of Beliefs Approach, the belief-importance 
rationale appears to be used to explain the attribute importance ⇒ product preference 
relation, given that Scott and Lamont claim that “attribute importance” is the 
construct employed in expectancy-value theory (in which product preference is 
suggested to result from the combining of attribute importances and attribute beliefs).  
However, Scott and Lamont do not use the belief-importance rationale for the other 
relations in their model, and instead simply state that human value importances 
influence consumption value importances which in turn influence attribute 
importances.  Nevertheless, as the reduction of the attribute-mediation approaches to 
their basic form is of interest, adopting Scott and Lamont’s exclusion of the belief 
component is sensible.  To incorporate a belief component in the current model 
would require the acceptance of a particular attribute-mediation approach either by 
forcing the inclusion of a specific construct such as Gutman’s consequences (e.g., the 
belief that attributes engender consequences that are important to human values) or 
from the manner in which beliefs link human values and attribute importances (such 
as Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s claim that attribute importances are formed 
from the beliefs that they reinforce important human values). Testing the core or 
most basic attribute-mediation approach is therefore not possible if the belief 
component is included. 
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 The exclusion of the belief component should not substantially affect the test of 
the attribute-mediation approach for two reasons.  Firstly, past research has excluded 
the belief component with satisfactory results.  Scott and Lamont’s test showed that 
human values, consumption values, and attribute importances are correlated, and 
Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s test of Formula #3 only included the evaluative 
component (attribute importances) and still yielded a significant prediction of 
housing class preference.  Thus, even among the current approaches precedence 
exists for excluding the belief component.  The second reason the exclusion of the 
belief component should not substantially affect the attribute-mediation test is that 
the belief component can (generally) be inferred if the evaluative component 
significantly predicts product preference that is indexed as product purchase and 
ownership.  The assumption that product owners have beliefs and knowledge about 
what attributes their possessions contain or what values the possessions reinforce is 
reasonable.  Even among non-owners, product knowledge may be less extensive but 
still satisfactory if the products are commonly available and in the public arena.  
Thus, in the eventuality that attribute importances and human values are good, 
sample-wide predictors of product purchase and ownership, the prediction would 
suggest that respondents act upon a common perception and beliefs about which 
products are consistent with their attribute importances or human values.  If attribute 
importances and human values are poor predictors of product purchase and 
ownership, at the very least, not measuring beliefs will create some ambiguity about 
whether the low prediction was a result of consumers not applying their human 
values and attribute importances, or alternatively a result of consumers having 
insufficient beliefs and knowledge to select the product that matches their attribute 
importances and human values.  Such ambiguity is acceptable for the current 
purpose. 
 
SUMMARY, MODIFICATIONS TO PROPOSAL, AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 To summarise, the review and integration of Lindberg, Garling and 
Montgomery’s (1989) Multi-attribute Approach, Gutman’s (1982) Means-end Chain 
Theory, and Scott and Lamont’s (1973) Centrality of Beliefs Approach observed how 
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each of the theorists outlined similar cognitive structures through which human 
values operate to influence product preference and offered similar rationale for how 
super-ordinate levels in their models influenced lower ones, namely, a belief-
importance combination.  Nevertheless, essential differences among the attribute-
mediation approaches were the roles of beliefs and the intervening variable between 
human values and attribute importances, and due to these differences the most basic 
attribute-mediation approach is:  
 
human values  ⇒  attribute importances  ⇒  product preference 
 
 Thus, the aim of Part I of the present thesis is to test the basic attribute-mediation 
approach.  Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s (1989), Gutman’s (1982), and Scott 
and Lamont’s (1973) expansion of expectancy-value theory into the realm of human 
values engenders some confidence in the basic attribute-mediation approach, but the 
foundation in expectancy-value theory is also a reason for scepticism.  Critics have 
asserted that expectancy-value theory is restricted in the degree and kind of product 
preference it can account for, and therefore the attribute-mediation approach may be 
similarly limited.  The expectancy-value theory criticism is reviewed in depth, 
followed by the criticism’s implications for the attribute-mediation approach. 
 
 The main criticism of expectancy-value theory is that it cannot explain that 
portion of product preference consumers derive from an evaluation of the product’s 
intangible attributes (e.g., Holbrook & Moore, 1981; Keaveney & Hunt, 1992; 
McCracken, 1988).  Attributes that are subjectively imbued onto the product by 
consumers, rather than “arising” from the product via the five senses, are 
“intangible” (e.g., Hirschman, 1980).  Intangible attributes, such as symbolic 
meanings and aesthetics, can play a vital role in the evaluations of a wide range of 
goods; from clothing, to soft drinks, to furniture, and so on.  Holbrook and Moore 
(1981), Keaveney and Hunt (1992), and McCracken (1988) suggest that expectancy-
value theory is inappropriate for intangible attributes because the theory assumes 
consumers evaluate products attribute-by-attribute, when with intangible attributes, 
consumers probably evaluate products in a Gestalt-like, holistic fashion.  
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Expectancy-value theory is more appropriate for tangible attributes because 
consumers probably do evaluate tangible attributes one at a time.  For example, the 
tangible attributes of a vacuum cleaner are the power of the motor, durability of 
construction, and proximity to the carpet, and although the precise combination rule 
may vary, the separate evaluations of these attributes contribute to the assessment of 
the product's ability to clean.  For intangible attributes, however, the product is likely 
to be evaluated in a Gestalt-like, holistic judgement because intangible attributes are 
tied to a specific configuration of tangible attributes, resulting in the instantaneous 
evaluation of the product.  Thus, paradoxically, whilst tangible attributes must exist, 
they do not separately contribute to product preference formed from intangible 
attributes.   
 
 To make the distinction between the two types of attributes and their judgements 
clearer, consider Fiske and Pavelchak’s (1986) discrimination between a “piecemeal 
affective response” and a “category-based affective response”.  A piecemeal affective 
response is the expectancy-value type of judgement that proceeds attribute-by-
attribute to evaluate a stimulus in a logical, systematic and comprehensive fashion, 
with the overall attitude towards the stimulus the result of the algebraic combination 
of the affect associated with each attribute.  However, a category-based affective 
response is a Gestalt-like, holistic judgement in which the stimulus is compared with 
an exemplar and in the case that the two match, the affect associated with the 
exemplar category schema is automatically transferred to the stimulus.  Thus, the 
stimulus must have a particular configuration of attributes for its exemplar or 
prototype to be recognised and classified, but the affect of the attributes does not 
contribute to the overall evaluation.  
 
 For a product stimulus example, consider an automobile consumer who might 
prefer a car with the intangible attribute “youthful image” if the car is a sports coupe 
but if the car is a sedan then he or she prefers the intangible attribute “sophisticated 
image”.  Thus, to instruct the consumer to rate his or her preference for the intangible 
attributes (e.g., a youthful image, a sophisticated image) is meaningless unless the 
researcher specifies the level of the tangible attribute (e.g., coupe or sedan).  When 
one considers that other intangible attributes (e.g., prestige, etc.) are also tied to 
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specific tangible attributes (e.g., an attractive paint job, no rust, leather interior, large 
body size, chrome grill, etc.), the only way a multi-attribute model could legitimately 
include both tangible and intangible attributes is if it contains a replica of the 
attributes of an actual and specific product.  To do so, however, shifts the 
investigation from the attribute-level to the product-whole level and thus violates the 
assumption in expectancy-value theory that consumers evaluate each attribute 
independently and that these independent evaluations combine to determine overall 
product preference.  
 
 Therefore, the essence of Keaveney and Hunt’s (1992), Holbrook and Moore’s 
(1981) and McCracken’s (1988) criticism of expectancy-value theory is three-fold:  
  
1. Expectancy-value theory and the multi-attribute model should generally be 
restricted to tangible attributes because intangible attributes will usually not 
meet the assumption in expectancy-value theory that attributes are evaluated 
independently. 
  
2. Intangible attributes are “located” on a particular configuration of tangible 
attributes, which is termed the “product-whole level” such as the product’s 
brand, class or category. 
 
3. Although intangible attributes are found on the agglomeration of tangible 
attributes, intangible attributes are still more than the sum of tangible ones.  
Consequently, that portion of product preference which consumers derive 
from an evaluation of the intangible attributes of the product cannot be 
determined from measuring consumer preferences for tangible attributes of 
the product.  Consumer preferences for intangible attributes must also be 
measured (but not through expectancy-value theory or the multi-attribute 
model given point #1). 
 
 The implication of the criticism of expectancy-value theory for the attribute-
mediation approach is that the role of tangible attributes in mediating the influence of 
human values on product preference can be modelled through the attribute-mediation 
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approach, but intangible attributes cannot and therefore should be excluded.  Thus, 
Gutman (1982), Scott and Lamont (1973) and Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery 
(1989) should be criticised for not recognising the limitation of expectancy-value 
theory and for failing to exclude intangible attributes from their models and 
investigations.  However, such a failure may not damage the validity of their 
approach because human values may always mediate through tangible attributes, 
perhaps because intangible attributes are carried on the agglomeration of tangible 
ones.  Contrary to that possibility, however, the current thesis accepts Keaveney and 
Hunt’s (1992), Holbrook and Moore’s (1981) and McCracken’s (1988) reasoning that 
although intangible attributes are found on the agglomeration of tangible attributes, 
intangible attributes are still more than the sum of tangible ones.  Therefore, the 
distinction between tangible and intangible attributes should be of consequence to 
the influence of human values, with human values mediating through both kinds of 
attributes to influence product preference.  
 
 One reason for cautious acceptance, besides the reasonableness that tangible and 
intangible attributes function in different ways, is that one of the attribute-mediation 
approaches provides evidence for it.  The readers would recall that Lindberg, Garling 
and Montgomery (1989) tested three alternative relationships among human values, 
attribute importances and product preference; firstly, that human values underlie each 
attribute importance and these linkages combine additively with other value-attribute 
linkages to form product preference; secondly, that human values do underlie 
attribute importance but not linearly nor additively and therefore human values were 
presumed to influence product preference at a holistic level, such as brand, class or 
category; and thirdly, that human values do not underlie attribute importance and 
instead product preference is formed entirely from attribute importances.  In a test of 
the three alternatives, Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery (1989) found that the 
second option -- human values underlie product preference but do not combine 
additively with attribute importances to form that preference -- provided the best 
predictor of residential housing preference.  Importantly, Lindberg, Garling and 
Montgomery (1989) included both tangible and intangible attributes in their analysis 
(e.g., Size of House is tangible and intrinsic whereas Reputation of Neighbourhood is 
not) and therefore violated the assumption in expectancy-value theory that each 
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attribute is evaluated independently.  Their finding that human values influence at the 
product whole-level but not the attribute-level is supportive of the claim, though not 
definitively, that intangible attributes are found on the product whole and are more 
than the sum of tangible attributes. 
 
 If intangible attributes are genuinely more than the sum of tangible attributes and 
both types mediate the influence of human values on product preference, then the 
attribute-mediation approach, properly limited to tangible attributes to meet the 
assumption of independence, would probably never fully account for the influence of 
human values on product preference.  Realistically, any single approach cannot fully 
account for all variation, but because the proponents of the attribute-mediation 
approach did not specify any other route of human value influence other than 
through their expectancy-value constructs, the issue of whether their approach can 
fully account for value influence is important.  The first hypothesis is that;  
 
 H1: The attribute-mediation approach, properly limited to tangible 
attributes, cannot fully account for the influence of human values on 
product preference.  
 
 If the attribute-mediation approach cannot fully account for the influence of 
human values then obviously human values must operate through another route.  If 
the alternative route is through the consumers’ evaluations of the product’s intangible 
attributes for which tangible attributes are not able to account for, then the strength 
of the alternative route would increase as intangible attributes become more 
important to consumers’ evaluations of the product.  Thus, the second hypothesis is 
that; 
 
 H2: The inability of tangible attributes to mediate the influence of human 
values on product preference increases as intangible attributes become more 
important to consumers’ evaluation of the product. 
 
 Support for both hypotheses would provide reasonable evidence of the divergent 
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roles tangible and intangible attributes play in mediating the influence of human 
values on product preference and, more generally, of the necessity for developing an 
alternative or supplementary approach that can account for the influence of human 
values on consumer evaluations of both kinds of attributes. 
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CHAPTER III.  STUDY 1: EXAMINATION OF THE ATTRIBUTE-
MEDIATION APPROACH HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
 Study 1 examines the hypotheses; 
 
H1: The attribute-mediation approach, properly limited to tangible 
attributes, cannot fully account for the influence of human values on 
product preference.  
 
H2: The inability of tangible attributes to mediate the influence of human 
values on product preference increases as intangible attributes become more 
important to consumers’ evaluation of the product. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Design 
 
 Though an experimental design is advantageous in its ability to establish causal 
relationships, a survey design was selected due to its naturalism and capacity to 
canvass a broad range of phenomena.  An experiment that isolates and manipulates 
all possible combinations of human values, tangible attribute importances and 
product preferences would be impractical.  Manipulating human values alone is 
problematic for reasons that will be discussed at length in a later chapter. 
 
 The hypotheses are examined at the level of the product, that is, whether the 
attribute-mediation approach has more success accounting for the influence of 
human values on preferences for those products that are generally evaluated on their 
tangible attributes than for those products generally evaluated on their intangible 
attributes.  Instead of a product-level analysis, the hypotheses could be examined at 
the level of the individual consumer by assessing whether the attribute-mediation 
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approach has more success accounting for the influence of human values on product 
preferences for individuals who prefer the product’s tangible attributes than those 
individuals who prefer the product’s intangible ones.  Thus, an individual-level 
analysis would directly assess the role of both types of attributes, but given that 
tangible attributes are the focus of the current study, a product-level analysis was 
chosen.  The product-level analysis, of course, requires that the examination of the 
attribute-mediation approach hypotheses is carried out across several products for 
which a reasonable assumption can be made about whether most consumers evaluate 
the products on their tangible or intangible attributes.  The process of selecting such 
products is reported once the other needed product characteristics are outlined. 
 
 Besides the requirement that the examination of the attribute-mediation approach 
be made across several products for which a reasonable assumption can be made 
about whether each is generally evaluated on its tangible or intangible attributes, 
using products that are commonly available and familiar to consumers is preferred.  
As the conceptual model only comprises evaluative components (human values and 
tangible attribute importances) ambiguity could arise if they prove to be poor 
predictors of product preference; the low predictive power could suggest that 
consumers do not apply their tangible attribute importances and human values, or 
alternatively, that consumers have insufficient beliefs and knowledge to select the 
product that matches their evaluations.  To ensure that the latter is not viable 
possibility, the products selected for examining the attribute-mediation approach 
should be ones that respondents are likely to own and that heavily saturate the 
marketplace, which can be accomplished by taking three indicators of product 
saturation and ownership into account.  Firstly, a rough count was made of the 
frequency that various product categories were advertised in major New Zealand 
newspapers (Herald, Sunday Star Times), magazines (Woman’s Weekly, North and 
South, Next, Metro, More) and on television (TV2 and 3).  The frequencies were 
obtained over a two-week period for television and newspapers and approximately 
one issue of the magazines.  Amongst the most frequently advertised products were 
cars, beverages (beer, other alcohol, mineral water, etc.), pet food, overseas holiday 
destinations and apparel (trousers, shoes, etc.).  The second source of information 
about product saturation and ownership was the Consumer Expenditure Statistics 
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(1994), which showed the product areas accounting for the largest share of retail 
sales in New Zealand were automotive, food and drink and hardware, and that the 
most frequently manufactured products were dairy foods, woollen products, and 
women’s garments.  The third indicator of product saturation and ownership were 
texts that detailed the pivotal role some products or services play in the New Zealand 
way of life (e.g., Mitchell, 1972; Morton, 1975; Smyth, 1973).   
 
 From these indicators of product saturation and ownership, three products were 
selected to examine the hypotheses of the attribute-mediation approach.  These three 
products are in the public view, are commonly owned, and a reasonable assumption 
can be made about whether each is generally evaluated on its tangible or intangible 
attributes.  Moreover, as a heterogeneous product set would provide a more 
comprehensive and rigorous test, the three products selected also vary along other 
dimensions such as good versus service, major versus routine purchase, and durable 
versus non-durable.  The three products are automobiles, overseas holiday 
destinations and types of meat. 
 
Automobiles 
 
 Automobiles have a high rate of ownership, accounted for a large share of retail 
sales in New Zealand, and in the count of advertisements in newspapers, magazines 
and on television, automobiles were among the most frequently advertised.  
Moreover, automobiles seem to be what Keaveney and Hunt (1992) and Shavitt, 
Lowrey and Han (1992) suggest are high-risk choices that lead to effortful, careful 
and piecemeal evaluations of tangible product features.  Moreover, Sirgy and Johar 
(1985) found that automobiles tend to be evaluated foremost on tangible features and 
cost then secondarily on their intangible / image attributes (although some 
differences between automobile classes were found).  Overall, however, automobiles 
should provide a good exemplar of a product that is generally evaluated foremost on 
tangible attributes and secondarily on intangible attributes.  
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Overseas HolidayingHolidayingHolidayingHolidaying 
 
 Overseas holiday destinations were among the most frequently advertised in 
major newspapers, magazines and on television, and overseas holidaying is 
culturally important.  For instance, in Half-gallon, Quarter-acre, Pavlova Paradise, 
Mitchell (1972) takes a humorous look at New Zealanders noting, “Three million 
people can’t cultivate their garden without the occasional peek over the fence at the 
three thousand million jostling outside.  Being small makes Kiwis insecure and gives 
them a unique love-hate relationship with Overseasia.  They can’t give it up.  They 
are not sure it’s good for them” (pg. 161).  The importance of overseas holidaying to 
New Zealanders is also evidenced in the 1990 census, which shows approximately 
15% of the adult population travelled overseas in the previous year.  Holidaying is a 
hedonic product that Hirschman (1980) suggests are characterised by emotional 
desires, the imaginative construction of reality, and consumers imbuing the product 
or service with subjective meaning and intangible attributes that supplement the 
tangible attributes.  Thus, the imbuing of intangible attributes onto tangible attributes 
suggests that overseas holiday destinations should provide a good exemplar of a 
product that is generally evaluated on an even mixture of both tangible and 
intangible attributes. 
 
 In the interest of manageability, the overseas holidaying investigated was limited 
to Australasia (e.g., Australia, Papua New Guinea) and Oceania (e.g., Melanesia, 
Micronesia, Polynesia). 
 
Meat ProductsProductsProductsProducts 
 
 Finally, grocery food purchases, specifically meat products, was selected as a 
routine, non-durable product, which Katz (1960) suggests that operant conditioning 
during early socialisation lead to predominately affective (e.g., category-based) 
judgements.  Although many foods are probably judged holistically, meat products 
were selected in particular because of their central place in the meal (Douglas, 1975; 
Fiddes, 1991; Twigg, 1983).  In Deciphering a Meal, Twigg (1983) argues “Meat is 
the most highly prised of food.  It is the centre of around which a meal is arranged.  
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It stands in a sense of the very idea of food itself” (p. 22).  Similarly, Fiddes (1991) 
observes that meat is so primary that its lack is described as a ‘meat hunger’ but not 
in the physiological sense, but rather as a food habit that “is a feature of society and 
is integrated into a structure of social values that may have nothing to do with the 
principles of nutrition” (p. 14; original quote from Le Gros Clark, 1968, p.69).  Thus, 
the centrality in the social structure and the de-emphasis of tangible attributes such as 
nutritional qualities suggests that meat products would provide a good exemplar of a 
product that is evaluated foremost on intangible attributes and secondarily on 
tangible attributes.  
 
 Although the selection of the three products, automobiles, overseas holidaying 
and meat types, was based on the best available theoretical and empirical research on 
the attribute composition of each product, the relative importance of each product’s 
tangible and intangible attributes will not be independently verified.  Thus, the 
attribute composition of each product is merely an assumption and commensurate 
caution is warranted when interpreting the results of the examination of the attribute-
mediation approach (the point is re-addressed in the discussion).  With that limitation 
made clear, automobiles are probably evaluated foremost on their tangible attributes, 
overseas holiday destinations on an even mixture of their tangible and intangible 
attributes, and meat products on predominantly their intangible attributes, and so H2 
can be elaborated as;  
 
H2: The inability of tangible attributes to mediate the influence of human 
values on product preference increases as intangible attributes become more 
important to consumers’ evaluation of the product.  Consequently, the 
attribute-mediation approach should have the most success accounting for 
the influence of human values on preferences for automobiles, should have a 
moderate success accounting for the influence of human values on overseas 
holidaying, and the least success accounting for the influence of human 
values on meat consumption. 
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Respondents 
 
 As mentioned in the design section, examining the hypotheses in a naturalistic 
setting with the broadest range of phenomena possible is preferable, and for the same 
reason, a general population sample was chosen to a student sample.  The survey was 
hand delivered to 1900 household post boxes in the medium-sized metropolitan 
region Wellington, New Zealand (the survey instrument is described in detail in the 
next section).  Care was taken to ensure that the households were evenly dispersed 
among urban, near and far suburbs and the full range from individual to family 
dwellings.  Targeted areas included Karori, Mt. Victoria, Central Wellington, 
Kelburn, Island Bay, Newtown, Johnsonville, Hatatai, Seatoun, Paraparaumu Beach 
and Waikanau Beach.  The survey envelope was addressed to “Adult Member of 
Household”, and three weeks were allowed to return the questionnaire in the pre-paid 
envelope.  Recipients unwilling or unable to participate were urged to pass the 
survey along to another adult household member.  Respondents were informed their 
participation was voluntary, that their responses were anonymous and would not be 
used for any other purpose, and that if they had any queries or wished a summary of 
the results to ring me. 
 
 Three hundred eighty-one (20%) were returned, of which 41 were not used due 
to respondents failing to answer all the questions or completing some sections 
incorrectly.  Though the relatively low rate could suggest a non-response bias, the 
demographic characteristics of the sample are variable and are similar to census 
records (see Table 2 on page 61) (Hereafter, referred to as Sample No. 1).  Overall, 
the sample is generally representative in age and most ethnic groups, but under-
representative of Pacific Islanders and males and over-representative of females.  
The sample also appears above average in education though the precise extent is 
unclear because the census education categories differ from those used in the current 
study.  Despite the sample’s similarity to census records, the low response rate does 
suggest caution at generalisation.  Approximately 50 respondents requested a 
summary of results posted approximately three months after the completion of the 
survey. 
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Survey 
 
 The survey measured human values, tangible attribute importances and 
purchases of automobiles, overseas holidays and meat products (see Appendix One 
beginning on page 307 for copy of cover letter and survey).  The survey also 
contained sections not used in the current analysis: respondent accounts of their meat 
consumption, meat eating identity and consumption values.  Readers would recall 
that consumption values are the construct Scott and Lamont (1973) suggest mediate 
the influence of human values on attribute importances, but as such a go-between is 
not specified in the other attribute-mediation approaches consumption values were 
dropped from consideration subsequent to the printing of the surveys. 
 
Human Values 
 
 Human values were measured with the Rokeach Value Survey, which consists of 
18 instrumental and 18 terminal values.  The 36 human values were supplemented 
with four additional values: Social Justice, Equity, Social Power and Self-
determination (definitions supplied by Ng et al., 1982).  Concerning the response 
format, Rokeach (1968) originally instructed respondents to first rank the 
instrumental values and then the terminal values.  The ranking procedure is 
advantageous because it reduces response sets and assures wide within-subject 
variably, but it has limited psycho-metric capabilities and is time consuming and 
taxing for the respondent.  Several other methods have been proposed and tested 
including rating (Braithwaite & Law, 1985; Ng, 1982; Rankin & Grube, 1980) and 
paired-comparisons (Feather, 1973) which generated roughly equivalent value 
system profiles as ranking.  However, whether these alternative formats ensure 
satisfactory within-subject variability is unclear.  Wide individual variably is crucial, 
as the aim of the current study is to assess the ability of human values to predict 
specific events such as product purchase and ownership. 
 
 Due to the above concerns about rating and ranking procedures pilot studies 
were conducted for an Allen (1993) study that compared a standard 1-10, "Least 
Important" to "Most Important", scale and a forced-distribution format in which 
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respondents named the thirteen most important values then the thirteen least 
important.  Those marked as most important were coded as a 3, those as least 
important were coded as a 1, and those not marked were given a 2.  Instrumental and 
terminal values were inter-mixed in the same alphabetically ordered list because 
previous research has been unable to substantiate their independence (see Crosby, 
Bitner & Gill, 1990; Heath & Fogel, 1978).  The list of human values was also 
counter-balanced with half the respondents receiving an alphabetical list in 
ascending order and the other half received an alphabetical list in descending order.  
The responses were subjected to factor analysis (principal components extraction 
with no rotation) that produced a small first factor in the forced-distribution method 
and a large first factor in the standard rating method.  The finding suggested (but not 
definitively) that the standard rating method suffers from greater response set or 
social desirability biases, and so the forced-distribution method was selected for the 
Allen (1993) study and the current one. 
 
 For the current study, respondents who did not complete the forced-distribution 
procedure correctly were discarded (less that 2% of the sample).  The means and 
standard deviations of human values are reported in Table 3 (on page 62), which 
shows that Honesty, Self-respect, True Friendship and Family Security were the most 
important whereas Obedience, Salvation and Social Power were the least important.  
The human value preferences seem to emphasise a self-originating guidance of 
behaviour (i.e., Honesty, Self-respect), recognise the importance of social 
relationships (True Friendship, Family Security) and resist authoritarianism 
(Obedience) and other forms of social power.  The resistance of traditional authority 
was also found in Gold and Webster’s (1990) study human, economic and political 
values in New Zealand. 
 
 As 40 human values would be unmanageable in the examination of the attribute-
mediation approach hypotheses, the human values were grouped through factor 
analysis.  The factor analysis met four criteria that ensure a stable factor structure: a 
minimum sample size of 100 to 200 (Comrey, 1978), a minimum ratio of participants 
to variables of between 2:1 and 10:1 (Gorsuch, 1983; Nunnally, 1978), a minimum 
ratio of participants to factors 2:1 (Cattell, 1978) and a minimum ratio of variables to 
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factors of 6:1 (Cattell, 1978).  The factoring of the 40 human value items with an 
Eigenvalue 1.0 cut-off resulted in 13 factors accounting for 56% of the variance (see 
Table 4 on page 63).  A maximum number of factors were selected (to the Eigenvalue 
1.0 cut-off) so that a topmost amount of human value variance is available for use in 
the prediction of tangible attribute importances and product preference.  Moreover, 
Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1992) suggest that an Eigenvalue 1.0 cut-off is 
appropriate when the number of variables is between 20-50, as in the current 
analysis.  A principal components extraction was selected and the solution not rotated 
because the purpose of the analysis is not to decipher the underlying structure but 
simply to reduce the number of items for testing the attribute-mediation approach 
hypotheses.  For the same reason, the current factors are not interpreted unless 
necessary at a later stage.  However, the dimensionality of human values for the 
current sample is fully explored and discussed in Allen (1994) which uses multi-
dimensional scaling to reduce the items to a small, yet still meaningful, number of 
dimensions. 
 
Tangible Attribute Importances and Product PreferencesAttribute Importances and 
Product PreferenceAttribute Importances and Product PreferenceAttribute 
Importances and Product Preference 
 
 Using a 10-point scale anchored by 'Not At All Important' (1) and 'Very 
Important' (10) respondents rated the importance of automobile, holiday destination 
and meat tangible attributes.  Unlike human values, sufficient within-subject 
variability was expected and so a forced-distribution response format was not 
necessary.  Concerning the number of tangible attributes for respondents to rate in 
importance, Fishbein (1967) suggests individuals can only consider between 6 and 
11 object attributes.  However, the current study uses the attributes to cover entire 
product categories, not just specific brands or classes, and thus a larger number of 
items (between 20 and 24) were considered essential.  An attempt was made to 
ensure that the attributes were tangible and intrinsic to the product, although 
occasionally the tangibility and objectivity of the attributes are ambiguous.  Some 
holiday destination attributes in particular are ambiguous because of the experiential 
aspect of the enterprise.  Nevertheless, along the tangible-intangible or objective-
subjective dimensions all of the selected attributes should be closer to the former 
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poles than the latter. 
 
 As mentioned, the use of a survey design and a general population sample are in 
the interests of naturalism and investigating the broadest range of phenomena 
possible.  In the same interests, product preference was indexed as actual product 
purchase and ownership.  Actual product purchase and ownership are more 
naturalistic than simple product attitude or liking, and are more stringent in that 
consumers must commit their resources such as money, time to purchase, and so on.  
However, many other factors contribute to product purchase other than human values 
or tangible attribute importances (e.g., financial ability, family considerations, and so 
on), and previous purchase does not necessarily imply current preference.  The latter 
limitation is addressed by focussing on each respondent’s multiple, and recent 
purchases of products within the same class or category. 
 
 Having reviewed the general framework of the tangible attribute importance and 
product preference measures, the procedures for selecting the automobile, overseas 
holiday destination, and meat product tangible attribute importances and product 
preference measures are reported in depth. 
 
Automobiles 
 
 The automobile attributes were gathered from Allen’s (1993) investigation that 
obtained the items from several sources: a pilot study in which American respondents 
described the characteristics of their favourite car, Vinson, Scott and Lamont’s 
(1977) test of the human values ™ consumption values ™ automobile attribute 
importances relationship (the best discriminators between cultural groups were 
selected), from Horsky and Nelson’s (1992) study of a new automobile brand’s 
positioning, and from Lim, Olshavsky and Kim’s (1988) study of the impact of 
inferences on automobile attribute evaluation. 
 
 For the present study, automobile attributes that were not intrinsic and tangible 
were discarded and new attributes added as a result of four informal conversations in 
which participants described the features they seek in an automobile.  The informal 
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conversations also aided modification of the remaining attributes for a New Zealand 
context.  The final automobile tangible attribute importances and their origin are 
listed in Table 5 (on page 64) and the mean importance to the current sample in Table 
6 (on page 65).  As might be anticipated the most important tangible attributes are 
safety and quality related (e.g., Safety, Reliability, and Few Repairs Needed), 
whereas the least important are Large Body Size and Air Conditioning / Cooling.  In 
the interest of manageability, automobile tangible attribute importances were 
grouped through factor analysis (principal components extraction with no rotation) 
that with an Eigenvalue 1.0 cut-off maximised the number of factors; 5 accounted for 
58% of the variance (see Table 6 on page 65).  The analysis meets four criteria that 
help to ensure a stable factor structure: a minimum sample size of 100 to 200, a 
minimum ratio of participants to variables of between 2:1 and 10:1, a minimum ratio 
of participants to factors 2:1 and a minimum ratio of variables to factors of 6:1.  As 
with the human value factor analysis, the content of these factors will not be 
interpreted unless necessary at a later stage. 
 
 As an indicator of automobile preference, respondents listed the make and model 
of their current automobile and up to two previously owned automobiles.  The 
automobiles were then grouped into five classes using the schemes developed by 
New Car Buyers Guide (1991), Which? Car Buying Guide (1985) and Which? Car 
Buying Guide (1989).  When an automobile was not listed in those schemes, the 
cubic capacity of the engine and the overall body length separated Smaller Family 
Cars (cubic capacity ≤ 1600, length ≤ 168 inches) from Larger Family Cars.  Other 
automobiles not listed in those schemes were categorised after visual examination in 
reference sources such as Automobile Association (1975) and Consumer Guide 
(1990, 1992) or the telephone consultation with automotive dealers.  The final five 
classes are (see Appendix Two beginning on page 318 for full a coding scheme): 
 
 SMALLER FAMILY CARS -- e.g., Austin Mini, Peugeot 205, Ford Laser 
 LARGER FAMILY CARS -- e.g., Mitsubishi Tredia, Honda Accord, Holden 
  Commodore 
 LUXURY CARS -- e.g., Saab 900, Citroen BX, Holden Calais 
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 SPORTS CARS -- e.g., Toyota Celica, MGB GT, Honda Integra 
 UTILITY AND MINIVANS -- e.g., Isuzu Trooper, Holden Ute, Mitsubishi 
  Spacewagon 
 
 Respondents’ automobile preferences were scored as the percentage of cars they 
owned in each class out of the total number of cars they owned.  For example, if an 
individual owned an Austin Mini, MGB GT, and Honda Integra, their SMALLER 
FAMILY CARS score  (Austin Mini) would be .33, their SPORTS CARS score 
(MGB GT, Honda Integra) would be .66, and all other car classes would be zero.  
The cars were scored in that manner to shift the focus from general car ownership to 
an individual's preferred car class.  
 
 The exclusion of those respondents who did not own an automobile reduced the 
sample size by one-third, from 340 to 280.  Of the remaining 280 respondents, the 
average number of cars owned of 2.4 (SD=1.02) from which the average proportion 
of Smaller Family Cars was .46 (SD=.38), Larger Family Cars .27 (SD=.33), Luxury 
Cars .10 (SD=.22), Sports Cars .06 (SD=.18), Utility and Mini-vans .03 (SD=.11), 
and Miscellaneous / Unclassifiable .08 (SD=.28).  Sports Cars and Utility and 
Minivans are skewed beyond repair by transformation (taking the square root) and 
consequently only Smaller Family Cars, Larger Family Cars and Luxury Cars will 
remain in the analysis.  
 
Holiday Destinations 
 
 Holiday destination tangible attributes were gathered from several sources: 
Kaciak and Louviere’s (1990) correspondence analysis of vacation destination 
choices and attributes, Wahlers and Etzel’s (1985) study of stimulation seeking 
which found that vacation attribute importances are influenced by the relative 
difference between optimal stimulation and daily level of stimulation, and Taylor’s 
(1989) study of the United States travel market.  Attributes were also accumulated 
from holiday brochures of Australasian and Oceania destinations, and from four 
informal conversations in which participants described the characteristics they seek 
in a holiday destination.   
 53
 
 The pool of attributes gathered from the above sources (more than 50) was 
reduced according to three criteria.  Firstly, all the attributes were ranked by 
frequency of occurrence across the sources and those most prevalent were considered 
the most eligible (a low frequency of occurrence did not automatically result in its 
deletion but simply a reconsideration).  Secondly, as visiting Australasian and 
Oceanic holiday destinations will become the product preference measure, attributes 
were selected based on their ability to describe those destinations.  To remain in 
consideration, the attribute must have described at least one destination, and 
conversely, each destination must have had several attributes from which it could be 
described.  The assessment of the degree of fit between the attribute and the 
destination was intuitively judged from the descriptions provided in the destination 
brochures.  For example, attributes such as Exciting Night Life, and Sophisticated 
Restaurants could describe Sydney or Melbourne, whereas Rugged and Tramping 
could describe Tasmania.  The holiday destinations the attributes were intuitively 
judged to describe were those in the Australasia and Oceania region most frequently 
visited by New Zealanders (according to the 1990 census).  The destinations were: 
Gold Coast, Bali, Norfolk Island, Northern Territory, Sydney, Fiji, Melbourne, 
Rarotonga, and Vanuatu.  The final criterion that each attribute must have met is that 
it fall on the former poles of the tangible-intangible and objective-subjective 
dimensions. 
 
 Pilot study.  The application of the above selection criteria reduced the initial 
pool of more than 50 attributes to 37, but before using the attributes in the main 
survey a pilot study examined their intelligibility and redundancy.  The forty-four 
participants who completed the pilot survey were recruited in libraries, shopping 
centres and other public areas around Wellington.  The demographic composition of 
the respondents reflected the manner of recruitment, that is, the sample was 
heterogeneous in age, gender, socio-economic status and so on.  Participants rated 
the importance of the 37 holiday destination tangible attributes, and were encouraged 
to comment on the items’ intelligibility.  Those items criticised as unintelligible were 
revised, and a correlational analysis suggested which items should be combined due 
to their excessively high correlation.  
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 Besides examining the intelligibility and redundancy of the holiday destination 
tangible attributes, the pilot study also empirically assessed the attributes’ ability to 
describe the holiday destinations.  Though the selection of the pilot items entailed an 
intuitive judgement of how well they described the holiday destinations, an empirical 
procedure was employed to make a more objective assessment.  The empirical 
procedure comprised two-steps.  Firstly, for each of the 37 attributes, respondents in 
the pilot study selected from a list of nine holiday destinations the two destinations 
they felt were best described by the attribute.  For example, for the attribute “Safe” 
respondents were to suggest which two destinations (a first and second choice) they 
felt were "safest".  The nine destinations, Gold Coast, Bali, Norfolk Island, Northern 
Territory, Sydney, Fiji, Melbourne, Rarotonga, and Vanuatu, were chosen both for 
their representativeness of the kinds of destinations available in the Australasia and 
Oceania region and their popularity (according to the 1990 census).  In the second 
step, the responses were subjected to correspondence analysis that reduced the 
associations among and between attributes and destinations to a minimum number of 
dimensions, and then plotted both the attributes and destinations on a single 
perceptual map (correspondence analysis is described in greater detail in the next 
section describing the holiday destinations and attributes used in the main survey).  
The correspondence analysis was performed twice; the “first choice only” analysis 
included the respondent’s first choice of the destination they felt was best described 
by each attribute, and the “combined choice” analysis included both the respondent’s 
first and second choice destinations (the two choices were accorded the same 
weight).  Both correspondence analyses generated similar overall solutions, but the 
“first choice only” correspondence analysis produced a two-dimensional solution 
that more comprehensively captured the variation in the cross-tabulation matrix; 
72% of the variation was captured by two-dimensions in the “first choice only” 
analysis whereas in the “combined choice” analysis the two-dimensions captured 
61%.   
 
 Given that both correspondence analyses of pilot study responses generated 
similar overall solutions and the “first choice only” analysis more comprehensively 
captured the original item variance, the “first choice only” results were selected for 
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further examination.  The examination of the “first choice only” correspondence 
analysis results consisted largely of an inspection of the perceptual map, which 
suggested two modifications to the attributes and destinations used in the main 
survey.  Firstly, attributes that were located near each other on the perceptual map 
were used by respondents to describe the destinations in similar ways.  Thus, 
attributes in similar positions on the map are perceived by the respondents to have 
comparable (but not necessarily identical) meanings and therefore were combined in 
the main study.  The combining of attributes reduced the number of attributes from 
37 to 22 for both the destination description section and the tangible attribute 
importance section.   
 
 The second modification to the main survey suggested by the “first choice only” 
correspondence analysis of pilot study responses was the addition of holiday 
destinations.  On the correspondence analysis perceptual map, each of the nine 
destinations was surrounded two or more attributes.  As attributes in the general 
proximity of a destination show that the sample used those attributes to describe that 
destination, the attributes and correspondence procedure should accurately represent 
consumer perceptions of an even larger number of similar destinations.  Thus, as a 
greater number of destinations would more comprehensively measure holidaying 
behaviour, the main survey increased the number of destinations from nine to 21.  
The additional destinations were selected based on the destinations of major airlines 
(e.g., Air New Zealand), the prominence of destination brochures at local travel 
agencies, and 1990 census records of the most frequently visited destinations by New 
Zealanders.  The 21 destinations were: Australia’s Gold Coast, Bali, Brisbane, 
Cairns, Club Med (Lindeman Island), Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Great Barrier Reef, 
Melbourne, New Caledonia, Niue, Norfolk Island, Northern Territory, Perth, 
Rarotonga, Sydney, Tahiti, Tasmania, 
 
 Main study.  Based on the results of the pilot study, respondents in the main 
study rated the importance of 22 holiday destination tangible attributes, and reported 
the number of times in the past five years they had visited any of 21 non-New 
Zealand destinations in the Australasia and Oceania region.  The reported visits were 
limited to the past five years to maintain congruence with human values and 
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preferred destination attributes, and to the same end, respondents were instructed to 
only include vacations in which they had some degree of control in the destination 
choice. 
 
 The tangible attributes and their origins are listed in Table 5 (on page 64) and the 
mean importance for the current sample in Table 7 (on page 66).  Among the most 
important attributes are Scenic, Safe, and Non-commercial, and the least are 
Ordinary, Theme Parks, and Night Life.  In the interest of manageability, the holiday 
destination tangible attribute importances were grouped through factor analysis 
(principal components extraction with no rotation) that with an Eigenvalue 1.0 cut-
off maximised the number of factors; 6 accounted for 60% of the variance (see Table 
7 on page 66).  As with human value and automobile tangible attribute importance 
factor analyses, the content of these factors will not be interpreted. 
 
 Besides using correspondence analysis in the pilot study to modify the attributes 
and number of destinations, correspondence analysis was also employed in the main 
study to group holiday destinations into maximally similar sets (akin to grouping 
automobiles into classes such as Smaller Family Cars, Larger Family Cars, etc.).  In 
the main survey, respondents selected from the list of 21 holiday destinations the two 
destinations they felt were best described by each attribute.  Due to the pilot study 
suggesting the superiority of the “first choice only” correspondence analysis, the 
main study also only used respondents first choice destinations.  The first choice 
responses were converted to a cross-tabulation matrix that reports the frequency each 
destination was described by each attribute (see Table 8 on page 67).  For example, 
the cross-tabulation shows that Gold Coast was most frequently described as having 
theme parks and great beaches, and Bali was described as tropical and inexpensive.  
The attribute Tramping was most frequently associated with Tasmania then Northern 
Territory and Papua New Guinea, whereas the attribute Have All Your Needs 
Attended To best described Club Med.  
 
 The cross-tabulation matrix was subjected to correspondence analysis, which 
firstly reduced the associations among and between attributes and destinations to a 
minimum number of dimensions, and secondly plotted both the attributes and 
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destinations on a single perceptual map.  To decide the number of dimensions that 
most concisely captures the variation among and between attributes and destinations, 
the percentage of the variance captured by each of the first four dimensions (55.3, 
21.3, 10.4 and 5.8, respectively) was plotted against the dimension number.  The 
plotting revealed an “elbow” at the two-dimensional solution suggesting a point of 
diminishing returns in which the incremental increase in the variance explained by 
the addition of further dimensions is negligible against the increased complexity of 
interpreting more dimensions.  Therefore, a two-dimensional solution was selected 
(both dimensions together captured 76% of the variance among and between 
attributes and destinations).   
 
 The co-ordinates of the attributes and destinations on the two dimensions are 
presented in Table 9 (on page 68) and the perceptual map in Figure 2 (on page 69).  
The placement of destinations represents the degree to which they were described 
with similar attributes, and the placement of attributes represents the degree to which 
they were used to describe similar destinations.  Although researchers disagree about 
how accurately the perceptual map represents the association between any row 
variable and column variable (e.g., Carroll, Green & Schaffer, 1986; Hoffman & 
Franke, 1986), making general comparisons is legitimate.  Furthermore, as the 
current purpose is to group destinations into similar sets and simply use the attributes 
to help describe the groupings, the principal limitation of correspondence analysis is 
not relevant to the current aim. 
 
 An examination of the perceptual map reveals four groupings of destinations that 
with the aid of the attributes within the general areas can be described as the 
following:  
 
 GROUP 1 -- RUGGED AND AUTHENTIC NATIVE CULTURE -- Papua New 
  Guinea, Northern Territory, Niue, Tonga, Western Samoa and Vanuatu. 
 GROUP 2 -- MAJOR CITIES -- Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane 
 GROUP 3 -- PRESTIGE AND STRUCTURED -- Club Med (Lindeman Island) 
  and Gold Coast. 
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 GROUP 4 -- SAFE AND TROPICAL -- Rarotonga, Cairns, Great Barrier Reef 
  Islands, Bali, New Caledonia, Tahiti/French Polynesia, Perth, Tasmania and 
  Norfolk Island. 
 
Brisbane is distant from all the groups and although it is closer to the Prestige and 
Structured group, Brisbane was placed in the Major Cites grouping due to its 
stronger conceptual similarity.  Overall, the first dimension (horizontal axis) seems to 
separate major city destinations from rugged and less commercial destinations, and 
dimension two appears to separate prestigious and exclusive destinations from those 
that are more commonly available. 
 
 From the four groupings of destinations uncovered in the correspondence 
analysis, holiday destination preference was scored as the percentage of times out of 
the total number of vacations taken in the past five years the respondent holidayed at 
one or more of the destinations within the group.  For example, if an individual 
holidayed once in Papua New Guinea and twice in Sydney the GROUP 1 score  
(Papua New Guinea) would be .33, the GROUP 2 score (Sydney) would be .66, and 
all other group scores would be zero.  The effect of the standardisation is to shift the 
focus from general holidaying to an individual’s preferred holiday destination class / 
group.  The exclusion of those who had not holidayed at any of the destinations 
reduced the sample size by over one-third, from 340 to 225.  Of the 225 remaining 
participants, the a mean number of holidays taken was 3.04 (SD=3.99), of which the 
proportion of holidays taken at the four group destinations were, in order, .05 
(SD=.14), .58 (SD=.33), .14 (SD=.21) and .22 (SD=.32).  GROUP 1 -- RUGGED 
AND AUTHENTIC NATIVE CULTURE is skewed beyond repair by transformation 
(taking its square root) and thus will not be included in any subsequent analysis. 
 
Meat Products 
 
 Meat tangible attributes were operationalised in the broader category of 
characteristics of food in general not including types or styles.  Attributes were 
collected from Lyman and McCloskey’s (1989) study of preferred food attributes 
during the imagination of common emotions, Devaki, Sureka and Venkataramaiah’s 
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(1988) examination of sex differences in preferred food attributes, and Simmons' 
(1989) Eating Values Inventory that measures human values specific to eating.  
Attributes were also gathered from four informal conversations in which participants 
described the features they seek in grocery foods. 
 
 The pool of attributes gathered from the above sources (more than 40) was 
reduced according to three criteria.  Firstly, all the attributes gathered from those 
sources were ranked by frequency of occurrence and those most mentioned were 
considered the most eligible (a low frequency of occurrence did not automatically 
result in its deletion but simply reconsideration).  Secondly, each attribute must fall 
on the former poles of the tangible-intangible or objective-subjective dimensions.  
Finally, attributes were selected that could not only describe different types of meat 
(e.g., red meat, white meat, etc.) but also describe the food preferences for the small 
percentage of vegetarians in the sample (approximately 6% according to Q.3 of the 
survey; see Appendix One beginning on page 307).  The ability of each attribute to 
describe different types of meat as well as the food preferences of vegetarians was 
intuitively judged from previous research on vegetarians and omnivores (e.g., Back 
& Glasgow, 1981; Beardsworth & Keil, 1991; Dwyer, Mayer, Kandel & Mayer, 
1974; Freeland-Graves, Greninger, Graves & Young, 1986).  For example, attributes 
such as Nutritious and Low Environmental Impact To Produce should be most 
important to vegetarians and health conscious omnivores, whereas strong meat eaters 
might emphasise Taste and Flavour.  Thus, the requirement that the tangible 
attributes describe the food preferences of both meat eaters and abstainers was most 
responsible for their operationalisation into the broader category of food in general. 
 
 The application of the above selection criteria reduced the initial pool of food 
tangible attributes from more than 40 to 27, which were tested in a pilot study.  
Participants in the pilot study were randomly selected from the Wellington telephone 
directory and received the pilot survey through the post accompanied with a pre-paid 
reply envelope.  One-hundred surveys were sent out and thirty were returned.  
Participants were encouraged to comment on the attributes’ intelligibility and 
correlational analysis was used to assess the attributes’ redundancy.  Attributes that 
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were excessively correlated were combined and those that some respondents 
criticised as intelligible were rewritten.  The final food tangible attributes and their 
origin are listed in Table 5 (on page 64) and the mean importance to the main sample 
in Table 10 (on page 70).  The most important tangible attributes centre on taste and 
safety (e.g., Tasty, Safe To Eat, Flavoursome) and the least are Bland, Salty and New 
On The Market.  Food tangible attribute importances were grouped through factor 
analysis (principal components extraction with no rotation) that with an Eigenvalue 
1.0 cut-off maximised the number of factors; 6 accounted for 57% of the variance 
(see Table 10 on page 70).  The content of the factors will not be interpreted. 
 
 Meat consumption was indexed as the total number of times in three days before 
responding to the survey the respondent had eaten red and white meat.  The three-
day period was chosen for being long enough to reduce floor effects but short enough 
for respondents to make accurate counts.  The numbers of times the individual had 
eaten red and white meat was each divided by the total number of main dish servings 
(red meat, white meat, diary products, and fish/seafood) to compensate for larger 
eaters and to shift the focus towards meat type preference.  The exclusion of 
participants with missing data resulted in a sample size of 303 with an average total 
number of main dish servings of 8.3 (SD=4.56), of which the average proportion of 
red meat servings were .19 (SD=.14) and white meat .16 (SD=.14).  
 61
Table 2.  Demographic profile of Sample No. 1. 
 
     
   
Cases 
 
Percent 
Census for 
Target Area 
     
All Respondents  340   
     
Gender     
  Male  149 43.8 49.2 
  Female  191 56.2 50.8 
     
Age     
  18 and 19  11 3.2 ----- 
  20 to 29  72 21.2 26.6 
  30 to 39  76 22.4 22.8 
  40 to 49  71 20.9 18.1 
  50 to 59  45 13.2 12.2 
  60 or more  65 19.1 20.3 
     
Ethnicity     
  NZ - European  278 81.7 81.2 
  NZ - Maori  15 4.4 5.2 
  Pacific Islander  1 .3 3.0 
  Other / Refused  46 13.5 10.6 
     
Education     
  No Qualification  15 4.4 ----- 
  Higher School  63 18.2 ----- 
  Technical/Trade  57 16.8 ----- 
  Undergraduate Work  40 11.8 ----- 
  Bachelors Degree  76 22.4 ----- 
  Postgraduate Work  41 12.1 ----- 
  Postgraduate Degree  48 14.1 ----- 
     
 
Notes: 
 Target Areas: Karori, Mt. Victoria, Central Wellington, Kelburn, Island Bay, Newtown, 
   Johnsonville, Hatatai, Seatoun, Paraparaumu Beach and Waikanau Beach. 
 1991 Census. 
 Census education categories differ from those used in the current study. 
Census information for 18 and 19 age group unavailable, and remaining age census  
 categories modified to reflect the adult-only composition of the sample.  
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Table 3.  Means of human values. 
 
 
   
   
 Mean StdDev 
   
Honest 2.63 .53 
Self-Respect 2.58 .57 
True Friendship 2.54 .64 
Family Security 2.51 .64 
Happiness 2.43 .64 
A World Of Peace 2.39 .74 
Freedom 2.39 .70 
Loving 2.36 .63 
Responsible 2.34 .65 
Equality 2.29 .75 
Wisdom 2.26 .78 
Broad-Minded 2.25 .70 
Courageous 2.22 .69 
A Sense of Accomplishment 2.15 .83 
A World Of Beauty 2.11 .75 
Independent 2.11 .76 
Capable 2.08 .69 
Cheerful 2.04 .68 
Forgiving 2.03 .67 
Mature Love 2.03 .78 
Inner Harmony 2.02 .82 
Helpful 1.99 .66 
Exciting Life 1.97 .85 
A Comfortable Life 1.96 .89 
Social Justice 1.95 .85 
Intellectual 1.92 .80 
Polite 1.89 .72 
Self-Determination 1.89 .77 
Pleasurable 1.84 .79 
Imaginative 1.83 .78 
Self-Controlled 1.74 .73 
Equity 1.69 .76 
Logical 1.69 .75 
Social Recognition 1.69 .80 
Ambitious 1.59 .70 
Clean 1.55 .74 
National Security 1.49 .66 
Obedient 1.33 .53 
Salvation 1.29 .63 
Social Power 1.19 .47 
   
 
Note: Scale of 1’Least Important’ to 3 ‘Most Important’. 
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Table 4.  Factor structure of human values. 
 
      
   Factors    
      
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
      
Polite .62 -.10 .09 -.10 .15 .06 -.10 .07 .09 -.10 -.31 -.01 .01
Obedient .60 .01 .16 .22 -.07 -.05 -.09 .01 .12 -.18 .22 -.01 .11
Clean .53 -.28 .10 -.19 -.08 -.20 -.15 .10 -.06 -.11 -.23 -.18 -.11
Exciting Life -.49 -.17 .22 .10 -.14 -.18 .09 .05 .28 -.20 .06 -.06 -.03
Imaginative -.45 .20 -.21 .18 -.09 -.35 .03 .06 .15 -.09 .13 -.11 -.05
Self-Control .48 -.29 -.12 -.01 -.15 -.08 -.09 .03 .02 -.18 .13 -.19 .02
Mature Love -.43 .14 .06 .31 -.24 .22 -.02 .08 -.14 .17 -.12 -.08 .02
Fam.Security .40 .04 .18 .06 .09 -.04 .29 -.21 -.21 .21 .14 .23 -.36
Honest .39 .17 -.01 -.21 -.18 .26 -.04 -.07 -.37 -.25 -.09 -.05 -.10
Responsible .39 .01 -.24 -.13 .17 .06 .33 -.04 -.00 .05 .29 -.04 .05
Freedom -.41 -.08 -.12 -.20 .25 .15 .09 -.03 .10 -.14 .11 .17 .35
Salvation .39 .23 .05 .36 -.28 -.16 -.07 .19 .02 .07 .17 .05 .17
Self-
determination
-.41 -.20 -.23 .08 -.13 .14 -.13 -.18 -.31 -.25 -.03 .12 .02
Broad-Mind -.32 .01 -.32 -.21 .10 .06 .03 .17 .26 .05 -.23 .41 -.07
Forgiving .36 .47 .01 .05 -.12 .07 -.07 .04 .21 .07 -.17 .18 .26
Helpful .35 .44 -.05 -.02 -.00 -.15 .25 .01 -.16 .10 -.06 .28 .18
Loving -.06 .38 .41 .13 -.08 .03 .31 .02 -.04 .07 -.08 -.22 .10
Logical .24 -.38 -.33 -.24 .01 -.14 .01 .24 .03 .16 -.15 -.10 -.28
Equality -.22 .41 -.01 -.30 .31 -.24 .14 -.08 -.16 .00 .13 -.01 -.01
Wisdom .08 .10 -.55 .16 -.10 .18 -.14 .35 -.00 .12 .10 -.20 .12
Pleasurable -.34 -.21 .50 -.22 .12 -.03 .02 .25 -.17 -.05 .09 .06 -.05
Comfortable -.11 -.46 .50 .02 .07 .03 -.14 -.04 -.12 .16 .19 -.08 -.01
Happiness -.08 -.08 .46 .04 .06 .34 .14 .33 -.05 .07 -.06 .10 -.15
Cheerful .09 -.06 .37 -.14 -.17 -.05 -.18 .25 .10 -.36 .03 .37 .19
Social Justice -.17 .24 .06 -.59 -.41 -.20 -.05 -.11 .01 .19 .24 -.04 .05
Social Power -.05 -.33 .10 .31 .24 -.25 -.04 -.00 .05 .34 .11 .09 .07
Recognition .08 -.08 -.04 .55 .58 -.13 .05 .02 -.06 -.14 -.12 .08 .04
Inner Harmony -.19 .36 .01 .11 -.06 .47 -.27 .19 .04 .11 .17 .05 -.33
Self-Respect -.11 .06 -.04 -.13 .03 .48 .25 -.19 .31 .01 -.10 -.26 .10
Nat. Security .21 -.07 -.07 .07 .24 .35 -.34 -.24 -.15 .28 .15 -.05 .23
Capable .21 -.33 -.17 -.17 .01 .02 .44 .11 .19 .25 -.05 .05 .01
Beauty -.13 .32 -.07 -.06 .30 -.28 -.41 .11 .22 .04 -.04 -.12 -.17
Peace .00 .39 .10 -.26 .38 -.08 -.39 -.30 .04 .05 -.06 -.09 -.03
Ambitious .02 -.35 .13 .11 -.28 -.06 -.04 -.38 .33 .17 .15 -.02 .03
Intellectual -.29 -.04 -.32 .08 -.10 -.21 .07 .35 -.37 .12 -.02 -.14 .10
Independent -.06 -.36 -.24 -.05 .21 .21 .11 .01 .06 -.39 .25 -.11 .01
Courageous .04 .32 -.23 .25 -.09 -.07 .18 -.27 -.07 -.33 .18 .11 -.31
Equity -.25 -.32 -.12 -.03 -.14 -.15 -.05 -.29 -.36 .06 -.31 .06 .23
Accomplish -.07 -.20 -.17 .23 -.27 .03 -.09 -.32 .17 .08 -.26 .24 -.20
Friendship -.13 .24 .28 .16 .05 -.06 .22 -.10 .08 -.13 -.36 -.38 .03
      
Eigenvalue 3.8 2.8 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.24 1.16 1.09 1.0
Cumul. %  
Variance 
9.5 16.4 22.1 26.6 30.7 34.6 38.3 41.7 45.0 48.1 51.0 53.7 56.2
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Table 5.  Tangible attribute importances and their origin. 
 
        
Automobiles  Holiday Destinations  Food 
Item Origin  Item Origin  Item Origin 
        
Spacious Interior VSL  Wilderness, Rugged T,B,C  Tasty D,C 
Smooth Riding VSL  Tropical C  Sweet LM 
Safety PIL  Sophisticated  
Restaurants & Hotels 
T,C  Spicy LM 
Quality 
Workmanship 
VSL  Shopping T,C  Sour LM 
Luxurious Interior VSL  Scenic KL,B,C  Simple VEG,C 
Low Pollution 
Emission 
VSL  Safe C  Safe To Eat VEG 
Large Engine C  Ordinary B  Organically Grown VEG,C 
Large Body Size VSL  Exciting Night Life T,C  Nutritious / High In 
Vitamins And 
Minerals 
VEG,C 
Inexpensive PIL, HN  Museums, Galleries,  
and Theatre 
T,B  Nice Aroma S 
High Kilometres Per 
Litre 
HN, 
LOK 
 Many Activities / 
Things To Do 
KL,B  New Product On The 
Market 
S 
High Speed 
Capabilities 
VSL  Intellectually 
Interesting 
WE  Made Of High 
Quality Ingredients 
D,C 
Heating C  Inexpensive KL,C  Low Environmental 
  Impact To Produce 
VEG 
Road Handling VSL  Historical T,B,C  Low In Fat VEG 
Few Repairs Needed / 
Low Maintenance 
PIL  Theme Parks T  Looks Appealing S,C 
Reliability / 
Dependability 
HN, 
LOK 
 Great Beaches B,C  Inexpensive S,C 
Compact PIL  Few Tourists / Non-
Commercial 
C  High In Protein VEG 
Comfort HN, 
LOK 
 Educational WE  Gourmet VEG 
Colour PIL  Authentic Native 
Culture 
WE,B,C  Flavoursome VEG 
Air Conditioning 
(cooling) 
PIL  A Place For A 
Planned/ Structured 
Holiday 
WE,B  Exotic / From 
Another Culture 
VEG 
Advanced 
Engineering 
VSL  A Place To Have All 
Your Needs 
Attended To 
T,B  Easy To Prepare C 
   A Unique Place WE  Easy To Obtain C 
   A Good Place For 
Tramping 
T  Salty LM 
      Crunchy LM 
      Bland LM 
Notes: 
VSM = Vinson, Scott and Lamont (1977) LM = Lyman and McCloskey (1989) 
 HN = Horsky and Nelson (1992)   D = Devaki, Sureka and Venkataramaiah (1988) 
 LOK = Lim, Olshavsky and Kim (1988) S = Simmons (1989) 
 PIL = Pilot study of Allen (1993)   VEG = Vegetarian research (Back & Glasgow,  
KL = Kaciak and Lauviere (1990)    1981; Beardsworth & Keil, 1991; Dwyer, 
WE = Wahlers and Etzel (1985)    Mayer, Kandel & Mayer, 1974; 
T = Taylor (1989)       Freeland-Graves, Greninger, Graves & 
B = Holiday destination brochures   Young,1986) 
 C = Informal conversations 
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Table 6.  Means and factor structure of automobile tangible attribute importances. 
 
 
         
      Factors   
         
 Mean t StdDev  1 2 3 4 5 
         
Comfort 7.67 1.67  .72 .10 -.09 -.22 -.01 
Smooth Riding 7.80 1.72  .71 .13 -.02 -.10 -.11 
Handling 8.51 1.59  .66 -.03 .06 -.09 .02 
Safety 9.33 1.39  .63 -.23 .16 -.24 -.24 
Reliability 9.40 1.14  .59 -.35 .24 -.21 .25 
Few Repairs 
Needed 
8.98 1.45  .57 -.44 .18 .02 .11 
Advanced 
Engineering 
5.24 2.62  .53 .39 -.39 .02 -.15 
Low Pollution 
Emission 
7.76 2.23  .49 -.39 -.14 .23 -.37 
Spacious Interior 6.66 2.10  .48 .27 .29 -.10 .25 
Large Engine 4.06 2.25  .16 .70 .46 .19 -.07 
Luxurious 
Interior 
4.11 2.13  .34 .65 -.15 .03 -.01 
Large Body Size 3.61 2.27  .18 .63 .52 .07 .02 
Colour 4.75 2.66  .14 .35 -.49 .27 .22 
Air Conditioning 3.90 2.48  .37 .35 -.47 -.08 .17 
Compact 5.41 2.26  .34 -.32 -.46 .21 -.06 
High Speed 4.34 2.34  .15 .53 .03 .55 .08 
Inexpensive 6.82 2.39  .24 -.51 .22 .55 .04 
Kilometres Per 
Litre 
7.22 2.34  .41 -.43 .13 .49 .18 
Heating 6.60 2.15  .49 -.09 -.08 -.13 .58 
Quality 8.67 1.76  .53 .12 .07 .00 -.55 
         
Eigenvalue    4.5 3.2 1.6 1.3 1.1 
Cumul. %  
Variance 
   22.5 38.4 46.5 52.8 58.4 
 
Note: t = Scale of 1’Not At All Important’ to 10 ‘Very Important’. 
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Table 7.  Means and factor structure of holiday destination tangible attribute 
importances. 
 
 
          
       Factors   
          
 Mean t StdDev  1 2 3 4 5 6 
          
Educational 5.61 2.30  .63 .34 -.30 -.04 -.09 -.11 
Historical 5.84 2.53  .61 .29 -.36 -.13 -.06 .11 
Intellectually 
Interesting 
6.07 2.59  .60 .26 -.47 .15 -.04 .02 
Museums, 
Galleries,  
  and Theatre 
5.54 2.60  .59 -.01 -.46 .06 .02 .31 
Theme Parks 2.92 2.38  .58 -.21 .32 -.20 .23 -.15 
Many Activities 6.49 2.30  .55 -.17 .02 .11 -.09 -.01 
Planned 
/Structured 
3.24 2.25  .54 -.26 .07 -.30 .39 -.29 
Unique 5.59 2.61  .42 .26 .17 .37 -.16 -.29 
Good Tramping 4.20 2.79  .13 .65 .27 .04 .45 .17 
Wilderness, 
Rugged 
4.64 2.76  .11 .59 .29 .23 .48 .13 
Sophisticated  
  Restaurants 
and Hotels 
4.01 2.56  .43 -.56 -.06 .27 .03 .22 
Shopping 4.91 2.56  .50 -.54 -.04 .06 -.16 .19 
All Needs 
Attended To 
4.04 2.69  .46 -.53 .28 -.03 .08 -.30 
Non-Commercial 6.61 2.16  .08 .53 .33 -.06 -.39 .10 
Authentic Native 
Culture 
5.22 2.73  .45 .50 .01 .24 -.04 -.27 
Inexpensive 6.83 2.27  .36 .38 .28 -.22 -.13 -.15 
Beaches 6.00 2.56  .09 .00 .75 .10 -.27 .12 
Tropical 5.29 2.51  .11 -.14 .58 .39 -.01 .05 
Safe 7.65 2.34  .25 -.12 .26 -.65 -.22 -.11 
Ordinary 2.56 1.90  .19 -.06 .21 -.54 .28 .40 
Night Life 3.69 2.51  .34 -.40 .25 .42 .06 .25 
Scenic 7.79 1.64  .31 .30 .19 -.24 -.29 .37 
          
Eigenvalue    3.9 3.1 2.3 1.7 1.2 1.0 
Cumul. %  
Variance 
   17.8 31.8 42.4 49.9 55.3 59.9 
 
Note: t = Scale of 1’Not At All Important’ to 10 ‘Very Important’. 
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Table 8.  Cross-tabulation of respondent descriptions of holiday destinations with attributes. 
 
                      
 Gold 
Coast 
 
Bali 
Bris-
bane 
 
Cairns 
Club 
Med 
 
Fiji 
 
Papua 
 
Reef 
Mel-
bourne 
Cale-
donia 
 
Niue 
Nor-
folk 
North-
ern 
 
Perth 
Raro-
tonga 
 
Sydney 
 
Tahiti 
Tas-
mania 
 
Tonga 
Van-
uatu 
 
Samoa 
                      
Wilderness, 
Rugged 
1 0 0 3 0 0 105 5 1 3 2 5 119 0 0 0 0 26 0 4 3 
Tropical 6 83 2 17 9 35 11 6 0 8 1 0 5 1 27 1 51 0 5 6 2 
Restaurants/Hotels 27 0 8 0 18 1 0 1 70 1 0 0 0 1 0 134 7 1 0 1 1 
Shopping 6 7 9 0 0 2 0 0 63 1 0 3 0 0 0 183 1 0 0 1 0 
Scenic 4 34 1 13 6 8 7 99 0 3 1 5 20 4 10 5 24 20 0 10 1 
Safe 18 5 18 5 34 12 0 6 27 3 13 43 0 12 26 17 1 23 5 1 3 
Ordinary 23 2 51 12 5 9 3 0 16 4 10 28 5 36 7 13 0 22 8 4 10 
Night Life 37 2 7 1 16 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 175 8 1 1 1 0 
Museums, 
Galleries, 
Theatre 
0 0 11 0 0 0 0 1 149 1 0 0 0 4 0 103 1 1 0 0 0 
Many Activities 51 9 7 7 67 5 1 4 24 1 1 1 4 2 0 84 2 2 0 1 1 
Intellectually 
Interesting 
0 26 1 3 1 1 19 11 96 7 2 7 11 4 1 47 10 9 0 6 1 
Inexpensive 6 47 1 3 1 26 6 1 3 1 20 34 3 1 37 14 1 7 29 11 15 
Historical 0 19 1 0 0 1 15 2 33 4 1 63 17 5 2 37 20 42 4 1 1 
Theme Parks 126 0 40 3 7 2 1 6 18 1 0 0 1 3 0 44 0 3 0 1 0 
Beaches 119 21 1 11 8 25 1 18 0 7 0 1 1 8 16 8 18 0 5 4 2 
Non-Commercial 0 1 0 7 0 0 53 2 2 1 63 15 23 6 12 2 2 13 23 29 15 
Educational 0 22 2 6 0 2 28 26 47 11 2 18 22 8 2 26 17 20 1 3 1 
Authentic Native 
Culture 
0 29 0 2 1 14 81 0 1 4 15 0 12 1 13 0 8 1 38 27 23 
Planned/Structure 27 3 11 9 129 7 2 9 11 0 1 0 7 9 1 27 4 5 0 1 3 
Needs Attended 
To 
18 13 3 1 173 9 0 6 6 4 0 0 1 1 2 27 1 0 3 1 0 
Unique 3 40 0 8 5 1 42 28 1 3 35 15 39 0 5 3 9 5 10 11 4 
Tramping 1 3 0 17 1 1 30 11 1 4 1 24 49 7 1 2 2 104 3 3 1 
                      
 
Note: figures indicate that each destination was described with each attribute.  
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Table 9.  Correspondence analysis co-ordinates of holiday destinations and 
attributes. 
 
 
   
 Dim. 1 Dim. 2 
Attributes   
Wilderness, Rugged 1.40 -.52 
Tropical .53 .44 
Sophisticated  Restaurants/Hotels -.97 -.55 
Shopping -1.02 -.89 
Scenic .60 .32 
Safe -.07 .29 
Ordinary -.07 .11 
Exciting Night Life -1.00 -.44 
Museums, Galleries, Theatre -.99 -1.09 
Many Activities -.74 .38 
Intellectually Interesting -.20 -.66 
Inexpensive .65 .16 
Historical .19 -.44 
Theme Parks -.77 .33 
Beaches -.13 .68 
Non-Commercial 1.16 -.21 
Educational .26 -.37 
Authentic Native Culture 1.13 -.07 
Planned/Structured -.57 1.14 
All Needs Attended To -.70 1.51 
Unique .95 -.04 
Good Tramping .94 -.21 
   
Destinations   
Gold Coast -.64 .59 
Bali .50 .23 
Brisbane -.59 .15 
Cairns .41 .33 
Club Med -.72 1.46 
Fiji .28 .62 
Papua New Guinea 1.21 -.38 
Great Barrier Reef .49 .30 
Melbourne -.73 -.86 
New Caledonia .30 .03 
Niue 1.05 -.08 
Norfolk Island .45 -.18 
Northern Territory 1.14 -.38 
Perth .02 .18 
Rarotonga .57 .38 
Sydney -.94 -.59 
Tahiti .32 .14 
Tasmania .31 -.11 
Tonga .98 .10 
Vanuatu .81 -.04 
Samoa 1.02 -.01 
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Figure 2.  Correspondence analysis map of holiday destinations and attributes. 
 
 Notes: 
  Attribute labels not presented to avoid cluttering (see Table 9 for co-ordinates). 
  Dimension One is the horizontal axis and Dimension Two is the vertical axis. 
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Table 10.  Means and factor structure of meat tangible attribute importances. 
 
          
       Factors   
          
 Mean t StdDev  1 2 3 4 5 6 
          
Low 
Environmental 
  Impact 
6.93 2.57  .59 -.40 .24 -.08 -.22 .09 
Easy To Obtain 7.10 2.18  .58 -.18 -.43 .22 -.14 -.05 
Nice Aroma 6.20 2.31  .56 .23 -.07 -.32 .24 .04 
High Protein 6.13 2.15  .56 -.12 .25 .12 .01 -.28 
Organically 
Grown 
5.20 2.72  .53 -.30 .36 -.12 -.20 .16 
Nutritious 7.75 2.14  .49 -.48 .34 -.20 .02 .09 
Looks Appealing 6.53 2.19  .48 .18 -.21 -.28 .22 -.33 
Inexpensive 7.09 2.24  .49 -.12 -.14 .37 -.21 -.01 
Flavoursome 7.73 1.69  .46 .25 -.28 -.45 .10 .07 
Tasty 8.04 1.80  .42 .21 -.49 -.38 .05 .20 
Low In Fat 7.20 2.47  .40 -.38 .34 -.03 -.12 -.16 
Spicy 5.61 2.17  .25 .65 -.00 -.13 -.38 .32 
Exotic/Another 
Culture 
4.72 2.35  .27 .51 .21 -.19 -.36 -.07 
Safe To Eat 8.85 1.80  .28 -.52 -.15 -.11 .28 .32 
High Quality 7.72 2.13  .43 -.49 -.00 -.30 .16 .02 
Sweet 4.82 2.26  .34 .47 -.24 .23 .07 .18 
Gourmet 4.33 2.35  .35 .47 .25 -.07 .04 -.46 
Sour 3.71 2.09  .31 .45 .35 .14 -.20 .38 
New On Market 3.43 2.28  .42 .44 .10 .14 .19 -.34 
Salty 3.25 2.07  .25 .44 .13 .23 .31 .21 
Easy To Prepare 7.16 2.18  .49 -.15 -.52 .27 -.24 -.22 
Simple 6.06 2.31  .35 -.25 -.34 .42 -.05 .08 
Crunchy 4.25 2.30  .58 .07 .17 .27 .09 .04 
Bland 2.10 1.74  .28 .10 .29 .39 .54 .19 
          
Eigenvalue    4.6 3.2 1.9 1.6 1.2 1.2 
Cumul. %  
Variance 
   19.1 32.5 40.3 46.9 51.9 56.7 
 
Note: t = Scale of 1’Not At All Important’ to 10 ‘Very Important’. 
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RESULTS 
 
Rationale of Analysis  
 
 To make the product the level of analysis and examine the attribute-mediation 
approach hypotheses, two separate regression analyses were performed for each of 
the eight product class preferences: three automobile ownerships (Smaller Family 
Cars, Larger Family Cars, Luxury Cars), three overseas holiday destination groups 
(Major Cites, Prestige and Structured, Safe and Tropical), and two meat types (red 
and white).  As already stated, Sports Cars, Utility Vehicles - Minivans and Rugged, 
and Authentic Native Culture holiday destinations were skewed beyond repair by 
transformation and thus will not be included in any analysis.   
 
 In the first regression analysis, human values alone are regressed onto product 
preference.  If human values significantly predict product preference then the first 
hurdle in examining the attribute-mediation approach hypotheses is reached, and the 
analysis can continue to the second step that assesses how tangible attribute 
importances mediate that human value influence.  If human values do not 
significantly influence product preference, the result could suggest that human values 
have no part in consumer evaluations of products, though that conclusion would be 
overly speculative.  Human values are abstract, general criteria and their influence on 
specific behaviours such as product purchase and ownership may not always be 
traceable (an issue that is re-addressed in the discussion).  Nevertheless, to examine 
the attribute-mediation approach hypotheses, some indication of human value 
influence is required to detect if the influence occurs via tangible attribute 
importances. 
 
 The second regression analysis is made up of two blocks or stages.  Block 1 
regresses tangible attribute importances onto product preference, and then Block 2 
regresses human values onto the remainder of product preference variance.  If Block 
2 does not explain a significant amount of product preference variance once the 
influence of tangible attribute importances is removed, then the attribute-mediation 
approach would appear to be the only route of human value influence.  The 
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interpretation would be supported if the first regression analysis could significantly 
predict product preference with human values alone, because it would suggest that 
whatever influence human values do have on product preference occurs exclusively 
through tangible attribute importances.  If, however, Block 2 can significantly predict 
product preference beyond tangible attribute importances, the finding would suggest 
that human values influence product preference through another route(s) besides that 
outlined in the attribute-mediation approach.  Such a finding would support H1, and 
H2 would be supported if the strength of that alternative route is greater for those 
products assumed to be evaluated on their intangible attributes (e.g., meat products 
and overseas holiday destinations).  
 
 In each regression, human value and tangible attribute importance factor scores 
were entered instead of the individual items.  The readers would recall that in each 
factor analysis a maximum number of factors were selected (to the Eigenvalue 1.0 
cut-off) so that a topmost amount of human value and tangible attribute importances 
variance is available for use in the prediction of product preference.  The factor 
analyses resulted in 13 human value factors, 5 automobile tangible attribute 
importance factors, 6 holiday destination tangible attribute importance factors and 6 
meat tangible attribute importance factors.   
 
 However, the large number of factors, particularly for human values, presents a 
problem for the regression analyses because of the likelihood that human values will 
only moderately predict product preference.  Admittedly, many agents influence 
product purchase other than human values (e.g., family considerations, finances, etc.) 
and that fact is compounded by human values’ abstract nature that makes them 
difficult to trace to concrete, specific behaviours.  Consequently, the low prediction 
rate coupled with the loss of degrees of freedom from the large number of 
independent variables, may result in some regressions failing to reach significance 
despite their accounting for a level of product preference variance that is acceptable 
given the obstacle in predicting product purchase with human values.  As the weak 
statistical relationship between human values and product purchase is immutable, the 
degrees of freedom must be conserved.  The conservation was accomplished by 
firstly, entering the independent variables into the regression equation on a step-wise 
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basis, and secondly, relaxing the significance required for the entrance of those 
variables.  Unlike the full entry method, a step-wise regression only enters those 
independent variables that significantly predict the dependent variable at or below 
the p<.05 level (as determined by its F or t).  Therefore, only the best predictors are 
used in the computation of the regression equation and a lower level of product 
preference variance needs to be explained for the equation to reach significance. 
 
 One problem, however, with the step-wise entrance of independent variables is 
that it decreases the reliability of the regression solution (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & 
Black, 1992).  Other factors, such as the composition of the sample, outliers or 
interactions among variables, can shift the independent variables entered into the 
equation from test to test and sample to sample.  However, relaxing the significance 
required for the entrance of the independent variables from p<.05 to p<.10 gives 
more leeway as it would eliminate any instability that might have been caused from 
independent variables shifting their prediction of the dependent variable from p<.05 
in one test to .05< p<.10 in another test.  Thus, the p<.10 criterion should produce a 
(slightly) more robust regression equation than the p<.05 criterion, and yet still be 
more stringent than liberal standards above p<.15.  Moreover, the attribute-mediation 
approach is examined for eight separate product classes, and so reliability can also be 
established through the emergence of a consistent pattern of relations found across 
the product classes and categories. 
 
 To summarise, two regressions were performed for each of the eight product 
classes.  The first regression entered human values alone to predict product 
preference, and the second regression entered tangible attribute importances to 
predict product preference (Block 1) then entered human values onto the remaining 
product preference variance (Block 2).  The human values and tangible attribute 
importances factor scores were entered instead of the individual items, and each 
regression entered the independent variables on a step-wise basis with a p<.10 
criterion.  The following 16 regressions were performed: 
 
• The 13 human value factors were regressed onto participants’ Smaller Family Car 
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ownerships. 
• The 13 human value factors were regressed onto participants’ Larger Family Car 
ownerships. 
• The 13 human value factors were regressed onto participants’ Luxury Car 
ownerships. 
• The 13 human value factors were regressed onto participants’ holidaying at 
Major Cities destinations. 
• The 13 human value factors were regressed onto participants’ holidaying at 
Prestige and Structured destinations. 
• The 13 human value factors were regressed onto participants’ holidaying at Safe 
and Tropical destinations. 
• The 13 human value factors were regressed onto participants’ red meat 
consumption. 
• The 13 human value factors were regressed onto participants’ white meat 
consumption. 
 
• The 5 automobile tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ 
Smaller Family Car ownerships (Block 1), followed by the 13 human value 
factors (Block 2). 
• The 5 automobile tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ 
Larger Family Car ownerships (Block 1), followed by the 13 human value factors 
(Block 2). 
• The 5 automobile tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ 
Luxury Car ownerships (Block 1), followed by the 13 human value factors 
(Block 2). 
• The 6 holiday destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
participants’ holidaying at Major Cities destinations (Block 1), followed by the 
13 human value factors (Block 2). 
• The 6 holiday destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
participants’ holidaying at Prestige and Structure destinations (Block 1), followed 
by the 13 human value factors (Block 2). 
• The 6 holiday destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
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participants’ holidaying at Safe and Tropical destinations (Block 1), followed by 
the 13 human value factors (Block 2). 
• The 6 food destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
participants’ red meat consumption (Block 1), followed by the 13 human value 
factors (Block 2). 
• The 6 food destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
participants’ white meat consumption (Block 1), followed by the 13 human value 
factors (Block 2). 
 
Results of Regression Analyses 
 
 Before reporting the results of the regression analyses, readers are informed that 
five factors, which according to Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1992) may affect 
the stability and integrity of the regression analyses, were examined: linearity, 
homoscedacity, normality of error terms, multi-collinearity and a low subject-to-
variable ratio.  A visual inspection of the residual plots suggested each regression 
equation did not deviate substantially from linearity and were homoscedastic, and an 
inspection of the normal probability plots showed that the distributions were 
essentially normal.  Moreover, as the independent variables are human value and 
tangible attribute importance scores from un-rotated factor analyses, multi-
collinearity is not an impediment.  With un-rotated factors the first factor captures the 
greatest amount of the variance, the second captures some variance not already 
captured by the first factor, and the third factor captures part of the remaining 
variance and so on.  Therefore, as expected, a perusal of the correlation matrix 
confirmed that the factors are un-correlated.  Finally, the minimum subject-to-
variable ratio suggested ranges from 10 to an absolute minimum of 4 respondents per 
variable, for which each regression in the current study easily exceeds.   
 
 The results of the two-block regression analyses are reported in detail in Table 11 
(on page 78) and the results of the human values only regressions are reported in 
detail in Table 12 (on page 79).  Each detailed table reports the independent variables 
entered each equation, their beta weights and the Multiple Rs.  For instance, Table 11 
shows that the step-wise regression of automobile tangible attribute importances 
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(Block 1) onto Smaller Family Car ownership resulted in tangible attribute 
importance factors #2, #5 and #3 being entered and a Multiple R of .47. 
 
 The detailed tables may be referred to periodically, but the focal point for the 
evaluation of the attribute-mediation approach hypotheses is Table 13 (on page 80), 
which summarises the important aspects of Table 11 and Table 12 and reports other 
needed calculations.  Beginning with the left portion of the table, the two-block 
regressions, the far left column reports the Multiple Rs from regressing tangible 
attribute importances onto product preference (Block 1).  The second column from 
the left reports the Multiple Rs from regressing human values onto the remaining 
product preference variance not already accounted by tangible attribute importances 
(Block 2).  The “Change in R” column reports the extent human values predicted 
product preference beyond tangible attribute importances, and so represents the 
influence of human values that does not flow through tangible attribute importances.  
The Multiple Rs from regressing human values alone onto product preference is 
reported in the “Human Values Only” column.  Finally, the far right column marked 
“HVs via Tangible Attribute Importances” is the total influence of human values (the 
Human Value Only regression column) minus the “Change in R” from the two-block 
regression.  Thus, the “HVs via Tangible Attribute Importances” column represents 
the influence of human values on product preference that does flow via tangible 
attribute importances.  In interest of caution, however, the Multiple Rs from the 
human values only regressions are not necessarily precise indicators of human value 
influence in that, for example, the two cases that human values alone could not 
significantly predict product preference (Larger Family Cars and White Meat), 
incongruously, human values could significantly predict those product preferences 
once tangible attribute importances were removed (see the “Change in R” column).  
As the human values only regression and Multiple Rs must be used to calculate the 
strength of the indirect route of value influence, some degree of imprecision must be 
acknowledged and tolerated. 
 
 Hypothesis 1 stated that the attribute-mediation approach, properly restricted to 
tangible attributes, cannot fully account for the influence of human values on 
consumer choices.  Consistent with that hypothesis, Table 13 shows that of the six 
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product classes that human values alone could significantly predict product 
preference (e.g., Smaller Family Cars, Luxury Cars, Major Cities destinations, 
Prestige and Structured destinations, Safe and Tropical destinations, and Red Meat), 
only for Smaller Family Cars did all of the influence occur via tangible attribute 
importances.  For the remaining five products, tangible attribute importances could 
not fully account for the influence of human values, which is shown by the 
significant Change in Rs.  Therefore, overall, the attribute-mediation approach 
cannot fully account for the influences of human values on product preference 
(Hereafter, the value route via tangible attribute importances is termed the “indirect 
route” and its alternative is termed the “direct route”). 
 
 Hypothesis 2 stated that the inability of tangible attributes to mediate the 
influence of human values on product preference increases as intangible attributes 
become more important to consumers’ evaluation of the product.  Consequently, the 
attribute-mediation approach should have the most success accounting for the 
influence of human values on preferences for automobiles, should have a moderate 
success accounting for the influence of human values on overseas holidaying, and 
the least success accounting for the influence of human values on meat consumption.  
The primary means to assess the hypothesis is the “Change in R” column in Table 
13, which shows the influence of human values that does not flow through tangible 
attribute importances.  Hypothesis 2 concerns product categories, and not classes, 
and therefore finer distinctions among product classes will not be made until the 
discussion section.  For the present, however, among the three product categories, the 
“Change in R” tends to be lowest (both in significance and Multiple Rs) for 
automobile ownership, higher for overseas holidaying, and highest for meat 
consumption, particularly red meat.  Although important differences exist among 
product classes, a tentative conclusion is that the results are consistent with H2; that 
tangible attribute importances had the most success accounting for the influence of 
human values on preferences for automobiles, a moderate success with overseas 
holidaying, and the least success with meat consumption. 
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Table 11.  Results from two-block regression of tangible attribute importances and 
human values onto product preferences. 
 
            
  BLOCK 1  BLOCK 2  
 
 
Product 
 Tangible 
Attribute 
Importances  
  
 
Mult. R 
  
 
Human Values 
  
 
Mult. R 
  
Prefer-
ence 
 Factors 
Enteredt 
 
Beta 
 for Block 
1 
 Factors 
Enteredt 
 
Beta 
 for Block 
1 and 2 
 Change 
in R 
             
Smaller  FACTOR2 -.36  .47 ****  [none]   .47 ****  .00 
Family  FACTOR5 .21  F= 24.8     F= 24.8   
Cars  FACTOR3 -.18  df=3,267     df=3,267   
             
             
Larger  FACTOR3 .28  .40 ****  FACTOR6 -.11  .42 ****  .02 * 
Family  FACTOR2 .26  F=16.8     F=13.8   
Cars  FACTOR1 .17  df=3,267     df=4,266   
             
             
Luxury  FACTOR2 .22  .18 **  FACTOR10 -.11  .27 ***  .09 * 
Cars  FACTOR4 -.11  F=2,215     F=5.0   
     df=5.5     df=3,266   
             
             
Major  FACTOR3 -.13  .22 **  FACTOR10 .20  .35 ****  .13 ** 
Cities  FACTOR6 .15  F=5.5  FACTOR11 -.19  F=7.1   
     df=2,215     df=4,213   
             
             
Prestige  FACTOR3 .18  .27 ***  FACTOR11 .16  .34 ****  .07 ** 
and  FACTOR2 -.13  F=5.6  FACTOR8 -.13  F=5.6   
Structure  FACTOR1 .13  df=3,214     df=5,212   
             
             
Safe and  FACTOR1 -.15  .19 *  FACTOR10 -.16  .25 **  .06 * 
Tropical  FACTOR2 .12  F=3.8     F=4.6   
     df=2,215     df=3,214   
             
             
Red Meat  FACTOR1 -.10  .12 *  FACTOR2 -.19  .28 ****  .16 *** 
     F=3.8  FACTOR1 .13  F=6.3   
     df=1,301  FACTOR6 -.12  df=4,298   
             
             
White  FACTOR2 .13  .15 *  FACTOR6 .11  .19 *  .04 * 
Meat  FACTOR1 .11  F=3.4     F=3.6   
     df=2,300     df=3,299   
             
Notes: 
 *  p<.05,   **  p<.01,   *** p<.001,   **** p<.0001 
 t = only factors significant at the p<.10 level were entered. 
 Block 1 = tangible attribute importances onto product preference. 
 Block 2 = human values onto remaining product preference not already accounted by tangible  
attribute importances. 
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Table 12.  Results from regression of human values onto product preferences. 
 
     
   
Human Values 
  
PRODUCT 
PREFERENCE 
 Factors 
Enteredt 
 
Beta 
  
Mult. R 
      
Smaller Family  FACTOR10 .10  .16 * 
Cars     F = 3.9 
     df= 1,278 
      
      
Larger Family  FACTOR8 .12  .11 
Cars  FACTOR4 .10  F = 3.6 
     df = 2,277 
      
      
Luxury Cars  FACTOR5 -.11  .21 ** 
  FACTOR2 -.11  F = 4.0 
  FACTOR10 -.10  df=3,276 
      
      
Major Cities  FACTOR10 .22  .28 **** 
  FACTOR11 -.19  F = 9.3 
     df=2,222 
      
      
Prestige and  FACTOR11 .18  .28 *** 
Structured  FACTOR3 .16  F = 6.1 
  FACTOR8 -.14  df=3,221 
      
      
Safe and  FACTOR10 -.16  .16 * 
Tropical     F = 5.7 
     df=1,223 
      
      
Red Meat  FACTOR2 -.20  .26 **** 
  FACTOR1 .12  F = 7.3 
  FACTOR6 -.11  df=3,299 
      
      
White Meat  FACTOR3 .09  .09 
     F = 2.8 
     df=1,301 
      
 
Notes: 
 t = only factors significant at the p<.10 level were entered. 
 *        p<.05 
 **      p<.01 
 ***    p<.001 
 ****  p<.0001 
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Table 13.  Summary of Multiple Rs from two-block and human values only regression 
onto product preferences. 
 
 
 
        
  TWO-BLOCK REGRESSION      
  Block 1 Block 2     HVs via 
 
PRODUCT 
PREFERENCE 
 Tangible 
Attribute 
Importance 
 
Human 
Values 
 
Change 
In R 
 Human 
Values 
Only 
 Tangible 
Attribute 
Importancest 
         
Automobile 
Ownership 
        
  Smaller Family Cars  .47 **** .47 **** .00 .16 *  .16 
  Larger Family Cars  .40 **** .42 **** .02 * .11  .09 
  Luxury Cars  .18 ** .27 *** .09 * .21 **  .12 
        
Overseas Holidaying        
  Major Cities  .22 ** .35 **** .13 ** .28 ****  .15 
  Prestige and Structure  .27 *** .34 **** .07 ** .28 ***  .21 
  Safe and Tropical  .19 * .25 ** .06 * .16 *  .10 
        
Meat Consumption        
  Red Meat  .12 * .28 **** .16 *** .26 ****  .10 
  White Meat  .15 * .19 * .04 * .09  .05 
         
 
Notes: 
 *        p<.05 
 **      p<.01 
 ***    p<.001 
 ****  p<.0001 
 t   = test of significance unavailable. 
 Block 1 = tangible attribute importances onto product preference. 
 Block 2 = human values onto remaining product preference not already accounted by tangible 
attribute importances. 
 Change in R = indicates direct influence of human values. 
 HVs  via Tangible Attribute Importances = indicates indirect influence of human values and is 
calculated by subtracting Change in R from Human Values Only. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 
 Thus, the results are supportive of the hypotheses that (H1) the attribute-
mediation approach, properly restricted to tangible attributes, cannot fully account 
for the influence of human values on consumer choices, and (H2) that the inability of 
tangible attributes to mediate the influence of human values on product preference 
increases as intangible attributes become more important to consumer’s evaluation of 
the product.  Specifically, although important differences among product classes 
exist, in general the attribute-mediation approach had the most success accounting 
for the influence of human values on preferences for automobiles, a moderate 
success accounting for the influence of human values on overseas holidaying, and 
the least success accounting for the influence of human values on meat consumption. 
 
 Importantly, whilst H1 was supported, the route of human value influence 
outlined in the attribute-mediation approach is, nevertheless, the predominant mode.  
A comparison of the strength of the direct route of value influence (the “Change in 
R” column in Table 13) with the strength of the indirect route (far right column) 
shows that for seven of the eight product classes the indirect route is greater than or 
equal to the direct.  The exception is red meat and even in that instance the indirect 
route is of reasonable influence.  Moreover, the predominance of the attribute-
mediation route is also suggested by the result that the product classes most strongly 
predicted by tangible attribute importances (Smaller Cars, Larger Cars and Prestige 
and Structured destinations) are also those with the greatest difference between the 
stronger indirect route of value influence and the weaker direct route (a difference in 
Multiple Rs of .16, .07 and .14, respectively).  That result implies that an increase in 
the role of tangible attribute importances increases the influence of human values 
through those importances and the predominance of the indirect route. 
 
 Though human values largely mediated through tangible attributes to influence 
product preference, for most of the products human values also influenced product 
preference directly.  The direct route of value influence is probably a result of 
tangible attributes failing to account for the influence of human values on intangible 
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attributes given that, consistent with H2, the strength of the direct route was greater 
for those product categories which consumers probably place more importance on 
intangible attributes (e.g., meat products and overseas holiday destinations).  Even 
among some product classes, support is found for the contention that the direct route 
corresponds to the role of intangible attributes.  For instance, automobile ownership 
was expected to be the most appropriate to attribute-mediation approach because the 
high risk and cost of automobiles lead to careful and deliberate evaluations of 
tangible features first, and images second (Keaveney & Hunt, 1992; Shavitt, Lowrey 
& Han, 1992; Sirgy & Johar, 1985).  The results confirm the expectation but also 
show that it varies among the automobile classes as the direct route is weakest for the 
car class that image is probably least important (e.g., Smaller Family Cars) and is 
strongest for the car class that image is probably most important (e.g., Luxury Cars).  
Likewise, toward the conclusion of the current chapter, the argument is made that 
intangible attributes such as symbolic meaning are more important in consumer 
evaluations of red meat than white meat. 
 
 However, whilst the strengths of the direct and indirect routes appear consistent 
with the attribute composition of the product classes and categories, support for H2 
is tentative for several reasons.  Firstly, the differences among the Multiple Rs of the 
direct influences of human values (e.g., the “Change in R” column in Table 13) 
are minor.  The Multiple Rs of the automobile classes ranged from .00 to .09, the 
Multiple Rs of the overseas holiday destination groups ranged from .06 to .13, and 
the Multiple Rs for the meat types were .04 and .16.  The minor differences in 
Multiple Rs suggests that comparing the Multiple Rs of different product categories 
is tenuous; a suggestion that is reinforced by the regressions’ step-wise entrance of 
independent variables which can be unstable.  Nevertheless, a consistent pattern of 
relations did emerge, not only across product categories but also within product 
categories, in which the direct route of human values was stronger for those product 
categories and classes that a reasonable assumption can be made that intangible 
attributes are important to consumer evaluations of the products. 
 
 However, a second reason support for H2 is tentative is that the attribute 
composition of the product classes and categories are only assumed.  H2 was based 
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on empirical and theoretical research about how automobiles, overseas holiday 
destinations and meat products may be evaluated by consumers, but the attribute 
compositions of the products were not verified independently, and therefore other 
factors may contribute to the direct and indirect influences of human values other 
than the tangible and intangible attribute compositions of the products.  A third 
reason support for H2 is tentative is that intangible attributes were not explicitly 
tested and so their role in the bifurcation of value influence is indeterminate.  
Consequently, a future study should address each of the limitations by modelling and 
testing intangible attributes and modifying the level of analysis from the product to 
the individual consumer.  The latter would avoid making assumptions about how 
most consumers evaluate a particular product, and instead would focus on how each 
individual examines each product’s tangible and intangible attributes and how that 
examination affects the direct and indirect influences of his or her human values. 
 
 Concerning other limitations of the current study, perhaps the one of lingering 
concern to most readers is the low predictive power of human values on product 
purchase.  Referring to the summary of the regressions in Table 13 (on page 80), for 
six out of the eight product classes, the human values only regression significantly, 
but weakly, predicted product preference (see second right column in the summary 
table).  Some might argue that the weak (but significant) influence of human values 
on product purchases warrants a reconsideration of their merit in studying.  However, 
a more tempered position is warranted given that attempting to predict actual product 
purchase and ownership made the analysis the most stringent test of the attribute-
mediation approach.  A stronger role of human values may emerge when using 
product preference measures that are not as severely affected by external factors 
(e.g., family considerations, financial limitations, and so on) such as persuasiveness 
to varying advertising strategies or alternatively simple product attitude.  Moreover, 
a well-known axiom of Fishbein and Ajzen (1974) is that general attitudes predict 
general behaviour and specific attitudes predict specific behaviour.  To obtain a 
strong prediction, a preference measure should be specific in four ways: it should 
include the object of reference, the action the individual wants to do with the object, 
the time he or she wants to do it, and the context.  Human values have none of those 
features.  Consequently, attempting to trace the effects of general human values on 
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specific consumer behaviours will be plagued by low predictive power, and thus the 
primary contribution of the current study is to show a particular pattern of 
relationships more so than any absolute strength. 
 
 Additional limitations of the study centre on the beliefs, consumption values and 
consequences constructs which, besides intangible attributes, were not modelled nor 
tested.  In the basic conceptual model, Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s position 
was adopted that human values influence attribute importances without operating 
through a go-between such as Scott and Lamont’s  “consumption values” or 
Gutman’s “consequences”.  The formulation allowed the greatest flexibility in 
integrating the various perspectives, and the anticipation was that excluding the 
intervening variables would not present a problem as human values and tangible 
attribute importances should have sufficient common variation; an expectation 
confirmed.  In terms of the role of beliefs, contrary to Lindberg, Garling and 
Montgomery’s (1989) and Gutman’s (1982) suggestions, Scott and Lamont’s (1973) 
inclusion of the evaluative component and the exclusion of the belief component was 
selected because incorporating a belief component in the current model would 
require the acceptance of a particular attribute-mediation approach either by forcing 
the inclusion of a specific construct such as Gutman’s consequences (e.g., the belief 
that attributes engender consequences that are important to human values) or from 
the manner in which beliefs link human values and attribute importances (such as 
Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s claim that attribute importances are formed 
from the beliefs that they reinforce important human values). Testing the core or 
most basic attribute-mediation approach is therefore not possible if the belief 
component is included.  
 
 The exclusion of the belief component was expected to not substantially affect 
the testing of the basic attribute-mediation approach as past research has excluded 
the belief component with satisfactory results (e.g., Lindberg, Garling & 
Montgomery, 1989; Scott & Lamont, 1973).  Moreover, consumer beliefs and 
knowledge about what attributes products contain and the human values reinforced 
can be assumption if the products chosen for the investigation are commonly owned, 
as the products for the current sample were (83% of the sample owned a Smaller 
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Family Cars, Larger Family Cars or Luxury Cars, 65% took a holiday in the past five 
years at one of the 21 destinations, and of the 90% of the respondents who answered 
the meat questions all had some level of meat consumption).   Nevertheless, as the 
model only comprises evaluative components (human values and tangible attribute 
importances) ambiguity arises from whether the lower prediction of some product 
preferences was due to consumers not applying their tangible attribute importances 
and human values, or alternatively due to consumers having insufficient beliefs to 
select the product that matches their evaluations.  Thus, a limitation of the present 
study is the uncertainty of whether the inclusion of a belief component would 
increase the predictive power of the model and more definitively determine the role 
of beliefs.   
 
 However, though the accuracy of prediction may increase with the inclusion of a 
belief component, the general conclusions of the current study may not alter.  The 
addition of the belief component to tangible attribute importances may yield a 
stronger prediction of product preference than tangible attribute importances alone, 
and the addition of the belief component to human values, such as which tangible 
attributes reinforce which human values, may increase the predictive power of 
human values on tangible attribute importances and consequently the overall strength 
of the indirect route.  However, the direct route of value influence may also increase 
in strength if a belief component were added, such as which product-wholes 
reinforce which human values, and therefore the differences in the strengths of the 
two routes would be narrowed.  Thus, although the overall accuracy of prediction 
may change with the addition of a belief component, the attribute-mediation 
approach would probably still not fully account for the influence of human values on 
consumer choices.  Of course, the outcome is speculative and is simply stated for 
consideration. 
 
 As to other limitations of the study, critics of the survey method often level a 
“consistency” argument that the participants may rate the items on a scale simply to 
appear consistent with their responses on another scale, and not because the 
responses represent their actual preferences.  Feldman and Lynch (1988) for 
example, argue that an association found between attitudes and behaviour could be 
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due to respondents completing the behaviour measure to appear consistent with the 
attitude measure.  Thus, a limitation of the current study is that in the meat product 
section respondents may inaccurately estimate the number of times they had eaten 
meat in the previous three days.  Some respondents who, for example, emphasised 
nutrition and health-based tangible attribute importances may have felt compelled to 
understate their meat consumption.  However, the kind of bias argued for by Feldman 
and Lynch seems most likely to occur when the behaviour is measured on a metric 
scale, and therefore is only possible in the meat product section of the survey.  The 
possibility that respondents would list automobiles they have never owned or holiday 
destinations they have never visited seems unlikely.  Given that implausibility and 
that automobiles were the most strongly predicted by tangible attribute importances 
suggests the association found between tangible attribute importances and product 
preference is not an artefact of the survey method but is instead indicative of 
consumers’ cognitive structure.  The same rationale applies to the association found 
between human values and product preference.  
 
 A final limitation of the examination of the attribute-mediation approach 
hypotheses is that the survey methodology and regression procedures show an 
association and interconnection among human values, tangible attribute importances, 
and product preference; not a causation.  To show causation not only requires an 
association between variables, but also that one variable occurs before the other and 
that no other reasonable cause for the outcome exists (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & 
Black, 1992).  The survey approach does not allow the isolation and manipulation of 
the independent variables to gauge their effects on the dependent variable.  
Theoretical arguments put forth by researchers such as Rokeach (1968, 1973) and 
Feather (1975), discussed in Chapter I, is that the flow of influence is from human 
values to attitudes and to behaviour, or as in the current context, from human values 
to tangible attribute importances to product preference.  Nevertheless, these are still 
only theoretical arguments and the direction or existence of causality in the study is 
indeterminate. 
 
 Although the current study does have limitations, among its strengths are that a 
heterogeneous product set was used, care was taken to ensure that the lists of 
 87
tangible attributes were comprehensive, the broad scope of the Rokeach Value 
Survey, and that product preference was indexed as actual product purchase and 
ownership.  Thus, H1 and H2 can cautiously be accepted and the conclusion made 
that when the attribute-mediation approach is properly limited to tangible attributes it 
cannot fully account for the influence of human values on product preference.  
Intangible attributes, although not central, are still of consequence to value influence.  
That conclusion is consistent with McCracken’s (1988), Holbrook and Moore’s 
(1981), and Keaveney and Hunt’s (1992) expectancy-value theory criticism that 
although intangible attributes are carried on an agglomeration of tangible attributes, 
that portion of product preference consumers derive from an evaluation of the 
product’s intangible attributes cannot be determined solely from consumer 
preferences for the product’s tangible attributes.  Intangible attributes are more than 
the sum of tangible ones.   
 
 Given that expectancy-value theory and the multi-attribute model are not able to 
include intangible attributes without violating the assumption that consumers 
evaluate each attribute independently, the attribute-mediation approach will probably 
never fully account for the influence of human values on product preference.  
Nevertheless, the attribute-mediation approach should not be rejected completely 
because the indirect route was the predominant mode of value influence.  Instead, a 
more comprehensive conceptual model should be developed which builds upon the 
success of the attribute-mediation approach and can account for intangible attributes 
and the direct route of value influence.  Part II of the present thesis pursues such a 
model, but before proceeding, the results of the current study should be examined 
more thoroughly to help determine the direction the new conceptual model should 
take.  Particular attention should be paid to those findings relating to the direct route 
because the direct route is the most in need of theoretical and conceptual 
development.  The findings of the current study can be more thoroughly examined in 
three ways: 1) by considering the significance of the products that are most strongly 
influenced by the direct route, 2) by considering the human values that tend to 
influence product preference through the direct route, and 3) by determining which 
individuals tend to use the direct route and the human values that characterise those 
individuals.  As a forewarning, the results of the procedures in the present section are 
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not meant to form a definitive conclusion about what the new approach to the 
influences of human values on consumer choices should comprise, but rather, they 
are intended to gain only modest insight.  Thus, the following procedures and their 
conclusions are made in the spirit of exploration and should be taken as such.  
 
 The results of the current study can be examined more thoroughly by considering 
the significance of the products that are most strongly influenced by the direct route 
of human values.  Out of the eight product classes, human values had the strongest 
direct influence on red meat consumption (see “Change in R” column in Table 13).  
The anticipation was that human values would influence preferences for both red and 
white meat through an alternative route to tangible attribute importances because 
Katz (1960) suggests that operant conditioning during early socialisation lead to 
predominately affective/holistic judgements.  However, the direct route was much 
stronger for red meat than white meat, which could be due to red meat being judged 
more affectively and holistically than white meat, but the reason why red meat is 
judged more affectively than white meat is difficult to conceive.  More likely, human 
values influence red meat consumption more so than white meat consumption 
because of the differences in their intangible attributes.  In fact, several sociologists 
and anthropologists have argued that red meat more so than white meat has potent 
symbolic meaning that refers to masculine identity and social power values (e.g., 
Adams, 1990, 1994; Fiddes, 1989; Heisley, 1990; Twigg, 1983).  For example, 
Heisley’s (1990) study found that meat, particularly red meat, symbolises 
masculinity and strength whilst fruits, vegetables and grains generally symbolise 
femininity and weakness.  Similarly, Twigg (1983) outlines a hierarchy of food 
symbolism in which red meat occupies the second highest position (just short of the 
taboo items of human flesh, carnivores, and uncastrasted animals) but more powerful 
than white meat, fish and so on.  She observes “deeply embedded in dominant 
culture is the idea of animal food as containing certain qualities, a particular power.  
This power centres around the qualities of strength, aggression, passion, sexuality - 
all that culture has traditionally designated as humankind’s animal nature” (p. 22).  
Twigg continues, “men in particular are thought in some sense to need meat, 
especially red meat, and a series of masculine qualities are encapsulated in the ideal 
of redbloodedness” (p. 24).  Thus, the potency of the symbolic, intangible attributes 
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of a product and the attributes’ roles in reinforcing and expressing the identities of 
social groups and individuals could be one explanation for why human values 
directly influence product preference.   
 
 The results of the current study can also be more thoroughly examined by 
contemplating the human values that tend to influence product preference through 
the direct route.  An inspection of the detailed reports of the regressions (Table 11 
and Table 12) reveals that for Smaller Car ownership human value factor #10 
predicted product preference in the human values only regression, but not in Block 2 
of the two-block regression.  Thus, human value factor #10 influenced Smaller Car 
ownership indirectly via tangible attribute importances.  For Larger Car ownership, 
human value factors #8 and #4 predicted product preference in the human values 
only regression, but factor #6 emerged in Block 2 of the two-block regression.  Thus, 
factor #6 influenced product preference directly whereas #8 and #4 influenced 
indirectly via tangible attribute importances.  For Luxury Car ownership factor #10 
influenced product preference directly as evidence by its entrance in the second 
block of the two-block regression, and factors #2 and #5 influenced indirectly as they 
entered the human values only regression but not Block 2 of the two-block 
regression.  For Major Cities, holidaying factors #10 and #11 influenced product 
preference directly.  For Prestige and Structured holidaying factors #3, #8 and #11 
predicted product preference in the human values only regression, but only #8 and 
#11 were entered in Block 2 of the two-block regression.  Thus, factors #8 and #11 
influence product preference directly and  #3 influenced indirectly via tangible 
attribute importances.  For Safe and Tropical holidaying, factor #10 influenced 
product preference directly.  For red meat consumption factors #1, #2 and #6 
influenced product preference directly.  Finally, for white meat consumption human 
value factor #6 influenced product preference directly and #3 influenced indirectly. 
 
 Across all the relations summarised above, two human value factors show some 
degree of consistency.  In three product classes each, human value factors #6 and #10 
influenced product preference directly (and in only one instance did factor #10 
influence indirectly).  The probability that any factor always predicts product 
preference through the same route is slim.  Human value factor #10 contained a non-
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interpretable set of human values, but Factor #6 comprised the human values of Inner 
Harmony, Self-respect and National Security, the former two of which correspond to 
Schwartz and Bilsky’s (1990) Maturity domain.  The readers may recall that 
Schwartz and Bilsky developed a topology of human values based on the motivations 
and interests the values serve.  Maturity values foster the development and 
expression of the ideal self-concept, and engender an appreciation of oneself, others 
and the surrounding world.  Thus, an intriguing possibility is that when human 
values influence product preference directly they do so because the product functions 
to maintain and enhance the individual’s identity.  As readily apparent, the emphasis 
on self-realisation and expression is consistent with the previous exposition on the 
potency of red meat’s symbolic meaning and its possible role in reinforcing and 
expressing personal and social identities. 
 
 The final way the results of the current study can be examined more thoroughly 
is by determining which individuals tend to use the direct route and the human 
values that characterise those individuals.  Thus, though the current examination and 
the one in the previous paragraph both attempt to uncover human values associated 
with direct and indirect influences of human values, the focus of the previous 
examination was whether some human values tended to influence product preference 
through specific routes, whereas the current section examines whether those 
individuals who tend to use one route to the other can be characterised by their 
endorsement of specific human values.  Unfortunately, the primary results of the 
examination of the attribute-mediation approach hypotheses cannot be used for the 
current purpose because an indication is needed of the strengths of the direct and 
indirect routes of human value influence for each individual.  The examination of the 
attribute-mediation approach hypotheses was made for the sample as a whole and at 
the level of the product, not at the level of individual consumer.  Thus, the method 
used to determine the strengths of each individual’s direct and indirect human value 
influences is the “Residual Method”, which is discussed at greater length in method 
section of Study 3 (beginning on page 191).  Readers are encouraged to preview 
those pages before proceeding.  The limitations of the procedure are also spelt out in 
those pages, but given the exploratory spirit of the present investigation the 
limitations of the Residual Method are acceptable. 
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 Due to the multitude of calculations the Residual Method requires, only two 
product classes were examined: Smaller Family Cars and red meat.  As the main 
analysis in the current study found, Smaller Family Cars had the strongest indirect 
route of value influence and so is the best representative of the indirect route, 
whereas red meat consumption had the strongest direct route of value influence and 
so is the best representative of that route.  For each regression, factor scores were 
entered instead of the individual items.  Human values comprised 13 factors, car 
tangible attribute importances 5 and meat tangible attribute importances 6.  As the 
Residual Method is anchored in the relative prediction accuracy of the regressions, 
the absolute accuracy of prediction is less critical and therefore a step-wise entrance 
of independent variables was not needed.  Thus, all independent variables were used 
and they were entered simultaneously (i.e., full-entry method).  The regressions 
performed are listed below. 
 
Smaller Family Car Residual Method 
 
• The 5 automobile tangible attribute importance factors were regressed onto each 
of the 13 human value factors. 
 
• The residuals from the preceding regression analyses (e.g., 13 human value 
factors minus their co-variation with automobile tangible attribute importances) 
were regressed onto the percentage of the individual’s automobile ownerships 
that were Smaller Family Cars.  For each individual, the residual of the 
regression shows how accurately the direct influence of human values predicts 
his or her Smaller Family Car ownership and will be termed the “Smaller Family 
Car DIR”. 
    
• The 13 human value factors (full variance) were regressed onto the residual of 
the preceding analysis (e.g., Smaller Family Car ownership minus the direct 
influence of human values).  For each individual, the residual of the regression 
shows how accurately the indirect influence of human values predicts his or her 
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Smaller Family Car ownership and will be termed the “Smaller Family Car IIR”. 
 
 
Red Meat Residual Method 
 
• The 6 meat tangible attribute importance factors were regressed onto each of the 
13 human value factors. 
 
• The residuals from the preceding regression analyses (e.g., 13 human value 
factors minus their co-variation with meat tangible attribute importances) were 
regressed onto the percentage of the individual’s food consumption that was red 
meat.  For each individual, the residual of the regression shows how accurately 
the direct influence of human values predicts his or her red meat consumption 
and will be termed the “Red Meat DIR”. 
 
• The 13 human value factors (full variance) were regressed onto the residual of 
the preceding analysis (e.g., red meat consumption minus the direct influence of 
human values).  For each individual, the residual of the regression indicates how 
accurately the indirect influence of human values predicts his or her red meat 
consumption and will be termed the “Red Meat IIR”. 
 
 
 Due to the large number of regressions, the factors that may affect their stability 
and integrity were only examined for a small, randomly selected pool of ten 
regressions.  A visual inspection of the residual plots for the pool of regression 
showed that each did not deviate substantially from linearity and was homoscedastic, 
and an inspection of the normal probability plots suggested that the distributions 
were essentially normal.  Concerning all the regressions, as the independent variables 
are human value and tangible attribute importance scores from un-rotated factor 
analyses, a perusal of the correlation matrix confirmed that the factors are un-
correlated.  Finally, the minimum subject-to-variable ratio suggested ranges from 10 
to an absolute minimum of 4 respondents per variable, for which each regression in 
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the current analysis easily exceeds.   
 
 Also due to the large number of regressions performed in the Residual Method, 
only the results of the final two regressions, those used to separate individuals based 
on strength of their direct influence (DIR) and indirect influence (IIR), are reported.  
The direct influence regression onto Smaller Family Car ownership resulted in a 
Multiple R of .10 (F(13,307)=.3, p=.99) and the indirect influence regression onto 
Smaller Family Car ownership resulted in a Multiple R of .13 (F(13,307)=.4, p=.96).  
The direct influence regression onto red meat consumption resulted in a Multiple R 
of .28 (F(13,289)=1.9, p<.05) and the indirect influence regression onto red meat 
consumption resulted in a Multiple R of .08 (F(13,289)=.1, p=.99).  As a whole, the 
absolute strengths of the regressions are not crucial.  What is important is whether 
for each individual, and for each product, the direct influence regression (DIR) or the 
indirect influence regression (IIR) yielded a more accurate prediction of their product 
ownership.  Following those determinations, the individuals can be profiled on their 
human values.  
 
 The separation of the sample according to whether their Smaller Family Car DIR 
or Smaller Family Car IIR more accurately predicted their Smaller Family Car 
ownership resulted in 151 respondents for whom the DIR was a superior predictor of 
their Smaller Family Car ownership (direct influence group), and 170 for whom the 
IIR was superior (indirect influence group).  Discriminant analysis was then used to 
profile the groups on their human values.  The 40 human values were entered into a 
step-wise discriminant analysis with a p-value required for entrance of .20 (the p-
value criterion was relaxed from .05 to .20 due to the exploratory nature of the 
analysis).  The discriminant analysis yielded a significant function (Eigenvalue=.13, 
df=7, p<.001) and could correctly predict 64% of the group memberships, 
significantly better than chance (Press’s Q=25.8, p<.001) though the significance of 
the Press’s Q may be affected by the large sample size. The Box’s M for the analysis 
(M=26.25, p=.34) is non-significant, indicating that the groups meet the requirement 
in discriminant analysis of equal co-variance matrices. The human values that met 
the entrance criteria and their discriminant loadings are: Broad-minded -.46, 
Cheerful .28, Equity .29, Family Security .45, Imaginative -.33, Inner Harmony .61, 
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and Pleasurable Life -.41.  The sign of the discriminant loadings shows that being 
Broad-minded, Imaginative, and having a Pleasurable Life are preferred most by 
those individuals for whom the direct influence of human values more accurately 
predicted their Smaller Family Car ownership than the indirect influence of human 
values, whereas being Cheerful, and having Equity, Inner Harmony and Family 
Security are preferred most by those individuals for whom the indirect influence of 
human values more accurately predicted their Smaller Family Car ownership than 
the direct influence.  These findings will be more fully discussed after reporting the 
red meat consumption Residual Method and discriminant analysis. 
 
 The re-separation of the sample according to whether their Red Meat DIR or Red 
Meat IIR more accurately predicted their red meat consumption resulted in 146 
respondents for whom the DIR was a superior predictor of their red meat 
consumption (direct influence group), and 157 for whom the IIR was superior 
(indirect influence group).  The 40 human values were entered into a step-wise 
discriminant analysis with a p-value required for entrance of .20 that yielded a 
significant function (Eigenvalue=.06, df=7, p<.05) and could correctly predict 58% 
of the group memberships, significantly better than chance (Press’s Q=7.9, p<.01) 
though the significance of the Press’s Q may be affected by the large sample size. 
The Box’s M for the analysis (M=30.7, p=.36) is non-significant, indicating that the 
groups meet the requirement in discriminant analysis of equal co-variance matrices.  
The human values that met the entrance criteria and their discriminant loadings are: 
Comfortable Life -.33, World of Beauty -.42, Equity .39, Freedom .37, National 
Security .41, Responsible -.46, and True Friendship .49.  The signs of the 
discriminant loadings show that having A Comfortable Life, A World of Beauty, and 
being Responsible are preferred most by those individuals for whom the direct 
influence of human values more accurately predicted their red meat consumption 
than the indirect influence of human values, whereas having Equity, Freedom, 
National Security and True Friendship are preferred most by those individuals for 
whom the indirect influence of human values more accurately predicted their red 
meat consumption ownership than the direct influence.  
 
 For both products, Smaller Family Cars and red meat, those individuals using the 
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direct route seem to be characterised by three sets of human values: aesthetics, 
maturity and hedonism.  The aesthetic value of A World of Beauty is consistent with 
the direct route representing the attention to intangible attributes such as aesthetics 
and symbolic meaning.  Moreover, the emphasis on maturity values (e.g., 
Responsible, Imaginative, Broad-minded) is consistent with a previous examination 
that showed human value Factor #6, which largely comprised maturity values, tended 
to influence product preference through the direct route.  The readers may recall that 
Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) suggest that maturity values foster the development and 
expression of the ideal self-concept, and engender an appreciation of oneself, others 
and the surrounding world.  The Residual Method and discriminant analyses also 
showed that individuals who tended to apply their human values through the direct 
route were characterised by their endorsement of hedonistic and sensuous values 
such as A Pleasurable Life and A Comfortable Life, which had thus far not been 
given enough consideration.  Whist the recognition was made that meat consumption 
is governed by an affective, category-based judgement, the emergence of hedonistic 
values with the direct route for both red meat and Smaller Family Cars suggests that 
affectively may be a particularly important feature of the direct influence of human 
values.  
 
 As to the indirect route, two major sets of human values seem to characterise 
those individuals who apply their human values via tangible attribute importances.  
The first is an emphasis on inter-personal relationships (e.g., Family Security, True 
Friendship) and the second is a concern about security (e.g., Family Security, 
National Security).  Whilst drawing any firm conclusions from these diverse value 
preferences is problematic, the concern about security does suggest that these 
individuals make careful and cautious choices, which is to some extent consistent 
with the indirect route representing an expectancy-value, piecemeal, attribute-by-
attribute judgement. 
 
 Overall, the examination of the human values those individuals who use each 
route of value influence, suggests that the direct route is associated with a concern 
about aesthetics, the development and expression of the ideal self, and affective and 
sensuous experience, whereas the indirect route is associated with an emphasis on 
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security and inter-personal relationships.  The examination of the human value 
factors that influenced product preference through the direct route also showed that 
the direct influence route is associated with maturity values and the development and 
expression of the ideal self.  Moreover, the finding that red meat is strongly and 
directly influenced by human values, but white meat is not, also suggested that the 
direct route is associated with potent symbolic meanings that may reinforce and 
express the identities of individuals and social groups.  Thus, evidence is converging 
that the direct route of value influence is characterised by affectivity, symbolic 
meanings, aesthetics, and the development and expression of the self.   
 
To conclude, the examination of Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s (1989) 
Multi-attribute Approach, Gutman’s (1982) Means-end Chain Theory, and Scott and 
Lamont’s (1973) Centrality of Beliefs Approach showed that when the basic 
attribute-mediation approach is properly limited to tangible attributes the influence 
of human values cannot be fully accounted for, and the inability was greater for those 
products that consumers probably evaluate intangible attributes.  Thus, both tangible 
and intangible attributes appear consequential to the influence of human values, as 
are the different ways tangible and intangible attributes are judged (e.g., piecemeal, 
attribute-by-attribute, versus holistic, category-based).  Accordingly, a new approach 
and conceptual model are needed that build on the success of the attribute-mediation 
approach, given that it accounted for the largest share of value influence, but also 
incorporate intangible attributes and the direct influence of human values that is 
likely associated with symbolic meanings, aesthetics, affectivity, sensuousness, and 
the expression of consumers’ personal and social identities. 
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PART TWO: THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT 
INFLUENCES OF HUMAN VALUES 
 
 
CHAPTER IV.  THE PRODUCT MEANING APPROACH TO THE 
INFLUENCES OF HUMAN VALUES ON CONSUMER CHOICES 
 
 
 
 The results of Study 1 showed that when the attribute-mediation approach is 
properly limited to tangible attributes it cannot fully account for the influences of 
human values on product preference and that the inability is greater for those 
products evaluated on their intangible attributes.  Therefore, a new conceptual model 
of how consumers’ choice of products are influenced by the human values they 
endorse is needed that builds on the success of the attribute-mediation approach and 
can also account for the direct influence of human values that is likely associated 
with intangible attributes such as symbolic meaning and aesthetics, a category-based 
judgement, affectivity and sensuousness, and the expression of the self.  
 
 A fruitful avenue to pursue in developing such a conceptual model is the 
meaning products hold for consumers because a “product meaning approach to value 
influence” can embody central features of the attribute-mediation approach (e.g., 
tangible attributes and a piecemeal, attribute-by-attribute type of judgement) and the 
features of the direct route of human value influence (e.g., intangible attributes and a 
holistic, category-based judgement).  Moreover, a product meaning approach can 
more closely define the composition of both tangible and intangible attributes, 
judgement type, the psychological function being served, and the routes through 
which human values operate to influence the evaluations of product meanings. 
 
 The first section of the current chapter develops such an approach, first 
reviewing the nature of meaning, then the categories of product meanings, where the 
general categories of product meanings are “located” in the product, what type of 
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judgement the meanings are assessed with, and finally, how consumers use human 
values to evaluate the meanings.  Although the primary emphasis of Part II of the 
thesis is the product meaning approach to the influence of human values, a functional 
perspective is also offered that supplements the overly structural product meaning 
approach with an impetus or drive factor.  The functional perspective is how the 
psychological functions of an individual’s human values evaluate the psychological 
functions of his or her preferred product meanings, and several propositions are 
made about how the psychological functions may manifest in the value influence 
routes.   
 
 The chapter reviews a diverse range of theoretical and empirical research, and 
therefore readers are advised to preview the final conceptual model of the product 
meaning approach to value influence (see Figure 1 on page 21 for a schematic 
representation and Table 1 on page 22 for a more detailed tabular form).  In the 
product meaning approach, the route of value influence outlined in the attribute-
mediation approach (e.g., via tangible attribute importances) is suggested to be 
restricted to when consumers attend to the utilitarian meanings of products, make a 
piecemeal, attribute-by-attribute type of judgement, and the product serves an 
instrumental psychological function.  The alternative, direct route of value influence 
uncovered in Study 1 is generally used when consumers attend to the symbolic 
meanings of products, make an affective, category-based type of judgement, and the 
product serves an expressive psychological function.  Admittedly, the conceptual 
model aims to be broad enough to apply to most contexts, and consequently over-
simplifies the complex differences among types of products, individuals, human 
values, product meanings, and judgements. 
 
A PRODUCT MEANING APPROACHPRODUCT MEANING 
APPROACHPRODUCT MEANING APPROACHPRODUCT MEANING 
APPROACH 
 
 Meaning is the relation among mind, object and word (Odgen & Richards, 1923) 
and many theoretical perspectives have been offered to explain the relation but three 
seem most applicable to the meanings of products.  These are: Osgood’s behaviourist 
approach, Richins semiotic perspective, and Szalay and Deese’ notion of 
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psychological meaning.  Following a brief overview of each perspective, the roles of 
human values in influencing consumer evaluations of product meanings are 
considered. 
 
 Osgood and his colleagues (e.g., Osgood, 1952; Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 
1957) suggest that individuals come to understand the meaning of words and other 
signs by making mediating representational responses.  The mediating response is a 
facsimile of the individual’s actual behaviour towards the object represented by the 
word or sign.  As Osgood (1952) states,  
 
“a pattern of stimulation which is not the object is a sign of the object if it evokes 
in an organism a mediating reaction, this (a) being some functional part of the 
total behaviour elicited by the object and (b) producing distinctive self-
stimulation that mediates response which would not occur without the previous 
associations of non-object and object patterns of simulation” (p.  204). 
 
Mediating responses, and meanings, emerge from direct experiences that link the 
sign and object, and also from associations with other words.  Thus, although the 
response towards the object is transferred to the sign, the sign itself may elicit 
responses independently of the object.  To measure meaning, Osgood developed the 
semantic-differential scale in which the respondent rates an object (or non-object) on 
a series of bipolar adjectives, such as “good versus bad”, “fast versus slow” and so 
on.  In a series of studies, Osgood (1957) found that the bipolar adjectives factor to 
three principal dimensions: evaluation (good versus bad), potency (strong versus 
weak) and activity (fast versus slow).  Among these dimensions, however, Osgood 
suggests the evaluative dimension is the most crucial to mediating responses. 
 
 Richins (1994) regards the meanings of products from a semiotic perspective and 
so before describing her approach semiotics is briefly outlined.  Semiotics is the “the 
science of signs” and the study of any medium as a sign system (Saussure, 1974).  
Signs are words, images and objects that comprise a “signifier” -- the material form 
of the sign -- and the “signified” -- the concept it represents.  Signs are organised into 
meaningful systems according to certain conventions or “codes” which are sets of 
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practices familiar to users of the medium.  Pierce (1931-1935) delineates three 
categories of signs: “iconic” signs resemble the signified, “indexical” signs are 
connected in some way to the signified, and “symbolic” signs do not resemble the 
signified and instead are arbitrary and purely conventional.  The extent to which the 
signified determines the signifier is referred as the “motivation” or “constraint”, and 
therefore, iconic signs are highly motivated whereas symbolic signs are not.  
Semioticians distinguish between two levels of meaning; denotative meaning is the 
manifest or overt level whereas connotative meaning is the latent level.  The 
connotative meanings include affectivity, subjective interpretation, human values and 
ideology, and “derive not from the sign itself, but from the way the society uses and 
values both the signifier and the signified” (Fiske & Hartley, 1978, p.  41). 
 
 From the semiotic perspective, Richins (1994) suggests products and other 
material possessions are signs interpreted by viewers using a code that assigns 
meaning.  Contrary to some traditional economic theories that assume a product’s 
value is contained in its ability to be exchanged (for an overview see, for example, 
Ng, 1984), Richins argues that meaning gives products value.  Richins makes the 
claim in part from the observation that often the importance consumers assign to 
some possessions (e.g., pets, family heirlooms, photographs, etc.) is disproportionate 
with the possessions’ exchange value, and further that a substantial function not 
captured by “economic value” is the role of products as signifiers of social 
relationships and personal preferences.  Consumers choose products based on the 
products’ meanings within a cultural system, not from an objective or universalistic 
exchange value.  Richins suggests that product meanings can be “public” in that they 
are assigned to the product by the society as a whole through institutions, 
communication systems and interpersonal structures, or they can be “private”.  
Private meanings are the sums of an individual’s subjective meanings and include 
both internalised public meanings and meanings that result from idiosyncratic 
experience.   
 
 What Richins (1994) considers private meanings, Szalay and Deese (1978) term 
“psychological meaning”.  Psychological meaning is the individual’s subjective 
perception and affective reaction towards an object, including linguistic and non-
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linguistic elements such as images.  The individual’s representations of nature, 
themselves and the world are organised as “subjective representational systems” in 
which each concept (e.g., Democracy) has a number of components (e.g., The Right 
to Vote, Free Speech, etc.).  Each of these components varies along three dimensions: 
dominance, affinity and affectivity.  Dominance is the centrality or importance of the 
component to the concept, affinity is the similarity between two component 
meanings, and affectivity is the positive or negative evaluation of the component. 
 
 Although each theory has a different emphasis, from Osgood’s behaviourism, to 
Richins’ semiotics, to Szalay and Deese’s psychological meanings, their conceptions 
of meaning are similar in three ways; 1) that some meanings are suffused with 
affectivity, 2) that some meanings are subjective, and 3) that meaning can be either 
linguistic or non-linguistic.  The former two features are consistent with the assertion 
that an individual’s human values would influence his or her evaluations of product 
meanings.  Like product meanings, human values are subjective and affectively 
charged, but unlike product meanings, human values are positioned at the top of the 
abstraction and generalisation hierarchy, which means they are centrally-held (e.g., 
what Szalay and Deese term “dominant”).  At lower positions in the hierarchy are 
beliefs and affectivity resulting from direct and indirect experiences with specific 
objects such as products.  So, human values are super-ordinate to product meanings 
and should direct attention to product meanings based on the dominance and 
similarity of each.  Human values and product meanings that are dominant in the 
system and are subjectively perceived as similar in content should result in the affect 
for the human value being transferred to the evaluation of the product meaning.  For 
example, an individual’s preference for the human value Prestige would not only 
direct their attention to products that have meanings similar to prestige, such as a 
Mercedes-Benz, but would also contribute to his or her positive or negative 
evaluation of the automobile. 
 
 As psychological meaning may be linguistic or non-linguistic, the evaluation of 
product meanings and application of human value criteria could vary in both memory 
representation (e.g., verbal or imaginal) and judgement type (e.g., piecemeal, 
attribute-by-attribute or holistic, category-based).  Moreover, to assume human 
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values are applied in the same manner to all product meanings would be overly 
simplistic.  As Study 1 has shown, such a one-dimensional view of human values is 
unfeasible.  Instead, the way in which human values influence the evaluations of 
product meanings probably varies with the type of meaning, and therefore the 
different categories of product meanings are outlined before the roles of human 
values are considered. 
 
Types of Product Meanings and Their Psychological Functionsof Product Meanings 
and Their Psychological Functionsof Product Meanings and Their Psychological 
Functionsof Product Meanings and Their Psychological Functions 
 
 Richins (1994) proposes four major categories of product meanings: utilitarian, 
enjoyment, representation of interpersonal ties, and identity and self-expression.  In 
contrast, several other researchers propose a simple utilitarian-symbolic distinction 
(Abelson, 1986; Abelson & Prentice, 1989; Dittmar, 1992; Hirschman, 1980; 
Kilbourne, 1991) which is borne out empirically.  Abelson and Prentice (1987) for 
example, used multi-dimensional scaling to reduce lists of respondents’ favourite 
possessions to a single dimension in which instrumental products (e.g., tools, 
automobiles, etc.) were opposed by those that symbolically express personal and 
social identities (e.g., family heirlooms, photos, etc.).   
 
 As the utilitarian-symbolic dimension is a major distinction among product 
meanings, the two routes of value influence found in Study 1, that is, the route 
proposed in the attribute-mediation approach and the alternative, direct route, could 
represent the influences of human values when consumers evaluate utilitarian and 
symbolic product meanings.  However, to formulate rationale for why that may be 
so, the natures of utilitarian and symbolic meanings must be elaborated.  The current 
section reviews the contents of utilitarian and symbolic meanings, where on the 
products the meanings are “located”, the types of judgement consumers use to 
evaluate them, and the psychological functions they signify.  Readers are forewarned 
that the current section, particularly on symbolic meaning, is lengthy as the section 
overviews various perspectives on utilitarian and symbolic meanings and the 
psychological functions the meanings represent.  Following the elaboration of 
utilitarian and symbolic meanings, reasons that human values influence consumer 
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evaluations of the meanings are put forth. 
 
Utilitarian MeaningMeaningMeaningMeaning 
 
 Utilitarian meaning represents the overt function the product serves in allowing 
the users to control their environment (Dittmar, 1992; Richins, 1994).  The meaning 
is derived from the product in-use and is intrinsically linked to convenience, 
efficiency and exchange in the traditional economic sense.  Examples of utilitarian 
meaning might be that a vacuum cleaner is for cleaning the carpet, a car is for getting 
from point A to point B, or a cellular telephone is for talking to a business associate.  
Hirschman (1980) suggests that as utilitarian meaning centres on the product and the 
product’s physical performance, the meaning tends to be objective; “arising” from 
the object through the five senses.  Similarly, Sheth, Newman and Gross (1991) 
argue that utilitarian meaning is “located” in objective and tangible attributes 
because tangible attributes reveal the quality of the product’s physical performance, 
degree of functionality and ability to control the environment.  For example, the 
utilitarian meaning of a vacuum cleaner would be found in such tangible attributes as 
the power of the motor, durability of construction, and proximity to the carpet, all of 
which impact the product's ability to clean. 
 
Psychological Function of Utilitarian MeaningFunction of Utilitarian 
MeaningFunction of Utilitarian MeaningFunction of Utilitarian Meaning 
 
 Beggan (1991), Csikszentimihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981) and Furby 
(1978) suggest that a fundamental psychological function products serve is to give 
the user a feeling of “instrumentality”, that is, that he or she can control and 
manipulate the environment competently and effectively.  Furby’s (1978) suggestion 
that products serve an instrumental psychological function is based on the central 
role some theorists, such as Adler (1929) and Seligman (1975), give to the need for 
control.  Adler argued that feelings of competency and mastery are basic human 
needs, and Seligman suggested that objects that become internalised as the self are 
those that “exhibit near-perfect correlation between motor command and the visual 
kinaesthetic feedback; while those objects that do not become the world’ (pp.  141-
142).  Some studies have found that the more that individuals have control of a 
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product the greater the product is incorporated into their self-definitions (Beggan, 
1991; Prelinger, 1959).  Beggan (1991), for example, found that the inducement of 
control deprivation on those participants who generally felt in control their 
environment (e.g., had a high internal locus of control) resulted in the increased 
importance of possessions that generally give control.  The inducement of control 
deprivation did not alter the importance of possessions for those participants with an 
external locus of control. 
 
 Although some researchers such as Dittmar (1992) and Richins (1994) suggest 
that utilitarian meaning refers to the product’s ability to control the environment, the 
researchers did not explicitly state that the utilitarian meanings of products indicate 
how the products serve an instrumental psychological function.  The connection, 
however, is obvious; both an instrumental psychological function and utilitarian 
meaning centre on product in-use, physical performance, the control of the 
environment, and tangible attributes.  Concerning that final feature, clearly only the 
product’s tangible attributes can exhibit a correlation between motor command and 
visual kinaesthetic feedback. 
 
Symbolic MeaningMeaningMeaningMeaning 
 
 Beyond the objective meaning of tangible attributes are levels of intangible 
attributes with subjective meanings (Friedman, 1986; Hirschman, 1980).  Some of 
those subjective meanings are the result of idiosyncratic experiences and others are 
assigned to the product by society through institutions, communication systems and 
interpersonal structures.  The culturally shared and intangible attributes comprise the 
product’s image or symbolism (Dittmar, 1992; Levy, 1959).  Symbolic meaning is 
closely tied to the culturally constituted world, and though one could argue that even 
utilitarian meaning is culturally constituted, Verkuyten (1995) suggests that symbols 
are characterised by representation being central.  As Kilbourne (1991) states, “the 
term symbolic possession is not intended to imply that there is not symbolism in 
functional possession.  Rather it is intended here to refer to possession in which the 
symbolic takes precedence over the functional” (p.  450).  A similar notion is 
expressed by Firth (1973) who suggests that symbols are subjective, complex sets of 
 105
abstract beliefs associated with an object or action that represent an entity extrinsic 
to the physical form of the object.  Likewise, Gusfield and Michalowicz (1984) and 
Turner (1969) argue that symbols are characterised by their location outside the 
means-goal relationship and emphasise that even the actors may be unaware of their 
use of symbols. 
 
 McCracken (1988) observes that if symbols are cultural constitutions then 
schemes for describing the culturally constituted world should elucidate the nature 
and content of symbolic meaning.  McCracken suggests that culturally constituted 
meanings consist of two elements: cultural principles and cultural categories.  
Cultural principles are the ideals and human values that determine how cultural 
phenomena are organised, evaluated and ranked.  Culture categories are the 
conceptual grids that divide the phenomenological world into smaller parcels; from 
categories of time, to species of animals, and to social categories such as gender, 
status and so on.  Sensibly, as symbols refer to the culturally constituted world they 
can comprise cultural principles or categories.  An American flag, for example, may 
symbolise “Freedom” (a principle) or a cellular telephone may symbolise “yuppies” 
(a cultural category).  However, the dichotomy is misleading as all symbols represent 
social categories and principles simultaneously.  The American flag not only 
represents the cultural principle “Freedom” but also the social category “Americans”. 
 
 An additional feature of symbolic meaning is its “location” on a particular 
configuration of tangible attributes; what was termed the product-whole level such as 
brand, class or category.  The readers might recall from Chapter II that with 
intangible attributes such as symbolic meaning or aesthetics the product is likely to 
be evaluated in a holistic, category-based judgement because intangible attributes are 
tied to a specific configuration of tangible attributes, resulting in the instantaneous 
evaluation of the product (e.g., Holbrook & Moore, 1981; Keaveney & Hunt, 1992; 
McCracken, 1988).  McCracken (1988), for example, argues that the symbolic 
meaning of clothing is judged holistically because the meaning of some clothing 
outfits (i.e., punk rockers, business-persons, etc.) lose their interpretability (to mean 
“punk rocker” or “business-person”) if any part of the outfit is changed.  
Interpretation is limited to the form the product was in when meaning was initially 
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transferred to it via advertising or the fashion system, and so, unlike the linguistic 
models of meaning (and the expectancy-value model), the elements that comprise 
symbolic meaning are not interchangeable and the creation of new meaning is 
limited. 
 
 The symbolic meanings of products are generally measured through one of two 
methods.  In the first method, respondents are instructed to describe the traits and 
characteristics of the typical user of the product (e.g., Belk, Bahn & Mayer, 1982; 
Birdwell, 1968; Grubb & Hupp, 1968; Levy, 1959; Munson & Spivey, 1981; Ross, 
1971; Rudmin, 1991; Sirgy, 1982).  In the second method, respondents are instructed 
to list the words or phrases that come to mind when they think of the product (e.g., 
Elliott, 1994; Hirschman, 1981; Swartz, 1983; Szaly & Deese, 1978).  Of particular 
interest to researchers using both methods, is the extent symbolic meanings are 
culturally shared.  Some researchers have found that individuals can make consistent 
inferences about product users (Belk, 1978) or list similar words and phrases when 
thinking about a product (Szaly & Deese, 1978), but other researchers have found 
that symbolic meanings have a low consensus (e.g., Elliott, 1994; Hirschman, 1981; 
Swartz, 1983).  Those researchers finding a low consensus suggest that although a 
consensus is required for the creation of symbolic meanings, once constructed the 
meanings can be redefined by sub-groups, making the meanings diffuse.  Elliott 
(1994), for example, found that some clothing outfits had a low consensus among the 
population as a whole but were generally understood by younger participants whom 
he suggested “actively engage in symbolic work to challenge the assumptions of 
powerful ideologies and controlling institutions” (p.  14). 
 
Psychological Function of Symbolic MeaningFunction of Symbolic 
MeaningFunction of Symbolic MeaningFunction of Symbolic Meaning 
 
 Symbols serve two primary psychological functions: development and 
organisation of knowledge, and the expression of self-concepts and identities.  Many 
theories have been put forth about how symbolic meaning serves these two 
psychological functions (e.g., Belk, Bahn & Mayer, 1982; Birdwell, 1968; Cooley, 
1902; Dittmar, 1992; Dolich, 1969; Felson, 1978; Green, Maheshwari & Rao, 1969; 
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Hong & Zinkhan, 1995; Levy, 1959; McCracken, 1988; Mead, 1934; Newman, 
1957; Orpen & Low, 1973; Samli & Sirgy, 1981; Sirgy, 1980; Solomon, 1983; 
Wallendorf & Arnould, 1988; Verkuyten, 1995).  However, three of the above 
theories are dealt with presently: Mead (1934) and Cooley’s (1902) symbolic-
interactionism theory, Verkuyten’s (1995) social representation approach, and 
McCracken’s (1988) system of meaning transfer theory.  After the three theories are 
briefly reviewed, important features that are absent from the theories are 
compensated with other approaches such as Johar and Sirgy’s (1991) self-congruity 
theory, Wicklund and Gollwitzer’s (1982) symbolic self-completion theory, among 
others.   
 
 Of the various theories of the functions of symbolic meaning George Herbert 
Mead’s (1934) and Charles Cooley’s (1902) symbolic-interactionism theory is 
perhaps the best known.  In symbolic-interactionism theory, identity is suggested to 
develop from self-reflexivity, or taking the perspective of the other, which can only 
occur through a socially shared meaning system and the ability for role taking in 
which self, others and objects are designated and represented symbolically.  Through 
the symbolic representation of groups, social roles and objects, individuals can 
acquire knowledge of social reality that allows them to interpret the behaviour of 
others, both specific individuals and aggregates such as reference groups, families 
and so on.  Moreover, the knowledge of the social world allows individuals to 
imagine how other people perceive them and through the imagination, or self-
reflexivity, the self-concept develops.  In symbolic-interactionism theory, then, an 
individual’s self-definition is wholly social.   
 
 A useful way to clarify symbolic-interactionism theory is through an example, 
offered by Dittmar (1992), who suggests that a girl comes to understand what it 
means to be a mother through enacting the role with a doll.  Through experience the 
girl learns the meanings attached to dolls by interacting with others who treat her 
differently because of her doll ownership or alternatively refer to the characteristics 
of other doll owners (e.g., “You will be a good mother because you treat your doll so 
well” or “Isn’t that girl with a doll nice”).  In essence, the doll serves as a role model 
and becomes an embodiment of the cultural meanings associated with motherhood, 
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both those meanings associated with the social role of a mother and those meanings 
associated with the personal attributes of mothers (e.g., supportive, caring, etc.).  
Moreover, as the girl owns a doll, in time the doll comes to symbolise her own 
gender identity, roles, and personal attributes.  Thus, as Solomon (1983) argues, 
consumer goods are symbolic objects that represent the social roles of others and 
socialise the individual to their own roles.  Products are not simply responses to 
internal needs, as some consumer theories speculate, but are social stimuli that 
motivate individuals to form role self-definitions through self-reflexive evaluation. 
 
 Verkuyten (1995) maintains that symbols are social representations, which are 
culturally shared systems of meaning that have a strong central core, and provide a 
common point of reference for knowledge, thought and action.  In particular, 
Verkuyten suggests that symbols are polemic social representations because they 
feature in inter-group conflicts by appealing to existing groups and creating new 
ones.  The creation of new groups occurs through the human values represented in 
the symbolic meaning; only those individuals who support the human value are 
addressed by the symbolic form.  For example, Verkuyten suggests that during the 
Gulf War the American Flag came to symbolise “imperialism” which left those 
opposed to imperialism feeling the flag did not represent them.  Symbols also appeal 
to pre-existing groups by expressing the groups’ worth and esteem.  When the 
American flag symbolised “imperialism”, the flag also symbolised pro-war 
supporters and their national identity, feelings of superiority, and pride in their 
country. 
 
 Verkuyten asserts that symbols refer to abstract, complex, and non-perceivable 
entities (e.g., human values, norms, ideals, etc.), and that symbols allow individuals 
to participate with the non-perceivable entities by experiencing them in a condensed, 
vivid, and materialised form.  For example, the American flag -- the symbolic form -- 
allows individuals to experience the symbolic content -- Freedom.  Applying 
Moscovici’s (1984) and Billig’s (1988) work with social representations to symbolic 
meaning, Verkuyten suggests three processes are necessarily for psychological 
participation with symbols.  Firstly, as unclassified and unnamed things are strange, 
alien, and threatening, an “anchoring” process cognitively integrates the represented 
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object into pre-existing systems of thought, and fosters ready-made opinions.  
Secondly, an “objectification” process turns unfamiliar, abstract concepts into 
concrete, familiar experiences.  Verkuyten comments “values, needs, norms and 
ideals are concretised so that the perceivable object (the symbolic form) embodies 
these abstract notions (symbolic content) and gets a symbolic meaning” (p.  270).  
Although Moscovici (1984) suggests anchoring and objectification are the principal 
processes of social representation, Billig (1988) argues that for every psychological 
process a counter-process must exist and that the counter-process to objectification is 
“transcendation” which transforms the material object into an abstraction.  Verkuyten 
accepts Billig’s argument and suggests that with symbols transcendation occurs when 
individuals abstract the symbolic meaning of the concrete object into broader 
meanings.  The abstraction is essentially psychological investment, which requires a 
unity between the symbolic form and content and that the objects are used self-
evidently and regularly. 
 
 In McCracken’s (1986, 1988) meaning transfer theory, the concern is how 
meaning moves from the culturally constituted world to the product and from the 
product to the individual.  McCracken suggests that initially, culturally constituted 
meanings are associated with the product through advertising and the fashion system.  
Through advertisements, for instance, consumers attribute to the good certain 
properties known in the culturally constituted world, creating a “metaphoric 
identification of sameness”.  Thus, the good comes to represent the culturally 
constituted meanings in isolation, and thereafter consumers can transfer the meaning 
from the good to themselves through various rituals.  In possession rituals, for 
example, consumers clean, display, reflect upon the product; each of which uses the 
culturally constituted meanings in the good to mark and reinforce consumers’ social 
identities and self-concepts. 
 
 The crucial aspect of Mead (1934) and Cooley’s (1902) symbolic-interactionism 
theory, Verkuyten’s (1995) social representation approach, and McCracken’s (1988) 
system of meaning transfer theory, is that the psychological functions of symbolic 
meaning are 1) to foster a knowledge of the social world, and 2) to maintain, express 
and enhance the individual’s self-concepts, social identities and human values.  
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McCracken attributes the latter function to rituals, Verkuyten to transcendation, and 
Mead and Cooley to taking the perspective of the other, but each theorist essentially 
suggests that psychological investment with a product occurs through its symbolic 
content.  However, whilst Mead, Cooley, Verkuyten and McCracken consider how 
psychological investment occurs via symbolic meaning, what the theorists do not 
address in detail is the need or motivation underlying the psychological investment.  
For those needs and motivations, Johar and Sirgy’s (1991) self-congruity theory, 
Wicklund and Gollwitzer’s (1982) symbolic self-completion theory, and other 
perspectives are more useful. 
 
 In Johar and Sirgy’s (1991) self-congruity theory, four needs and motivations are 
outlined that result in consumers preferring products with images consistent with 
their self-images.  Johar and Sirgy suggest that consumers who need self-consistency 
should prefer products that have an image consistent with their actual self-image.  
However, if a need for self-esteem is more important to some consumers than self-
consistency, these consumers should prefer products that have an image closer to 
their ideal self-image.  When consumers prefer a congruence between their actual 
social self-image (how they believe others perceive them) and the product’s image, 
the preference is due to a need for social consistency, and finally, when consumers 
prefer a congruency between their ideal social self-image (how they want others to 
perceive them) and the product’s image, the preference is from a need for social 
approval.   
 
Johar and Sirgy suggest that the type of congruity a consumer is seeking can be 
determined by measuring his or her self-concepts (actual and ideal, self and social 
self) on a semantic-differential scale (e.g., liberal versus conservative, cold versus 
warm, etc.), then measuring his or her perception of the product’s image on the same 
semantic-differential scale, and finally, calculating the difference.  A lower score 
indicates a greater congruence.  Several propositions from Johar and Sirgy’s 
typology have been supported (e.g., Hong & Zinkhan, 1995; Orpen & Low, 1973; 
Samli & Sirgy, 1981; Sirgy, 1980).  Hong and Zinkhan (1995), for example, found 
that a congruency between consumers’ perceptions of the image of the product and 
their actual self-image and ideal self-image resulted in greater product preference 
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and intention to purchase (though it did not affect brand recall).  In particular, Hong 
and Zinkhan found that the ideal self-concept elicited the strongest pull as consumers 
preferred advertisements consistent with their ideal self-concept to those simply 
consistent with their actual self-concept. 
 
 The importance of the ideal self-concept in the evaluation of product symbolic 
meaning is also stressed in three other theories and concepts: Wicklund and 
Gollwitzer’s (1982) symbolic self-completion theory, Solomon’s (1983) application 
of Mead (1934) and Cooley’s (1902) symbolic-interactionism theory, and 
McCracken’s (1988) notion of displaced ideals.  In Wicklund and Gollwitzer’s 
(1982) symbolic self-completion theory, consumers are suggested to use the 
symbolic meanings of products to compensate for low self-esteem caused by a lack 
of experience, expertise or competence.  Wicklund and Gollwitzer, for example, 
found those tennis players who recently began their careers were the most likely to 
adopt possessions symbolic of that profession, and thus concluded that products turn 
feelings of inadequacy to feelings of completeness by making consumers’ actual self-
image closer to their ideal self-image. 
 
 Solomon (1983), who is an advocate of Mead (1934) and Cooley’s (1902) 
symbolic-interactionism theory described earlier, makes a similar proposition as 
Wicklund and Gollwitzer (1982).  Solomon suggests that lack of experience in 
playing a particular role causes consumers to rely on products that are stereotypical 
of the role.  A common sense example offered by Solomon is how the nouveau riche 
are the most likely to purchase extravagant and ostentatious products whereas those 
who come from “old money” do not feel the need to show off their possessions.  
Solomon suggests that, through self-reflexivity, products that are symbolic of a new 
role allow consumers to create and enhance their role self-definitions. 
 
 Also expressing the importance of the ideal in product symbolism, McCracken 
(1988) suggests that products represent displaced ideals.  Displaced ideals range 
from personal ideals such as happiness or true friendship to political ideals such as 
democracy, but like all ideals, displaced ideals are on a different plane, representing a 
different era or some different people.  Consequently, products fill the gap between 
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the real and ideal and they do so for several reasons; products are concrete and 
enduring, are plentiful, have economic value that gives them symbolic value if 
beyond one’s purchasing power, and most important, products are synecdoche in that 
one can represent the whole ideal.  A wedding ring can symbolise the whole scene; a 
house with a white picket fence, a family, true love, and so on. 
 
Meaning, Judgement, and Human Values, Judgement, and Human Values, 
Judgement, and Human Values, Judgement, and Human Values 
 
 Having reviewed the two major categories of product meanings and the 
psychological functions they represent, the roles that human values play in 
influencing consumer evaluations of utilitarian and symbolic meanings of products 
can now be considered.  Before doing so, however, the theories and approaches to 
the meanings of products reviewed in the previous section should be regarded more 
critically in light of the suggestion, made in Chapter I, that any model of consumer 
decision processes should be tripartite; the model should specify what criteria 
consumers are using to evaluate products and where the criteria originate (e.g., 
attitudes, tangible attribute importances, human values, and so on), the judgement 
type that applies the criteria (e.g., a piecemeal, expectancy-value type of judgement 
or a holistic, category-based judgement), and the meaning that the product holds for 
consumers (e.g., utilitarian or symbolic).   
 
Those researchers reviewed in the previous section who skilfully profiled the 
types and categories of product meanings (e.g., Abelson, 1986; Abelson & Prentice, 
1989; Hirschman, 1980; Richins, 1994) failed to consider what types of judgement 
consumers use to evaluate the meanings, or what standard against which the product 
meaning is assessed.  For instance, Abelson and Prentice (1989) and Hirschman 
(1980) showed that utilitarian and symbolic meanings were the major categories of 
valued possessions but neither Abelson and Prentice nor Hirschman addressed 
whether the possessions are judged on a piecemeal or category-basis, and what 
consumer standards the possessions obviously meet (given that the possessions are 
valued).  
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 Likewise, most studies of symbolic meaning did not address how symbolic 
meaning is judged or the criteria consumers use to evaluate it (e.g., Elliott, 1994; 
Gusfield & Michalowicz, 1984; Hirschman, 1981; McCracken, 1988; Turner, 1969).  
Some theories and studies of symbolic meaning did link its evaluation to originating 
cognitive structures such as identity (e.g., Dittmar, 1992), social role definition (e.g., 
Firth, 1973; Mead, 1934; Cooley, 1902; Solomon, 1983), self-concept (e.g., Hong & 
Zinkhan, 1995; Johar & Sirgy, 1991; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982) or human values 
(e.g., Sears, Huddy, & Schaffer, 1986; Verkuyten, 1995).  However, none of those 
approaches considered how the product criteria formed from consumers’ identities, 
social role definitions, self-concepts and human values are applied in the judgement 
of the product, that is, whether the criteria are applied on a piecemeal basis or a 
category one.  In Mead’s (1934) and Cooley’s (1902) symbolic-interactionism theory, 
for instance, individuals are assumed to take the perspective of other to learn and 
express social roles through products, and in Verkuyten’s (1995) social 
representation approach, symbols are suggested to encapsulate group identities and 
human values, but neither Mead and Cooley nor Verkuyten specify whether the 
symbolic meaning is judged on a piecemeal or category basis.  Even the more 
psychological approaches to symbolic meaning, such as Johar and Sirgy’s (1991) 
self-congruity theory or Wicklund and Gollwitzer’s (1982) symbolic self-completion 
theory, ignore how the product is judged.  Most critically, all of the above approaches 
which link symbolic meaning to originating structures such as identity, social role 
definitions, self-concepts or human values, overlook the existence of utilitarian 
meaning and the psychological function it may represent.   
 
 Thus, the brief critique of current approaches to the meanings of products 
illustrates that no single approach or theory has integrated what is argued to be three 
elements important to understanding consumer decision processes: criteria, 
judgement type, and product meaning.  However, a conceptual model of how human 
values’ affect consumer evaluations of product meanings can be developed which 
includes all three elements.  The “product meaning approach to value influence” is 
founded in the supposition that as products comprise two major categories of 
meanings, utilitarian and symbolic, the two routes of value influence uncovered in 
Study 1 represent how human values influence consumer evaluations of those two 
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types of product meanings.  The readers would recall that Study 1 found that human 
values influence product preference through two routes; one via tangible attribute 
importances and a second, direct route, which increased in strength as intangible 
attributes such as symbolic meaning and aesthetics became more important to 
consumers’ evaluations of the product.  In the “product meaning approach to value 
influence”, the argument is that the route of human value influence proposed in the 
attribute-mediation approach (e.g., via tangible attribute importances) is only used 
when consumers attend to the products’ utilitarian meaning and make a piecemeal 
judgement, whereas the alternative, direct route of value influence is used when 
consumers attend to the product’s symbolic meaning and make an affective 
judgement.  Rationale for the suggestion is offered presently, but readers should bear 
in mind that the conceptual model aims to be broad enough to apply to most 
contexts, and therefore over-simplifies the complex relationships among different 
types of products, individuals, human values, product meanings and their 
judgements. 
 
Utilitarian Meaning, Piecemeal Judgement and the Indirect Route of Value 
InfluenceMeaning, Piecemeal Judgement and the Indirect Route of Value 
InfluenceMeaning, Piecemeal Judgement and the Indirect Route of Value 
InfluenceMeaning, Piecemeal Judgement and the Indirect Route of Value Influence 
 
 As reviewed, utilitarian meaning is the overt function the product serves in 
allowing the user to control his or her environment, is derived from the product in-
use, and is intrinsically linked to convenience, efficiency and exchange in the 
traditional economic sense.  Moreover, utilitarian meaning is located in tangible 
attributes for tangible attributes disclose the quality of the product’s physical 
performance, degree of functionality and ability to control the environment.  
Consequently, as a product’s utilitarian meaning is located in its tangible attributes, a 
consumer’s preference for the utilitarian meaning would be determined, in part, by 
his or her preferences for the product’s tangible attributes, and vice versa.  In either 
case, a consumer’s attention to a product’s utilitarian meaning should be associated 
with his or her human values mediating through tangible attribute importances to 
influence product preference. 
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 From such reasoning, the attribute-mediation approach, properly limited to 
tangible attributes to meet the assumption in expectancy-value theory that consumers 
evaluate each attribute independently, can probably only explain the influence that 
human values have on product preference when consumers are attending to the 
product’s utilitarian meanings.  Neither the attribute-mediation approaches to value 
influence (e.g., Gutman, 1982; Lindberg, Garling & Montgomery, 1989; Scott & 
Lamont, 1973) nor traditional expectancy-value theory (Fishbein, 1967; Rosenberg; 
1956) considered that their models may only be applicable when individuals are 
attending to utilitarian meanings.  However, other researchers have made such 
considerations (e.g., Holbrook & Moore, 1981; Johar & Sirgy, 1991).  Holbrook and 
Moore (1981), for instance, comment that when a product’s benefits are primarily 
utilitarian in nature “an intelligent decision maker might well focus on adding up the 
relative pros and cons so as to determine the bundle that offers the highest 
summative value” (p.16).  However, neither Holbrook and Moore nor similar critics 
(e.g., Johar & Sirgy) have verified their claims empirically.  The most current 
empirical evidence shows is that consumers evaluate utilitarian meaning through a 
judgement that is similar to the judgement outlined in expectancy-value theory (e.g., 
Chaudhuri & Buck, 1995).  For instance, Chaudhuri and Buck (1995) found that 
advertisements that employ a product information strategy and focus on the product’s 
utilitarian meaning are judged analytically (e.g., attribute-by-attribute, logical and 
serial). 
 
 Thus, the aim of Part II of the thesis is two-fold, firstly, to establish whether the 
influence of human values on product preference via tangible attribute importances is 
associated with the attention to utilitarian meaning, and secondly, whether the human 
value and tangible attribute importance criteria are applied in an expectancy-value 
type of judgement.  The readers might recall that Fiske and Pavelchak (1986) term 
the expectancy-value type of judgement a “piecemeal judgement”, which proceeds 
attribute-by-attribute to evaluate a product in a logical, systematic and 
comprehensive fashion, with overall product liking a result of the algebraic 
combination of the affect associated with each attribute (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986).  
Thus, attributes are evaluated anew each time encountered, each attribute is 
evaluated independently from other attributes, and each attribute and its evaluation 
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additively combines with other attribute-evaluations to form overall preference or 
attitude.  The piecemeal judgement requires effort and does not use prior experience 
to make inferences about missing attributes.   
 
 All the features of a piecemeal judgement just described can be subsumed under 
the broader category of “reasoning style”, but the piecemeal judgement can be 
delimited on other dimensions such as memory representation and affect latency and 
intensity.  Concerning the latter, due to the carefulness and thoroughness of a 
piecemeal judgement, the affect is probably delayed and is of low intensity (on the 
order of evaluation).  Evaluations make goodness or badness, like or dislike 
judgements, and are not intense affects such as emotional states and sensory 
experiences.  As to memory representation, a piecemeal judgement may comprise a 
verbal memory representation, which MacInnis and Price (1987) define as the 
combining of words and numbers in working memory to represent and solve 
problems.  One reason for the expectation that a verbal memory representation is a 
feature of a piecemeal judgement is that Miller (1987) synthesised various individual 
differences in cognitive styles (e.g., predispositions) and suggested, inter alia, that a 
verbal memory representation was a feature of a superordinate style that he termed 
“analytic” but that is essentially piecemeal.  Moreover, Holbrook and Moore (1981) 
suggested that a preference for verbal memory representation increases the 
individual’s attention to isolated, atomistic features, and therefore should be 
associated with the independent (e.g., piecemeal) evaluation of attributes.  Despite 
Miller’s and Holbrook and Moore’s suggestions, no study has assessed whether a 
verbal memory representation is a feature of a piecemeal judgement, and therefore 
for the purposes of the current thesis a verbal memory representation is not assumed 
to be a characteristic of a piecemeal judgement.   
 
 The issue of memory representation, however, is not central.  What is more 
important is whether the established characteristics of a piecemeal judgement (e.g., a 
logical, comprehensive, attribute-by-attribute analysis, with low and delayed affect) 
are related to the attention to utilitarian meaning, and even more crucially, whether 
utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement conjointly are associated with the 
route of value influence on product preference proposed in the attribute-mediation 
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approach, that is, via tangible attribute importances. 
 
Symbolic Meaning, Affective Judgement and the Direct Route of Value 
InfluenceMeaning, Affective Judgement and the Direct Route of Value 
InfluenceMeaning, Affective Judgement and the Direct Route of Value 
InfluenceMeaning, Affective Judgement and the Direct Route of Value Influence 
 
 As the attribute-mediation approach, properly limited to tangible attributes, 
appears capable of only explaining the influence of human values when consumers 
attend to utilitarian meaning and make a piecemeal judgement, the alternative, direct 
route of value influence found in Study 1 probably corresponds to the evaluation of 
symbolic meaning and a holistic, category-based judgement.  However, to develop 
such an argument, the content of symbolic meaning needs elaboration.   
 
 As reviewed, symbols are subjective, complex sets of abstract beliefs associated 
with an object and which refer to the culturally constituted world of principles and 
categories.  Importantly, as cultural principles are human values and other beliefs 
that evaluate and rank phenomena, when a product symbolises a cultural principle it 
has strong human value content.  Csikszentimihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981), for 
instance, suggest that a common symbolic theme in automobiles and appliances in 
the 1950’s and 1960’s was the human value principle for “Mastery of Nature”.  
Social category symbolism occurs when a product is conspicuously owned or 
consumed by a specific group, resulting in the product symbolising both the group 
and its culturally constituted characteristics (Douglas & Isherwood, 1978; 
McCracken, 1988).  These characteristics are critical to conceptualising value 
influence because a group becomes subjectively real to its members only when it 
differs from other groups along some cultural principle or value (see also Tajfel's 
Social Identity Theory, e.g., Tajfel (1981)).  A similar point was made by Feather 
(1984), who, when investigating the relationship between gender roles and human 
values, concluded that the degree individuals identify with a particular group is the 
degree they believe that the human values which define the group are preferable.  
Similarly, in Verkuyten’s (1995) social representation approach to symbolic meaning, 
the human value content of symbolism is suggested to create groups by implying that 
those individuals not holding the human value are not addressed by the symbolism.   
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 Consequently, when a product symbolises a social category it simultaneously 
symbolises the human values and principles that define the category, and therefore, 
whether the symbolism refers to cultural principles or to social categories, in either 
case, the symbolism would generally refer to human values.  Thus, the human value 
content of symbolic meaning should be directly evaluated by the human values 
consumers endorse.  For example, a consumer’s preference for the human value of 
“Freedom” would allow him or her to evaluate the symbol of the Bald Eagle, and by 
extension the Bald Eagle itself.  In a similar way, if yuppies are defined as high 
achievers then a consumer's preference for the human value of “Achievement” would 
allow him or her to evaluate yuppies, and by extension products that symbolise 
yuppies such as a cellular telephone.  Researchers of other types of symbolism also 
suggest that individuals evaluate symbols based on their human value content (e.g., 
Cobb & Elder, 1972; Firth, 1973; Gusfield & Michalowicz, 1984; Sears, Huddy & 
Schaffer, 1986).  Political psychologists Sears, Huddy and Schaffer (1986), for 
example, suggest that symbols are organised in a schema-like structure in which 
specific policy symbols, such as forced bussing, are subsumed under broader values 
relating to social categories, such as race and gender, which in turn are contained 
under even more general human values, such as Equality.  Thus, although the 
manifest content of the symbolic meaning may be a specific policy issue, individuals 
evaluate the symbol based on its broader human value content. 
 
 Thus, due to the human value content in symbolic meaning, when consumers 
attend to a product’s symbolic meaning their human values should have a direct 
influence on their product preference.  Moreover, as symbolic meaning tends to be 
“located” on the product whole with a particular configuration of tangible attributes 
(e.g., Keaveney & Hunt, 1992; McCracken, 1988), the application of human value 
criteria would be in a holistic, category-based judgement.  As described in Chapter 
II, in a category-based affective response the stimulus is compared with an exemplar 
and with a match, the affect associated with the exemplar category schema (a 
cognitive structure that represents organised abstract knowledge about a given 
concept) is automatically transferred to the stimulus (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986).  
Thus, the stimulus must have a particular configuration of attributes for its exemplar 
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(good specific examples of the category) or prototype (an abstract composite) to be 
recognised and classified, but the affect of the attributes does not independently 
contribute to the overall evaluation. 
 
 Although McCracken (1988) and Keaveney and Hunt (1992) suggest that 
consumers make a category-based, holistic judgement to evaluate symbolic meaning, 
more likely, the evaluation of symbolic meaning and application of human value 
criteria is an “affective judgement”.  Like a category-based judgement, an affective 
judgement is holistic, but unlike a category-based judgement, an affective judgement 
is subjective and difficult for individuals to verbalise (Mittal, 1988; Zajonc, 1980).  
Zajonc suggests affective reactions involve the interaction of the stimulus with some 
internal state or condition of the individual, and so compared with cognitive (e.g., 
piecemeal) judgements, affective judgements more directly and subjectively relate 
the self to the object.  The subjectivity and inexplicability, in particular, suggest that 
human values evaluate symbolic meaning through an affective judgement, not simply 
category-based response, because human values -- both those held by the individual 
and those represented in product symbolism -- implicate the self (subjective) and can 
be conceptually unclear and difficult to verbalise (e.g., Kilby, 1993).  Moreover, 
though McCracken and Keaveney and Hunt suggested that a category-based 
judgement evaluates symbolic meaning, the hypothesis was never tested.  In contrast, 
the association between an affective judgement and symbolic meaning has been 
shown, with Mittal (1988, 1994) finding that the expressive aspects of products, such 
as their sensory experiences, mood states attainment and symbolism, are judged 
affectively.  Similarly, Chaudhuri and Buck (1995) found that advertisements that use 
a mood arousal strategy, which mainly involve symbols, are also affectively judged.   
 
 Thus, due to the empirical support for the affective judgement of symbolic 
meaning and the subjectively and inexplicably of both human values and symbolism, 
the direct influence of human values on the evaluation of symbolic meaning probably 
comprises an affective judgement; not simply a category-based response.  As to other 
features of an affective judgement, Zajonc (1980, 1984) suggests affective 
judgements can be made more quickly and with greater confidence than cognitive 
(e.g., piecemeal) judgements, and are of greater intensity; on the order of emotional 
 120
states and sensory experiences.  Cohen (1990) terms an affective judgement an 
“affective trace” and notes that “evaluative cognitions are ‘cold’ things; outcomes of 
object/person assessment processes (e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980), remembrances of 
things learnt.  Affective traces, on the other hand, are often the residue of highly 
involving and emotional states.  When the term ‘affective trace’ is restricted to 
cognitive elements that serve as tags for experienced states of affect, their 
instantiation implies more than mere retrieval of information” (p.  157).   
 
 Unlike the uncertainty of whether a verbal memory representation is a feature of 
a piecemeal judgement, the relation between a visual memory representation and an 
affective judgement is strong both empirically and conceptually.  In MacInnis and 
Price’s (1987) seminal work, visual/imaginal memory representation is defined as a 
process by which sensory information such as ideas, feelings and objects, are 
represented in working memory.  Importantly, two central features of an affective 
judgement (holism and subjectivity) are also features of imagery (c.f., Gordon, 1972; 
MacInnis & Price, 1987).  Moreover, several studies have shown that subjective, 
self-referring imagery increase affectivity (and behaviour intention and recall) (e.g., 
Anderson, 1983; Bone & Ellen, 1992; Goossens, 1994; Gregory, Cialdini, & 
Carpender, 1982).  Similarly, Hirschman and Holbrook (1982), Hansen (1981) and 
Lindauer (1972) suggest that sensory and emotional attributes are evaluated with 
self-referring, subjective imagery.  Therefore, due to the strong conceptual and 
empirical association, for purposes of the current thesis a visual memory 
representation is assumed to be a feature of an affective judgement.   
 
 However, the issue of memory representation or any other single feature of an 
affective judgement is not central.  What is more important is whether the general 
characteristics of an affective judgement (e.g., holism, goodness of fit to exemplar, 
strong and immediate affect, visual memory representation) are related to the 
attention to symbolic meaning, and more crucially, whether an affective judgement 
and symbolic meaning conjointly are associated with the direct influence of human 
values on product preference. 
 
Levels of Prescriptive and Evaluative Beliefs and Levels of Product Meaningof 
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Prescriptive and Evaluative Beliefs and Levels of Product Meaningof Prescriptive 
and Evaluative Beliefs and Levels of Product Meaningof Prescriptive and Evaluative 
Beliefs and Levels of Product Meaning 
 
 Through the examination of the properties of utilitarian and symbolic meanings, 
the suggestions were made that human values generally have an indirect influence 
(via tangible attribute importances) on product preference when consumers evaluate 
a product’s utilitarian meaning because utilitarian meaning is located in tangible 
attributes.  Moreover, as tangible attributes are independently quantifiable, product 
judgement proceeds on a piecemeal basis.  Conversely, human values generally have 
a direct influence on product preference when consumers evaluate a product’s 
symbolic meaning because symbolism contains human values.  Further, the 
application would constitute an affective judgement because symbolic meaning is 
holistic and subjective.  However, the rationales of these suggestions are largely 
founded in the properties of product meaning, such as their location on the product or 
their human value content.  Consequently, tying the proposals more closely to the 
properties of human values and tangible attribute importances is advantageous.  
Figure 1 (on page 21) makes such an alliance.  Much of the current section reviews 
concepts given previously, but as they were interspersed, a more concise presentation 
is now offered.   
 
 Beginning with the left portion of the figure, levels of prescriptive and evaluative 
beliefs, human values are centrally-held prescriptive beliefs about ultimate end-goals 
but their abstractness and no specific object of referent suggests they can lack 
conceptual clarity, connoting little more than a “felt sense”.  The lack of conceptual 
clarity coupled with human values’ centrality and subjectivity (self-focus), implies 
that human values’ affective component may be more critical than their cognitive 
component.  At a lower level of abstraction and centrality are evaluative beliefs such 
as the importance assigned to tangible product attributes.  As human values represent 
ultimate goals and organise the specific evaluative beliefs, importance is assigned to 
tangible attributes based on the attributes’ ability to serve for the value’s ends.  
Tangible attribute importances are goodness or badness evaluations, are objective 
(object-focused), specific and conceptually clear, which suggests that their cognitive 
components may be more critical than their affective.  In sum, a specific and context-
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bound level of evaluative beliefs (tangible attribute importances) is subsumed under 
a broader and more centrally-held level of prescriptive beliefs (human values) and 
these two levels vary along dimensions of abstract-specific, subjective-objective, 
ends-means, and affective-cognitive. 
 
 Referring to the right side of Figure 1, levels of product meaning, utilitarian 
meaning is the manifest function the product serves in allowing the user to control 
his or her environment and live a more efficient life.  In the strictest 
operationalisation, utilitarian meaning will generally be found in tangible, functional 
attributes for tangible attributes reveal the quality of the physical performance of the 
product.  As those attributes are concrete, their meaning is objective and specific; 
“arising” from the object itself via the five senses.  Supplementing the objective 
meaning of tangible attributes are levels of intangible attributes with subjective 
meanings and those that are culturally shared are the product’s image or symbolism.  
Symbols are subjective, complex sets of abstract beliefs associated with a product 
and which represent entities in the culturally constituted world.  The representation is 
generally at the product-whole level such as brand, class or category.  In sum, a 
product contains a level of utilitarian meaning (in independent tangible attributes) 
and a more abstract level of symbolic meaning (in the product whole with dependent 
tangible attributes) and these two levels vary along dimensions of abstract-specific, 
and subjective-objective. 
 
 As tangible attribute importances are objective, specific, cognitive and means-
oriented they evaluate utilitarian product meaning that is also objective, specific and 
located in independent, tangible attributes.  Furthermore, as tangible attribute 
importances serve the goals of human values, human values are indirectly implicated 
in the evaluation of utilitarian meaning.  The strong cognitive base of tangible 
attribute importances with the location of utilitarian meaning in independent 
attributes suggests product judgement is on a piecemeal basis, which progresses, 
attribute-by-attribute to evaluate a product in a logical, systematic and 
comprehensive fashion.  Conversely, as human values are abstract, subjective, 
affective and represent ultimate end-goals, they directly evaluate product symbolism 
that is also abstract, subjective and contains human values.  The affectivity and 
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subjectivity of human values and the location of symbolic meaning “on” the product-
whole suggest that product judgement is affective because it meets three primary 
criteria: the implication of the self (e.g., subjectivity), the difficulty of explication, 
and holism.   
 
THE PRODUCT MEANING APPROACH HYPOTHESIS 
 
 Given that Study 1 showed that human values predominately mediate through 
tangible attributes importances to influence product preference, the product meaning 
approach to value influence attempted to build on the success of the attribute-
mediation approach while overcoming its failure to account for intangible attributes 
such as symbolic meaning.  In addition, the product meaning approach sought to 
more closely define the meanings associated with tangible and intangible attributes, 
the manner in which they are judged, and the criteria consumers are using to assess 
them.  Notwithstanding that important distinctions among different types of products 
and consumers are over-simplified, the product meaning approach to value influence 
is that human values generally have an indirect influence (via tangible attribute 
importances) on product preference when consumers evaluate a product’s utilitarian 
meaning and make a piecemeal judgement, and human values generally have a direct 
influence on product preference when consumers evaluate the product’s symbolic 
meaning and make an affective judgement.  Human values probably influence 
product preference though more than these two routes, and these two routes may not 
always correspond precisely with the specified meanings and judgements, nor will 
utilitarian meaning always be found in tangible attributes and symbolic meaning on a 
configuration of tangible attributes.  The proposal here is an approximate 
representation of what may generally occur. 
 
 As the product meaning approach to value influence was developed as an 
outcome of Study 1, the results of Study 1 naturally appear consistent with the 
product meaning approach.  For instance, among the automobile classes, the indirect 
route was strongest for what is arguably the most utilitarian automobile (e.g., Smaller 
Family cars) whereas the direct route was strongest for the most symbolic (e.g., 
Luxury cars).  Similarly, between the meat types, red meat was much more strongly 
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influenced through the direct route than was white meat, and as discussed, several 
anthropologists and sociologists have argued that red meat more than white meat has 
strong symbolic content (e.g., Adams, 1990, 1994; Fiddes, 1991; Heisley, 1990; 
Twigg, 1983).  Moreover, human values that tended to influence product preference 
through a specific route or tended to characterise those individuals who applied their 
human values through a specific route, centred on affectivity and sensuous 
experience in the direct route (e.g., A Pleasurable Life, A Comfortable Life, etc.), and 
possibly a careful and cautious approach to the evaluation of objects in the indirect 
route (e.g., Family Security, National Security, etc.).  A final way the findings of 
Study 1 are consistent with the product meaning approach to value influence, is that 
for seven of the eight product classes the strength of the indirect route was stronger 
than or equal to the strength of the direct route, which is sensible because utilitarian 
meaning is probably more important to consumers than symbolic meaning.  In many, 
but not all, instances, the functionality of a product would be more important than the 
image it conveys. 
  
 Though the pattern of results found in Study 1 appears to support the product 
meaning approach, Study 1 had limitations such as omitting intangible attributes, not 
assessing judgement type, and making the product the level of analysis.  The 
omission of intangible attributes is not serious given that the attention to symbolic 
meaning (an intangible attribute) is suggested to result in the direct application of 
human values.  Consumers may have specific intangible attributes or product images 
that they prefer (just as they have specific tangible attributes that they prefer), but the 
human value content of these intangible attributes means that the intangible attributes 
are closely tied to consumers’ human values.  Thus, what is meant by the “direct 
route” is not that human values do not mediate through some construct such as 
intangible attribute importances, but that the influence of human values is so strong 
that intangible attribute importances do not absolutely need to be measured and 
modelled.  Thus, akin to how the basic attribute-mediation approach developed in 
Part I omitted the intervening variable between human values and tangible attribute 
importances (e.g., Scott & Lamont’s (1973) “consumption values” or Gutman’s 
(1982) “consequences”) because human values and tangible attribute importances 
were expected to be sufficiently correlated, the product meaning approach omits 
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intangible attributes and focuses primarily on how human values influence product 
preference directly when consumers attend to symbolic meanings. 
 
 The other limitations of Study 1 are more critical.  If we are interested in closely 
associating the routes of value influence to tangible attribute importances, utilitarian 
and symbolic meanings, and judgement types, the level of analysis should not be the 
product because it forces an assumption to be made of how most consumers evaluate 
a particular product.  Despite the quality of theory and empirical research that inform 
the assumption it is still just that -- an assumption.  What is more appropriate is to 
make the individual consumer the level of analysis by measuring each consumer’s 
meaning and judgement preferences and then comparing those preferences against 
the strengths of his or her direct and indirect influences of human values on product 
preference. 
 
 So, the aim of Part II of the thesis is to show, at the level of the individual, that 
human values have an indirect influence (via tangible attribute importances) on 
product preference when consumers evaluate utilitarian meaning and make a 
piecemeal judgement, and human values have a direct influence on product 
preference when consumers evaluate symbolic meaning and make an affective 
judgement.  The contention, however, needs one further clarification.  Consistent 
with the re-examination of the results of Study 1 made at the beginning of the current 
section, utilitarian meaning and its associated piecemeal judgement will probably be 
rated as more important than symbolic meaning and its affective judgement because 
for most products, but not all, people probably believe that a product’s functionality 
is more important than its image.  Thus, the primary distinction between the direct 
and indirect influences of human values may not be the absolute preference for the 
respective meanings and judgements, but rather, the relative preference as follows: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: An individual’s preference for utilitarian meaning and a 
piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement 
should be greater when his or her human values have an indirect influence 
(via tangible attribute importances) on product preference than when his or 
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her human values have a direct influence. 
 
 
OTHER PROPOSITIONS 
 
 Besides the main hypothesis, several propositions are made of how the meanings 
of products affect the influences of human values; propositions which, if confirmed, 
draw out the implications of the product meaning approach and the roles of human 
values in general.  That these are propositions and not firm hypotheses is 
emphasised.  The first proposition considers an individual’s cross-product tendency 
to apply his or her human values through the same route and the remaining 
propositions concern the psychological functions that the routes of value influence 
may represent. 
 
Cross-product Consistency-product Consistency-product Consistency-product 
Consistency 
 
 The first proposition addresses the unity of the value-attitude-behaviour system.  
The product meaning approach rests on the assumption that human values are super-
ordinate to product meanings and should direct attention to product meanings based 
on the dominance and similarity of each.  Human values and product meanings that 
are dominant in the system and are subjectively perceived as similar in content 
should result in the affect for the human value being transferred to the evaluation of 
the product meaning.  Likewise, in Scott and Lamont’s (1973), Gutman’s (1982) and 
Lindberg, Garling and Montgomery’s (1989) attribute-mediation approaches human 
values are assumed to be one origin of influence in the value-attitude-behaviour 
system; a claim made by researchers of general human value processes as well (e.g., 
Feather, 1975, 1982; Kahle, 1983; Rokeach, 1968, 1973).  Importantly, if human 
value preferences inform consumer choices, then the abstractness and generality of 
human values would result in product preferences that are relatively consistent across 
products not only in how they reinforce important human values but also their 
meanings and routes of influence.  Therefore, the first proposition is;  
 
PROPOSITION 1: Individuals have a cross-product tendency to attend to 
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the same product meanings, use the same type of judgement, and apply 
human value criteria through the same route.   
 
 
Psychological FunctionFunctionFunctionFunction 
 
 Although the current formulation of the product meaning approach to value 
influence is tripartite, specifying what criteria consumers use to evaluate products 
and where these criteria originate (e.g., tangible attribute importances and human 
values), the judgement type that applies the criteria (e.g., piecemeal or affective), and 
the meaning attended (utilitarian or symbolic), the psychological functions the routes 
serve are nevertheless neglected.  The schematic representation of the product 
meaning approach (see Figure 1 on page 21) illustrates most clearly that the 
rationales in the product meaning approach are the structural features of the 
components; human values influence meaning evaluation due to the similar 
properties of each (e.g., abstractness, location, breadth, and so on).  The schematic 
representation of the product meaning approach is inconsistent with the argument 
made in Chapter I that a comprehensive model of consumer choices should specify 
criteria, judgement type, product meaning, and psychological function, and is also 
discordant with the review of product meaning earlier in the chapter which 
highlighted the importance of psychological function in product meaning.  Utilitarian 
meaning signals an instrumental psychological function in which the product allows 
the individual to control and manipulate the environment competently and 
effectively, and symbolic meaning fosters a knowledge of the social world, and 
maintains, expresses and enhances the individual’s self-concepts, social identities 
and human values. 
 
 Thus, the present section addresses the shortcoming of the current product 
meaning approach by specifying the psychological functions the direct and indirect 
influences of human values serve and how the functions may manifest and be 
measured.  However, whilst psychological function is important to grasping value 
influence, psychological function is not a central issue.  Instead, the investigation of 
the product meaning approach hypothesis is made at a more general level of product 
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meaning that includes psychological function along with content.  Consequently, the 
validation of the product meaning approach hypothesis would, by default, suggest 
what psychological functions the attention to utilitarian and symbolic meanings and 
applications of human value criteria serves. 
 
 Nevertheless, specific propositions will be made concerning what psychological 
function each route of value influence serves and how the functions may manifest 
and be measured, but before doing so, previous approaches to how the psychological 
functions of attitudes, human values and product meanings affect preferences for 
products and other objects are reviewed.  Readers are forewarned that the current 
section is lengthy.  The section first reviews the section begins with a functional 
approach to attitudes, then considers the influence and functions of human values, 
then outlines a functional approach to the value-attitude-behaviour system, and 
finally considers how the psychological functions may manifest in the value 
influence routes. 
 
Attitude Function TheoryFunction TheoryFunction TheoryFunction Theory 
 
 Attitude function theory is the contention that attitudes may serve any number 
and combination of psychological functions, and that each function has a different 
implication for how attitudes are related to behaviour and how the attitudes may be 
affected by cues in the environment (e.g., Katz, 1960; Herek, 1987; Smith, Bruner & 
White, 1956).  Katz (1960), for example, outlined four such psychological functions: 
instrumental (the need to maximise the rewards and minimise the costs from objects 
in the environment), knowledge (the need to organise and give meaning to the 
chaotic world), ego-defence (the need to protect oneself from acknowledging the 
most basic and difficult truths about themselves or about the world) and value-
expressive (the need for self-esteem and a desire to facilitate self-definition by giving 
positive expression of one’s self-concept and human values). 
 
 In contrast to Katz’s four attitude functions, Herek (1986, 1987) outlines two 
major categories of attitude functions: evaluative and expressive.  Herek developed 
his classification scheme by firstly content analysing essays written by participants 
 129
who expressed their thoughts and feelings about gays and lesbians.  Many arguments 
were produced which clustered to five major themes or functions.  In the validation 
phase, Herek developed questionnaire items based on these five themes, surveyed a 
new sample with new topics, and factor analysed the items.  The factor structure 
closely matched his initial categorisation.  According to Herek, attitudes serving an 
“evaluative” psychological function derive their valence from the intrinsic properties 
of the attitude object because interacting with the object results in tangible and 
quantifiable rewards and punishments.  These attitudes allow individuals to organise 
and structure their world in a purely self-interested way, with objects the means for 
obtaining particular ends.  Herek proposes sub-types of evaluative functions that are 
based on whether the attitude is derived from past experience or an anticipated 
experience, and whether the attitude is constrained to the specific object from which 
it originated or whether it applies to the entire object’s category.  For example, a 
belief such as “My opinions about gay men and lesbians are based on my personal 
experiences with specific gay persons” serves an evaluative function in which the 
individual generalises from an experience with a specific object to the whole object’s 
category.  Overall, Herek’s evaluative function is similar to Katz’ (1960) 
instrumental and knowledge functions. 
 
 Herek’s second broad category of attitude psychological functions is 
“expressive” in that the benefit is not so much derived from the attitude object but 
from expressing the attitude.  The object is used as a symbol or vehicle for self-
expression.  Herek describes three sub-types of expressive attitudes; attitudes that 
serve a “social-expressive” psychological function results from the individual 
seeking acceptance by others in their immediate environment, attitudes that serve a 
“value-expressive” psychological function result from the individual expressing 
important human values and self-concepts, and attitudes that serve a “defensive” 
psychological function arise from unconscious intra-psychic events that seek to 
avoid anxiety producing thoughts.  For example, an item such as “My opinions about 
gay men and lesbians are based on my concern that we safeguard the civil liberties of 
all people in society” serves a value-expressive function, whereas “My opinions 
about gay men and lesbians are based on the fact that I would rather not think about 
homosexuality or gay people” serves a defensive one.  Herek’s value-expressive and 
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ego-defensive sub-types of the expressive psychological function are the same as 
Katz’s descriptions and the social adjustive sub-type is similar to Smith, Bruner and 
White (1956) social-adjustive function in which attitudes help mediate self-other 
relationships. 
 
Attitude Function and Advertising EffectivenessFunction and Advertising 
EffectivenessFunction and Advertising EffectivenessFunction and Advertising 
Effectiveness 
 
 The central features of Katz’ (1960) and Herek’s (1986, 1987) typologies of the 
psychological functions of attitudes (e.g., the object yields tangible and quantifiable 
rewards and punishments, the object is used as a symbol for self-expression, etc.) 
should ring familiar from the previous section on the psychological functions 
underlying utilitarian and symbolic meanings.  However, before discussing the 
similarity in depth, previous attempts to couple attitude function with the attention to 
product meaning and with the influence of human values on preferences for products 
and other objects are reviewed.  The review will illustrate that a major conceptual 
shortcoming of previous research is its failure to recognise that psychological 
functions are not limited to attitudes or product meanings but instead extend the 
breadth of the value-attitude-behaviour system. 
 
 Consumer researchers applying the functional approach to attitudes generally 
investigate how the psychological function that an individual’s attitude serves affects 
his or her ability to be persuaded by two types of advertisements; those that focus on 
the product’s tangible attributes and utility versus those that focus on its image and 
symbolism (e.g., Shavitt, 1990; Shavitt, Lowrey & Han, 1992; Snyder & DeBono, 
1985; Spivey, Munson & Locander, 1983).  Most of these advertising effectiveness 
studies use self-monitoring as a proxy for attitude function, that is, these studies 
measure an individual’s self-monitoring tendency and then assume that all the 
individual’s attitudes serve the same psychological function that self-monitoring 
serves.  These researchers have found that low self-monitors are more easily 
persuaded by utilitarian advertisements and high self-monitors prefer symbolic ones.  
As high self-monitors report they are aware and concerned about how others 
perceive them (see Snyder, 1974), these researchers suggest that high self-monitors 
 131
attend to symbolic meaning because symbolic meaning conveys information about 
the personal and social characteristics of the product user (Shavitt, Lowrey & Han, 
1992; Snyder & DeBono, 1985).  Therefore, the product attitudes of high self-
monitors serve a social adjustive/social identity psychological function.  Although a 
consensus exists on the psychological function underlying the attitudes of high self-
monitors, these same researchers disagree about the functions of low self-monitors, 
with some suggesting that the function is value-expressive (Synder & DeBono, 1985) 
and others suggesting that the function is instrumental (Shavitt, Lowrey & Han, 
1992).  These researchers do agree that low self-monitors attend to utilitarian 
meaning, but Synder and DeBono suggest the reason is that low self-monitors want 
to express their own, as opposed to their reference group’s, identity and human 
values, whereas Shavitt, Lowrey and Han suggest the reason is that low self-monitors 
want to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs of interacting with objects. 
 
 Such contradictory proposals highlight problems with using self-monitoring as a 
proxy for attitude function.  Those studies measure the strength of each individual’s 
attitude on a typical instrument (such as the semantic-differential scale) then 
categorise the attitude on an assumption of what psychological function underlies 
self-monitoring.  In contrast, other researchers tailor the measurement of the attitude 
strength to meet the specific properties of the attitude’s psychological function 
(Locander & Spivey, 1978; Spivey, Munson & Locander, 1983).  For instance, 
Locander and Spivey (1978) suggest that Katz’ (1960) instrumental attitude should 
be measured through the multi-attribute model as both expectancy-value theory and 
an instrumental psychological function are founded in the assumption that attitudes 
develop from the abstraction of positive and negative experiences and that the 
attitude object is a means to an end goal.  Thus, for example, an individual’s 
instrumental attitude towards playing tennis is the joint function of how strongly he 
or she believes that tennis has various attributes such as “gives me a suntan” or  “will 
make me healthy” and the importance he or she gives to those attributes.  Locander 
and Spivey also suggest that Katz’ value-expressive attitude should be measured 
along semantic-differential scales in which individuals describe who they believe are 
the typical people engaging in the attitude activity or are associated with the attitude 
object.  Continuing the tennis example, respondents would rate how much they 
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believe a typical tennis player is “ugly versus beautiful”, “flexible versus rigid” and 
so on.  The extent the attitudes serves a value-expressive psychological function is 
determined by measuring each individual’s own self-concept on the same semantic-
differential scale, and then subtracting the individual’s perception of the typical 
tennis player from his or her perception of themselves; the lower the score the more 
the attitude serves a value-expressive psychological function. 
 
 Only one study of consumer preferences, carried out by Spivey, Munson and 
Locander (1983), has implemented Locander and Spivey’s (1978) suggestion of how 
to combine attitude measurement with attitude psychological function.  Spivey, 
Munson and Locander (1983) measured consumers’ instrumental attitudes towards a 
luxury car with attribute importances and found that those rating attribute 
importances more highly were more easily persuaded by advertisements that focused 
on the car’s utilitarian meaning and tangible features.  Despite Locander and 
Spivey’s innovative technique for measuring a value-expressive attitude, Spivey, 
Munson and Locander simply measured consumers’ value-expressive attitudes as the 
extent the consumers wanted a luxury car that conveyed particular symbolic 
meanings and images (e.g., conformist versus non-conformist, strong versus weak, 
etc.).  Nevertheless, Spivey, Munson and Locander’s experiment did find that those 
who emphasised the images were more easily persuaded by symbolic advertisements 
that focused on the kind of people who drive the luxury car. 
 
Attitude Function and Value InfluenceFunction and Value InfluenceFunction and 
Value InfluenceFunction and Value Influence 
 
 Thus, Spivey, Munson and Locander’s (1983) study suggests that consumers use 
their instrumental attitudes to evaluate utilitarian product meanings and their value-
expressive attitudes to evaluate symbolic meanings.  The implication of that finding 
to the product meaning approach and psychological functions is discussed shortly, as 
is Locander and Spivey’s (1978) suggestion that expectancy-value theory and the 
multi-attribute model are best suited to measuring an instrumental attitude.  The 
present section, however, observes how Locander and Spivey and the other 
researchers of attitude function and advertising effectiveness (e.g., Shavitt, Lowrey 
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& Han, 1992; Spivey, Munson & Locander, 1983; Snyder & DeBono, 1985) failed to 
consider that attitudes and their psychological functions may be influenced by human 
values.  Other studies, specifically, Mellema and Bassili (1995), Maio and Olsen 
(1994, 1995),and Prentice (1987), have begun investigating how human values 
influence the psychological functions of attitudes.   
 
 For instance, the rationale in Mellema and Bassili’s (1995) investigation of 
human values, self-monitoring and attitudes was that as self-monitoring is the degree 
that individuals are aware and concerned about how other people perceive them, low 
self-monitors should formulate their attitudes based on internal preferences and 
human values, and high self-monitors should attenuate their attitudes to fit the 
attitudes of other people in their immediate environment.  Mellema and Bassili found 
that human values predicted the attitudes of low self-monitors more accurately than 
the attitudes of high self-monitors and that the difference was amplified for high and 
low self-monitors who are “schematic”.  Individuals who are “schematic” answered 
the self-monitoring questions rapidly, suggesting that the concepts are closely tied to 
their self-schema and definition.  Despite Mellema and Bassili’s important finding, 
the use of self-monitoring as a proxy for attitude function is problematic for reasons 
already mentioned, that is, an assumption must be made on the psychological 
functions that underlie self-monitoring.  A more critical limitation, however, is 
Mellema and Bassili’s presupposition that individuals’ levels of self-monitoring  
indicate the psychological function of their attitudes and that human values merely 
operate accordingly.  Given that self-monitoring is a general personality tendency 
that extends beyond any specific attitude or context, Mellema and Bassili’s 
assumption that the psychological function exists at the level of attitudes but not at 
the level of human values seems unwarranted (the point is re-addressed shortly). 
 
 Maio and Olsen’s (1994) study of attitude function and value influence is a slight 
improvement of Mellema and Bassili’s (1995) investigation because rather using 
self-monitoring as a proxy for attitude function, Maio and Olsen measured attitude 
function through a “thought listing” procedure.  In the thought-listing procedure, 
respondents listed reasons why they held a positive or negative attitude towards a 
school dance that raised money to build an on-campus smoking area.  The attitudes 
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of those who listed self-interested thoughts (e.g., “I should go because I need a 
break”) were classified as instrumental whereas those who listed reasons involving 
their self-concept or human values (e.g., “It is unfair to have non-smokers pay for a 
smoking area”) were classed as value-expressive.  Maio and Olsen surveyed the 
strength of the respondent’s attitude towards the dance using series of traits on a 
semantic-differential scale (e.g., good versus bad, unattractive versus attractive), and 
measured a limited set of human values and whether the respondent was willing to 
write a pro-dance essay (the behavioural measure).  Maio and Olsen found that 
human values significantly predicted attitudes and behaviour for individuals holding 
a value-expressive attitude, but human values had low predictive power for 
individuals holding an instrumental attitude.  However, the difference between the 
predictive powers of human values on the two types of attitudes depended on the 
human values investigated; some human values exaggerated the difference (e.g., 
“Freedom”, “Individualism”) and others reduced it (e.g., “Well-being”). 
 
 Despite Maio and Olsen’s (1994) important findings, some degree of caution in 
interpretation is warranted because, as previously mentioned, attitude strength should 
not be measured on a general semantic-differential scale that is subsequently classed 
to function according to an external measure, whether that external measure is self-
monitoring or a thought-listing procedure.  Instead, as Locander and Spivey (1978) 
suggest, the measurement of the attitude should be tailored to meet the precise 
character of its underlying function as doing so should provide more accurate 
measures of both attitude strength and function.  Though not addressing attitude 
function specifically, Eagly, Mladinic and Otto (1994) make a criticism of the 
semantic differential scale that has similar implications.  Eagly, Mladinic and Otto 
suggest that the semantic differential scale is adequate for measuring attitude 
strength but it cannot measure its base or structure.  Often the items on the semantic 
differential scale do not describe the attitude object either in reality or in how the 
individual has thought about it previously.  In such instances, the individual responds 
to the items by symbolically projecting his or her attitude onto them.  The projection 
does not present a problem for measuring attitude strength but it can for measuring 
its structure, and possibly its psychological function.  The instrumental function, in 
particular, is based on individuals’ assessing the objective properties of the attitude 
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object because individuals are concerned about the object’s real (not unreal) rewards 
and costs.  Thus, measurement of an instrumental attitude should comprise realistic 
elements, and therefore as Maio and Olsen (1994) used a semantic-differential scale 
of the object’s real and unreal characteristics, their conclusions regarding the 
instrumental attitude should be interpreted more cautiously.  Specifically, rather than 
concluding that human values have no influence on an instrumental attitude, a more 
careful interpretation would be that human values influence attitudes and behaviour 
more strongly for value-expressive attitudes than for instrumental attitudes and 
behaviour (a caution that Maio and Olson also make in their 1995 study).   
 
A Functional Approach to the Value-Attitude-Behaviour SystemFunctional 
Approach to the Value-Attitude-Behaviour SystemFunctional Approach to the 
Value-Attitude-Behaviour SystemFunctional Approach to the Value-Attitude-
Behaviour System 
 
 Besides the above reservation, a serious limitation of most studies of attitude 
function and human value influence (e.g., Maio & Olsen, 1994,1995; Mellema & 
Bassili, 1995) is their assumption that only attitudes and not human values serve a 
psychological function.  The readers might recall, from Chapter I, that Rokeach  
(1973) and others (e.g., Epstein, 1989; Kristiansen, 1990; Williams, 1979) have 
suggested that human values serve various psychological functions such as 
knowledge, social adjustment, value-expression, instrumentality, and ego-defence, 
and that these psychological functions are similar to the functions of attitudes.  Thus, 
it is surprising that Maio and Olsen (1994,1995) and  Mellema and Bassili (1995) 
failed to consider that the psychological function of an individual’s attitude is 
matched by the psychological function of his or her human values, and that 
consequently, each psychological function spans the breadth of the value-attitude-
behaviour system. 
 
 Only Prentice (1987) has made that speculation.  Prentice separated individuals 
on their expressive or instrumental attitude towards a fictitious proposal to build a 
Naval base near the respondents.  Prentice found that those who held an expressive 
attitude also valued their symbolic possessions (e.g., diary, photos, etc.) and 
preferred symbolic values (e.g., World of Peace, World of Beauty, etc.), and although 
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a similar pattern was hypothesised for the instrumental value-attitude-behaviour 
system none was found.  Prentice suggested a possible reason for the lack of 
association is that the instrumental function is more context bound than the 
expressive function and that arousing an instrumental attitude in one domain (such as 
attitude towards the Navy) does not mean that individuals will have an instrumental 
attitude in another (such as consumer choices).  Moreover, the individual must have 
direct experience and knowledge of the object to appreciate its tangible benefits and 
means to an end, and so a fictitious issue cannot arouse it.  The finding highlights the 
previous criticism of Maio and Olson (1994, 1995) in that individuals holding an 
instrumental attitude cannot project their attitudes onto semantic-differential scale 
items that represent the object unrealistically or in ways the individuals have not 
thought about it previously.  
 
 Equally important, however, Prentice’s (1987) study may have been 
misconceived in another way.  Prentice assumed that a functional approach to the 
value-attitude-behaviour system is simply an extension of attitude function theory to 
human values or products.  However, a functional approach to the value-attitude-
behaviour system may be differences in route and sub-system, that is, the strength of 
the interconnectedness among human values, attitudes and behaviour.  Thus, the 
psychological functions individuals’ value-attitude-behaviour systems serve cannot 
be assessed solely by measuring how individuals prefer different items (e.g., 
symbolic or instrumental values, symbolic or instrumental products), but how well 
human values predict behaviour through the two routes.  The distinction is an 
important one because the two functions may or may not correspond to differences in 
preferred human values, attitudes and products.  In many instances, those individuals 
for whom their value-attitude-behaviour system serves an instrumental function may 
prefer the same products as those individuals for whom their value-attitude-
behaviour system serves and expressive function, simply because many products can 
be appreciated for either their utilitarian or symbolic properties (e.g., holiday 
destinations).  The distinction echoes Katz’ (1960) original claim that the benefit of 
thinking in terms of attitude functions is its recognition that individuals may like the 
same objects but for completely different reasons.   
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 The present thesis assumes, like Prentice (1987), that the psychological function 
spans the value-attitude-behaviour system and therefore that each attitude function is 
rooted in a corresponding human value function and behaviour function, and that two 
primary functions are instrumental and expressive.  The instrumental psychological 
function indicates that the product or other object fulfils the user’s need to control his 
or her environment efficiently and effectively, whereas the expressive psychological 
function indicates that the product fulfils the user’s need to express his or her self-
concepts and identities, particularly his or her need for social-approval and self-
consistency.  However, unlike Prentice (1987), the present thesis assumes that the 
functional approach to the value-attitude-behaviour system is differences route and 
sub-system, that is, the strength of the interconnectedness between human values, 
tangible attribute importances and product preference.   
 
Consequently, the two routes of value influence found in Study 1 and developed 
in the product meaning approach earlier in the chapter could represent the two 
psychological functions of the value-attitude-behaviour system.  The readers would 
recall that in the product meaning approach, human values are suggested to have an 
indirect influence (via tangible attribute importances) on product preference when 
consumers attend to utilitarian meaning and make a piecemeal judgement, whereas 
human values have a direct influence on product preference when consumers attend 
to symbolic meaning and make an affective judgement.  The influence of human 
values on product preference via tangible attribute importances when consumers 
attend to utilitarian meaning and make a piecemeal judgement probably serves an 
instrumental psychological function for two reasons.  Firstly, an instrumental 
function attempts to maximise the rewards and minimise the costs of interacting with 
objects in the environment and utilitarian meaning represents the ability of the 
product to control the environment competently and effectively.  A second reason the 
route of value influence via tangible attribute importances probably serves an 
instrumental function is that tangible attribute importances measure an instrumental 
attitude.  The readers might recall, Locander and Spivey (1978) suggest that an 
instrumental attitude should be measured through an expectancy-value formulation, 
and so, Spivey, Munson and Locander (1983) operationalised the instrumental 
attitude as attribute importances.  However, the instrumental attitude should be 
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operationalised as tangible attribute importances in particular to avoid the criticism 
made of Maio and Olsen (1994, 1995), among others, that the measure of an 
instrumental attitude should comprise a real representation of the attitude object.   
 
The direct influence of human values on product preference when consumers 
attend to symbolic meaning and make an affective judgement likely serves an 
expressive psychological function because symbolic meaning is a potent vehicle for 
the expression of one’s self-concepts, identities and human values.  Most of the 
studies of attitude function and value influence, though theoretically misconceived, 
did find that the relationship between human values and behaviour was strongest for 
the (value-) expressive attitude.  Thus, the structure of expressive function in the 
value-attitude-behaviour system is perhaps more aptly conceptualised as the value-
behaviour system because the attitude closely ties human values to behaviour.   
 
 Interestingly, some findings of Study 1 appear consistent with the contention that 
the direct route of value influence serves to express one’s self-concepts, identities 
and human values.  Red meat consumption was strongly and directly influenced by 
human values and several researchers have not only suggested that red meat has 
potent symbolic meaning but that the meaning refers to dominance values and group 
identities such as males over females, Anglos over non-Anglos, and humans over 
nature, animals and the environment (e.g., Adams, 1990, 1994; Fiddes, 1991; 
Heisley, 1990; Twigg, 1983).  Moreover, Study 1 found that Maturity values (e.g., 
Inner Harmony, Self-respect, etc.) tended to influence product preference directly 
and were preferred by individuals who tended to use the direct route.  According to 
Schwartz and Bilsky (1990), Maturity values engender an appreciation of oneself, 
others and the surrounding world and foster the development and expression of the 
ideal self-concept, which is naturally consistent with suggestion that the direct route 
serves an expressive psychological function. 
 
Functional PropositionsPropositionsPropositionsPropositions 
 
 As discussed at the beginning of the current section, the product meaning 
approach hypothesis is the primary focus of Part II of the thesis.  Products meaning 
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no doubt includes psychological function (among other features) and therefore the 
investigation and validation of the product meaning approach hypothesis would, by 
default, support some suggestions of what psychological functions underlie the 
routes.  Still, particular attention is paid to psychological function because 
psychological function can supplement the overly structural product meaning 
approach with an impetus or drive factor.  Thus, given the ambivalence, the 
suggestions that the indirect influence of human values on product preference likely 
serves an instrumental psychological function and that the direct influence of human 
values on product preference likely serves an expressive psychological function are 
only explored through several, non-comprehensive propositions. 
 
 One proposition is that greater psychological investment or identification with a 
product is a feature of the direct route of value influence.  If the direct application of 
human values serves to express one’s self-concepts, identities and human values, and 
some individuals have incorporated a product more closely into their definitions of 
themselves, then these individuals should be more likely to express their human 
values directly.  So, the second proposition is; 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Greater psychological identification with a product is a 
feature of an expressive psychological function and therefore is associated 
with the direct influence of human values. 
 
 
 The next proposition is that the direct route is associated with an overarching 
importance of human values or what will be termed “value relevance”.  The readers 
might recall from Chapter I that Wojciszke (1989) suggests that people vary in the 
extent they incorporate human values into their ideal self-concept.  In particular, 
those whom Wojciszke terms “idealists” are characterised by their claim that they 
use human values more frequently to judge themselves and others and make 
behavioural choices.  Evidence that idealists more closely tie human values into their 
ideal self-concept was shown by their highly differentiated value system, their 
greater number of self-referent thoughts when thinking about human values, and 
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their stronger value-behaviour consistency.  Thus, if some individuals more closely 
tie human values to their self-concepts that result in an overarching importance of 
human values (e.g., value relevance), then these individuals should be more likely to 
apply their human values directly onto product preference because the direct route 
serves an expressive psychological function.  So, the third proposition is; 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Greater value relevance is a feature of an expressive 
psychological function and therefore is associated with the direct influence 
of human values. 
 
 
 The next two propositions rest on the assumption that each psychological 
function spans the breadth of the value-attitude-behaviour system, and that therefore 
the psychological functions that each route serves is revealed in the human values 
that are unique to the routes.  The proposal is that two such categories of human 
values, instrumental and terminal values, serve instrumental and expressive functions 
respectively, and consequently should be associated with the indirect and direct 
routes respectively.  Concerning the indirect route, readers would recall that 
utilitarian meaning is the overt function the product serves in allowing the user to 
control his or her environment, is derived from the product in-use, and is intrinsically 
linked to convenience, efficiency and exchange in the traditional economic sense.  
Thus, if utilitarian meaning represents how using the product will bring about certain 
end goals, then individuals who attend to utilitarian meaning to apply human values 
via tangible attribute importances would prefer instrumental values (e.g.  being 
Ambitious or Honest) because Rokeach (1968) suggests that instrumental values 
represent the importance of actions and means that bring about the ends of terminal 
values.  So, the forth proposition is;  
 
PROPOSITION 4: Instrumental human values serve an instrumental 
psychological function and therefore a preference for instrumental values 
should be associated with the indirect influence of human values. 
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 Although the relationship between instrumental values and an instrumental 
function is somewhat apparent, how terminal values serve an expressive function 
only becomes evident when taking into account the multiple theories and research 
espousing the importance of the “ideal” in symbolic meaning (e.g., Wicklund and 
Gollwitzer’s (1982) symbolic self-completion theory, McCracken’s (1988) displaced 
ideals, Johar and Sirgy’s (1991) needs underling the expression of the ideal self, and 
so on).  The readers would recall, for instance, McCracken’s (1988) suggestion that 
products symbolise “displaced ideals” that are so abstract and removed from daily 
experience that products bridge the real and ideal.  Importantly, not only are these 
symbolised ideals ultimate and abstract but are also states of existence.  Many 
products symbolise states such as being loved, respected, having prestige and so on.  
Thus, a characteristic of symbolic meaning, in contrast to utilitarian meaning, is that 
symbolic meaning is not tied to product use or performance.  States of existence such 
as possessing, reflecting or displaying are enough to reap expressive benefits.  For 
example, if some individuals purchased a luxury car to express their human values 
and make their real self closer to their ideal, then simply owning the car would be 
enough to expand their self-image.  Obviously, the car’s non-use would be 
inconsistent with an individual who purchased it for the utility of getting from point 
A to point B.  Thus, if products symbolise ideal states that are abstract and ultimate, 
then individuals who attend to symbolic meaning to express their self-concepts and 
human values directly would prefer terminal values (e.g., Comfortable Life, Mature 
Love) because Rokeach (1968) suggests that terminal values represent the 
importance of ultimate states of existence.  So, the fifth proposition is; 
 
PROPOSITION 5: Terminal human values serve an expressive 
psychological function and therefore a preference for terminal values should 
be associated with the direct influence of human values. 
 
 
 Some support for the contention that instrumental and terminal values serve 
instrumental and expressive functions respectively is manifest in Prentice’s (1987) 
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study that found that those individuals who held an expressive attitude also preferred 
symbolic possessions (e.g., diary, photos, etc.) and symbolic values (e.g., World of 
Peace, World of Beauty, etc.), though no consistent pattern was found for those 
individuals holding an instrumental attitude.  Importantly, although the article does 
not mention it, all of Prentice’s “symbolic” values are in fact terminal and Prentice’s 
the “instrumental” values are instrumental.  Thus, though Prentice’s study suffered 
some conceptual shortcomings as discussed previously it does offer some support for 
the current proposals. 
 
SUMMARY AND PLAN OF ANALYSISAND PLAN OF ANALYSISAND PLAN 
OF ANALYSISAND PLAN OF ANALYSIS 
 
 Readers are encouraged to review again the schematic representation of the 
product meaning approach to value influence presented in Figure 1 (on page 21) and 
the more detailed tabular form Table 1 (on page 22).  With the addition of 
psychological function the product meaning approach now defines four parts: 
criteria, meaning, judgement and function.  Meaning and judgement are the primary 
focus of the chapter and part of thesis and so are stated in the hypothesis; 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: An individual’s preference for utilitarian meaning and a 
piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement 
should be greater when his or her human values have an indirect influence 
(via tangible attribute importances) on product preference than when his or 
her human values have a direct influence. 
 
 
 The examination of the product meaning approach hypothesis could be carried 
out using either an experimental or a correlational design.  An experimental design 
has the advantage that it can establish that consumers’ human values are one cause of 
their tangible attribute importances, product preferences and attentions to product 
meanings.  An experiment, for example, could isolate and manipulate the kind of 
product meaning to which consumers attend and the kind of judgement they make, 
and then gauge how that manipulation affects the strengths of the value influence 
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routes.  As reviewed in a previous section, some experimental studies have isolated 
and manipulated the kind of product meaning to which consumers attend and 
examined how that manipulation affected the relationship between attribute 
importances and product preference or affected the relationship between attitudes 
and product preference (e.g., Shavitt, 1990; Shavitt, Lowrey & Han, 1992; Snyder & 
DeBono, 1985; Spivey, Munson & Locander, 1983).  Spivey, Munson and 
Locander’s (1983) experiment, for example, showed that the attention to symbolic 
meaning was associated with the increased influence of intangible attribute 
importances (e.g., each consumer’s preferred product image) on product preference 
whereas the attention to utilitarian meaning was associated with the increased 
influence of tangible attribute importances on product preference.  Thus, given the 
existing experimental evidence, a future study of human values that manipulated the 
kind of product meaning to which consumers attend might show that the attention to 
utilitarian meaning results in the increased influence of tangible attribute 
importances on product preference and that human values influence those tangible 
attribute importances, and that the attention to symbolic meaning results in the 
increased direct influence of human values given that intangible attributes closely tie 
human values and product preference.   
 
 However, such potential experimental evidence would be of limited benefit.  
Only the less important issue of whether product meaning (or judgement) affects the 
routes of value influence would be addressed; what would fail to be addressed is the 
more crucial question of whether human values are, in fact, influencing tangible 
attribute importances, product preference and the attention to product meaning.  To 
show that human values cause another component human values must be 
manipulated so that changes in tangible attribute importances, meaning and 
judgement preferences and product preferences can be observed.  Most experimental 
studies cited in the current chapter merely show that the correlation between attitudes 
and behaviour, or the correlation among human values, attitudes and behaviour, is 
affected when an external variable is manipulated such as product meaning or 
attitude function (e.g., Maio & Olsen, 1995; Prentice, 1987; Shavitt, 1990; Shavitt, 
Lowrey & Han, 1992; Snyder & DeBono, 1985; Spivey, Munson & Locander, 1983).  
For instance, Spivey, Munson and Locander’s (1983) experiment only showed that 
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the strength of the correlation between attribute importances and product preference 
varies when the kind of product meaning to which consumers attend was 
manipulated through advertisements.   
 
 Thus, to establish human value causality human values must be manipulated, 
which is the crux of the problem; few experimental methods can manipulate an 
individual’s human value preferences.  The most well-established of the methods is 
Rokeach’s (1973) value self-confrontation procedure that, as discussed in Chapter I, 
informs participants that two of their important values are logically inconsistent and 
are different from those of an important reference group.  Rokeach argues that the 
information creates a state of self-dissatisfaction, and that consequently participants 
will alter one of their values to make it consistent with the other human value and to 
the human values of the reference group.  Moreover, participants alter specific 
attitudes and behaviours to bring them in line with the new human value importance. 
 
   Conceivably, the value self-confrontation procedure could be used to show that 
human values influence product preference through two primary routes.  For 
instance, a determination could first be made about which human values are unique 
to each route, that is, which human values tend to influence product preference 
through a particular route, or alternatively, which human values characterise those 
individuals who tend to apply all their human values through a particular route.  The 
readers may recall that Study 1 found that Maturity values (e.g., Inner Harmony, 
Self-respect, Broad-minded, etc.) tended to influence product preference directly and 
were preferred by participants who tended to use the direct route, whereas security 
values (e.g., Family Security, National Security) were preferred by participants who 
tended to use the indirect route.  Once a determination is made concerning the human 
values associated with each route, two pertinent values would be selected (such as 
Self-respect for the direct route and Family Security for the indirect route) and each 
participant informed that these two human values are logically inconsistent and that 
his or her preference for these values differs from the preferences of an important 
reference group.  Following the manipulation, changes should be observed in the 
participant’s preferences for one of these two human values and his or her meaning 
and judgement preferences, tangible attribute importances, product preference and 
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routes of value influence. 
 
 Though the value self-confrontation procedure could be used to establish that 
human values influence consumer choices through separate routes, the procedure is 
limited in two ways.  Firstly, the procedure requires that the two values manipulated 
are equally important and are logically inconsistent; obviously, most human value 
pairs that are logically inconsistent are not equally preferred.  Consequently, most 
value self-confrontation studies have only used the values of Freedom and Equality 
because participants tend to emphasise both and the experimenter can make a 
reasonable argument that the values are logically inconsistent for as people gain 
more freedom inequality increases, and vice versa (e.g., Gray & Ashmore, 1975; 
Hamid & Flay, 1974; Hopkins, 1973; Penner, 1971; Rokeach, 1973; Rokeach & 
Cochrane, 1972; Rokeach & McLellan, 1972).  The only other human values used in 
the self-confrontation procedure are A World of Beauty and A Comfortable Life (e.g., 
Grube, Mayton & Ball-Rokeach, 1994) and Wisdom and Happiness (e.g., Schwartz 
& Inbar-Saban, 1988).  Although a case could be made for the inconsistency of other 
pairs of values, the likelihood that participants believe both human values are 
important limits the procedure to only a handful of values. 
 
 A more serious limitation of value self-confrontation procedure for the current 
purposes is that the motivations it arouses would interact with the value influence 
routes.  As the experimental manipulation relies on the individual comparing his or 
her human values with the reference group and to other values in their value system, 
the procedure requires two motivations; a need for social approval and a need for 
self-consistency.  However, the readers might recall that these two motivations likely 
underlie the expressive psychological function and the attention to symbolic meaning 
(e.g., Johar & Sirgy, 1991; Katz, 1960; Herek, 1987; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982).  
For just one example, Johar and Sirgy (1991) suggested that a need for self-
consistency leads to individuals preferring products with symbolic meaning 
consistent with their actual self-image, whereas a need for social approval leads to 
individuals preferring products with symbolic meaning consistent with their ideal 
social self image.  In either case, the need for consistency and the need for social 
approval compel individuals to attend to the symbolic meanings of products, and 
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consequently, the value self-confrontation procedure would probably be successful in 
manipulating the values of those individuals attending to symbolic meaning, holding 
an expressive psychological function, and following the direct route, but would have 
little success for those individuals attending to the utilitarian meaning, holding an 
instrumental psychological function, and following the indirect route.  Given that 
Study 1 showed the indirect route was the predominant mode of value influence, the 
value self-confrontation procedure can apparently only manipulate the human values 
of a small subset of participants. 
 
 Thus, the value self-confrontation procedure’s ability to manipulate human 
values and gauge the effect on attitudes and behaviours is limited in the number of 
human values it can manipulate and the type of people who are amenable.  What is 
needed is a way to manipulate all human values for all individuals; a difficult 
challenge.  An alternative experimental method to the value self-confrontation 
procedure could be developed that could meet such a challenge, but the development 
of such a method is problematic and is outside the scope of the present thesis.   
 
Therefore, correlational evidence of human value influence must be settled for 
rather than causal evidence, which means that the methodological decision in testing 
the product meaning approach hypothesis is whether to use an experimental design 
that did not directly address human value influence or to use a survey approach.  The 
experimental design, outlined previously, could manipulate the kind of product 
meaning to which consumers attend and the kind of judgement they make, and then 
gauged how that manipulation affected the strengths of the value influence routes.  
However, for reasons mentioned, such experimental evidence would be of limited 
benefit, particularly, when compared with a correlational design and survey approach 
that could examine the product meaning approach hypothesis in a more naturalistic 
setting and with a broader range of phenomena.  An experiment could only 
manipulate a small subset of human values, tangible attribute importances, product 
meanings, judgements and product preferences.  As the conceptual model aims to be 
a general representation of how these components are related in most contexts, the 
capacity of the survey approach and correlational design to canvass a broad range of 
phenomena makes it the most suitable (the full implications of the examination of the 
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product meaning approach hypothesis in a correlational design are discussed in 
Chapter VIII). 
 
 Given that the product meaning approach hypothesis is at the level of the 
individual consumer, Study 2 develops and tests scales designed to measure each 
consumer’s meaning and judgement preferences.  Using these meaning and 
judgement scales, Study 3 tests the hypothesised relationship between each 
consumer’s meaning and judgement preferences and the direct and indirect influence 
of his or her human values on product preference, that is, whether each consumer’s 
preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning 
and an affective judgement is greater when his or her human values have an indirect 
influence (via tangible attribute importances) on product preference than when his or 
her human values have a direct influence. 
 
 The discussion of cross-product consistency and psychological function led to 
several conceptions and as they are not the central focus of the thesis are stated as 
propositions rather than formal hypotheses; 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Individuals have a cross-product tendency to attend to 
the same product meanings, use the same type of judgement, and apply 
human value criteria through the same route.   
  
PROPOSITION 2: Greater psychological identification with a product is a 
feature of an expressive psychological function and therefore is associated 
with the direct influence of human values. 
  
PROPOSITION 3: Greater value relevance is a feature of an expressive 
psychological function and therefore is associated with the direct influence 
of human values. 
 
PROPOSITION 4: Instrumental human values serve an instrumental 
psychological function and therefore a preference for instrumental values 
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should be associated with the indirect influence of human values. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: Terminal human values serve an expressive 
psychological function and therefore a preference for terminal values should 
be associated with the direct influence of human values. 
 
 
 Also due to the propositions not being a central focus of the thesis, Study 4 
explore the propositions by examining the results of Studies 1-3 in greater detail, by 
re-analysing the data collected in Studies 1-3, by analysing data collected in Studies 
1-3 but not previously used, or by analysing a fourth data set. 
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CHAPTER V.  STUDY 2: DEVELOPMENT OF MEASURES OF 
PRODUCT MEANING AND JUDGEMENT PREFERENCE 
 
 
 
 Given that the hypothesis of the product meaning approach is at the level of the 
individual consumer, the aim of Study 2 is to develop and test scales that can 
measure each consumer's preferred product meanings and judgement types. 
 
METHOD 
 
Design 
 
 To measure meaning and judgement preferences adequately, the scales should 
meet three criteria:  
 
1. The scales should overlap conceptually with the constructs they purport to 
measure. 
 
2. The underlying structures of the scales should match their conceptual 
structures. 
 
3. The scales should be sensitive to consumers’ “true” meaning and judgement 
preferences.   
 
 
 The construction and item selection of the meaning and judgement scales will be 
carried out in a way that ensures the first criterion is met, and whether the meaning 
and judgement scales meet the second and third criteria will be determined from the 
responses of general population participants who use the scales to indicate what kind 
of product meaning they prefer to attend to and what kind of judgement they prefer 
to make when considering the purchases of several specific products.  Whether the 
meaning and judgement preference scales meet the second criterion will be resolved 
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by factor analysing the participants’ responses to the items in the meaning and 
judgement scales, and comparing the factor structures with the scales’ conceptual 
structures.  The factor structures and conceptual structures would match if all the 
items that make up a scale load on the same factor.  Thus, the factor analysis should 
result in either two or four factors; four factors if each of the four components 
emerges on a separate factor (e.g., utilitarian meaning on one factor, symbolic 
meaning on another, piecemeal judgement on still another, and affective judgement 
on the final factor), and two factors if the meanings and their associated judgements 
load on the same factor (e.g., utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement on one 
factor, and symbolic meaning and an affective judgement on the other). 
 
 Whether the meaning and judgement preference scales meet the third criterion 
can obviously not be determined.  However, one finding that would suggest that the 
meaning and judgement scales are measuring consumers “true” meaning and 
judgement preferences is if the mean ratings’ participants give to the scales vary 
across products that probably differ in their meanings and judgements.  As 
mentioned, participants will use the scales to indicate what kind of product meaning 
they prefer to attend to and what kind of judgement they prefer to make when 
considering the purchases of several specific products.  Accordingly, several product 
stimuli are needed for participants to indicate their meaning and judgement 
preferences; stimuli for which a reasonable assumption can be made whether for 
most consumers each product’s meaning is primarily utilitarian or symbolic and its 
judgement primarily piecemeal or affective.  Four features aided in the selection of 
such products.  Firstly, according to Johar and Sirgy (1991), products that tend to 
denote utilitarian meaning (and serve an instrumental psychological function) are 
those with highly involved consumers who perceive critical differences among the 
brands.  Secondly, Johar and Sirgy (1991) and Holman (1981) argue that products 
that are scarce and conspicuously owned or consumed tend to be symbolic.  Thirdly, 
Keaveney and Hunt (1992) and Shavitt, Lowrey and Han (1992) suggest that high 
risk choices lead to effortful, careful and piecemeal evaluations of tangible product 
features, and finally, Mittal (1988, 1994) suggests that products high in 
expressiveness (e.g., symbolism and associated emotional and sensory experiences) 
tend to be judged affectively. 
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 Thus, the products used as stimuli for participants to indicate their meaning and 
judgement preferences should vary in the four features outlined.  Moreover, all of the 
products selected should be purchased regularly, or at a minimum should be 
contemplated by consumers frequently, to ensure that consumers have firm 
conceptions of their meaning and judgement preferences.  The necessity for products 
that met all the above requirements was discussed with other social psychologists 
who suggested three products suitable for pilot testing: automobiles, lounge suites 
and sunglasses.   
 
 Automobiles seem to be what Keaveney and Hunt (1992) and Shavitt, Lowrey 
and Han (1992) suggest are high-risk choices that lead to effortful, careful and 
piecemeal evaluations of tangible product features, and Sirgy and Johar (1985) found 
that automobiles tend to be evaluated foremost on tangible features and cost then 
secondarily on their intangible / image attributes (although some differences between 
automobile classes were found).  Thus, automobiles should provide a good exemplar 
of a product for which utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement are more 
important to most consumers than symbolic meaning and an affective judgement.  
Moreover, using automobiles as stimuli in the current study maintains some 
consistency with the method and procedures in Study 1.  Lounge suites were selected 
as a second product stimulus because they are conspicuous, central features in the 
home, are stylistic, and are moderately expensive, which suggests that both 
utilitarian and symbolic meanings of lounge suites will be important to consumer 
evaluations.  Thus, lounge suites should provide a good exemplar of a product for 
which utilitarian meaning and its associated piecemeal judgement and symbolic 
meaning and its associated affective judgement are equal in importance.  Finally, the 
conspicuousness and generally low cost of sunglasses suggest they should be 
evaluated somewhat equivalently on their symbolism and their utility in decreasing 
glare and harmful sunlight.  In a thought-listing procedure in which respondents 
wrote their own sunglasses advertisements, Shavitt, Lowrey and Han (1992) found 
that sunglasses were high in both self-expressiveness (symbolism) and 
instrumentality (utility) for low self-monitors but was largely self-consistency for 
high self-monitors.  Thus, sunglasses, like lounge suites, should provide a good 
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exemplar of a product for which utilitarian and symbolic meanings and the 
meanings’ associated piecemeal and affective judgements are equal in importance.   
 
 Importantly, for none of the three products, automobiles, lounge suites, or 
sunglasses, is the product’s symbolic meaning and its associated affective judgement 
definitively more important than utilitarian meaning and its associated piecemeal 
judgement.  In each instance, utilitarian meaning is probably more important to most 
consumers than symbolic meaning, because as suggested in Chapter IV, often, but 
not always, the functionality of a product would be more important than the image it 
conveys.  Thus, the primary distinction among the three products is the relative 
preference for utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning 
and affective judgement, with automobiles having the greatest disparity and lounge 
suites and sunglasses the least.  Some products, such as family heirlooms, might 
present a case in which symbolic meaning is more important than utilitarian, but 
symbolic meanings would tend to develop over a period of ownership and 
psychological investment, and therefore such products would probably fail to meet 
the criteria for the current study that the product stimuli are purchased regularly, or 
their purchase considered regularly. 
 
 Prior to using these three products as stimuli to examine the soundness of the 
meaning and judgement scales, a pilot study was conducted in which respondents 
used a provisional version of the scales to rate their meaning and judgement 
preferences for one of the three products.  Participants in the pilot study were 
randomly selected from the Wellington telephone directory and received the pilot 
instrument through the post accompanied with a pre-paid reply envelope.  One 
hundred surveys were sent out, 40 were returned, and as the respondents rated the 
pilot meaning and judgement items for only one product (automobiles, lounge suites, 
or sunglasses) between 10 and 15 respondents rated each product.  An analysis of the 
responses helped refine the instrument (see next section) and showed that for all 
three products utilitarian meaning and its associated piecemeal judgement were 
preferred to symbolic meaning and its affective judgement.  Thus, as speculated, the 
products’ functionality and usefulness are more important overall than the image 
they convey.  Although utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement were 
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preferred to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement, the relative preference 
did vary by product with automobiles showing the greatest difference and lounge 
suites and sunglasses the least.  Sunglasses were slightly more symbolic and 
affective than lounge suites and therefore as the main study instructs respondents to 
rate all the products so that within-subject comparisons can be made, lounge suites 
were discarded from the main study to reduce the length of the questionnaire.   
 
 Whilst having only one product to represent each type of meaning and 
judgement is tenuous, automobiles and sunglasses are different points along the 
utilitarian-symbolic and piecemeal-affective continua, and thus should be sufficient 
for the current purposes of establishing whether the scales’ factor structures match 
their conceptual structures and whether the scales are sensitive to consumers “true” 
meaning and judgement preferences.  Concerning the latter, the pilot study confirmed 
the argument made in Chapter IV that for most products utilitarian meaning and its 
associated piecemeal judgement will be rated as more important than symbolic 
meaning and its affective judgement.  Therefore, the sensitivity of the meaning and 
judgement preference scales would be verified if; 1) for both automobiles and 
sunglasses the utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement scale was rated more 
important than the symbolic meaning and affective judgement scale, and 2) the 
relative preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic 
meaning and an affective judgement was greater for automobiles than for sunglasses. 
 
Respondents 
 
 As examining meaning and judgement preferences in a naturalistic setting with 
the broadest range of phenomena is advantageous, a general population sample was 
chosen to a student sample.  The survey was distributed through the post to a random 
sample of 350 adults drawn from the Wellington telephone directory.  The random 
procedure selected every nth name in the directory and for married and cohabiting 
couples alternated between the male and female partner.  The respondents were 
encouraged to return the questionnaire within three weeks, and those unwilling or 
unable to participate were urged to pass the survey along to another adult household 
member.  Participants were informed their participation was voluntary, that their 
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responses were anonymous and would not be used for any other purpose and that if 
they had any queries or wished a summary of the results to ring me. 
 
 One hundred fifty surveys were returned, of which 25 were undeliverable and 19 
could not be used due to respondents failing to answer all the questions or 
completing the sections incorrectly.  Thus, the correctly competed surveys and 
incorrectly completed surveys combined (106+19=125) out of the total number of 
surveys distributed minus those not delivered (350-25=325) is a reasonable response 
rate of 39%.  Overall, the sample contains a representative proportion of men and 
women but under-represents the younger age groups (see Table 14 on page 159) 
(Hereafter, the data set is referred to as Sample No. 2).  Approximately 30 
respondents requested a summary of results posted approximately three months after 
the completion of the survey. 
 
Survey 
 
 The survey measured human values and meaning and judgement preferences for 
automobiles and sunglasses (see Appendix Three beginning on page 319 for copy of 
cover letter and survey). 
 
Human ValuesValuesValuesValues 
 
 Human values were measured in the same format as in Study 1.  To review: the 
36 human values  of the Rokeach Value Survey were supplemented with the human 
values of Social Justice, Equity, Social Power and Self-determination (definitions 
supplied by Ng et al., 1982).  A forced-distribution response format was employed in 
which of the 40 human values, respondents selected the 13 most important values 
and the 13 least important.  Those human values selected as most important were 
coded as 3, those selected as least important were coded as 1 and the remainder were 
coded as 2.  Instrumental and terminal values were inter-mixed in the same 
alphabetically ordered list because previous research has been unable to substantiate 
their independence (see, Crosby, Bitner & Gill, 1990; Heath & Fogel, 1978).  The 
alphabetical list was also counter-balanced with half the respondents receiving a list 
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of values in ascending order and the other half receiving a list in descending order.  
Those respondents completing the forced-distribution procedure incorrectly were 
discarded (less than 1% of the sample). 
 
 Besides measuring human values with the Rokeach Value Survey, human values 
were also measured in two open-ended questions.  The questions immediately 
followed the Rokeach Value Survey and were: “Referring to the values listed on the 
previous page, do you feel that there are some values that are important to you but do 
not appear in the list?  If so, what are they?” and “Can you think of other values that 
may be important to New Zealanders but are not listed”.  A selection of participants’ 
answers to these questions is given in Chapter VII, which discusses why the 
questions measure value relevance and examines the proposition that value relevance 
is a feature of the direct route of value influence on product preference. 
 
Meaning and Judgement Preferencesand Judgement Preferencesand Judgement 
Preferencesand Judgement Preferences 
 
 Given that several studies have confirmed, or suggested, which kind of 
judgement evaluates each kind of meaning (e.g., Chaudhuri & Buck, 1995; 
Keaveney & Hunt, 1992; Mittal, 1988), the scales will measure meaning and 
judgement preferences conjointly.  One scale will measure consumer preferences for 
attending to utilitarian meaning and making a piecemeal judgement, whereas the 
other scale will measure consumer preferences for attending to symbolic meaning 
and making an affective judgement.  However, the analysis still independently 
evaluates meaning and judgement preferences within each scale to verify their 
association.   
 
 Readers are encouraged to review the summary table of the product meaning 
approach in Table 1 (on page 22) as the characteristics of meaning and judgement 
preferences that the scales attempt to measure are outlined most clearly.  The items of 
the scales that measure consumer preferences for attending to a product’s utilitarian 
and symbolic meanings focus primarily on the meanings’ content, and the items of 
the scales that measure consumer preferences for making piecemeal and affective 
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judgements focus on reasoning, affect latency and affect intensity.  However, the 
scale items that measure consumer preferences for making an affective judgement 
also include memory representation due to the close conceptual and empirical 
association between an affective judgement and a visual memory representation (as 
discussed in Chapter IV).  In addition, the meaning and judgement scales do not 
explicitly measure the psychological functions underpinning the two of routes of 
value influence and attentions to product meanings, though because the meaning 
portion of the scales focus on the meanings’ general contents, the symbolic meaning 
preference scales implicitly measures a preference for an expressive psychological 
function and the utilitarian meaning preference scale may implicitly measures a 
preference for an instrumental psychological function. 
 
Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal JudgementMeaning and Piecemeal 
JudgementMeaning and Piecemeal JudgementMeaning and Piecemeal Judgement 
 
 The Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale measures a desire to 
focus on the product's practicality and usefulness and judge with a reasoning that is 
attribute-by-attribute, logical, systematic, and comprehensive, and with an affect that 
is delayed and is of low intensity.  The final version of the Utilitarian Meaning and 
Piecemeal Judgement Scale was developed from a pilot instrument in which the 
piecemeal judgement portion of the scale was Mittal's (1988) Information Processing 
Mode scale.  Mittal’s Information Processing Mode scale was derived from 
Chaiken's (1980) descriptions of a judgement process in which consumers 
accumulate information about each brand, evaluate the levels of the attributes for 
each brand, and then combine the attribute evaluations to form overall brand liking.  
Obviously, the Information Processing Mode is the same judgement outlined in 
expectancy-value theory and what Fiske and Pavelchak (1986) term a piecemeal 
judgement.  Not explicitly tapped in Mittal’s Information Processing Mode scale is 
the meticulous and rational nature of a piecemeal judgement, and so new items were 
constructed to more fully measure a piecemeal judgement.  All the items measuring a 
preference for utilitarian meaning are original. 
 
 In total, 12 utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement items were tested in the 
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pilot study, described in the previous section, which assessed the items’ sensitivity to 
three product categories: automobiles, sunglasses and lounge suites.  Items that were 
excessively correlated with each other were combined, and those items that were 
insensitive to product type, that is, their mean ratings were the same whether 
consumers were evaluating automobiles, lounge suites or sunglasses, were discarded.  
The 8 final items of the Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale are 
listed in Table 15 (on page 160) along with each item’s origin and the construct the 
item is purported to measure.  Utilitarian meaning preference is only measured with 
two items, and consequently, particular attention will be paid to the scale in the 
analysis section to ensure that the scale is satisfactorily reliable. 
 
Symbolic Meaning and Affective JudgementMeaning and Affective 
JudgementMeaning and Affective JudgementMeaning and Affective Judgement 
 
 The Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale measures a propensity to 
focus on the product's image and symbolism and judge with a reasoning that is 
holistic, approximate and intuitive, an affect that is immediate and on the level of 
emotional states, and a visual memory representation.  The final version of the scale 
was developed from a pilot instrument founded upon Mittal's (1988) Affective 
Choice Mode and Expressiveness scales.  Mittal's Affective Choice Mode scale 
measures consumer preferences for evaluating a product holistically and subjectively, 
and Mittal's Expressiveness scale measures a consumer’s attention to the product’s 
symbolism and ability to engender emotional and sensory experiences.  Absent from 
Mittal’s Affective Choice Mode scale, however, are the deeper emotional states 
associated with affective judgements, and thus to rectify the limitation, two of 
Mittal’s Expressiveness scale items, specifically, the items measuring an emphasis on 
emotional and sensory experiences, were re-classified as measuring an affective 
judgement.  The pilot instrument also contained newly constructed items to measure 
the remaining characteristics of an intuitive and instantaneous liking and more 
thoroughly measure a concern about a product image.  Concerning the latter, the 
reader might recall that the expressive psychological function indicates that the 
product fulfils the user’s need to express his or her self-concepts and identities, 
particularly his or her need for social-approval and self-consistency.  Consequently, 
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the newly constructed items needed to be applicable to those consumers attending to 
symbolic meaning for social-approval purposes and for those consumers attending to 
symbolic meaning for self-consistency purposes. 
 
 In total, 16 symbolic meaning and affective judgement items were tested in the 
pilot study, discussed in the previous section, which assessed the items’ sensitivity to 
three diverse product categories: automobiles, sunglasses and lounge suites.  Items 
that were excessively correlated with each other were combined, and those items that 
were insensitive to product type, that is, their mean ratings were the same whether 
consumers were evaluating automobiles, lounge suites or sunglasses, were discarded.  
The final items of the Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale are listed in 
Table 16 (on page 161) along with each item’s origin and the construct the item is 
purporting to measure.  
 
 For the main study, the items in both scales were anchored on a 1-7 'Strongly 
Disagree' to 'Strongly Agree' scale, and rated twice, once in reference to cars and a 
second in reference to sunglasses. 
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Table 14.  Demographic profile of sample No.2. 
 
     
   
Cases 
 
Percent 
Census for 
Target Area 
     
All Respondents  106   
     
Gender     
  Male  50 47.2 49.2 
  Female  56 52.8 50.8 
     
Age     
  18 and 19  3 2.6   ----- 
  20 to 29  14 12.1 26.6 
  30 to 39  28 26.7 22.8 
  40 to 49  30 26.7 18.1 
  50 to 59  13 12.9 12.2 
  60 or more  18 19.0 20.3 
     
     
 
Notes: 
 Target Area: Wellington Regional District. 
 1991 Census. 
Census information for 18 and 19 age group unavailable, and remaining age census  
 categories modified to reflect the adult-only composition of the sample.  
 160
Table 15.  Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale. 
 
    
  Construct  
    
 Origin Type Sub-type 
    
1. I think it is important to select the most practical 
product. 
 
New Meaning Practicality 
2. When deciding on whether or not to buy a product 
I think about how useful it will be. 
 
New Meaning Usefulness 
3. Before you make your final selection of a product, 
you would: Seek a lot of information about each 
product. 
 
IPM Judgement Reasoning 
4.  I believe in being logical and rational when 
deciding on a product. 
 
New Judgement Reasoning 
5. Before you make your final selection of a product, 
you would: Consider the pros and cons for each 
product. 
 
IPM Judgement Reasoning 
6. I believe in selecting a product based on a careful 
examination of all its features. 
 
New Judgement Reasoning and 
Affect 
Latency 
7. I believe in making a responsible and well-
considered decision. 
 
New Judgement Reasoning and 
Affect 
Latency 
8. I believe in exercising self-control and not being 
impulsive when deciding on a product. 
 
New Judgement Affect Latency 
and Intensity 
    
 
Notes: Items rated on a scale of 1-7, ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’. 
The specific product versions substituted ‘a product’ with ‘a pair of sunglasses’ and 
‘an automobile’. 
  IPM = Information Processing Mode (Mittal, 1988). 
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Table 16.  Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale. 
 
    
  Construct 
    
 Origin Type Sub-type 
    
1. To what extent would you want your chosen 
product to be: Most compatible with the image 
you have of yourself. 
 
EXP/ 
Modified 
Meaning Self-consistency 
2. I prefer a product that reflects who I am. 
 
New Meaning Self-consistency/ 
Social-approval 
3. The image a product portrays is an important part 
of my decision whether or not to buy it. 
 
New Meaning Social-approval/ 
Social-approval 
4. To what extent would you want your chosen 
product to be: In fashion or in vogue. 
 
EXP Meaning Social-approval/ 
Social-approval 
5. To what extent would you want your chosen 
product to be: Known to be expensive. 
 
EXP Meaning Social-approval 
6. To what extent would you want your chosen 
product to be: A product that you can proudly 
display. 
 
EXP Meaning Social-approval 
7. Usually my selection of a product is based on a gut 
feeling. 
New Judgement Reasoning 
8. To what extent would you want your chosen 
product to be: Something that puts you in a good 
mood when you use it. 
 
EXP Judgement Affect Intensity 
9. To what extent would you want your chosen 
product to be: Something that feels pleasant to 
your senses (i.e., sight, feel, etc.). 
 
EXP Judgement Affect Intensity 
and Memory 
Representation 
10. The instant I see a product I know if I like it. 
 
New Judgement Affect Latency and 
Reasoning 
 
11. Before you make your final selection of a 
product, you would: Think a lot about yourself as 
a user of the product (i.e., how you would look, 
feel, etc.). 
 
ACM Judgement Memory 
Representation 
    
 
Notes: Items rated on a scale of 1-7, ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’. 
The specific product versions substituted ‘a product’ with ‘a pair of sunglasses’ and  
‘an automobile’. 
  ACM = Affective Choice Mode (Mittal, 1988). 
  EXP= Product Expressiveness (Mittal, 1988). 
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RESULTS 
 
 
 As suggested in the design section, adequate meaning and judgement scales 
should overlap conceptually with the constructs they purport to measure, the scales’ 
underlying structures should match their conceptual structures, and the scales should 
be sensitive to “true” meaning and judgement preferences.  The meaning and 
judgement scales were constructed to overlap with the purported constructs, and thus 
the first portion of the current section addresses the structure of the scales and the 
next portion the sensitivity of the scales.  
 
I.  Scale Structure.  Scale Structure.  Scale Structure.  Scale Structure 
 
 The structures of the meaning and judgement items were uncovered through 
factor analyses carried out separately for consumers’ meaning and judgement 
preferences when considering the purchase of automobiles and sunglasses.   
 
 The 19 items measuring consumer preferences for meanings and judgements 
when evaluating automobiles (11 symbolic and affective items and 8 utilitarian and 
piecemeal items) were factor analysed with principal component extraction and 
varimax/orthogonal rotation.  To ensure a stable factor structure four criteria have 
been proposed which the current analysis meets: a minimum sample size of 100 to 
200 (Comrey, 1978), a minimum ratio of participants to variables of between 2:1 and 
10:1 (Gorsuch, 1983; Nunnally, 1978), a minimum ratio of participants to factors 2:1 
(Cattell, 1978) and a minimum ratio of variables to factors of 6:1 (Cattell, 1978).  A 
principal component extraction was selected and the solution rotated to enable a 
more meaningful structure.  The scree plot suggested three factors most concisely 
summarised the patterns of item ratings, and the three factors together captured 
57.8% of the item variance (see Table 17 on page 169). 
 
 Interestingly, Factor One (Table 17) opposes the symbolic meaning and affective 
judgement items with the utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement items. 
However, the only items to load substantially on Factor One are the social-approval 
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symbolic items (such as products in vogue and that can be proudly displayed) 
followed by the self-consistency symbolic items (such as preferring products that are 
compatible with the image the consumers have of themselves).  The item “To what 
extent would you want your chosen automobile to be: Something that puts you in a 
good mood when you use it” loaded moderately high on both Factor One and Three, 
and although the item is slightly higher on Factor One the item is more compatible 
with the other items on Factor Three.  Factor Two contained all 8 of the utilitarian 
meaning and piecemeal judgement items, and Factor Three included all the affective 
judgement items except “I prefer an automobile that reflects who I am”.  That item 
also loaded on Factor One with which its symbolic content suggests it is more 
similar. 
 
 Thus, the factor analysis of consumer meaning and judgement preferences when 
evaluating automobiles resulted in the utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement 
items loading on a single factor, and the symbolic meaning items emerging on a 
separate factor from the affective judgement items.  A possible reason that the 
utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement items loaded on a single factor and the 
symbolic meaning and affective judgement items on separate factors is that a three-
factor solution forced an odd split, and so even number of factors such as two or four 
would more evenly separate the meaning and judgement items.  To appraise the 
possibility, a factor analysis with a two-factor solution was performed which resulted 
in the utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement items loading on one factor and 
the symbolic meaning and affective judgement items on the other.  A four-factor 
solution was also performed and resulted in the utilitarian meaning, symbolic 
meaning, affective judgement, piecemeal judgement items each loading on separate 
factors.  Thus, the odd number of factors probably accounts for the symbolic 
meaning items emerging on a separate factor from the affective judgement items, 
though that rationale does not explain why, at least according to the scree plot, the 
three-factor solution was the appropriate one in the first instance.  Overall, despite 
the shortcoming, the three-factor solution reveals a structure that corresponds well to 
conceptual structure the meaning and judgement items are intended to measure. 
 
 The 19 items measuring consumer preferences for meanings and judgements 
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when evaluating sunglasses (11 symbolic and affective items and 8 utilitarian and 
piecemeal items) were entered into a factor analysis (principal component extraction 
with varimax/orthogonal rotation) that according to the scree plot was also best 
represented by three factors (see Table 18 on page 170).  The three factors together 
accounted for 58.9% of the variance and, overall, the factor structure is similar to the 
factor structure of the meaning and judgement items when consumers evaluated 
automobiles.  Interestingly, like the automobiles evaluation factor structure, Factor 
One opposes the utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement items with the 
symbolic meaning and affective judgement.  However, the only items to load 
substantially on Factor One are the eight utilitarian meaning and piecemeal 
judgement items.  The second factor contained mostly affective judgement items, and 
the third factor lead with the social-approval symbolic items followed by the self-
consistency symbolic items.  The exceptions are the items, “To what extent would 
you want your chosen pair of sunglasses to be: Most compatible with the image you 
have of yourself” and “I prefer a pair of sunglasses that reflects who I am”, both of 
which loaded relatively equally on Factors Two and Three.  However, the items’ 
symbolic contents suggests they are more similar with the other items on Factor 
Three.  Again, the symbolic meaning items emerged on a separate factor from 
affective judgement items, whereas utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement 
items loaded on a single factor.  To review the possibility that a three-factor solution 
forced an odd split, a factor analysis with a two-factor solution was performed and 
resulted in the utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement items loading on one 
factor and the symbolic meaning and affective judgement items on the other.  A four-
factor solution was also performed and resulted in the utilitarian meaning, symbolic 
meaning, affective judgement, piecemeal judgement items loading on separate 
factors.  Thus, again the odd number of factors appears to account for the symbolic 
meaning items emerging on a separate factor from the affective judgement items, 
though that rationale does not explain why, at least according to the scree plot, the 
three-factor solution was the appropriate one in the first instance.  Overall, the factor 
structure of the meaning and judgement items when consumers evaluated both 
automobiles and sunglasses are consistent with the conceptual structures. 
 
 As the utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement items loaded on the same 
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factor in both the automobile and sunglasses evaluations, the utilitarian meaning and 
piecemeal judgement items can legitimately be combined into a single scale 
(hereafter referred to as the Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale).  
The Cronbach’s Alphas for the scale are .84 when consumers evaluated automobiles 
and .90 when sunglasses were evaluated.  However, the factor analyses resulted in 
the symbolic meaning items loading on a separate factor from the affective 
judgement items, and therefore before combining them into a single scale their 
association should be established; both in absolute terms and by comparing the 
strength of their association with the strength of the association of the utilitarian 
meaning items with the piecemeal judgement items. 
 
 To make those determinations, the meaning and judgement items were made into 
four scales according to the construct they are purporting to measure: a preference 
for utilitarian meaning, symbolic meaning, affective judgement, and piecemeal 
judgement (see Table 15 on page 160 and Table 16 on page 161 for the constructs the 
items measure).  The two items of the Utilitarian Meaning Scale produced a 
Cronbach’s Alpha of .59 when consumers evaluated automobiles and .54 when 
consumers evaluated sunglasses, the Cronbach’s Alpha for the six items of the 
Symbolic Meaning Scale was .87 for automobiles and .85 for sunglasses, the 
Cronbach’s Alpha for the six items of the Piecemeal Judgement Scale was .82 for 
automobiles and .90 for sunglasses, and the Cronbach’s Alpha for the five items of 
the Affective Judgement Scale was .67 for automobiles and .71 for sunglasses.  The 
reliabilities of the Utilitarian Meaning Scale are low but could be a result of the small 
number of items, a possibility supported by the items’ significant correlation in the 
evaluations of both automobiles (r=.44, df=113, p<.001, one-tailed) and sunglasses 
(r=.38, df=113, p<.001, one-tailed).  The reliabilities of the Affective Judgement 
Scale are marginal but acceptable for the current purpose. 
 
 Following the construction of the separate meaning and judgement scales, the 
scales were correlated with each other (see Table 19 on page 171).  In the evaluation 
of automobiles, a preference for a piecemeal judgement was strongly and positively 
correlated with attention to utilitarian meaning (r=.64) and a preference for an 
affective judgement was positively correlated with attention to symbolic meaning 
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(r=.67).  The correlations between preferences for utilitarian meaning and symbolic 
meaning, utilitarian meaning and an affective judgement, piecemeal judgement and 
symbolic meaning, and piecemeal judgement and affective judgement were all 
negative (e.g., -.36, -.35, -.21 and -.29, respectively).  In the evaluations of 
sunglasses, a preference for a piecemeal judgement was also strongly and positively 
correlated with attention to utilitarian meaning (r=.62) and a preference for an 
affective judgement was positively correlated with attention to symbolic meaning 
(r=.59).  Similarly, the correlations between preferences for utilitarian meaning and 
symbolic meaning, utilitarian meaning and an affective judgement, piecemeal 
judgement and symbolic meaning, and piecemeal judgement and affective judgement 
were all negative, although only two were significant (e.g., -.15, -.03, -.20 and -.19, 
respectively). 
 
 The most notable of the above relations is that the correlation of symbolic 
meaning with an affective judgement is not only significant, but is also equal in 
strength to the correlation of utilitarian meaning with a piecemeal judgement.  Thus, 
combining symbolic meaning and an affective judgement into a single scale appears 
appropriate (hereafter referred to as the Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement 
Scale).  The Cronbach's alphas for the scale are .87 when consumers evaluated 
automobiles and .86 when sunglasses were evaluated. 
 
 In the interest of completeness, the joint meaning and judgement scales were 
correlated with each other (see Table 19 on page 171).  Akin to the relations shown 
in the separate meaning and judgement scale correlations, a preference for one type 
of meaning and judgement decreased a preference for the other.  Specifically, when 
automobiles were evaluated the correlation between the Utilitarian Meaning and 
Piecemeal Judgement Scale and the Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement 
Scale was -.34, and the same negative relationship was found when consumers 
evaluated sunglasses (r=-.22).  The negative relations are also evident across 
products, with the automobile Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale 
correlated -.19 with the sunglasses Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement 
Scale, and the automobile Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale 
correlated -.21 with the sunglasses Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement 
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Scale.  The cross-product correlations also show that individuals tend to prefer the 
same meanings and judgements for both automobiles and sunglasses.  The 
automobile Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale was correlated .67 
with the sunglasses Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale, and the 
automobile Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale was .64 with the 
sunglasses Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale.   
 
II.  Scale Sensitivity.  Scale Sensitivity.  Scale Sensitivity.  Scale Sensitivity 
 
 The previous section showed that the factor structures of the scales are consistent 
with their conceptual schemes, and therefore the current section addresses their 
sensitivity.  The suggestion was that the sensitivity of the scales would be established 
if 1) for both automobiles and sunglasses the utilitarian meaning and piecemeal 
judgement scale was rated more important than the symbolic meaning and affective 
judgement scale, and 2) the relative preference for utilitarian meaning and a 
piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement was greater 
for automobiles than for sunglasses. 
 
 The mean importance of the meaning and judgement scales for each product type 
are represented in Figure 3 (on page 172) and support the expectations.  The means 
were compared in a 2(car versus sunglasses) x 2(Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal 
Judgement Scale versus Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale) within-
subjects ANOVA, which showed that overall the Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal 
Judgement Scale was rated more highly than the Symbolic Meaning and Affective 
Judgement Scale (mean of 5.40 versus 4.05) (F(1,105)=70.4, p<.001, MSerror=2.8), 
that overall the meaning and judgement preferences when evaluating automobiles 
were more important than when evaluating sunglasses (mean of 4.83 versus 4.02) 
(F(1,105)=12.8, p<.001, MSerror=.4), and that these main effects were complicated 
by a significant interaction effect (F(1,105)=50.0, p<.001, MSerror=.6).  As the test 
variables were ordered into the SPSS ANOVA procedure such that the interaction 
made the appropriate comparison vis-à-vis the hypothesis, the significant interaction 
confirms that the Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale was rated 
more highly for cars than for sunglasses (mean of 5.76 versus 5.04) whereas the 
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reverse was true for the Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale (mean of 
3.89 for cars versus 4.20 for sunglasses).   
 
 Thus, as expected, for both automobiles and sunglasses, utilitarian meaning and 
its associated piecemeal judgement were preferred to symbolic meaning and its 
associated affective judgement, but difference was greater for automobiles than for 
sunglasses.  
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Table 17.  Factor structure of meaning and judgement preferences for automobiles. 
 
    
  Factor  
 1 2 3 
    
To what extent would you want your chosen automobile to be: 
Known to be expensive. 
.85 -.06 .06 
To what extent would you want your chosen automobile to be: 
In fashion or in vogue. 
.83 -.10 .04 
To what extent would you want your chosen automobile to be: 
An automobile that you can proudly display. 
.76 -.02 .12 
The image an automobile portrays is an important part of my 
decision whether or not to buy it. 
.72 -.20 .39 
To what extent would you want your chosen automobile to be: 
Most compatible with the image you have of yourself. 
.63 -.05 .48 
To what extent would you want your chosen automobile to be: 
Something that feels pleasant to your senses (i.e., sight, feel, 
etc.). 
.60 .09 .21 
To what extent would you want your chosen automobile to be: 
Something that puts you in a good mood when you use it. 
.48 .24 .41 
 
 
   
I believe in selecting an automobile based on a careful 
examination of all its features. 
.19 .80 -.27 
Before you make your final selection of an automobile, you 
would: Consider the pros and cons for each automobile. 
-.00 .77 .30 
Before you make your final selection of an automobile, you 
would: Seek a lot of information about each automobile. 
.10 .76 -.18 
When deciding on whether or not to buy an automobile I think 
about how useful it will be. 
-.16 .71 .17 
I believe in making a responsible and well-considered decision. .11 .67 -.32 
I believe in being logical and rational when deciding on an 
automobile. 
-.21 .65 -.45 
I think it is important to select the most practical automobile. -.37 .51 -.44 
I believe in exercising self-control and not being impulsive 
when deciding on an automobile. 
-.18 .47 -.14 
 
 
   
Before you make your final selection of an automobile, you 
would: Think a lot about yourself as a user of the automobile 
(i.e., how you would look, feel, etc.). 
.37 .09 .66 
The instant I see an automobile I know if I like it. .26 -.32 .58 
I prefer an automobile that reflects who I am. .44 -.23 .53 
Usually my selection of an automobile is based on a gut 
feeling. 
.03 -.38 .52 
    
Eigenvalue 6.2 3.6 1.2 
Cumulative Percent Variance 32.4 51.4 57.8 
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Table 18.  Factor structure of meaning and judgement preferences for sunglasses. 
 
    
  Factor  
 1 2 3 
    
I believe in selecting a pair of sunglasses based on a careful 
examination of all its features. 
.90 -.08 .00 
I believe in making a responsible and well-considered decision. .89 -.05 -.00 
Before you make your final selection of a pair of sunglasses, 
you would: Consider the pros and cons for each pair of 
sunglasses. 
.80 -.04 -.05 
Before you make your final selection of a pair of sunglasses, 
you would: Seek a lot of information about each pair of 
sunglasses. 
.78 -.06 .01 
I believe in being logical and rational when deciding on a pair 
of sunglasses. 
.75 -.26 -.02 
I believe in exercising self-control and not being impulsive 
when deciding on a pair of sunglasses. 
.68 .04 -.04 
I think it is important to select the most practical pair of 
sunglasses. 
.67 -.15 -.14 
When deciding on whether or not to buy a pair of sunglasses I 
think about how useful it will be. 
.54 .38 -.14 
 
 
   
To what extent would you want your chosen pair of sunglasses 
to be: Something that puts you in a good mood when you use 
it. 
.07 .72 .21 
Before you make your final selection of a pair of sunglasses, 
you would: Think a lot about yourself as a user of the pair of 
sunglasses (i.e., how you would look, feel, etc.). 
-.04 .69 .21 
The instant I see a pair of sunglasses I know if I like it. -.18 .63 .10 
To what extent would you want your chosen pair of sunglasses 
to be: Something that feels pleasant to your senses (i.e., sight, 
feel, etc.). 
.20 .61 .11 
To what extent would you want your chosen pair of sunglasses 
to be: Most compatible with the image you have of yourself. 
-.15 .59 .50 
Usually my selection of a pair of sunglasses is based on a gut 
feeling. 
-.33 .55 -.09 
I prefer a pair of sunglasses that reflects who I am. -.21 .55 .49 
 
 
   
To what extent would you want your chosen pair of sunglasses 
to be: Known to be expensive. 
.10 .06 .88 
To what extent would you want your chosen pair of sunglasses 
to be: In fashion or in vogue. 
-.05 .14 .84 
The image a pair of sunglasses portrays is an important part of 
my decision whether or not to buy it. 
-.19 .44 .60 
To what extent would you want your chosen pair of sunglasses 
to be: A pair of sunglasses that you can proudly display. 
-.08 .52 .54 
    
Eigenvalue 5.8 4.0 1.5 
Cumulative Percent Variance 30.3 51.2 58.9 
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Table 19.  Correlations of automobile and sunglasses separate and joint meaning 
and judgement preference scales. 
 
 
Correlations of automobile and sunglasses separate meaning and judgement preference scales. 
 
            
 AUM  APJ  ASM  AAJ  SUM  SPJ  SSM  
            
APJ .64 ***          
ASM -.36 *** -.21 *        
AAJ -.35 *** -.29 ** .67 ***       
SUM .50 *** .50 *** -.03  -.05       
SPJ .44 *** .61 *** -.10  -.26 ** .62 ***     
SSM -.20 * -.22 * .70 *** .52 *** -.15  -.20 *   
SAJ -.10  -.10  .34 *** .51 *** -.03  -.19 * .58 *** 
            
            
 
Notes: 
 * = p<.05 ** = p<.01 *** = p<.001 
 Degrees of Freedom for all correlations is 104, and significance is two-tailed 
 AUM = Utilitarian Meaning Preference When Evaluating Automobiles 
 APJ = Piecemeal Judgement Preference When Evaluating Automobiles 
 ASM = Symbolic Meaning Preference When Evaluating Automobiles 
 AAJ = Affective Judgement Preference When Evaluating Automobiles 
 SUM = Utilitarian Meaning Preference When Evaluating Sunglasses 
 SPJ = Piecemeal Judgement Preference When Evaluating Sunglasses 
 SSM = Symbolic Meaning Preference When Evaluating Sunglasses 
 SAJ = Affective Judgement Preference When Evaluating Sunglasses 
 
 
 
Correlations of automobile and sunglasses joint meaning and judgement preference scales. 
 
     
 AUMPJ ASMAJ SUMPJ 
     
ASMAJ -.34 ***   
SUMPJ .64 *** -.19 *  
SSMAJ -.21 * .67 *** -.21 * 
     
     
 
Notes: 
 * = p<.05 ** = p<.01 *** = p<.001 
 Degrees of Freedom for all correlations is 104, and significance is two-tailed. 
 AUMPJ = Utilitarian Meaning And Piecemeal Judgement Preference When  
Evaluating Automobiles 
 ASMAJ = Symbolic Meaning And Affective Judgement Preference When  
Evaluating Automobiles 
 SUMPJ = Utilitarian Meaning And Piecemeal Judgement Preference When  
Evaluating Sunglasses 
 SSMAJ = Symbolic Meaning And Affective Judgement Preference When  
Evaluating Sunglasses 
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Figure 3.  Average meaning and judgement preferences by product. 
 
Note: Scale of 1-7, ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 
 Thus, the scales measuring consumer meaning and judgement preferences appear 
to meet all three criteria: the scales overlap conceptually with the constructs they 
purport to measure, the scales’ underlying structures match their conceptual 
structures, and the scales seem sensitive to “true” meaning and judgement 
preferences.   
 
 The meaning and judgement scales were constructed explicitly to overlap with 
the purported constructs, and the factor analyses showed that whether consumers 
were indicating their meaning and judgement preferences for automobiles or 
sunglasses, the meaning and judgement items reduced to the same three factors: a 
utilitarian and piecemeal factor, a symbolic factor and an affective judgement factor.  
The emergence of the symbolic meaning items on a separate factor from the affective 
judgement items is likely due to the odd number of factors, although the reason three 
factors were the preferred solution in the first instance is uncertain.  One possibility 
is that the small number of utilitarian meaning items enabled them to load more 
easily with the piecemeal judgement items, than the larger number of symbolic 
meaning items could load with the affective judgement items.  Utilitarian meaning 
preference is measured with two items, compared with six items that measured 
symbolic meaning preference.   
 
 Whatever the precise reason the symbolic meaning items loaded on a separate 
factor from the affective judgement items, the correlation of a preference for 
symbolic meaning with a preference for an affective judgement was strong, positive, 
and similar in strength to the correlation of a preference for utilitarian meaning with 
a preference for a piecemeal judgement.  Those results suggest that the symbolic 
meaning and affective judgement items can be legitimately combined, a 
interpretation confirmed by the satisfactory reliabilities of the Symbolic Meaning 
and Affective Judgement Scale (e.g., the reliabilities were .87 when consumers 
evaluated automobiles and .86 when sunglasses were evaluated).  The reliabilities of 
the Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale were also satisfactory (e.g., 
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.84 when consumers evaluated automobiles and .90 when sunglasses were 
evaluated). 
 
 The strong and positive correlations between the preferences for attending to 
utilitarian meaning and making a piecemeal judgement and between the preferences 
for attending to symbolic meaning and making an affective judgement, and the joint 
meaning and judgement scales’ high reliabilities, are consistent with previous 
research that has shown, or has suggested, that consumers make a piecemeal 
judgement to evaluate utilitarian meaning and an affective judgement to evaluate 
symbolic meaning (e.g., Chaudhuri & Buck, 1995; Keaveney & Hunt, 1992; Mittal, 
1988).  For instance, Chaudhuri and Buck (1995) found that advertisements that use 
a product information strategy and focus on the product’s utilitarian meaning are 
judged analytically (e.g., piecemeal) and that advertisements that use a mood arousal 
strategy, which largely involve symbols, are affectively judged.  Similarly, Mittal 
(1988) found that the expressive aspects of products such as their sensory 
experiences, mood states attainment, and image and symbolism are judged 
affectively.  Thus, for both of the above reasons -- the previous conceptual and 
empirical support and the findings in the current study -- we can be reasonably 
confident that the attention to utilitarian meaning is associated with a piecemeal 
judgement and that the attention to symbolic meaning is associated with an affective 
judgement, though that confidence is offset by the recognition that consumers 
preferred meanings and judgements were measured, not the actual judgements 
consumers make when evaluating automobiles’ and sunglasses’ actual meanings. 
 
 Concerning the third criterion the meaning and judgement scales should have 
met, ANOVA showed that the joint meaning and judgement scales are probably 
sensitive to the natures of the products as for both automobiles and sunglasses, 
utilitarian meaning and its associated piecemeal judgement were preferred to 
symbolic meaning and its associated affective judgement, but difference was greater 
for automobiles than for sunglasses.  However, support for the sensitivity of the 
meaning and judgement scales is tentative because only two products were 
investigated.  Moreover, although automobiles and sunglasses are different ends 
along the utilitarian-symbolic and piecemeal-affective continua, each is not 
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necessarily an adequate indicator of a utilitarian, symbolic, piecemeal, or affective 
product.  One could easily think of more utilitarian products (e.g., a vacuum cleaner, 
hand tools) or symbolic one (e.g., family heirlooms).  Thus, firm support for the 
sensitivity of the meaning and judgement scales would be only be achieved from 
testing the scales on a larger number of products, particularly those products that are 
at more extreme ends of the utilitarian-symbolic and piecemeal-affective continua.  
For the present purposes, however, the sensitivity of the meaning and judgement 
scales appears satisfactory. 
 
 The analysis also showed that whether consumers were evaluating automobiles 
or sunglasses, the Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale and Symbolic 
Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale were negatively correlated, as were the 
Utilitarian Meaning Scale and the Symbolic Meaning Scale, and the Piecemeal 
Judgement Scale and the Affective Judgement Scale (see Table 19 on page 171).  
Whilst an individual can technically judge a product on both a piecemeal and 
affective basis either simultaneously or in some sequence, Mittal (1988) also found a 
negative correlation between an affective judgement and a judgement he termed 
Information Processing Mode (IPM) but is essentially piecemeal.  Mittal suggested 
that although IPM and affective judgements are each a separate process, they are 
likely to be negatively related because an affective judgement can be made more 
readily than an IPM judgement, making the latter unnecessary when an affective 
judgement is strong.  Zajonc (1984), who was an advocate for the predominance of 
affective judgements, stated “that affect and cognition are separate and partially 
independent systems and that although they ordinarily function conjointly, affect 
could be generated without a prior cognitive process.  It could, therefore, at times 
precede cognition in a behavioural chain”  (p.117).  That position did generate some 
controversy, but Mittal’s (1988) finding and the negative relationship found between 
preferences for a piecemeal and affective judgement in the present study, does 
suggest the increase or importance of one type of judgement decreases the 
importance of the other type of judgement, and possibly the product meanings the 
judgements evaluate given that the preferences for utilitarian and symbolic meanings 
were also negatively correlated. 
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 A final finding of note in the current study is that the meaning and judgement 
scales were positively correlated across products, that is, that a consumer’s 
preference for utilitarian meaning, symbolic meaning, piecemeal judgement, and an 
affective judgement, was similar whether he or she evaluated automobiles or 
sunglasses.  The finding suggests that consumers have generalised meaning and 
judgement preferences, and is concordant with the proposition made in Chapter IV 
that if human values inform consumer choices, then the abstractness and generality 
of human values would result in consumers preferring products that are consistent 
not only in how they reinforce important values but also in their meanings, 
judgements and routes of value influence.  The notion is explored further in Chapter 
VII, but presently, the finding suggests that as individuals tend to prefer the same 
meaning and judgement across products then only general preferences need be 
measured.  Thus, the next study employs a “generic” form of the meaning and 
judgement scales in which respondents’ rate their preferences for products in general, 
rather than repeating the items for each specific product.   
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CHAPTER VI.  STUDY 3: EXAMINATION OF THE PRODUCT 
MEANING APPROACH HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
 
 With Study 2 having established the structural reliability and sensitivity of the 
meaning and judgement preference scales and that utilitarian meaning and piecemeal 
judgement are preferred to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement, Study 3 
aims to associate each consumer’s meaning and judgement preferences with his or 
her direct and indirect influences of human values in the test of the product meaning 
approach hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS: An individual’s preference for utilitarian meaning and a 
piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement 
should be greater when his or her human values have an indirect influence 
(via tangible attribute importances) on product preference than when his or 
her human values have a direct influence. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Design 
 
 As discussed in Chapter IV, the product meaning approach hypothesis is 
examined in a correlational, rather than experimental, design because of the survey 
approach’s naturalism and ability to canvass a broad range of phenomena, and the 
difficulty in isolating and manipulating an individual’s human values.  The survey 
will focus on the same two products examined in Study 2, automobiles and 
sunglasses, and for the same reasons.  The high cost and risk of automobiles should 
result in piecemeal evaluations foremost on tangible and utilitarian features and 
secondarily on symbolism, whereas the conspicuousness and low cost of sunglasses 
suggests symbolic meaning and its associated affective judgement is nearly as 
important as utilitarian meaning and its associated piecemeal judgement.  Therefore, 
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automobiles and sunglasses are different ends along the utilitarian-symbolic and 
piecemeal-affective continua.   
 
 Whilst Study 2 may have been limited by having only one product to represent 
each type of meaning and judgement, the present study analyses automobiles and 
sunglasses separately and therefore having two products is not so much a limitation 
as it is a replication.  In Study 2, meaning and judgement preferences for automobiles 
were contrasted with meaning and judgement preferences for sunglasses to assess the 
sensitivity of the meaning and judgement scales, that is, whether for both 
automobiles and sunglasses the Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale 
was rated more important than the Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement 
Scale, and whether the relative preference was greater for automobiles than for 
sunglasses.  However, the present study examines the pattern of meaning and 
judgement preferences and routes of human value influence for automobiles and 
sunglasses independently.  Thus, support for the product meaning approach would be 
found if the influences of human values on automobile preference varies with 
meaning and judgement preferences in the directions hypothesised in the product 
meaning approach, and even stronger support for the product meaning approach 
would be found if the influences of human values on sunglasses preference also 
varies with meaning and judgement preferences in the directions hypothesised. 
 
Respondents 
 
 As examining meaning and judgement preferences in a naturalistic setting with 
the broadest range of phenomena is advantageous, a general population sample was 
chosen to a student sample.  The survey was distributed through the post to a random 
sample of 750 adults drawn from the Wellington telephone directory.  The random 
procedure selected every nth name in the directory and for married and cohabiting 
couples alternated between the male and female partner.  The respondents were 
encouraged to return the questionnaire within three weeks, and those unwilling or 
unable to participate were urged to pass the survey along to another adult household 
member.  Respondents were informed their participation was voluntary, that their 
responses were anonymous and would not be used for any other purpose and that if 
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they had any queries or wished a summary of the results to ring me. 
 
 Two steps were taken to increase the response rate; firstly, all those who 
participated were eligible to win a prize of 100 Dollars.  The winning name was 
drawn and the award distributed approximately three weeks after the completion of 
the survey.  The second step taken to increase the response rate was the posting of a 
reminder letter along with another copy of the survey to those who had not returned 
the survey within two weeks of receipt.  Eighty-one additional responses were 
achieved by that second procedure. 
 
 Overall, 324 surveys were returned, of which 40 were undeliverable and 28 
could not be used due to respondents failing to answer all the questions or 
completing the sections incorrectly.  Thus, the correctly competed surveys and 
incorrectly completed surveys combined (256+28=284) out of the total number of 
surveys distributed minus those not delivered (750-40=710) is a reasonable response 
rate of 40%.  Similar to Sample No. 2, the current sample contains a representative 
proportion of men and women but under-represents the younger age groups (see 
Table 20 on page 186) (Hereafter, the data set is referred to as Sample No. 3).  Forty 
respondents requested a summary of results posted approximately three months after 
the completion of the survey. 
 
SurveyQuestionnaireQuestionnaireQuestionnaire 
 
 The survey measured human values, automobiles and sunglasses tangible 
attribute importances and ownerships, and meaning and judgement preferences (see 
Appendix Four beginning on page 325 for copy of cover letter and survey).  The 
survey also contained a section on memory representation preference that is not used 
in the current analysis. 
 
Human ValuesValuesValuesValues 
 
 Human values were measured in the same way as in Studies 1 and 2 (readers are 
encouraged to review those studies for a description).  The means and standard 
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deviations of the human values for the current sample are reported in Table 21 (on 
page 187), and show that, similar to Study 1, Honesty, Self-respect, True Friendship 
and Family Security were the most important and National Security, Obedience, 
Salvation and Social Power the least important.  The 40 human values were grouped 
through factor analysis that resulted in 15 factors accounting for 62% of the variance 
(see Table 21 beginning on page 187).  A maximum number of factors were selected 
(to the Eigenvalue 1.0 cut-off) so that a topmost amount of human value variance is 
available for use in the prediction of tangible attribute importances and product 
preference, and a principal components extraction was selected and the solution not 
rotated because the purpose of the factor analysis is not to decipher the underlying 
structure but simply to reduce the number of items for testing the product meaning 
approach hypothesis. 
 
Tangible Attribute ImportancesAttribute ImportancesAttribute ImportancesAttribute 
Importances 
 
 Using a 10-point scale anchored by 'Not At All Important' (1) and 'Very 
Important' (10) respondents rated the importance of automobile and sunglasses 
tangible attributes.  Unlike human values, sufficient within-subject variability was 
expected and so a forced-distribution response format was not necessary.  
Concerning the number of tangible attributes for respondents to rate in importance, 
Fishbein (1967) suggests individuals can only consider between 6 and 11 object 
attributes.  However, the current study uses the attributes to cover entire product 
categories, not just specific brands or classes, and thus a larger number of items 
(between 20 and 24) were considered essential.  An attempt was made to ensure that 
the attributes were tangible and intrinsic to the product, although occasionally the 
tangibility and objectivity of the attributes are ambiguous.  Nevertheless, along the 
tangible-intangible or objective-subjective dimensions all of the selected attributes 
should be closer to the former poles than the latter. 
 
Automobiles 
 
 The car attributes were the same as those used in Study 1.  To review: the 
automobile attributes were gathered from Allen’s (1993) investigation that obtained 
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the items from several sources: a pilot study in which American respondents 
described the characteristics of their favourite car, Vinson, Scott and Lamont’s 
(1977) test of the human values ⇒ consumption values ⇒ automobile attribute 
importances relationship (the best discriminators between cultural groups were 
selected), from Horsky and Nelson’s (1992) study of a new automobile brand’s 
positioning, and from Lim, Olshavsky and Kim’s (1988) study of the impact of 
inferences on automobile attribute evaluation.  In Study 1 and the current one, 
attributes that were not intrinsic and tangible were discarded and new attributes 
added as a result of four informal conversations in which participants described the 
features they seek in an automobile.  These informational conversations also aided 
modification of the remaining attributes for a New Zealand context. 
 
 The mean importances of the car tangible attribute importances to the current 
sample are presented in Table 22 (on page 189).  Among the most important 
attributes are Reliability, Safety, and Few Repairs Needed, whereas the least are 
Large Body Size, Large Engine and Air Conditioning.  In the interest of 
manageability, automobile tangible attribute importances were grouped through 
factor analysis (principal components extraction with no rotation) that with an 
Eigenvalue 1.0 cut-off maximised the number of factors; 5 accounted for 40% of the 
variance (see Table 22 on page 189).  The analysis meets four criteria that help to 
ensure a stable factor structure: a minimum sample size of 100 to 200, a minimum 
ratio of participants to variables of between 2:1 and 10:1, a minimum ratio of 
participants to factors 2:1 and a minimum ratio of variables to factors of 6:1.  As with 
the human value factor analysis, the content of these factors will not be interpreted 
unless necessary at a later stage. 
 
Sunglasses 
 
 Previous research that developed or implemented sunglasses tangible attribute 
importances was unavailable, and so sunglasses tangible attributes were gathered 
exclusively from manufacture and retail outlet brochures (e.g., Ray-Ban, Sunglasses 
Hut, etc.).  The brochures comprised numerous, easily detectable attributes; for 
instance, one typical brochure stated “The Original Eyecon Sunglasses are made in 
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the USA and offer; 100% UV Protection, Scratch-resistant, polycarbonate lenses, 
Lightweight construction, and Unlimited lifetime warranty”.  The pool of attributes 
gathered from the brochures (more than 50) was reduced according to two criteria; 
firstly, all the attributes were ranked by frequency of occurrence and those most 
prevalent were considered the most eligible (a low frequency of occurrence did not 
automatically result in its deletion but simply a reconsideration), and secondly, each 
attribute must fall on the former poles of the tangible-intangible and objective-
subjective dimensions.  The application of the selection criteria reduced the initial 
pool of attribute importances from more than 50 to 20.  These were: brand name 
printed on lens or frame, colour of frame, darkly tinted lens, engineered design, fits 
comfortably on face, high UV protection, inexpensive, lenses with a large coverage 
area, light-weight, made of highest quality materials, metal frame, nylon frame, 
precision ground optical glass lenses, reduces glare and increases image clarity, 
reflective/mirrored lenses, scratch-resistant lenses, shape of frame (e.g., round, 
square, etc.), strong, rugged, impact resistant, suitable for a variety of sunlight 
conditions, and thin frame. 
 
 The mean importances of the sunglasses tangible attributes are presented in 
Table 23 (on page 190).  Among the most important tangible attributes are Fits 
Comfortably On Face, Reduces Glare, and UV Protection, whereas the least are 
Brand Name Printed On Lens Or Frame, Reflective / Mirrored Lenses, Metal Frame, 
and Nylon Frame.  Sunglasses tangible attribute importances were grouped through 
factor analysis (principal components extraction with no rotation) that with an 
Eigenvalue = 1.0 cut-off resulted in 6 factors accounting for 64% of the variance (see 
Table 23 on page 190).  The factors are not interpreted. 
 
Product PreferencePreferencePreferencePreference 
 
 As mentioned, the use of a survey design and a general population sample are in 
the interests of naturalism and investigating the broadest range of phenomena 
possible.  In the same interests, and consistent with Study 1, product preference was 
indexed as actual product purchase and ownership.  Indexing product preference as 
actual product purchase and ownership are more naturalistic than simple product 
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attitude or liking, and is more stringent in that consumers must commit their 
resources such as money, time to purchase, and so on.  However, many other factors 
contribute to product purchase other than human values or tangible attribute 
importances (e.g., financial ability, family considerations and so on), and previous 
purchase does not necessarily imply current preference.  The latter limitation is 
addressed by focussing on each respondent’s multiple, recent purchases of products 
within the same class or category. 
 
Automobiles 
 
 As an indicator of automobile preference, respondents listed the make, model 
and year of their current automobile and up to two previously owned automobiles.  
Cars greater than ten years old were excluded to help ensure that preferences 
measured by the meaning and judgement scales were still commensurate with 
product ownership.  With older cars the year of manufacture is probably unrelated to 
the length of time the current owner has maintained possession, whereas newer cars, 
by definition, are relatively recently purchased. 
 
 As in Study 1, the automobile makes and models were grouped into five classes 
using the schemes developed by New Car Buyers Guide (1991), Which? Car Buying 
Guide (1985) and Which? Car Buying Guide (1989).  When an automobile was not 
listed in those schemes, the cubic capacity of the engine and the overall body length 
separated Smaller Family Cars (cubic capacity ≤ 1600, length ≤ 168 inches) from 
Larger Family Cars.  Other automobiles not listed in those schemes were categorised 
after visual examination in reference sources such as Automobile Association (1975) 
and Consumer Guide (1990, 1992) or the telephone consultation with automotive 
dealers.  The final five classes are (see Appendix Two beginning on page 318 for full 
a coding scheme): 
 
 SMALLER FAMILY CARS -- e.g., Austin Mini, Peugeot 205, Ford Laser 
 LARGER FAMILY CARS -- e.g., Mitsubishi Tredia, Honda Accord, Holden 
  Commodore 
 LUXURY CARS -- e.g., Saab 900, Citroen BX, Holden Calais 
 184
 SPORTS CARS -- e.g., Toyota Celica, MGB GT, Honda Integra 
 UTILITY AND MINIVANS -- e.g., Isuzu Trooper, Holden Ute, Mitsubishi 
  Spacewagon 
 
 Respondents’ automobile preferences were scored as the percentage of cars they 
owned in each class out of the total number of cars they owned.  For example, if an 
individual owned an Austin Mini, MGB GT, and Honda Integra, their SMALLER 
FAMILY CARS score (Austin Mini) would be .33, their SPORTS CARS score 
(MGB GT, Honda Integra) would be .66, and all other car classes would be zero.  
The cars were scored in that manner to shift the focus from general car ownership to 
an individual's preferred car class.   
 
 The exclusion of those respondents who did not own an automobile and whose 
only automobile(s) was more than ten years old reduced the sample size by nearly 
one-half, from 256 to 142.  Of the remaining 142 respondents, the average proportion 
of Smaller Family Cars owned was .50 (SD=.46), Larger Family Cars .37 (SD=.43), 
Luxury Cars .08 (SD=.24), Sports Cars .02 (SD=.10), Utility Vehicles .04 (SD=.18) 
and Miscellaneous / Unclassifiable .14 (SD=.28).  Sports Cars, Luxury Cars and 
Utility and Minivans are skewed beyond repair by transformation (taking the square 
root) and consequently only Smaller Family Cars and Larger Family Cars will 
remain in the analysis.   
 
Sunglasses 
 
 The general public was anticipated to own a wide range of sunglasses brands, 
and so the measure of sunglasses ownership needed to be multi-faceted in the event 
that brand name became an unworkable index of product class ownership.  For their 
current pair of sunglasses respondents reported the brand name (e.g., Ray-Ban, Bill 
Bass, etc.), where and when the pair of sunglasses was purchased, the price paid, and 
the main purpose the pair of sunglasses was bought (e.g., Sports, Driving, General 
Use, etc.).  For respondents who listed more than one pair of sunglasses only the first 
pair listed was retained.  Moreover, sunglasses purchased more than three years prior 
to the completion of the survey were excluded to help ensure that meaning and 
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judgement preferences measured by the scales are still commensurate with product 
ownership. 
 
 In the current sample, more than 50 brands of sunglasses were listed but 12% of 
participants were unsure of the brand name of their sunglasses and a further 17% did 
not answer the brand name question.  Thus, due to a profusion of brands and many 
respondents not knowing which brand they own, the price paid was considered the 
best indicator of quality and product class ownership.  The exclusion of respondents 
who did not own a pair of sunglasses and those whose only pair of sunglasses was 
more than three years old reduced the sample size by more than one-half, from 256 
to 98.  Of the remaining 98 respondents, the mean price paid was 73.30 NZ Dollars 
(SD=85.8).   
 
Meaning and Judgement Preferencesand Judgement Preferencesand Judgement 
Preferencesand Judgement Preferences 
 
 The Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale and Symbolic Meaning 
and Affective Judgement Scale were in a generic form in which respondents rated the 
items for products in general, rather than repeating the items for each specific 
product.  The decision to use a generic form of the meaning and judgement scale was 
due to the result in Study 2 that consumers tended to prefer the same meaning and 
judgement for both automobiles and sunglasses.  The generic form yielded a slightly 
lower Cronbach's Alpha for the Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale 
(.78) but did not affect the reliability of the Symbolic Meaning and Affective 
Judgement Scale (.88). 
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Table 20.  Demographic profile of sample No. 3. 
 
     
  Sample No. 3   
   
Cases 
 
Percent 
Census for 
Target Area 
     
All Respondents  256   
     
Gender     
  Male  133 51.8 49.2 
  Female  123 48.2 50.8 
     
Age     
  18 and 19  5 1.9     ----- 
  20 to 29  43 16.6    26.6 
  30 to 39  51 20.1    22.8 
  40 to 49  53 21.2    18.1 
  50 to 59  43 16.6    12.2 
  60 or more  60 23.6 20.3 
     
     
 
Notes: 
 Target Area: Wellington Regional District. 
 1991 Census. 
Census information for 18 and 19 age group unavailable, and remaining age census  
 categories modified to reflect the adult-only composition of the sample.  
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Table 21.   Means and factor structure of human values. 
 
 
          
      Factors    
          
 Mean t StdDev  1 2 3 4 5 6 
          
Obedient 1.49 .64  .59 -.10 .04 -.12 .05 -.06 
Polite 2.01 .78  .53 -.28 .07 -.06 -.09 .21 
Salvation 1.45 .74  .51 .28 -.07 -.18 -.13 -.32 
Exciting Life 1.86 .79  -.48 -.05 .26 .06 -.12 -.38 
Imaginative 1.71 .71  -.48 .08 -.26 -.02 -.15 .04 
Freedom 2.27 .74  -.47 .18 .17 -.23 .20 .20 
Self-
determination 
1.91 .78  -.45 -.18 -.16 -.14 .15 -.04 
Responsible 2.49 .60  .41 -.09 -.27 -.01 .11 .16 
Self-Controlled 1.91 .77  .40 -.36 -.18 -.03 -.11 -.13 
Honest 2.67 .54  .33 -.04 -.13 .07 .17 .27 
Logical 1.75 .75  -.04 -.55 -.26 -.11 -.18 .02 
Ambitious 1.65 .69  .03 -.47 .07 .03 .24 -.05 
Clean 1.75 .82  .37 -.46 .14 -.04 -.05 .04 
Forgiving 2.01 .71  .32 .45 -.17 -.06 -.17 -.21 
Inner Harmony 1.93 .84  .03 .44 -.15 .09 .17 -.22 
Independent 2.22 .77  -.26 -.42 -.13 .05 .17 .15 
Equality 2.04 .77  -.07 .39 .09 -.23 .36 .19 
World Of Peace 2.36 .78  .05 .37 .26 -.22 .29 .32 
Helpful 1.97 .65  .35 .36 -.05 -.06 .05 .11 
Capable 2.15 .69  -.21 -.34 -.22 -.03 -.19 .05 
Comfortable Life 1.88 .88  -.18 -.35 .50 .12 -.06 -.07 
Intellectual 1.81 .76  -.34 .06 -.43 .04 .03 -.04 
Happiness 2.42 .64  .10 .09 .43 .35 -.08 .08 
Wisdom 2.21 .82  .11 .20 -.43 -.13 -.22 -.04 
Social Justice 1.78 .86  -.14 .15 .31 -.56 -.18 -.02 
Pleasurable 1.70 .74  -.10 .03 .41 .49 -.21 -.00 
Social Power 1.26 .50  .04 -.17 -.17 .42 .20 -.39 
Loving 2.43 .64  .09 .33 .07 .36 -.18 -.04 
True Friendship 2.54 .62  .02 .26 .24 .35 -.14 .06 
Cheerful 1.96 .74  .12 .01 .24 .08 -.53 .11 
National Security 1.63 .74  .06 -.07 .27 -.10 .47 -.17 
Recognition 1.79 .82  .12 .01 -.35 .43 .45 -.09 
Broad-Minded 2.21 .76  -.24 -.06 -.20 .03 -.17 .54 
Self-Respect 2.61 .61  -.17 .04 -.11 .34 .06 .40 
World Beauty 1.95 .77  -.16 .31 -.05 .07 -.14 .09 
Courageous 2.25 .67  -.09 -.01 -.01 -.41 -.09 -.11 
Mature Love 2.00 .81  -.31 .30 -.20 .10 .01 -.27 
Accomplishment 2.02 .82  -.10 -.10 -.08 -.24 -.19 -.18 
Family Security 2.58 .61  .17 .01 .32 -.05 .18 .11 
Equity 1.65 .71  -.10 -.18 .36 -.15 .24 -.29 
          
Eigenvalue    3.19 2.85 2.35 1.98 1.71 1.62 
Cumul. %  
Variance 
   8.0 15.1 21.0 25.9 30.2 34.3 
 
Note: t = Scale of 1’Least Important’ to 3 ‘Most Important’. 
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Table 21.  Means and factor structure of human values (continued). 
 
 
          
    Factors     
          
 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
          
Obedient -.02 .30 -.06 -.01 .12 -.16 -.19 .02 -.18 
Polite -.17 .02 .22 -.01 -.05 -.06 -.08 .07 -.05 
Salvation .08 -.16 -.10 -.06 -.09 -.16 -.15 -.00 .14 
Exciting Life .12 -.01 .03 -.02 .14 -.02 -.05 -.08 -.28 
Imaginative .18 -.15 .09 -.25 -.31 -.16 -.22 .09 .01 
Freedom .22 -.16 -.19 -.11 -.16 .06 -.13 -.32 .04 
Self-
Determination 
.02 .02 .10 .21 .11 -.33 .01 .17 .14 
Responsible .04 .14 -.23 .02 .03 -.00 .25 .05 -.40 
Self-Controlled .06 .07 -.33 -.07 -.07 -.03 .01 -.10 .02 
Honest .19 -.10 .03 .30 -.19 .28 .13 -.21 .11 
Logical -.02 -.12 -.29 .08 .04 .14 .02 .07 -.02 
Ambitious .22 .12 .20 -.09 -.30 -.26 .02 -.02 .19 
Clean -.14 -.13 .27 -.22 -.09 -.08 -.10 -.14 .10 
Forgiving .18 -.21 -.16 .03 -.03 .05 -.02 -.04 -.05 
Inner Harmony -.18 -.31 -.16 .10 .24 -.30 .09 .02 .18 
Independent -.13 .21 .09 .14 .33 .13 -.25 -.11 -.13 
Equality .28 .29 -.25 -.25 .02 .14 -.13 .04 -.11 
World Of Peace -.29 -.13 .07 -.23 .09 .05 -.12 -.14 -.03 
Helpful .08 .09 .03 .02 .17 .14 -.13 -.05 .30 
Capable .05 -.26 -.29 .18 .27 .09 -.25 -.18 -.06 
Comfortable Life -.05 .11 -.14 .02 -.12 -.06 .05 -.28 .01 
Intellectual -.25 .33 .05 -.06 -.14 .29 .21 .11 .17 
Happiness .21 -.00 -.19 .15 .22 -.07 .07 .17 .05 
Wisdom -.25 .17 .15 .26 -.05 -.04 -.17 .01 .07 
Social Justice -.08 .43 -.10 -.04 .02 -.14 .10 .01 .19 
Pleasurable -.19 -.03 -.24 -.06 -.28 .07 -.08 -.00 -.02 
Social Power -.14 .20 .04 -.36 .12 .06 -.00 -.02 .19 
Loving .23 .27 .00 -.06 -.12 -.08 -.05 .29 -.27 
True Friendship .05 .29 .30 .11 .26 .19 -.04 -.15 .10 
Cheerful .09 -.26 .15 -.09 .07 .30 .08 .11 .23 
National Security -.23 -.28 .01 -.06 .14 .09 .16 .19 .06 
Recognition .24 -.19 .16 -.16 -.09 .15 -.02 -.00 -.10 
Broad-Minded -.15 -.05 -.21 -.25 -.02 .01 .18 .38 .09 
Self-Respect .33 -.02 .12 .23 .17 -.37 -.02 .03 .13 
World Beauty -.50 -.21 .28 -.07 -.00 -.13 .01 -.08 -.41 
Courageous .33 -.05 .45 .20 -.10 .20 -.07 .13 -.15 
Mature Love -.15 .14 -.10 .34 -.20 .09 .15 -.20 .05 
Accomplishment .33 -.04 .19 -.33 .33 .00 .53 -.14 -.09 
Family Security -.06 -.06 .05 .39 -.23 -.09 .40 -.03 -.11 
Equity -.02 -.11 -.04 .22 -.02 .26 -.20 .51 -.00 
          
Eigenvalue 1.54 1.41 1.37 1.33 1.13 1.09 1.08 1.06 1.02 
Cumul. %  
Variance 
38.1 41.6 45.1 48.4 51.2 54.0 56.6 59.3 61.9 
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Table 22.  Means and factor structure of automobile tangible attribute importances. 
 
 
         
      Factors   
         
 Mean t StdDev  1 2 3 4 5 
         
Handling 8.64 1.49   .76 -.18 .07 -.11 -.10 
Smooth Riding 8.05 1.73   .73 .04 -.09 -.22 .06 
Quality 8.70 1.65   .72 -.13 -.17 -.24 -.22 
Comfort 8.17 1.62   .68 .02 .11 -.22 .10 
Safety 9.04 1.46   .67 -.35 -.32 -.15 -.21 
Advanced Engineering 5.85 2.81   .63 .40 .20 -.16 -.24 
Few Repairs Needed 8.96 1.52   .59 -.52 -.06 .01 .30 
Reliability 9.37 1.06   .57 -.54 -.15 -.05 .30 
Heating 7.24 1.99   .54 -.13 .23 -.08 .39 
Air Conditioning 4.98 2.93   .52 .34 .49 .02 .05 
Spacious Interior 7.00 2.10   .48 .16 -.36 .08 .34 
Kilometres Per Litre 7.41 2.25   .47 -.43 .06 .46 -.27 
High Speed 4.92 2.44   .28 .63 .10 .22 -.01 
Luxurious Interior 4.82 2.45   .48 .62 -.01 .08 .02 
Large Engine 4.73 2.39   .41 .59 -.39 .28 -.09 
Large Body Size 4.34 2.35   .38 .56 -.49 .26 .06 
Colour 5.44 2.66   .35 .33 .53 -.05 .24 
Compact 6.08 2.26   .35 -.21 .51 .43 -.17 
Inexpensive 6.78 2.40   .11 -.34 -.03 .72 .24 
Low Pollution Emission 7.17 2.47   .50 -.27 .01 .09 -.51 
         
Eigenvalue    5.72 3.01 1.59 1.35 1.11 
Cumul. %  Variance    28.6 43.6 51.6 58.3 63.9 
 
Note: t = Scale of 1’Not At All Important’ to 10 ‘Very Important’. 
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Table 23.  Means and factor structure of sunglasses tangible attribute importances. 
 
 
          
       Factors   
          
 Mean t StdDev  1 2 3 4 5 6 
          
Made Of Highest 
Quality Materials 
6.53 2.73  .71 -.03 -.05 -.36 -.02 -.35 
Scratch-Resistant 
Lenses 
7.48 2.40  .66 -.32 -.23 -.23 .23 .17 
Thin Frame 4.72 2.64  .64 .24 -.18 .06 .22 .29 
Engineered Design 4.65 2.80  .63 .34 -.13 .04 -.09 .01 
Strong, Rugged, 
Impact Resistant 
7.32 2.56  .61 -.28 -.18 -.02 .17 .35 
Suitable For A Variety 
Of Sunlight 
Conditions 
8.16 1.99  .59 -.32 .14 .02 -.29 .15 
Precision Ground 
Optical Glass Lenses 
5.46 3.11  .58 .12 -.37 -.40 .09 -.05 
Lenses With A Large 
Coverage Area 
5.95 2.64  .54 -.26 .02 .12 .38 -.43 
Light-Weight 6.63 2.63  .54 -.05 .22 .24 -.23 .29 
Metal Frame 3.77 2.65  .53 .40 -.33 -.12 .02 .11 
High UV Protection 8.67 1.74  .52 -.39 .17 .01 .12 -.37 
Nylon Frame 3.54 2.65  .49 .23 .13 .44 -.14 -.30 
Brand Name Printed 
On Lens or Frame 
3.08 2.64  .45 .53 .00 .07 -.30 -.04 
Reduces Glare And 
Increases Image 
Clarity 
8.95 1.41  .46 -.51 .27 -.04 -.36 .16 
Darkly Tinted Lens 5.19 2.80  .20 .48 .33 -.05 .19 .05 
Reflective/Mirrored 
Lenses 
2.44 2.18  .42 .47 -.18 .38 -.22 -.16 
Fits Comfortably On 
Face 
9.30 1.08  .39 -.45 .45 -.03 -.20 -.07 
Colour Of Frame 6.58 2.80  .07 .38 .72 -.34 .17 -.04 
Shape Of Frame (e.g., 
Round, Square, etc.) 
7.21 2.44  .22 .39 .67 -.17 .16 .18 
Inexpensive 6.19 2.57  .19 -.15 .17 .65 .51 .15 
          
Eigenvalue    5.04 2.41 1.92 1.34 1.13 1.01 
Cumul. %  Variance    25.2 37.3 46.9 53.6 59.2 64.3 
 
Note: t = Scale of 1’Not At All Important’ to 10 ‘Very Important’. 
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RESULTS 
 
 
 The first portion of the current section examines the product meaning approach 
hypothesis, and the second portion explores whether other factors such as product 
ownership affected the examination of the hypothesis. 
 
I.  Meaning and Judgement Preferences and the Direct and Indirect Influences of 
Human Values 
 
 The objective for the analysis is to examine whether each individual’s direct and 
indirect influences of human values on product ownership varies with his or her 
meaning and judgement preferences as measured by Utilitarian Meaning and 
Piecemeal Judgement Scale and the Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement 
Scale.  The product meaning approach hypothesis is that an individual’s preference 
for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an 
affective judgement should be greater when his or her human values have an indirect 
influence (via tangible attribute importances) on product preference than when his or 
her human values have a direct influence.  Two different procedures would enable 
the examination of the product meaning approach hypothesis: the “Standard Method” 
and the “Residual Method”. 
 
 In the Standard Method, participants would be divided into two groups according 
to their meaning and judgement preferences.  One group would comprise those 
individuals who strongly prefer utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to 
symbolic meaning and an affective judgement, and the second group would comprise 
those individuals who only slightly prefer utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal 
judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement (if at all).  Then, the 
regression procedure employed in Study 1 would be performed separately on these 
two groups.  That procedure carried out two regressions; the first regressed human 
values alone onto product ownership, and the second regressed tangible attribute 
importances onto product ownership then regressed human values onto the remaining 
product ownership variance not already accounted by tangible attribute importances.  
The Multiple R that human values predicted of product ownership beyond tangible 
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attribute importances showed the strength of the direct route, whereas the strength of 
the indirect route was calculated by subtracting the Multiple R of the direct route 
from the Multiple R of the human values only regression. 
 
 Thus, if Standard Method were employed to examine the product meaning 
hypothesis then the indirect route Multiple R should be greater for the group that 
strongly prefers utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning 
and an affective judgement than for the group that only slightly prefers utilitarian 
meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement.  Conversely, the direct route Multiple R should be lower for the group 
that strongly prefers utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic 
meaning and an affective judgement than for the group that only slightly prefers 
utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement.   
 
 The advantages of the Standard Method are that it maintains closeness with the 
original data and is easily interpretable, but it has two limitations.  Firstly, the two 
groups may not be similarly heterogeneous; the regression analyses might yield 
different levels of prediction simply because one group is more homogenous than the 
other.  A more serious limitation for the current purpose is that, as Study 1 showed, 
human values are weakly related to product ownership, especially automobile 
ownership, and so the Multiple Rs would likely be small as would differences 
between groups, both of which make any comparison tenuous.  Unlike Study 1, a 
multitude of product categories and classes are not available to assess whether a 
consistent pattern of Multiple Rs emerges across products. 
 
 A second regression process, the Residual Method, can also be used to examine 
the product meaning approach hypothesis, and does not suffer from the limitations of 
the Standard Method.  As is evident from the name, the Residual Method uses the 
regressions’ standardised residuals, rather than their Multiple Rs, to gauge the 
strength of each individual’s direct and indirect influences of human values.  For 
those readers more visually inclined, an illustration of the procedure is provided in 
Figure 4 (on page 203). 
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 In Stage 1, tangible attribute importances are regressed onto human values, 
leaving residuals in which the co-variation of tangible attribute importances is 
removed from human values.   
 
 Stage 2 then regresses the residuals from Stage 1 onto product ownership.  That 
regression, therefore, represents the direct influence of human values as the influence 
via tangible attribute importances is excluded.  For each individual, the residual of 
that regression shows how accurately the direct influence of human values predicts 
his or her product ownership and thus is called the Direct Influence Residual (DIR).   
 
 To detect how accurately the indirect influence of human values can predict each 
individual’s product ownership, Stage 3 regresses the original, full-variance human 
values onto the DIR.  As the DIR does not contain the direct influence of human 
values, any further influence of human values on that residual must occur indirectly 
via tangible attribute importances.  Thus, that regression shows how accurately the 
indirect influence of human values can predict each individual’s product ownership 
and is called the Indirect Influence Residual (IIR). 
 
 Having calculated the DIR and IIR the next stage separates the sample into two 
groups according to whether the DIR or the IIR was a more accurate predictor of 
their product ownership.  Specifically, as the DIR and IIR are Studentised residuals, 
individuals would be separated according to which was lower; the absolute value of 
their DIR or the absolute value of their IIR.  If the product meaning approach 
hypothesis is correct, then the preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal 
judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement should be greater for the 
group whose IIR was a superior predictor (the indirect influence group) than for the 
group whose DIR was a better predictor (the direct influence group).   
 
 Thus, the advantage of the Residual Method to the Standard Method is that it 
calculates the regression equations for the sample as a whole rather than for 
subgroups that may differ in their heterogeneity.  Moreover, by using the residual as 
an indicator of prediction strength, rather than the Multiple R, the procedure can 
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detect differences among individuals even when the absolute magnitude of prediction 
is low.  One limitation of the Residual Method, however, is that the abstraction of the 
data and the multitude of regressions performed may introduce some level of noise 
Technically, both methods should produce equivalent results, which Chapter VII 
substantiates by showing that whether the Standard Method or the Residual Method 
is employed the relationship between product identification and the routes of value 
influence is essentially the same.  In that analysis, the specific product investigated is 
strongly influenced by human values and thus the Standard Method is appropriate 
because the difference among the sub-groups’ Multiple Rs is substantial.  However, 
human values weakly influence automobile ownership and possibly sunglasses 
ownership, and therefore the Residual Method was chosen for the current analysis. 
 
 The Residual Method was used to examine the product meaning approach 
hypothesis separately for Smaller Family Cars, Larger Family Cars, and sunglasses, 
and accordingly the hypothesis is tested three times (the other car class ownerships 
are skewed beyond repair and thus are not analysed).  For each regression, factor 
scores were entered instead of the individual items.  Human values comprised 15 
factors, car tangible attribute importances 5 factors, and sunglasses tangible attribute 
importances 6 factors.  As the Residual Method is anchored in the relative prediction 
accuracy of the regressions, the absolute accuracy of prediction is less critical, and 
therefore, unlike Study 1 a step-wise entrance of independent variables was not 
needed.  Thus, all independent variables were entered simultaneously (e.g., full-entry 
method).  The regressions performed are listed below. 
 
 
Smaller Family Car Residual Method 
 
• The 5 automobile tangible attribute importance factors were regressed onto each 
one of the 15 human value factors. 
 
• The residuals from the preceding regression analyses (e.g., 15 human value 
factors minus their co-variation with automobile tangible attribute importances) 
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were regressed onto the percentage of the individual’s automobile ownerships 
that were Smaller Family Cars.  For each individual, the residual of the 
regression indicates how accurately the direct influence of human values predicts 
his or her Smaller Family Car ownership and will be termed the “Smaller Family 
Car DIR”. 
 
• The 15 human value factors (full variance) were regressed onto the residual of 
the preceding analysis (e.g., Smaller Family Car ownership minus the direct 
influence of human values).  For each individual, the residual of the regression 
indicates how accurately the indirect influence of human values predicts his or 
her Smaller Family Car ownership and will be termed the “Smaller Family Car 
IIR”. 
 
 
Larger Family Car Residual Method 
 
• The 5 automobile tangible attribute importance factors were regressed onto each 
one of the 15 human value factors. 
 
• The residuals from the preceding regression analyses (e.g., 15 human value 
factors minus their co-variation with automobile tangible attribute importances) 
were regressed onto the percentage of the individual’s automobile ownerships 
that were Larger Family Cars.  For each individual, the residual of the regression 
indicates how accurately the direct influence of human values predicts his or her 
Larger Family Car ownership and will be termed the “Larger Family Car DIR”. 
 
• The 15 human values factors (full variance) were regressed onto the residual of 
the preceding analysis (e.g., Larger Family Car ownership minus the direct 
influence of human values).  For each individual, the residual of the regression 
indicates how accurately the indirect influence of human values predicts his or 
her Larger Family Car ownership and will be termed the “Larger Family Car 
IIR”. 
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Sunglasses Residual Method 
 
• The 6 sunglasses tangible attribute importance factors were regressed onto each 
one of the 15 human value factors. 
 
• The residuals from the preceding regression analyses (e.g., 15 human value 
factors minus their co-variation with sunglasses tangible attribute importances) 
were regressed onto the price the individual paid for their current pair of 
sunglasses.  For each individual, the residual of the regression indicates how 
accurately the direct influence of human values predicts his or her Sunglasses 
ownership and will be termed the “Sunglasses DIR”. 
 
• The 15 human values factors (full variance) were regressed onto the residual of 
the preceding analysis (e.g., price paid for current pair of sunglasses minus the 
direct influence of human values).  For each individual, the residual of the 
regression indicates how accurately the indirect influence of human values 
predicts his or her sunglasses ownership and will be termed the “Sunglasses IIR”. 
 
 
 Due to the large number of regressions performed, the factors that may affect the 
regressions’ stability and integrity were only examined for a small, randomly 
selected pool of ten regressions.  A visual inspection of the residual plots for the pool 
of regressions indicated each did not deviate substantially from linearity and was 
homoscedastic, and an inspection of the normal probability plots indicated that the 
distributions were essentially normal.  Concerning all the regressions, as the 
independent variables are human value and tangible attribute importance scores from 
un-rotated factor analyses, a perusal of the correlation matrix confirmed that the 
factors are un-correlated.  Finally, the minimum subject-to-variable ratio that has 
been suggested ranges from 10 to an absolute minimum of 4 respondents per 
variable, for which each regression in the current study easily exceeds.   
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 Also due to the large number of regressions performed in the Residual Method, 
only the results of the final two regressions, those used to separate individuals based 
on strength of their direct influence (DIR) and indirect influence (IIR), are reported 
(see Table 24 on page 204).  Across the three product classes, both routes of value 
influence appear stronger than that found in Study 1 but they failed to reach 
significance.  The failure to reach significance, however, is likely a result of the large 
number of independent variables.  Moreover, unlike Study 1, the direct route is 
stronger than the indirect route, though the outcome is probably due to less product 
ownership variance being available for the indirect regression to predict given that it 
attempts to predict product ownership once the direct influence of human values is 
removed.  For that reason principally, the Multiple Rs reported in Table 24 should be 
interpreted cautiously.  As a whole, the absolute strengths of the regressions are not 
crucial.  What is important is whether for each individual, and for each product, the 
direct influence regression (DIR) or the indirect influence regression (IIR) yielded a 
more accurate prediction of each individual’s product ownership, and whether those 
predictions are related to meaning and judgement preferences in the direction 
hypothesised in the product meaning approach.  Those determinations are now 
reported for each product: Smaller Family Cars, Larger Family Cars and sunglasses. 
 
Smaller Family CarsFamily CarsFamily CarsFamily Cars 
 
 The separation of the sample according to whether their Smaller Family Car DIR 
or Smaller Family Car IIR more accurately predicted their Smaller Family Car 
ownership resulted in 67 respondents for whom the DIR was a superior predictor of 
their Smaller Family Car ownership (direct influence group), and 65 for whom the 
IIR was superior (indirect influence group).  The average meaning and judgement 
preferences for these two groups are presented in Figure 5 (beginning on page 205) 
and compared with a 2(direct influence group versus indirect influence group) x 
2(Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale versus Symbolic Meaning and 
Affective Judgement Scale) mixed ANOVA, which showed that overall that the 
Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale was rated more highly than the 
Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale (mean of 5.42 versus  4.30) 
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(F(1,130)=93.7, p<.001, MSerror=.89) and that the main effect was complicated by a 
significant interaction effect (F(1,130)=3.8, p<.05).  As the test variables were 
ordered into the SPSS ANOVA procedure such that the interaction made the 
appropriate comparison vis-à-vis the hypothesis, the significant interaction confirms 
that the preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic 
meaning and an affective judgement was greater for the indirect influence group than 
for the direct influence group. 
 
Larger Family CarsFamily CarsFamily CarsFamily Cars 
 
 The re-separation of the sample according to whether their Larger Family Car 
DIR or Larger Family Car IIR more accurately predicted their Larger Family Car 
ownership resulted in 65 respondents for whom the Larger Family Car DIR was a 
superior predictor of their Larger Family Car ownership (direct influence group), and 
67 for whom the Larger Family Car IIR was superior (indirect influence group).  As 
an important note, these two groups are not the same two groups that are referred to 
in the previous paragraph.  The readers will recall that the Residual Method was 
performed separately for each product (e.g., Smaller Family Cars, Larger Family 
Cars and sunglasses) and hence the sample was divided anew for each product tested.  
The average meaning and judgement preferences for the Larger Family Car direct 
and indirect groups are presented in Figure 5 (beginning on page 205) and compared 
with a 2(direct influence group versus indirect influence group) x 2(Utilitarian 
Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale versus Symbolic Meaning and Affective 
Judgement Scale) mixed ANOVA, which showed that overall the Utilitarian Meaning 
and Piecemeal Judgement Scale was rated more highly than the Symbolic Meaning 
and Affective Judgement Scale (mean of 5.42 versus  4.30) (F(1,130)=97.1, p<.001, 
MSerror=.87) and that the main effect was complicated by a significant interaction 
effect (F(1,130)=6.6, p<.05).  As the test variables were ordered into the SPSS 
ANOVA procedure such that the interaction made the appropriate comparison vis-à-
vis the hypothesis, the significant interaction confirms that the preference for 
utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement was greater for the indirect influence group than for the direct influence 
group. 
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Sunglasses 
 
 The re-separation of the sample according to whether their Sunglasses DIR or 
Sunglasses IIR more accurately predicted their sunglasses ownership resulted in 47 
respondents for whom the Sunglasses DIR was a superior predictor of their 
sunglasses ownership (direct influence group), and 45 for whom the Sunglasses IIR 
was superior (indirect influence group).  The average meaning and judgement 
preferences for these two groups are presented in Figure 5 (beginning on page 205) 
and compared with a 2(direct influence group versus indirect influence group) x 
2(Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale versus Symbolic Meaning and 
Affective Judgement Scale) mixed ANOVA, which showed that overall the 
Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale was rated more highly than the 
Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale (mean of 5.21 versus  4.48) 
(F(1,89)=28.5, p<.001, MSerror=.90) and that the interaction was complicated by a 
significant interaction effect (F(1,89)=8.2, p<.01).  As the test variables were ordered 
into the SPSS ANOVA procedure such that the interaction made the appropriate 
comparison vis-à-vis the hypothesis, the significant interaction confirms that the 
preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning 
and an affective judgement was greater for the indirect influence group than for the 
direct influence group. 
 
 Thus, overall the results of the Residual Method regressions and ANOVAs 
support the product meaning approach hypothesis for each product examined: 
Smaller Family Cars, Larger Family Cars and sunglasses.  An individual’s preference 
for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an 
affective judgement was greater when his or her human values have an indirect 
influence (via tangible attribute importances) on product preference than when his or 
her human values have a direct influence. 
 
II.  Product Ownership and the Direct and Indirect Influences of Human Values 
 
 One limitation of the previous analysis linking meaning and judgement 
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preferences with the direct and indirect influences of human values is that other 
factors could be affecting the prediction of product ownership other than the 
purported constructs.  Given that in the Residual Method individuals were divided 
into groups based on how well human values directly or indirectly predicted their 
product ownerships, the conclusions are vulnerable to other factors that confound the 
accuracy of prediction. 
 
 One such factor is product ownership itself as conceivably the higher prediction 
rates for some individuals and lower for others could be due in part to what product 
they owned.  Of particular concern is if the level of product ownership affected 
whether the direct influence regression (DIR) or indirect influence regression (IIR) 
yielded a more accurate prediction of product ownership for those individuals who 
had a higher (or lower) level of product ownership.  For instance, as Smaller Family 
Cars are probably the most utilitarian product, the regression analysis representing 
the indirect influence of human values on product ownership (IIR) could have more 
easily predicted the product ownership of Smaller Family Car owners than non-
owners.  Conversely, the regression analysis representing the direct influence of 
human values (DIR) could have more easily predicted the product ownership of 
Smaller Family Car non-owners than owners.  Consequently, in the separation of the 
sample into two groups based on the relative prediction accuracy of their DIR and 
IIR, the composition of the indirect influence group would be biased toward Smaller 
Family Car owners, the composition of the direct influence group would be biased 
toward Smaller Family Car non-owners, and the meaning and judgement preferences 
of both groups could be biased accordingly.  The same bias could have affected the 
Larger Family Car ownership regressions and the sunglasses regressions, though 
possibly in the opposite directions given that both products are more symbolic than 
Smaller Family Cars.  
 
 In either case, the support of the product meaning approach hypothesis could be 
due to the level of product ownership unequally contributing to the predictive power 
of the direct and indirect influence regressions (the DIR and IIR), the formation of 
the value influence groups, and the conclusion that the groups differ in their meaning 
and judgement preferences in the directions hypothesised.  If the level of the product 
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ownership is unequally contributing to the predictive power of the direct and indirect 
influence regressions and the formation of the value influence groups, then the 
groups should differ in their mean levels of product ownership.  However, the mean 
proportion of Smaller Family Cars owned by the Smaller Family Cars indirect 
influence group was .47 and for the Smaller Family Cars direct influence group was 
.51, a non-significant difference (t=-.6, df=132, p=.57, two-tailed).  The mean 
proportion of Larger Family Cars owned by the Larger Family Cars indirect 
influence group was .36 and for the Larger Family Cars direct influence group was 
.37, also a non-significant difference (t=-.04, df=132, p=.97, two-tailed).  Finally, the 
mean price paid for sunglasses by the sunglasses indirect influence group was 84.60 
and for the sunglasses direct influence group was 57.50, a difference that approached 
significance (t=1.6, df=91, p=11, two-tailed). 
 
 Overall, the non-significant differences suggest that product ownership was not 
contributing to the differential predictive power of the direct and indirect influences 
of human values, and thus the locus of the prediction was likely human values and 
tangible attribute importances.  Given that possibility, addressing whether global 
difference in human values and tangible attribute importances contribute to the 
relative predictive power of the direct and indirect influence regressions is useful.  
As proposed in Chapter IV, the direct route should be associated with an overall 
value relevance and Chapter VII assesses the possibility more thoroughly, but 
presently, the forced-distribution response format of the human value measure means 
that value relevance could not emerge as rating all human values highly.  The sum of 
value ratings is the same for all respondents and therefore overall ratings of human 
values cannot affect the creation of the value influence groups nor their confirmed 
meaning and judgement preferences. 
 
 However, a global effect might be possible with tangible attribute importances as 
they were rated with an open distribution.  Thus, to examine whether an overarching 
preference for tangible attribute importances contributed to the formation of the 
value influence groups, the mean rating each respondent gave to the automobile 
tangible attribute importances was calculated, as was the mean rating each 
respondent gave to the sunglasses tangible attribute importances.  The mean rating 
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given to automobile tangible attribute importances by the group whose indirect 
influence of human values more accurately predicted their Smaller Family Car 
ownership was 6.92, and the mean rating given by the group whose direct influence 
of human values more accurately predicted their Smaller Family Car ownership was 
6.85; a non-significant difference (t=-.4 df=133, p=66, two-tailed).  The mean rating 
given to automobile tangible attribute importances by the group whose Larger 
Family Car ownership was more strongly predicted by the indirect influence of 
human values was 6.99 and the mean rating given by the direct influence group was 
6.79; also a non-significant difference (t=-1.1 df=133, p=26, two-tailed).  Finally, the 
mean rating given to sunglasses tangible attribute importances by the group whose 
sunglasses ownership was more strongly predicted by the indirect influence of 
human values was 5.90, and the mean rating given by the direct influence group was 
6.18; a non-significant difference (t=-1.1 df=92, p=25, two-tailed).   
 
 Thus, differences in overall ratings of tangible attribute importance and human 
values and overall levels of product ownerships do not appear to contribute to the 
differential predictive power of human values, the formations of the direct and 
indirect influence groups, and the conclusions that the groups differ in their meaning 
and judgement preferences in the directions hypothesised in the product meaning 
approach. 
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Stage 1: Tangible attribute importances (TAIs) regressed onto human values (HVs). 
 
PO 
HVs TAIs 
 
 
 
 
Stage 2: Residual of Stage 1 regressed onto product ownership (PO). 
 
PO 
HVs TAIs 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 3: Human values regressed onto residual of Stage 2. 
 
PO 
HVs TAIs 
 
_____ 
Figure 4.  Venn diagrams representing the regression stages that achieved the 
prediction of the direct and indirect influences of human values. 
 
Notes: 
 = predicted variance.     HVs = Human values. 
 = residual.       PO = Product ownership.  
         TAIs = Tangible attribute importances. 
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Table 24.  Multiple Rs from regressing human values directly and indirectly (via 
tangible attribute importances) onto product ownerships.  
 
 
     
     
PRODUCT 
OWNERSHIP 
 DIRECT VALUE 
INFLUENCE 1 
 INDIRECT VALUE 
INFLUENCE 2 
 
 
    
Smaller Family Cars  .30  .18 
  F(15,119)=.8, p=.70  F(15,119)=.3, p=.99 
     
Larger Family Cars  .27  .13 
  F(15,119)=.6, p=.86  F(15,119)=.2, p=.99 
     
Sunglasses  .35  .16 
  F(15,79)=.8, p=.71  F(15,79)=.1, p=.99 
     
     
 
Notes:  
 1 = regression of human values (minus their co-variation with tangible attribute  
importances) onto product ownership. 
 2 = regression of human values (full variance) onto product ownership (minus  
the direct influence of human values). 
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Smaller Car Ownership
3
4
5
6
7
Utilitarian and Piecemeal Symbolic and Affective
Indirect Influence Group
Direct Influence Group
 
 
Larger Car Ownership
3
4
5
6
7
Utilitarian and Piecemeal Symbolic and Affective
Indirect Influence Group
Direct Influence Group
 
 
_____ 
Figure 5.  Means of meaning and judgement scales for groups formed according 
to the route of value influence that more accurately predicted their Smaller 
Family Car, Larger Family Car, and sunglasses ownerships. 
 
Note: Scale of 1-7, ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’. 
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Sunglasses Ownership
3
4
5
6
7
Utilitarian and Piecemeal Symbolic and Affective
Indirect Influence Group
Direct Influence Group
 
 
 
 
______ 
Figure 5. Means of meaning and judgement scales for groups formed according 
to the route of value influence that more accurately predicted their Smaller 
Family Car, Larger Family Car, and sunglasses ownerships (continued). 
 
Note: Scale of 1-7, ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 
 Consistent with the product meaning approach hypothesis, the current study 
showed that an individual’s preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal 
judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement was greater when his or 
her human values have an indirect influence (via tangible attribute importances) on 
product preference than when his or her human values have a direct influence.  The 
pattern was replicated for two classes of cars and sunglasses.  Major methodological 
and conceptual limitations of the study are reviewed in depth in Chapter VIII, such 
as the correlational rather than experimental design, and the overly general 
conceptual model.  Presently, however, three issues are addressed: Feldman and 
Lynch’s (1988) consistency argument, the finding that the level of product ownership 
did not differentially affect the direct and indirect influence regressions, and the 
generic form of the meaning and judgement scales.   
 
 Firstly, the discussion in Chapter III that the “consistency” argument did not 
easily apply to Study 1 with its categorical behavioural measure applies even less to 
the current analysis.  The readers will recall that some critics of the survey method 
often level a “consistency” argument that the participants may rate the items on a 
scale simply to appear consistent with their responses on another scale, and not 
because they represent their actual preferences.  Feldman and Lynch (1988) argue 
that an association found between attitudes and behaviour could be due to 
respondents completing the behaviour measure to be consistent with the attitude 
measure.  However, as suggested in Chapter III, that kind of bias is most likely to 
occur when the behaviour is measured on a metric scale, and hence seems 
implausible that respondents would list automobiles they have never owned.  
Conceivably, however, respondents might over- or under-estimate the price they paid 
for their sunglasses.  Besides the categorical nature of the behavioural measure, the 
analytical procedures used in the study also make Feldman and Lynch’s (1988) 
consistency argument incompatible with the pattern of results.  To conclude that 
individuals rate the human values and tangible attribute importances simply to 
appear consistent with their product ownership, one would have to assume that half 
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the respondents rated both tangible attribute importances and human values to appear 
consistent with their product ownership whereas the other half rated only human 
values to appear consistent with product ownership.  Moreover, the former group 
would coincidentally have had to rate utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement 
more highly and the latter group symbolic meaning and affective judgement more 
highly, which seems unlikely.  Instead, human values and tangible attribute 
importances are probably used in these consumers’ product evaluation and selection 
or are closely tied to what is. 
 
 A second issue of the current study important to address is the finding that the 
direct and indirect influence groups did not differ in their levels of product 
ownership, and therefore that product ownership itself did not affect the formation of 
the direct and indirect value influence groups nor the conclusion that the groups 
differ in meaning and judgement preferences in the directions hypothesised in the 
product meaning approach.  Moreover, the analysis also showed that the value 
influence groups did not differ in overall levels of tangible attribute importances, and 
the forced-distribution format of the human value measure meant that the groups also 
could not differ in overall importances of human values.  Thus, the way the value 
influence groups must differ is their relationships among specific human values, 
tangible attribute importances and product ownerships.  The finding seems to suggest 
that individuals applying human values directly in product evaluation are applying 
only the relevant values, and likewise, those applying human values through tangible 
attribute importances only apply preferences relevant to the product being 
considered. 
 
 The finding that the value influence groups did not differ in their overall levels 
of product ownership not only engenders confidence in the product meaning 
approach hypothesis a point made previously is also reinforced.  The readers might 
recall that in Chapter IV the argument was made that psychological functions of the 
value-attitude-behaviour system should not be assessed solely by measuring how 
individuals prefer different items (e.g., symbolic or instrumental values, symbolic or 
instrumental products), but rather the routes of value influence should also be 
measured.  The point was made as a criticism to Prentice (1987) because the two 
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functions may or may not correspond to differences in preferred values, attitudes and 
products.  Often those holding instrumental or expressive functions may prefer the 
same products because many products can be valued for either their utilitarian or 
symbolic properties.  The criticism also echoes Katz’ (1960) original claim that the 
benefit of thinking about functions is that it recognises that individuals may like the 
same objects but for completely different reasons.  Thus, the finding that the direct 
and indirect influence groups did not differ in their product ownerships seems to 
suggest that at least for Smaller Family Cars, largely family cars and sunglasses, 
individuals can attend to different meanings, make different judgements and apply 
their values through different routes and yet still own the same product.  However, to 
conclude that human values never influence preferences for some products through a 
particular route would obviously be overly simplistic, and so the issue is addressed 
again in Chapter VIII. 
 
 A third issue of the current study important to address is that the overall design 
of the study rested on the observation in Study 2 that individuals tended to prefer the 
same meaning and judgement for both automobiles and sunglasses.  As the present 
study instructs respondents to indicate their preferred meanings and judgements for 
“products in general”, to link these preferences to the direct and indirect influences 
of human values on the ownership of cars and sunglasses, these general preferences 
must translate to specific consumer behaviours.  The finding highlights what is a 
major limitation of the current study, not obtaining meaning and judgement 
preferences for a specific context.  One could claim that the meaning and judgement 
preferences consumers used when selecting their current cars and sunglasses differ 
from those stated in the survey.  After all, the survey was completed some time after 
the actual purchase.  Nevertheless, the current study did find that generalised 
meaning and judgement preferences were associated with the direct and indirect 
influences of human values in the directions hypothesised in the product meaning 
approach, which does seem to suggest that consumers’ generalised meaning and 
judgement preferences translate to specific contexts and products, though other 
interpretations are reviewed in Chapter VIII. The next chapter, however, examines 
the five product meaning approach propositions.  
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CHAPTER VII.  STUDY 4: EXAMINATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
 
 
 
The discussion in Chapter IV of cross-product consistency and psychological 
function leads to five propositions: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Individuals have a cross-product tendency to attend to 
the same product meanings, use the same type of judgement, and apply 
human value criteria through the same route.   
 
PROPOSITION 2: Greater psychological identification with a product is a 
feature of an expressive psychological function and therefore is associated 
with the direct influence of human values. 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Greater value relevance is a feature of an expressive 
psychological function and therefore is associated with the direct influence 
of human values. 
 
PROPOSITION 4: Instrumental human values serve an instrumental 
psychological function and therefore a preference for instrumental values 
should be associated with the indirect influence of human values. 
 
PROPOSITION 5: Terminal human values serve an expressive 
psychological function and therefore a preference for terminal values should 
be associated with the direct influence of human values. 
 
 
 The readers would recall that the propositions were made informally and that the 
psychological function propositions, in particular, were made with deference to the 
product meaning approach hypothesis that an individual’s preference for utilitarian 
meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective 
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judgement should be greater when his or her human values have an indirect influence 
(via tangible attribute importances) on product preference than when his or her 
human values have a direct influence.  The investigation of the product meaning 
approach hypothesis was made at a more general level of product meaning that 
included psychological function along with content.  For instance, the symbolic 
meaning scale items of “To what extent would you want your chosen product to be: 
Most compatible with the image you have of yourself” and “I prefer a product that 
reflects who I am” measure a preference for an expressive psychological function 
and particularly the needs for social-approval and self-consistency.  Moreover, the 
utilitarian meaning preference items “I think it is important to select the most 
practical product” and “When deciding on whether or not to buy a product I think 
about how useful it will be” also appear to measure a preference for an instrumental 
psychological function, though not as certain as the symbolic meaning items.  
Consequently, Study 3’s use of the meaning and judgement preference scales to 
support the product meaning approach hypothesis has some implications for what 
psychological function each route of value influence and attentions to product 
meanings may serve.  Nevertheless, some specific propositions were made that 
sought to supplement the overly structural product meaning approach with an 
impetus or drive factor. 
 
Thus, given that the functional propositions in particular were made in deference 
to the product meaning approach hypothesis, the assessments of the propositions are 
carried out informally and without the aim of validating the propositions 
conclusively, but rather of making a tentative first few steps towards such 
conclusions.  So, both the making of the propositions and their examinations are in 
the spirit of exploration, and should be viewed as such.  Given the spirit, the present 
study’s examination of the propositions does not develop a new survey nor does it 
conduct an experiment.  Rather, the propositions are assessed by reviewing the 
results of Studies 1-3 in greater detail, by re-analysing the data collected in Studies 
1-3, by analysing data collected in Studies 1-3 but not previously used, and by 
analysing a fourth data set (e.g., Ng et al., 1982). 
 
 The examinations of the propositions will proceed on an elemental basis, that is, 
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only two or three components of each proposition are examined at a time to 
gradually, but comprehensively, evaluate each proposition.  Given the piece by piece 
procedure, a graphical summary is provided in Figure 6 (on page 213) and Figure 7 
(on page 214), which illustrates what each analysis in Study 4 seeks to show and 
how, in combination with the results from the first three studies, each proposition is 
fully examined.  The dots connected by lines show which studies and analyses 
established, or will establish, the association among the components.  For example, 
line (a) in Figure 6 comprises dots connecting human values, tangible attribute 
importances and product ownership and indicates that Study 1 showed human values 
influence product ownership via tangible attribute importances.  Likewise, line (f) 
comprises dots connecting human values, tangible attribute importances, product 
ownership and low product identification and shows that Study 4: Analysis Two will 
assess whether low product identification is associated with the indirect influence of 
human values.  Readers are encouraged to preview what each analysis in the chapter 
seeks to show (Study 4: lines d-k in both figures).  Additionally, the figures report 
which data set is used to make each assessment. 
 213 
   INDIRECT ROUTE    INSTRUMENT AL FUNCTION  
    Tangible        
   Human Attribute Product Utilitarian Piecemeal Instrumental Low Value Low Value Low Product 
  Sample Values Importances Ownership Meaning Judgement Values Relevance 1 Relevance 2 Identification 
            
            
(a) Study 1: No.1 λ------- --------λ-------- --------λ       
            
(b) Study 2: No.2    λ----------------λ     
            
(c) Study 3: No.3 λ------- --------λ-------- --------λ-------- -------λ-------- --------λ     
            
(d) Study 4: A1 No.2    z----------------z     
      cross-product consistency     
(e) Study 4: A1 No.3 λ------- --------λ-------- --------λ       
   cross -product consistency        
(f) Study 4: A2 No.1 λ------- --------λ-------- --------λ-------- ----------------- ----------------- ------------------ ------------------ --------------------------λ 
            
(g) Study 4: A3 No.2    λ-------- --------λ------- --------------------------λ   
            
(h) Study 4: A3 No.2      λ----------------λ   
            
(i) Study 4: A3 Ng et al      λ-------------------------- --------λ  
            
(j) Study 4: A4 No.2    λ-------- -------λ-------- --------λ    
            
(k) Study 4: A4 No.1  λ-------- --------λ-------- ----------------- ----------------- --------λ    
            
_____ 
Figure 6.  Summary of studies and analyses which examined criteria, meaning, judgement and function of the indirect route of value influence.  
Notes: 
 Value relevance1 = number of values listed on open-ended questions of values important to themselves or New Zealander but not listed on Rokeach Value Survey. 
 Value relevance2 = mean rating of all Rokeach Value Survey  items. 
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   DIRECT ROUTE    EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION  
           
   Human Product Symbolic Affective Terminal High Value High Value High Product 
  Sample Values Ownership Meaning Judgement Values Relevance 1 Relevance 2 Identification 
           
           
(a) Study 1: No.1 λ---------------λ       
           
(b) Study 2: No.2   λ----------------λ     
           
(c) Study 3: No.3 λ------- --------λ-------- -------λ-------- --------λ     
           
(d) Study 4: A1 No.2   λ----------------λ     
     cross-product consistency     
(e) Study 4: A1 No.3 λ---------------λ       
   cross-product consistency       
(f) Study 4: A2 No.1 λ------- --------λ-------- ----------------- ----------------- ------------------ ------------------ ------------------ --------λ 
          
(g) Study 4: A3 No.2   λ-------- --------λ------- --------------------------λ   
           
(h) Study 4: A3 No.2     λ----------------λ   
           
(i) Study 4: A3 Ng et al     λ----------------------------------λ  
           
(j) Study 4: A4 No.2   λ-------- -------λ-------- --------λ    
           
(k) Study 4: A4 No.1 λ------- --------λ-------- ----------------- ----------------- --------λ    
           
_____ 
Figure 7.  Summary of studies and analyses which examined criteria, meaning, judgement and function of the direct route of value influence.  
Notes: 
 Value relevance1 = number of values listed on open-ended questions of values important to themselves or New Zealander but not listed on Rokeach Value Survey. 
 Value relevance2 = mean rating of all Rokeach Value Survey  items.  
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ANALYSIS ONE: CROSS-PRODUCT CONSISTENCY 
 
 
In Chapter IV, the rationale was offered that if human values inform consumer 
choices then the abstractness and generality of human values would result in product 
preferences that are relatively consistent across products not only in how they 
reinforce important values but also their meaning, judgement and routes of value 
influence.  So, Proposition #1 stated that individuals should have a cross-product 
tendency to attend to the same product meanings, make the same judgement, and 
apply human values directly or indirectly via tangible attribute importances. 
 
 Study 2 did find that preferences for attending to an automobile’s utilitarian 
meaning and making a piecemeal judgement was correlated .67 with preferences for 
attending to sunglasses’ utilitarian meaning and making a piecemeal judgement.  
Similarly, preferences for attending to an automobile’s symbolic meaning and 
making an affective judgement was correlated .64 with preferences for attending to 
sunglasses’ symbolic meaning and making an affective judgement.  Moreover, when 
automobiles were evaluated, the correlation between the Utilitarian Meaning and 
Piecemeal Judgement Scale and the Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement 
Scale was -.34 and the same negative relationship was found when sunglasses were 
evaluated (r=-.22).  The negative relations are also evident across products, with the 
automobile Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale correlated -.19 with 
the sunglasses Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale, and the 
automobile Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale correlated -.21 with 
the sunglasses Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale.  Both sets of 
correlations, the positive correlations of the same scale across products and the 
negative correlations of different scales across products, suggest that individuals 
have cross-product consistency in their meaning and judgement preferences, and thus 
the aim of the current analysis is to examine cross-product consistency in routes of 
human value influence. 
 
The readers might recall that Study 3 examined the product meaning approach 
hypothesis using a Residual Method in which a series of regressions were calculated 
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culminating in two final regressions: one representing the direct influence of human 
values on product ownership (DIR) and the other the indirect influence via tangible 
attribute importances (IIR).  Individuals were separated into two groups according to 
whether their direct (DIR) or indirect influence (IIR) regression more accurately 
predicted their product ownership (e.g., whether the absolute value of their Direct 
Influence Residual or Indirect Influence Residual was lower).  The calculation of the 
regressions and division of the sample was carried out three times: once for Smaller 
Family Car ownership, again for Larger Family Car ownership, and finally for 
sunglasses ownership.  Table 25 (beginning on page 218) summarises the number of 
respondents who were placed into each value influence group for each product tested 
(As a side note; the number of individuals placed into these groups differs slightly 
from that reported in Study 3 as Study 3 eliminated some respondents whose 
meaning and judgement preferences were unavailable). 
 
If the proposition is correct, then each individual should have tended to be 
placed into the same value influence group for each product.  The examination of 
whether that occurred is made on a pair-wise basis, firstly comparing the value 
influence groups formed from the Smaller Family Car ownership regressions with 
the groups formed from the Larger Family Car ownership regressions, then 
comparing Smaller Family Car ownership groups with the sunglasses ownership 
groups, and finally comparing the Larger Family Car ownership groups with the 
sunglasses ownership groups.  A small number of respondents owned both 
automobiles and sunglasses, and thus the two pair-wise examinations made across 
the product categories (e.g., between Smaller Family Car ownership and Sunglasses 
ownership, and between Larger Family Car ownership and Sunglasses ownership) 
should be interpreted with caution. 
 
 Table 25 (beginning on page 218) reports the cross-tabulation of the Larger 
Family Car influence groups and the Smaller Family Car influence groups.  Of the 70 
respondents for whom the DIR was a superior predictor of their Smaller Family Car 
ownership, the Larger Family Car ownership of 55 of them was also more strongly 
predicted by their DIR whereas the remaining 15 were more strongly predicted by 
the IIR.  Of the 65 respondents for whom the IIR was a superior predictor of their 
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Smaller Family Car ownership, the Larger Family Car ownership of 52 of them was 
also more strongly predicted by their IIR whereas the remaining 13 were more 
strongly predicted by the DIR.  Thus, in total 107 respondents were placed into the 
same value influence group in both product conditions whereas 28 were not, a 
significant difference in the binomial distribution (observed probability=.79, 
p<.0001, one-tailed).  Table 25 (beginning on page 218) also reports the cross-
tabulation of the Sunglasses influence groups and the Smaller Family Car influence 
groups.  In total 30 respondents were placed into the same value influence group in 
both product conditions whereas 21 were not, a difference in the expected direction 
but that only approached significance in the binomial distribution (observed 
probability=.41, p=.12, one-tailed).  Finally, Table 25 (beginning on page 218) 
reports the cross-tabulation of the Sunglasses influence groups and the Larger Family 
Car influence groups.  In total 29 respondents were placed into the same value 
influence group in both product conditions whereas 22 were not, a difference in the 
expected direction but that only approached significance (observed probability=.41, 
p=.20, one-tailed). 
 
Overall, the comparison between the Smaller Family Cars and Larger Family 
Cars value influence groups provided the strongest support of the proposition that 
individuals tend to apply their human values though the same routes across products.  
The comparisons between Smaller Family Cars and sunglasses and between Larger 
Family Cars and sunglasses yielded results in the expected directions but failed to 
reach significance.  However, the statistical powers of the tests were .29 for the 
comparison of the Smaller Family Cars groups with the sunglasses groups, .29 for 
the comparison of the Larger Family Cars groups with the sunglasses groups, and 1.0 
for the comparison between Smaller Family Cars and Larger Family Cars.  Thus, 
given that the two tests failing to reach significance are also those with powers far 
below the .80 criterion suggested by Cohen (1988), the non-support of the 
proposition is probably due to the small sample sizes.   
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Table 25.  Cell counts and cross-tabulations of individuals whose direct and indirect 
influences of human values more accurately predicted their Smaller Family Cars, 
Larger Family Cars and sunglasses ownerships. 
 
 
Total number of individuals placed into value influence groups for each product. 
  
 Indirect  
Influence Group 
 Direct  
Influence Group 
 
     
Smaller Family Cars 65  70  
     
Larger Family Cars 67  68  
     
Sunglasses 47  45  
     
 
 
 
 
Cross-tabulation of Larger Family Cars value influence groups with Smaller Family Cars influence 
groups. 
       
   Larger Cars  
Influence Group 
  
       
   Indirect Direct  TOTALS 
       
      Same Group = 107 * 
 Indirect  52 13   
Smaller Cars      Different Group = 28 * 
Influence Group       
 Direct  15 55   
       
       
 
Note: * = Significant difference between cell sizes (observed probabality=.79, p<.0001, one-tailed). 
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Table 25.  Cell counts and cross-tabulations of individuals whose direct and indirect 
influences of human values more accurately predicted their Smaller Family Cars, 
Larger Family Cars and sunglasses ownerships (continued). 
 
 
Cross-tabulation of sunglasses value influence groups with Smaller Family Cars influence groups. 
       
   Sunglasses  
Influence Group 
  
       
   Indirect Direct  TOTALS 
       
      Same Group = 30 * 
 Indirect  14 12   
Smaller Cars      Different Group = 21 * 
Influence Group       
 Direct  9 16   
       
       
 
Note: * = Non-significant difference between cell sizes (observed probabality=.41, p=.12, one-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
Cross-tabulation of sunglasses value influence groups with Larger Family Cars influence groups. 
       
   Sunglasses 
Influence Group 
  
       
   Indirect Direct  TOTALS 
       
      Same Group = 29 * 
 Indirect  14 13   
Larger Cars      Different Group = 22 * 
Influence Group       
 Direct  9 15   
       
       
 
Note: * = Non-significant difference between cell sizes (observed probabality=.41, p=.20, one-tailed). 
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ANALYSIS TWO: PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION 
 
 
The current analysis examines Proposition #2 that greater psychological 
identification with a product is a feature of an expressive psychological function and 
therefore is associated with the direct influence of human values. 
 
The examination of the proposition is only made on red meat consumption 
because, as discussed in Chapter III, red meat plays an important role in the 
expression of the self-concepts and identities.  The readers may recall that several 
sociologists and anthropologists have argued that red meat more so than white meat 
has potent symbolic meaning, which refers to masculine identity and social power 
values (Adams, 1990, 1994; Fiddes, 1989; Heisley, 1990; Twigg, 1983).  For 
example, Heisley’s (1990) study found that meat, particularly red meat, symbolises 
masculinity and strength whilst fruits, vegetables and grains generally symbolise 
femininity and weakness.  Similarly, Fiddes (1989) examination of historical texts, 
modern scientific analyses and meat merchandising sources uncovered a consistent 
theme of meat representing the domination of males over females, Anglos over non-
Anglos, and humans over nature, animals and the environment.  Fiddes (1989) 
concluded, “what meat exemplifies, more than anything, is an attitude: the masculine 
world view that ubiquitously perceives, values, and legitimates hierarchical 
domination of nature, of women, and of other men and, as its corollary, devalues less 
domineering modes of interaction between humans and with the rest of nature”(p.  
210).   
 
 Whatever the precise symbolic meaning of red meat may be, those individuals 
for whom red meat symbolises important elements of their self-concepts (e.g., gender 
identity, power values, etc.) should feel greater psychological affiliation or 
identification with red meat, and consequently should tend to express their human 
values directly given that the direct route serves to express one’s self-concepts and 
identities.  Moreover, the psychological identification with red meat would probably 
be at the expense of a rationale, unemotional, and piecemeal evaluation of red meat’s 
tangible attributes such as its nutritional qualities.  As Fiddes (1991) suggests, meat 
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“is integrated into a structure of social values that may have nothing to do with the 
principles of nutrition” (p.  14; original quote from Le Gros Clark, 1968, p.69).  
Thus, the influence that psychological identification has on the consumption of red 
meat may be negatively related to the influence that tangible attribute importances 
have on the consumption of red meat, and consequently the proposition that 
psychological identification is a feature of the direct route of value influence can be 
divided into two propositions;  
 
1) Tangible attribute importances should predict red meat consumption 
more strongly for low meat identifiers than for high meat identifiers. 
 
2) The indirect influence of human values (via tangible attribute 
importances) on red meat consumption should be stronger for low meat 
identifiers than for high meat identifiers whereas the reverse should be true 
for the direct influence of human values.   
 
 
 Concerning the analysis of the propositions, readers may recall from Chapter VI 
that two methods are available for comparing the strengths of the direct and indirect 
influences of human values as a function of third variable such as meaning and 
judgement preference or, in the current instance, meat identification: the Standard 
Method and the Residual Method.  In the Standard Method, participants would be 
divided into two groups based on their scores on the third measure and then for each 
group two regressions would be performed; the first would regress human values 
alone onto product preference and the second would regress tangible attribute 
importances onto product preference (Block 1) followed by human values (Block 2).  
By comparing the Multiple Rs for each regression and block, a determination can be 
made about which group has the stronger direct influence of human values and 
which group has the stronger indirect influence and whether those groups are the 
ones consistent with the proposition.  The Standard Method is advantageous because 
it maintains a closeness to the original data and easily interpretable, but the Standard 
Method’s limitations are that the two groups may not be similarly heterogeneous and 
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the overall influence of human values may be low, making a comparison of the 
groups’ Multiple Rs tenuous.  In the Residual Method, a series of regressions is 
calculated that culminate in two regressions representing the direct and indirect 
influences of human values, respectively.  By separating individuals according to 
which regression more accurately predicted their product preference, a determination 
can be made about whether each group differs on the third measure such as meaning 
and judgement preference or meat identification.  The Residual Method is 
advantageous because it calculates the regressions on a single sample rather than 
sub-groups that may differ in their heterogeneity and the Residual Method uses 
residuals to gauge prediction accuracy rather than the Multiple Rs.  However, the 
multitude of regressions performed in the Residual Method introduces some level of 
noise. 
 
Technically, both methods should produce equivalent results, but Study 3 used 
the Residual Method to examine the product meaning approach hypothesis because 
human values were expected to weakly influence automobile and sunglasses 
ownerships.  However, readers may recall that Study 1 showed that human values 
strongly influenced red meat consumption (especially through the direct route).  
Thus, both methods are appropriate for examining how the direct and indirect 
influences of human values on red meat consumption are associated with 
psychological identification, and both methods will be used to 1) verify that both 
methods do in fact yield similar results, and 2) enable a more comprehensive 
examination of the propositions. 
 
For both the Standard Method and Residual Method examinations of the 
propositions, the data set used was Sample No. 1 and the measure of red meat 
identification was the 10-point bipolar adjective scale question instructing 
respondents to indicate the extent they are a “vegan (a person who eats vegetables, 
grains, etc.  but no animal or seafood/fish products) versus an omnivore (a person 
who eats vegetables, grains, etc.  and most animal and seafood/fish products)”.  
Whilst the item may appear to only measure meat eating behaviour, evidence that it 
measures identity comes from its strong correlation with the number of times in the 
three days prior to responding to the survey the participant had eaten red meat (r=.38, 
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df=301, p<.001, one-tailed) and weak correlation with the number of times in the 
three days prior to responding to the survey the participant had eaten white meat 
(r=.05, df=301, p=.21, one-tailed).  Both red and white meat consumption should be 
equally correlated with omnivoreness as omnivoreness makes no distinction among 
types of meat; an omnivore is a person who eats any type of meat.  Thus, the lack of 
a correlation with white meat consumption seems to support the claim made by 
Twigg (1983) and others (Adams, 1990, 1994; Fiddes, 1989; Heisley, 1990) that red 
meat is more central to meat identification than white meat.   
 
Standard MethodMethodMethodMethod 
 
Sample No. 1 was divided into two groups at the mean of the meat identification 
scale (mean of 7.9, SD=2.4), resulting in 206 high meat identifiers and 99 low meat 
identifiers.  For each group, two regressions were performed; the first regressed 
human value factor scores onto red meat consumption, and the second regressed 
tangible attribute importance factor scores onto red meat consumption (Block 1) 
followed by human value factor scores onto the remaining red meat consumption 
variance (Block 2).  In both regressions, the independent variables were entered on a 
step-wise basis to conserve degrees of freedom and the criteria required for entrance 
relaxed from p<.05 to p<.10 to enable a (slightly) more robust solution (see Chapter 
III for a fuller explanation of the entrance criteria).  The detailed results of the 
regressions are reported in Table 26 (on page 227), but the summary Table 27 (on 
page 228) will be the focus of the inquiry.   
 
Beginning with the left portion of the summary table, the two-block regressions, 
the far left column reports the Multiple Rs from regressing tangible attribute 
importances onto red meat consumption (Block 1).  As expected, tangible attribute 
importances predicted the red meat consumption for low meat identifiers more 
strongly than for high meat identifiers (.22 versus .00).  The second column from left 
reports the Multiple Rs from regressing human values onto the remaining red meat 
consumption variance not already accounted by tangible attribute importances 
(Block 2).  The “Change in R” column reports the extent human values could predict 
product preference beyond tangible attribute importances, and so represents the 
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influence of human values that does not flow through tangible attribute importances 
(the direct route).  As expected, the direct route is stronger for high meat identifiers 
than for low meat identifiers (.36 versus .08).  The Multiple Rs from regressing 
human values only onto product preference is reported in the “human values only” 
column.  The far right column marked “HVs via Tangible Attribute Importances” is 
the total influence of human values (the “Human Value Only” column) minus the 
“Change in R” from the two-block regression.  The column represents the influence 
of human values on product preference that does flow via tangible attribute 
importances (the indirect route).  As expected, the indirect route is stronger for low 
meat identifiers than for high meat identifiers (.14 versus .00). 
 
 Thus, the results of the Standard Method analysis support the propositions that 
tangible attribute importances predict red meat consumption more strongly for low 
meat identifiers than for high meat identifiers, and that the indirect route of value 
influence is stronger for low meat identifiers than for high meat identifiers whereas 
the reverse is true for the direct route. 
 
Residual MethodMethodMethodMethod 
 
Given that examination using the Standard Method supported the propositions, 
the aim of the current section is to replicate the findings using the Residual Method.  
In Stage 1, tangible attribute importances regressed onto human values, which leaves 
residuals in which the co-variation of tangible attribute importances is removed from 
human values.  Stage 2 then regresses these residuals onto red meat consumption.  
That regression, therefore, represents the direct influence of human values as the 
influence via tangible attribute importances is excluded.  For each individual, the 
residual of that regression showed how accurately the direct influence of human 
values predicts their red meat consumption and thus is called the Direct Influence 
Residual (DIR).  To detect how accurately the indirect influence of human values can 
predict each individual’s red meat consumption, Stage 3 regresses the original, full-
variance human values onto the DIR.  As the DIR does not contain the direct 
influence of human values, any further influence of human values on that residual 
must occur indirectly via tangible attribute importances.  Thus, that regression shows 
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how accurately the indirect influence of human values can predict each individual’s 
red meat consumption and is called the Indirect Influence Residual (IIR). 
 
 As the Residual Method is anchored in the relative prediction accuracy of the 
regressions, the absolute accuracy of prediction is less critical, and therefore, unlike 
the Standard Method, a step-wise entrance of independent variables was not needed.  
Thus, all independent variables were entered simultaneously (i.e., full entry).  
Moreover, the procedure generates more than 20 regression equations and so only the 
results of the final two regressions, those used to separate individuals based on 
strength of their direct influence (DIR) and indirect influence (IIR), are reported.  
The Multiple R from the direct influence regression was a reasonable .29 
(F(13,296)=2.0, p<.05) whereas the Multiple R from the indirect influence regression 
was .07 (F(13,296)=.1, p=.99).  However, the low strength of the indirect regression 
is probably due to less red meat consumption variance being available for the 
indirect regression to predict given that it attempts to predict red meat consumption 
once the direct influence of human values is removed. 
 
Having calculated the DIR and IIR to represent the direct and the indirect 
influence of human values respectively, the next stage separated the sample into two 
groups according to whether the DIR or the IIR more accurately predicted their red 
meat consumption, resulting in 155 respondents for whom the DIR was a superior 
predictor of their red meat consumption (direct influence group), and 155 for whom 
the IIR was superior (indirect influence group).  A t-test of their meat identification 
showed that the direct influence group did identify more strongly as meat eaters than 
the indirect influence group, but that the difference was not significant (mean of 7.88 
versus 7.84, t=-.1, df=308, p=.46, one-tailed).  Given that the Residual Method 
introduces some level of noise due to the multitude of regressions performed, the 
pattern of relations between meat identification and the direct and indirect influences 
of human values on red meat consumption that the Standard Method uncovered may 
be present in the Residual Method but obscured.  Thus, comparing the extreme ends 
of the meat identification scale should provide a clearer account.  Those individuals 
scoring between 4 and 7 on the 10-point meat identification scale were excluded and 
a new t-test calculated, which confirmed that the direct influence group identified 
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more strongly as meat eaters than the indirect influence group (mean of 8.83 versus 
8.31, t=-1.8, df=233, p<.05, one-tailed). 
 
Overall, both the Standard Method and Residual Method yielded similar, but not 
identical, results supporting the proposition that greater psychological identification 
is a feature of the direct route of value influence.   
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Table 26.  Detailed results from regressing tangible attribute importances and human 
values onto the red meat consumption of low and high meat identifiers. 
 
 
TWO-BLOCK REGRESSION ONTO RED MEAT CONSUMPTION 
 
            
  BLOCK 1  BLOCK 2 
   
Tangible 
Attribute 
Importances  
  
 
 
Mult. R 
  
 
 
Human Values 
  
 
Multiple 
R for 
  
Identity 
Group 
 Factors 
Enteredt 
 
Beta 
 for 
Block 1 
 Factors 
Enteredt 
 
Beta 
 Block 1 
and 2 
 Change 
in R 
             
Low  FACTOR1 -.21  .22 *  FACTOR3 -.21  .30 **  .08 * 
Meat     F= 4.7     F= 4.7   
Identity     df=1,97     df=2,96   
             
             
High  [none]   .00  FACTOR6 -.21  .36 ****  .36**** 
Meat       FACTOR10 -.18  F=6.0   
Identity       FACTOR2 -.17  df=5,198   
       FACTOR1 .13     
       FACTOR9 .11     
             
 
 
 
HUMAN VALUES ONLY REGRESSION ONTO RED MEAT CONSUMPTION 
 
     
 
 
  
Human Values 
  
 
Identity Group 
 Factors 
Enteredt 
 
Beta 
  
Mult. R 
      
Low  FACTOR3 -.22  .22 * 
Meat     F = 5.0 
Identity     df= 1,97 
      
      
High  FACTOR6 -.21  .36 **** 
Meat  FACTOR10 -.18  F=6.0 
Identity  FACTOR2 -.17  df=5,198 
  FACTOR1 .13   
  FACTOR9 .11   
      
 
 
Notes: 
 *        p<.05    ***    p<.001 
 **      p<.01    ****  p<.0001 
 t = only factors significant at the p<.10 level were entered. 
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Table 27.  Summary of Multiple Rs from two-block and human values only regression 
onto the red meat consumption of low and high meat identifiers. 
 
 
 
 
       
  TWO-BLOCK REGRESSION    
  Block 1 Block 2     HVs via 
 
RED MEAT 
CONSUMPTION 
 Tangible 
Attribute 
Importances 
 
Human 
Values 
 
Change 
In R 
 Human 
Values 
Only 
 Tangible 
Attribute 
Importances t 
         
         
Low Meat Identity  .22 * .30 *** .08 * .22 * .14 
       
       
High Meat Identity  .00 .36 **** .36**** .36 **** .00 
         
         
 
 
Notes: 
 *        p<.05 
 **      p<.01 
 ***    p<.001 
 ****  p<.0001 
 t   = test of significance unavailable. 
 Block 1 = tangible attribute importances onto product preference. 
 Block 2 = human values onto remaining product preference not already accounted by tangible 
attribute importances. 
 Change in R = indicates direct influence of human values. 
 HVs  via Tangible Attribute Importances = indicates indirect influence of human values and are 
calculated by subtracting Change in R from Human Values Only. 
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ANALYSIS THREE: VALUE RELEVANCE 
 
 
 The current analysis examines Proposition #3 that greater value relevance is a 
feature of an expressive psychological function and so is associated with the direct 
influence of human values.  The measures of value relevance will be discussed 
shortly, but presently readers are advised that because the measures of value 
relevance are only contained in Study 2 and the abilities to measure the direct and 
indirect influences of human values on product preference are only in Study 1 and 
Study 3, assessing whether value relevance is associated with the direct and indirect 
influences of human values is not possible.  Therefore, only the association between 
value relevance and meaning and judgement preferences are examined, and 
Proposition #3 is restated as: 
 
PROPOSITION 3 (restated): Value relevance is a feature of an expressive 
psychological function and therefore greater value relevance should be 
associated with a preference for symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement and lesser value relevance should be associated with a preference 
for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement. 
 
 
Given that Study 3 showed that meaning and judgement preferences were 
associated with the direct and indirect influences of human values in the directions 
hypothesised in the product meaning approach, any current analysis that shows value 
relevance is associated with meaning and judgement preferences would suggest that 
value relevance is probably associated with the direct and indirect influences of 
human values (though other interpretations are reviewed in the discussion).  The 
current analysis also associates value relevance with terminal values as the 
suggestion was made that both value relevance and terminal values serve an 
expressive psychological function.  The relation between instrumental and terminal 
values and instrumental and expressive psychological functions are examined more 
thoroughly in Analysis Four. 
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Value Relevance and Meaning and Judgement PreferenceRelevance and Meaning 
and Judgement PreferenceRelevance and Meaning and Judgement 
PreferenceRelevance and Meaning and Judgement Preference 
 
 The readers might recall that the responses to the Rokeach Value Survey cannot 
tap value relevance because the rating procedure forces a distribution and thus 
cannot distinguish those individuals that might, if given the opportunity, rate all the 
values more highly than other individuals.  To measure human values in a way that 
can tap value relevance without being redundant to the Rokeach Value Survey, the 
survey in Study 2 contained two open-ended questions immediately following the 
Rokeach Value Survey; “Referring to the values listed on the previous page, do you 
feel that there are some values that are important to you but do not appear in the list? 
If so, what are they?” and “Can you think of other values that may be important to 
New Zealanders but are not listed”.  Some human values important to the 
respondents but not included in the Rokeach Value Survey were Supporting Success, 
Health, Spirituality, Community, Being Your Own Person, and Adaptability, and 
some human values believed to be important to New Zealanders but not in the 
Rokeach Value Survey were Family Cohesiveness, Ethnic Identity, Pride in Work, 
Green Image and Having a Positive Attitude. 
 
If human values in general are important to a respondent then he or she should 
be motivated to fill out the open-ended question of the human values that are 
important to him or her, and should also be aware of the values important to typical 
New Zealanders.  Consequently, no matter whether the human values respondents 
listed were in the open-ended question about human values important to themselves 
or in the open-ended question about human values important to New Zealanders, the 
more human values respondents listed the greater the probability that human values 
in general are important to them (e.g., value relevant).  Thus, value relevance was 
indexed as the total number of human values listed in both open-ended questions 
(mean=.78, SD=1.66).  The number of listed values ranged from 0 to 8, but most of 
the respondents listed none, resulting in a highly skewed scale (skewness=2.6).  
Thus, the skewness of the variable was corrected to the more acceptable level of 1.5 
by taking the variable’s square root.  The calculation resulted in a new mean of .44 
(SD=.77). 
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As Study 2 instructed respondents to rate the meaning and judgement items 
twice, the first referring automobiles and the second to sunglasses, value relevance is 
examined against meaning and judgement preferences for each product.  In consumer 
considerations of automobiles, 90 participants rated the Utilitarian Meaning and 
Piecemeal Judgement Scale more highly than the Symbolic Meaning and Affective 
Judgement Scale and 17 participants rated the reverse.  A t-test showed that those 
who rated symbolic meaning and an affective judgement more highly than utilitarian 
meaning and a piecemeal judgement also scored higher in the value relevance index 
and that those preferring utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement scored lower 
(skewness corrected mean of .87 versus .34, t=-2.7, df=105, p<.01, one-tailed).  
However, the relatively low number of respondents in the latter group (n=17) 
suggests that the results should be interpreted with some degree of caution.   
 
 In consumer considerations of sunglasses, 73 respondents rated the Utilitarian 
Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale higher than the Symbolic Meaning and 
Affective Judgement Scale and 36 respondents rated the reverse.  A t-test showed 
that those who rated symbolic meaning and an affective judgement more highly than 
utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement also scored higher in the value 
relevance index and that those preferring utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal 
judgement scored lower (skewness corrected mean of .63 versus .29, t=-2.3, df=107, 
p<.01, one-tailed).  Thus, although the number of respondents in the automobile 
symbolic meaning and affective judgement group is small, the number of 
respondents in the sunglasses symbolic meaning and affective judgement group is 
acceptable, and thus the proposition that greater value relevance should be associated 
with a preference for symbolic meaning and an affective judgement and lesser value 
relevance should be associated with a preference for utilitarian meaning and a 
piecemeal judgement can be cautiously accepted. 
 
Value Relevance and Instrumental and Terminal ValuesRelevance and Instrumental 
and Terminal ValuesRelevance and Instrumental and Terminal ValuesRelevance and 
Instrumental and Terminal Values 
 
The aim of the current section is to assess whether preferences for instrumental 
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and terminal values are associated with value relevance.  In Proposition #3, greater 
value relevance is suggested to be a feature of an expressive psychological function, 
and in Proposition #5, terminal values are suggested to serve an expressive function.  
Thus, both value relevance and terminal values represent an expressive function and 
should be positively associated.  Moreover, in Proposition #4 instrumental values are 
suggested to serve an instrumental psychological function, and that the expressive 
and instrumental functions are in opposition, a weaker value relevance should be 
associated with a preference for instrumental values.   
 
 Unlike the examination of value relevance and meaning and judgement 
preference, the inquiry of value relevance and instrumental and terminal value 
preference uses two indices of value relevance.  The first index is the same as that 
used in the previous analysis; the number of values listed on the open-ended 
questions of values important to the respondent or to New Zealanders but not listed 
in the Rokeach Value Survey.  If value relevance and terminal values both represent 
an expressive psychological function and instrumental values and low value 
relevance both represent an instrumental function, then a preference for terminal 
values to instrumental values should be associated with a higher score on the index 
of value relevance, whereas a preference for instrumental values to terminal values 
should be associated with a lower value relevance score.  To make the assessment, 
for each individual in Sample No. 2 the mean rating he or she gave to the 18 
instrumental values was calculated as was the mean rating he or she gave to the 18 
terminal values.  Individuals were then placed into two groups according to which 
was higher; 46 respondents preferred instrumental values to terminal values and 64 
respondents preferred terminal values to instrumental values.  The mean number of 
values listed on the open-ended questions for the instrumental value group was .28 
(skewness corrected) and for the terminal value group was .53 (also skewness 
corrected); a significant difference (t=1.7, df=108, p<.05, one-tailed).  Thus, as 
expected, those emphasising terminal values scored higher in value relevance 
whereas those emphasising instrumental values scored lower. 
 
A second index of value relevance that can be associated with instrumental and 
terminal value preferences is the mean rating the individual gave to all the Rokeach 
 233
Value Survey items.  Those individuals who rate the values on the Rokeach Value 
Survey more highly should also tend to prefer terminal values to instrumental values, 
and conversely those who rate the values less in importance should prefer 
instrumental values to terminal values.  Unfortunately, all three studies in the current 
thesis employed a forced-distribution response format to the Rokeach Value Survey 
and therefore the mean rating is the same for all individuals.  Consequently, a 
different data set was used, Ng et al.  (1982), which obtained Rokeach Value Survey 
preferences for student samples in nine East Eurasian and Pacific Insular countries.  
As that study instructed participants to rate the values on a 9-point scale of 
importance, the responses are suitable for the current purpose.  In the interest of 
consistency with the previous analysis, all non-New Zealand respondents were 
excluded. 
 
 To test the proposition that a preference for terminal values is associated with a 
greater preference for all human values, firstly for each individual the mean rating he 
or she gave to the 18 instrumental values was calculated as was the mean rating he or 
she gave to the 18 terminal values.  Individuals were then placed into two groups 
according to which was higher; 48 respondents preferred instrumental values to 
terminal values and 42 respondents preferred terminal values to instrumental values.  
Next, the mean rating each individual gave to all 36 human values (both instrumental 
and terminal combined) was calculated and the groups compared.  As expected, the 
group that preferred terminal values to instrumental values rated all human values 
significantly higher than the group that preferred instrumental values to terminal 
values (mean of 7.1 versus 6.7)(t=2.1, df=88, p<.05, one-tailed). 
 
Overall, the current set of analyses confirm that greater value relevance is 
associated with a preference for terminal values to instrumental values and with a 
preference for symbolic meaning and an affective judgement to utilitarian meaning 
and a piecemeal judgement, whereas lower value relevance is associated with a 
preference for instrumental values to terminal values and with a preference for 
utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement. 
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ANALYSIS FOUR: INSTRUMENTAL AND TERMINAL VALUES 
 
 
Given that Analysis Three showed that value relevance is related to meaning and 
judgement preferences and instrumental and terminal values, the current analysis 
more thoroughly examines instrumental and terminal values.  Proposition #4 was that 
instrumental human values serve an instrumental psychological function and 
therefore a preference for instrumental values should be associated with the indirect 
influence of human values, and Proposition #5 was that terminal human values serve 
an expressive psychological function and therefore a preference for terminal values 
should be associated with the direct influence of human values.   
 
 The current analysis first probes the association between instrumental and 
terminal values and meaning and judgement preferences, and then examines the 
routes through which instrumental and terminal values influence product preference. 
 
Instrumental and Terminal Values and the Meaning and Judgement Preferences 
 
The aim of the current section is to examine whether meaning and judgement 
preferences co-vary with instrumental and terminal value preferences.  However, as 
shown repeatedly throughout Part II of the current thesis, the preference for 
utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement is robust and therefore can probably only be modified slightly, not 
reversed, by terminal values.  Thus, support for Proposition #4 would be found if the 
preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning 
and an affective judgement was greater for those individuals preferring instrumental 
values to terminal values.  Conversely, support for Proposition #5 would be found if 
the preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic 
meaning and an affective judgement was weaker for those individuals preferring 
terminal values to instrumental values.   
 
The examination of the meaning and judgement elements of Propositions #4 and 
#5 are made with Sample No. 2 because respondents indicated their meaning and 
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judgement preferences for both automobiles and sunglasses.  The participants were 
divided into two groups according to which they rated higher; the 18 instrumental 
values or the 18 terminal values.  Forty-six respondents preferred instrumental values 
to terminal values and 64 respondents preferred terminal values to instrumental 
values.  These two groups’ meaning and judgement preferences for automobiles are 
shown in Figure 8 (on page 251) and were compared with a 2(instrumental group 
versus terminal group) x 2(Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale 
versus Symbolic Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale) mixed ANOVA, which 
resulted in a significant main effect (the Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal 
Judgement Scale was rated more highly than the Symbolic Meaning and Affective 
Judgement Scale (F(1,98)=135.0, p<.001, MSerror=1.34) and a significant 
interaction effect (F(1,98)=13.4, p<.001).  As the test variables were ordered into the 
SPSS ANOVA procedure such that the interaction made the appropriate comparison 
vis-à-vis the propositions, the significant interaction confirms that the preference for 
utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement is greater for the group that prefers instrumental values to terminal values, 
and that the preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to 
symbolic meaning and an affective judgement is weaker for the group that prefers 
terminal values to instrumental values. 
 
 The two groups were also compared on their meaning and judgement preferences 
for sunglasses (see Figure 8 on page 251).  A 2(instrumental group versus terminal 
group) x 2(Utilitarian Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale versus Symbolic 
Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale) mixed ANOVA showed that the Utilitarian 
Meaning and Piecemeal Judgement Scale was rated more highly than the Symbolic 
Meaning and Affective Judgement Scale (F(1,105)=22.6, p<.001, MSerror=1.49) and 
that the factors significantly interact (F(1,105)=13.6, p<.001).  As the test variables 
were ordered into the SPSS ANOVA procedure such that the interaction made the 
appropriate comparison vis-à-vis the propositions, the significant interaction 
confirms that the preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to 
symbolic meaning and an affective judgement is greater for the group that prefers 
instrumental values to terminal values, and that the preference for utilitarian meaning 
and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement is 
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weaker for the group that prefers terminal values to instrumental values. 
 
Instrumental and Terminal Values and the Direct and Indirect Routes 
 
Having shown that instrumental and terminal value preferences are related to 
meaning and judgement preferences for both automobiles and sunglasses, the current 
section examines the remaining elements of Propositions #4 and #5; whether 
instrumental and terminal values are associated with the indirect and direct 
influences of human values respectively.  Instrumental and terminal values may 
manifest in the value influence routes in one of two ways.  Firstly, instrumental and 
terminal values may operate through separate routes to influence product preference; 
instrumental values may operate through the indirect route and terminal through the 
direct.  The second way instrumental and terminal values may manifest in the routes 
is that individuals who prefer one type of value to the other may apply all their 
human values (both instrumental and terminal) directly or indirectly; those 
individuals who prefer terminal values to instrumental may tend to apply all their 
human values directly, whereas those who prefer instrumental values to terminal 
values may tend to all apply their human values indirectly via tangible attribute 
importances.  Both possible manifestations are examined utilising Sample No. 1, 
which allows comparison with the findings of the attribute-mediation approach test 
(Study 1) and provides the most diverse exploration (given that it comprises eight 
product classes ownerships).  Whether instrumental and terminal values operate 
through separate routes is examined first, followed by whether individuals preferring 
one type of value to the other tend to apply all their values directly or indirectly. 
 
 To examine whether instrumental and terminal values operate through separate 
routes, the regression procedure used in Study 1 to examine the attribute-mediation 
approach hypotheses was performed on instrumental and terminal values separately.  
To review: two regression analyses were performed for each of the eight product 
classes: three automobile ownerships (Smaller Cars, Larger Cars, Luxury Cars), 
three overseas holiday destination groups (Major Cites, Prestige and Structured, Safe 
and Tropical), and two types of meat consumption (red and white).  In the first 
regression analysis, human values alone were regressed onto product preference.  
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The second regression analysis entered tangible attribute importances onto product 
preference (Block 1), then entered human values onto the remainder of product 
preference variance (Block 2).   
 
Thus, as the human values alone regression and two-block regression were 
performed on each of the eight product classes and separately with instrumental and 
terminal values, the following 32 regressions were performed: 
 
• Instrumental values were regressed onto Smaller Family Car ownership. 
• Instrumental values were regressed onto Larger Family Car ownership. 
• Instrumental values were regressed onto Luxury Car ownership. 
• Instrumental values were regressed onto holidaying at Major Cities 
destinations. 
• Instrumental values were regressed onto holidaying at Prestige and Structured 
destinations. 
• Instrumental values were regressed onto holidaying at Safe and Tropical 
destinations. 
• Instrumental values were regressed onto red meat consumption. 
• Instrumental values were regressed onto white meat consumption. 
• Terminal values were regressed onto Smaller Family Car ownership. 
• Terminal values were regressed onto Larger Family Car ownership. 
• Terminal values were regressed onto Luxury Car ownership. 
• Terminal values were regressed onto holidaying at Major Cities destinations. 
• Terminal values were regressed onto holidaying at Prestige and Structured 
destinations. 
• Terminal values were regressed onto holidaying at Safe and Tropical 
destinations. 
• Terminal values were regressed onto red meat consumption. 
• Terminal values were regressed onto white meat consumption. 
 
• The automobile tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ 
Smaller Family Car ownerships (Block 1), followed by instrumental values 
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(Block 2). 
• The automobile tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ 
Larger Family Car ownerships (Block 1), followed by instrumental values (Block 
2). 
• The automobile tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ 
Luxury Car ownerships (Block 1), followed by instrumental values (Block 2). 
• The holiday destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
participants’ holidaying at Major Cities destinations (Block 1), followed by 
instrumental values (Block 2). 
• The holiday destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
participants’ holidaying at Prestige and Structured destinations (Block 1), 
followed by instrumental values (Block 2). 
• The holiday destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
participants’ holidaying at Safe and Tropical destinations (Block 1), followed by 
instrumental values (Block 2). 
• The food tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ red 
meat consumption (Block 1), followed by instrumental values (Block 2). 
• The food tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ white 
meat consumption (Block 1), followed by instrumental values (Block 2). 
• The automobile tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ 
Smaller Family Car ownerships (Block 1), followed by terminal values (Block 
2). 
• The automobile tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ 
Larger Family Car ownerships (Block 1), followed by terminal values (Block 2). 
• The automobile tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ 
Luxury Car ownerships (Block 1), followed by terminal values (Block 2). 
• The holiday destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
participants’ holidaying at Major Cities destinations (Block 1), followed by 
terminal values (Block 2). 
• The holiday destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
participants’ holidaying at Prestige and Structured destinations (Block 1), 
followed by terminal values (Block 2). 
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• The holiday destination tangible attribute importances were regressed onto 
participants’ holidaying at Safe and Tropical destinations (Block 1), followed by 
terminal values (Block 2). 
• The food tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ red 
meat consumption (Block 1), followed by terminal values (Block 2). 
• The food tangible attribute importances were regressed onto participants’ white 
meat consumption (Block 1), followed by terminal values (Block 2). 
 
 
 If instrumental and terminal values do operate through separate routes, the 
degree of product preference variance each can account for when mediating and not 
mediating through tangible attribute importances should vary.  For example, when 
terminal values are examined, if Block 2 of the two-block regression can explain a 
significant amount of product preference variance after the influence of tangible 
attribute importances have been removed, then terminal values may operate through 
the direct route.  The interpretation would be validated if the terminal value only 
regressions were strong as it would show that the influence occurs directly.  
Moreover, when instrumental values are examined, if Block 2 of the two-block 
regression cannot explain a significant amount of product preference variance after 
the influence of tangible attribute importances have been removed, then instrumental 
values may operate through the indirect route.  The interpretation would be validated 
if the instrumental value only regressions were strong as it would show that all the 
influence occurs indirectly via tangible attribute importances.   
 
Before reporting the results of the 32 regressions, three issues are of note.  
Firstly, like Study 1 human value and tangible attribute importance factor scores 
were entered into the regressions instead of the full items.  Automobile tangible 
attribute importances comprised 5 factors, holiday destination tangible attribute 
importances 6 factors and food tangible attribute importances 6 factors.  However, 
the 13 human value factors uncovered in Study 1 could not be used in the current 
analysis because in Study 1 instrumental and terminal values were factor analysed 
conjointly, and consequently the instrumental and terminal values are intermixed 
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within the 13 factors.  As the current procedure enters instrumental and terminal 
values into separate regressions, instrumental and terminal values must be factor 
analysed separately.  The 18 instrumental values were grouped through factor 
analysis (principal components extraction with no rotation) resulting in 7 factors 
accounting for 58% of the variance, and the reduction of the 18 terminal values 
resulted in 6 factors accounting for 61% of the variance.  Both factor analyses met 
the four criteria that help ensure a stable factor structure: a minimum sample size of 
100 to 200 (Comrey, 1978), a minimum ratio of participants to variables of between 
2:1 and 10:1 (Gorsuch, 1983; Nunnally, 1978), a minimum ratio of participants to 
factors 2:1 (Cattell, 1978) and a minimum ratio of variables to factors of 6:1 (Cattell, 
1978).  Thus, for the 16 regressions entering terminal values, the 6 terminal value 
factors were entered, and for the 16 regressions entering instrumental values, the 7 
instrumental factors were entered. 
 
A second issue of note is that as the number of human value factors in these 
regression analyses is much less than in the full human values factor analysis in 
Study 1 (6 or 7 versus 13), the degrees of freedom lost is acceptable and a step-wise 
entrance of independent variables not necessary.  Thus, all independent variables 
were entered simultaneously (i.e., full entry method).  A third issue of note is that the 
following factors that may affect the stability and integrity of the regression analyses 
were examined: linearity, homoscedacity, normality of error terms, multi-collinearity 
and a low subject-to-variable ratio (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1992).  A 
visual inspection of the residual plots indicated each regression equation did not 
deviate substantially from linearity and was homoscedastic.  An inspection of the 
normal probability plots suggested that the distributions were essentially normal.  
Moreover, as the independent variables are human value and tangible attribute 
importance scores from un-rotated factor analyses, a perusal of the correlation matrix 
confirmed that multi-collinearity is not an impediment.  Finally, the minimum 
subject-to-variable ratio suggested ranges from 10 to an absolute minimum of 4 
respondents per variable, for which each regression in the study easily exceeds. 
 
 The Multiple Rs of the instrumental and terminal value regression analyses and 
their significance are summarised in Table 28 (on page 252)(the beta weights for the 
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independent variables are not reported).  Referring to the “Change in R” column in 
the two-block regressions, instrumental values did significantly predict Luxury Car 
ownership and red meat consumption beyond that predicted by tangible attribute 
importances, whereas terminal values only predicted red meat consumption beyond 
tangible attribute importances.  Thus, the direct influence of instrumental values is 
slightly stronger than the direct influence of terminal values.  Referring to the 
“Human Values Only” column, instrumental values could significantly predict 
Luxury Car ownership, Prestige and Structured holidaying, and red meat 
consumption, whereas terminal values could only predict red meat consumption.  
The far right-hand column reports the influence of human values on product 
preference that occurs via tangible attribute importances, and shows that instrumental 
and terminal values are similar in strength, except Prestige and Structured holiday 
destinations in which the indirect route of instrumental values is slightly stronger 
than the indirect route of terminal values (.21 versus .15). 
 
Overall, instrumental and terminal values do not appear to operate through 
separate routes.  Instrumental values seem to have a slightly stronger influence on 
product preference than terminal values, but the influence is evenly split between the 
direct and indirect routes.  For example, for the two product classes that instrumental 
values alone could significantly predict product preference but terminal values did 
not, that is, Luxury Cars and Prestige and Structured holiday destinations, for the 
former product the increased influence of instrumental values occurs through the 
direct route whereas for the latter product the increased influence occurs via tangible 
attribute importances. 
 
Thus far in assessing Propositions #4 and #5, the analyses have shown that 
instrumental and terminal are associated with separate meaning and judgement 
preferences but do not appear to operate through separate routes.  The results may 
appear incongruent except that another avenue exists for how instrumental and 
terminal values may manifest in the value influence routes.  Rather than instrumental 
and terminal values being applied differentially, individuals who prefer one value 
type to the other may tend to express all their values (both instrumental and terminal) 
through the respective routes.   
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 Thus, the current section examines whether individuals who prefer one type of 
value to the other tend to express all their human values through separate routes by 
dividing individuals into two groups based on relative strengths of their direct and 
indirect routes of value influence, and then comparing the groups’ instrumental and 
terminal value preferences.  Those individuals for whom the direct influence of all 
their human values more accurately predicts their product preference should prefer 
terminal values to instrumental values, and those individuals for whom the indirect 
influence of all their human values more accurately predicts their product preference 
should prefer instrumental values to terminal values.  Unfortunately, the Residual 
Method used in Study 3 for separating individuals into two groups according the 
relative predictive power of the direct and indirect influences of human values was 
unfeasible for the current analysis that uses Sample No. 1.  Study 3 only comprised 
three product classes (Smaller Family Cars, Larger Family Car and sunglasses), 
which was manageable given that the Residual Method employed for each product 
required 17 regression analyses.  Sample No. 1 comprises eight product class 
ownerships (e.g., Smaller Family Car ownership, Larger Family Car ownership, 
Luxury Car ownership, holidaying at Major Cities destinations, holidaying at 
Prestige and Structured destinations, holidaying at Safe and Tropical destinations, 
red meat consumption, and white meat consumption), and consequently using the 
Residual Method for the current analyses would require more than one-hundred 
regressions (obviously unmanageable). 
 
 Discriminant analysis is more appropriate for the current purpose than the 
Residual Method because discriminant analysis can focus on product ownership at 
the product-category level (e.g., automobiles, overseas holiday destinations, and 
meat types) rather than the product class level and thus substantially reduce the 
number of analyses.  In the investigation of each product category, individuals would 
be separated into groups based their most frequently purchased product class.  For 
instance, in the automobile category, individuals would be placed into three groups 
based on whether they had owned more Smaller Family Cars, Larger Family Cars or 
luxury cars.  Following the separation of the sample, two discriminant analyses 
would be performed which attempt to predict these ownership groups: one of the 
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analyses would assess the direct influence of human values and the other the indirect 
influence.  Using the results of these two discriminant analyses, a determination can 
be made whether, for each individual, the direct route or indirect route yielded a 
stronger prediction of their most frequently purchased car class.  If the propositions 
are correct, then for those individuals for whom the direct influence discriminant 
analysis accurately predicted their most frequently purchased car class but the 
indirect influence discriminant analysis did not, terminal values should be preferred 
to a greater extent than terminal values are preferred by those individuals for whom 
the indirect influence discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently 
purchased car class but the direct influence discriminant analysis did not.  
Conversely, for those individuals for whom the indirect influence discriminant 
analysis accurately predicted their most frequently purchased car class but the 
indirect influence discriminant analysis did not, instrumental values should be 
preferred to a greater extent than instrumental values are preferred by those 
individuals for whom the direct influence discriminant analysis accurately predicted 
their most frequently purchased car class but the indirect influence discriminant 
analysis did not.  The discriminant analysis and separation of the sample would be 
carried out again for the individuals’ most frequently visited holiday destination and 
again for their most frequently consumed meat. 
 
Despite the advantage of the discriminant analysis in requiring fewer analyses 
than the Residual Method, one limitation of discriminant analysis for the current 
purpose is that the direct and indirect influences of human values cannot be 
determined with precision.  Discriminant analysis does not allow residuals to be used 
as the dependent variable (readers would recall that in the third stage of the Residual 
Method human values are regressed onto the residual of product ownership after the 
direct influence of human values has been removed).  Due to the limitation, the 
discriminant analysis that is meant to represent the direct route of value influence 
will enter human values to predict the individual’s most frequently purchased 
product class, whereas the discriminant analysis that is meant to represent the 
indirect route of value influence will enter tangible attribute importances to predict 
the individual’s most frequently purchased product class.  Theoretically, at least, the 
relative predictive power of an individual’s tangible attribute importances verses 
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their human values should be similar, but not identical, to the relative predictive 
power of their indirect versus direct routes of value influence.  The procedure is not 
as precise as the Residual Method and caution is warranted when interpreting the 
results (a caution that will be more fully discussed in the next section). 
 
 Given the limitation of the discriminant analysis procedure, the propositions are 
restated as the following; for those individuals for whom the human value 
discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently purchased product 
class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis did not, terminal 
values should be preferred to a greater extent than terminal values are preferred by 
those individuals for whom the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis 
accurately predicted their most frequently purchased product class but the human 
value discriminant analysis did not.  Conversely, for those individuals for whom the 
tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most 
frequently purchased product class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant 
analysis did not, instrumental values should be preferred to a greater extent than 
instrumental values are preferred by those individuals for whom the human value 
discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently purchased product 
class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis did not. 
 
The propositions are examined for each of the three product categories: 
automobiles, overseas holidaying and meat types. 
 
Automobile OwnershipOwnershipOwnershipOwnership 
 
 For the automobile category, the separation of respondents into their most 
frequently purchased car class resulted in 136 Smaller Family Car owners, 66 Larger 
Family Car owners, and 20 Luxury Car owners.  The first discriminant analysis 
entered the 13 human value factors to predict each individual’s most frequently 
owned car class.  The readers might recall from Study 1  that the 13 human value 
factors intermixed instrumental and terminal values.  As the suggestion is now made 
that instrumental and terminal values are not applied differentially, but that 
individuals who prefer one value type to the other may tend to express all their 
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values (both instrumental and terminal) through the respective routes, both 
instrumental and terminal values must be used as predictors.  The discriminant 
analysis yielded two functions neither of which were significant (Function 1: 
Eigenvalue=.07, df=26, p=.51)(Function 2: Eigenvalue=.05, df=12, p=.60).  The 
non-significance of the functions does not necessarily imply that no group 
memberships could be predicted by the functions; the significance refers to the 
ability of the functions to predict the group memberships of the entire sample.  
Overall, 45% of the group memberships could be correctly predicted by the human 
value factors, significantly better than chance (Press’s Q=13.7, p<.01) though the 
significance of the Press’s Q may be affected by the large sample size. The Box’s M 
for the analysis (M=230.4, p=.34) is non-significant, indicating that the groups meet 
the requirement in discriminant analysis of equal co-variance matrices.  The second 
discriminant analysis entered the 5 automobile tangible attribute importance factors 
to predict each individual’s most frequently owned car class, which produced two 
functions (Function 1: Eigenvalue=.25, df=10, p<.001)(Function 2: Eigenvalue=.02, 
df=4, p=.36).  Both functions together could predict 57% of the automobile class 
ownerships, significantly better than chance (Press’s Q=56.9, p<.01). The Box’s M 
for the analysis (M=65.6, p<.001) is significant, indicating that the groups may not 
meet the requirement in discriminant analysis of equal co-variance matrices.  For 
both discriminant analyses, the sample size exceeded the recommended 20 
respondents per independent variable (Hair, Tatham & Black, 1992), and as the 
human value and tangible attribute importance factors were not rotated, a perusal of 
the correlation matrix confirmed that multi-collinearity is not an obstacle. 
 
Following the computation of the human values and tangible attribute 
importances discriminant analyses, individuals were divided into four groups based 
on which analysis (or analyses) more accurately predicted their most frequently 
purchased automobile class.  The division resulted in 37 respondents for whom the 
human value discriminant analysis correctly predicted their most frequently 
purchased car class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant could not 
(termed the “human values group”), 64 respondents that the tangible attribute 
importance discriminant analysis predicted their most frequently purchased car class 
but the human value discriminant did not (termed the “tangible attribute importances 
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group”), 59 respondents for whom both analyses predicted their most frequently 
purchased car class (termed the “both group”), and 62 respondents that neither 
predicted their most frequently purchased car class.   
 
 Before comparing instrumental and terminal value preferences for these groups, 
instrumental and terminal value scores were calculated for each individual.  The 
instrumental value score was the mean rating the individual gave to the 18 
instrumental values and the terminal value score was the mean rating the individual 
gave to the 18 terminal values.  The mean instrumental and terminal value scores for 
the three groups that one or both of the discriminant analyses correctly predicted 
their most frequently purchased car class are presented in Figure 9 (beginning on 
page 253).  As speculating a pattern of preferences for the group for which both 
human values and tangible attribute importances predicted their most frequently 
purchased car class is problematic, only the human value group and tangible attribute 
importance group are compared.  Consistent with the propositions, for those 
individuals for whom the human value discriminant analysis accurately predicted 
their most frequently purchased car class but the tangible attribute importance 
discriminant analysis did not, terminal values were preferred to a greater extent than 
terminal values were preferred by those individuals for whom the tangible attribute 
importance discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently 
purchased car class but the human value discriminant analysis did not (mean of 2.15 
and SD of .18 versus mean of 2.08 and SD of .15, t=2.0, df=99, p<.05, one-tailed).  
Conversely, for those individuals for whom the tangible attribute importance 
discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently purchased car class 
but the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis did not, instrumental 
values were preferred to a greater extent than instrumental values were preferred by 
those individuals for whom the human value discriminant analysis accurately 
predicted their most frequently purchased car class but the tangible attribute 
importance discriminant analysis did not (mean of 2.0 and SD of .15 versus mean of 
1.91 and SD of .18, t=-2.6, df=99, p<.01, one-tailed). 
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Overseas HolidayingHolidayingHolidayingHolidaying 
 
For the overseas holidaying product category, the separation of respondents into 
their most frequently visited destination group resulted in 137 respondents for Major 
Cities, 10 for Prestige and Structured, and 40 Safe and Tropical destinations.  The 
first discriminant analysis entered the 13 human value factors to predict each 
individual’s most frequently visited holiday destination, and yielded two non-
significant functions (Function 1: Eigenvalue=.13, df=26, p=.20)(Function 2: 
Eigenvalue=.06, df=12, p=.64).  These two functions correctly predicted 51% of the 
group memberships, significantly better than chance (Press’s Q=25.6, p<.01) though 
the significance of the Press’s Q may be affected by the large sample size. The Box’s 
M for the analysis (M=236.9, p<.001) is significant, indicating that the groups may 
not meet the requirement in discriminant analysis of equal co-variance matrices.  The 
second discriminant analysis entered the 6 holiday destination tangible attribute 
importance factors to predict each individual’s most frequently visited holiday 
destination, and produced two non-significant functions (Function 1: 
Eigenvalue=.08, df=12, p=.07)(Function 2: Eigenvalue=.03, df=5, p=.38) which 
together could predict 44% of the group memberships, significantly better than 
chance (Press’s Q=9.3, p<.01). The Box’s M for the analysis (M=59.3, p=.20) is non-
significant, indicating that the groups meet the requirement in discriminant analysis 
of equal co-variance matrices. 
 
 The division of the sample based on the relative prediction accuracy of the 
tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis and the human value discriminant 
analysis resulted in 55 respondents for whom the human value discriminant analysis 
correctly predicted their most frequently visited destination but the tangible attribute 
importance discriminant could not (the human values group), 41 respondents that the 
tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis predicted their group membership 
but the human value discriminant did not (the tangible attribute importances group), 
40 respondents for whom both analyses predicted their group membership (the both 
group), and 51 respondents that neither predicted their group membership.   
 
The means on instrumental and terminal values for the first three groups are 
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reported in Figure 9 (beginning on page 253).  As speculating a pattern of 
preferences for the group for which both human values and tangible attribute 
importances predicted their most frequently visited destination is problematic, only 
the human value group and tangible attribute importance group are compared.  
Consistent with the propositions, for those individuals for whom the human value 
discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently visited holiday 
destination but the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis did not, 
terminal values were preferred to a greater extent than terminal values were preferred 
by those individuals for whom the tangible attribute importance discriminant 
analysis accurately predicted their most frequently visited holiday destination but the 
human value discriminant analysis did not (mean of 2.14 and SD of .16 versus mean 
of 2.05 and SD of .13, t=3.1, df=94, p<.01, one-tailed).  Conversely, for those 
individuals for whom the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis 
accurately predicted their most frequently visited holiday destination but the tangible 
attribute importance discriminant analysis did not, instrumental values were 
preferred to a greater extent than instrumental values were preferred by those 
individuals for whom the human value discriminant analysis accurately predicted 
their most frequently visited holiday destination but the tangible attribute importance 
discriminant analysis did not (mean of 2.01 and SD of .16 versus mean of 1.92 and 
SD of .14, t=-2.8, df=99, p<.01, one-tailed). 
 
Meat ConsumptionConsumptionConsumptionConsumption 
 
 For the meat product category, the separation of respondents into their most 
frequently consumed meat type resulted in 129 in the red meat group and 174 in the 
white meat group.  Those who consumed equal amounts of each were placed in the 
white meat group.  The first discriminant analysis entered the 13 human value factors 
to predict each individual’s most frequently consumed meat type, and yielded a 
significant function (Eigenvalue=.09, df=13, p<.05) that correctly predicted 62% of 
the group memberships, significantly better than chance (Press’s Q=17.6, p<.01). 
The Box’s M for the analysis (M=94.8, p=.50) is non-significant, indicating that the 
groups meet the requirement in discriminant analysis of equal co-variance matrices.  
The second discriminant analysis entered the 6 food tangible attribute importance 
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factors to product each individual’s most frequently consumed meat type, and 
resulted in a significant function (Eigenvalue=.05, df=12, p<.05) that predicted 61% 
of the group memberships, significantly better than chance (Press’s Q=14.8, p<.01). 
The Box’s M for the analysis (M=15.4, p=.82) is non-significant, indicating that the 
groups meet the requirement in discriminant analysis of equal co-variance matrices. 
The division of the sample based on the relative prediction accuracy of the tangible 
attribute importance discriminant analysis and the human value discriminant analysis 
resulted in 58 respondents for whom the human value discriminant analysis correctly 
predicted their most frequently consumed meat type but the tangible attribute 
importance discriminant could not (the human values group), 56 respondents that the 
tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis predicted their group membership 
but the human value discriminant did not (the tangible attribute importances group), 
129 respondents for whom both analyses predicted their group membership (the both 
group), and 60 respondents that neither predicted their group membership.   
 
The means on instrumental and terminal values for the first three groups are 
reported in Figure 9 (beginning on page 253).  As speculating a pattern of 
preferences for the group for which both human values and tangible attribute 
importances predicted their most frequently visited destination is problematic, only 
the human value group and tangible attribute importance group are compared.  
Contrary to the propositions, for those individuals for whom the human value 
discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently consumed meat type 
but the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis did not, terminal values 
were preferred to same the extent that terminal values were preferred by those 
individuals for whom the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis 
accurately predicted their most frequently consumed meat type but the human value 
discriminant analysis did not (mean of 2.09 and SD of .16 versus mean of 2.11 and 
SD of .14, t=-.6, df=112 p=.27, one-tailed).  Likewise, for those individuals for 
whom the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis accurately predicted 
their most frequently consumed meat type but the tangible attribute importance 
discriminant analysis did not, instrumental values were preferred to the same extent 
that instrumental values were preferred by those individuals for whom the human 
value discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently consumed 
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meat type but the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis did not (mean 
of 1.96 and SD of .15 versus mean of 1.98 and SD of .16, t=.5, df=112, p=.32, one-
tailed). 
 
 Overall, the examination of instrumental and terminal values showed that the 
preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning 
and an affective judgement is greater for the group that prefers instrumental values to 
terminal values, and that the preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal 
judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement is weaker for the group 
that prefers terminal values to instrumental values.  The results of the discriminant 
analyses and related procedures for automobile and overseas holidaying are 
consistent with the propositions that for those individuals for whom the human value 
discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently purchased product 
class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis did not, terminal 
values should be preferred to a greater extent than terminal values are preferred by 
those individuals for whom the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis 
accurately predicted their most frequently purchased product class but the human 
value discriminant analysis did not.  Conversely, for those individuals for whom the 
tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most 
frequently purchased product class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant 
analysis did not, instrumental values should be preferred to a greater extent than 
instrumental values are preferred by those individuals for whom the human value 
discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently purchased product 
class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis did not.  Why the 
pattern did not emerge in meat consumption is uncertain but possible causes are 
reviewed in the discussion section. 
 251
 
Automobile Condition
3
4
5
6
7
Utilitarian and Piecemeal Symbolic and Affective
Terminal Group
Instrumental Group
 
 
 
Sunglasses Condition
3
4
5
6
7
Utilitarian and Piecemeal Symbolic and Affective
Terminal Group
Instrumental Group
 
 
 
 
_____ 
Figure 8.  Means of meaning and judgement scales for groups formed according 
to instrumental and terminal value preference. 
 
Note: Scale of 1-7, “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”. 
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Table 28.  Summary of Multiple Rs from regressing tangible attribute importances 
and instrumental and terminal human values onto product preferences. 
 
 
INSTRUMENTAL VALUES       
  TWO-BLOCK REGRESSION   
 
 
PRODUCT 
PREFERENCE 
  
Tangible 
Attribute 
Importances 
 
 
Human 
Values 
 
 
Change 
In R 
  
Human 
Values 
Only 
 HVs via 
Tangible 
Attribute 
Importances t 
         
Automobile 
Ownership 
        
  Smaller Cars  .47 *** .49 *** .02 .21  .19 
  Larger Cars  .41 *** .44 *** .03 .16 .13 
  Luxury Cars  .22 * .32 ** .10* .24 * .14 
       
Overseas Holidaying       
  Major Cities  .27 * .34 * .07 .21 .14 
  Prestige and Structure  .30 ** .37 *** .07 .28 * .21 
  Safe and Tropical  .23 .29 .07 .17 .10 
       
Meat Consumption       
  Red Meat  .18  .30 ** .12 * .27 ** .15 
  White Meat  .16 .24  .08 .16 .08 
         
 
 
TERMINAL VALUES        
  TWO-BLOCK REGRESSION   
 
 
PRODUCT 
PREFERENCE 
  
Tangible 
Attribute 
Importances 
 
 
Human 
Values 
 
 
Change 
In R 
  
Human 
Values 
Only 
 HVs via 
Tangible 
Attribute 
Importances t 
         
Automobile 
Ownership 
        
  Smaller Cars  .47 *** .49 *** .02 .19   .17 
  Larger Cars  .41 *** .43 *** .02 .20  .18 
  Luxury Cars  .22 * .28 * .06 .21  .15 
        
Overseas Holidaying        
  Major Cities  .27 * .31 .04 .20  .16 
  Prestige and Structure  .30 ** .31 .01 .16  .15 
  Safe and Tropical  .23 .26 .03 .16  .13 
        
Meat Consumption        
  Red Meat  .18  .29 * .11 * .25 *  .14 
  White Meat  .16 .24  .08 .16  .08 
         
Notes: 
 *     p<.05 
 **  p<.01 
 ***  p<.001 
 t   = test of significance unavailable. 
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_____ 
Figure 9.  Average instrumental and terminal value preferences for groups 
formed according to the ability of human values and tangible attribute 
importances to predict automobile ownership, overseas holidaying and meat 
consumption. 
 
Notes:  
 Scale of human value preference 1-3, “Least Important” to “Most Important”. 
 HV Group = Human values discriminant analysis correctly predicted their product purchase 
but tangible attribute importances discriminant analysis did not. (automobile ownership n=37) 
(overseas holidaying n=55) (meat types n=129) 
  HV and TAI Group = Both human values discriminant analysis and tangible attribute 
 importances discriminant analysis correctly predicted their product purchase. (automobile 
ownership n=59) (overseas holidaying n=40) (meat types n=129) 
  TAI Group = Tangible attribute importances discriminant analysis correctly predicted their 
 product purchase but tangible attribute importances discriminant analysis did not. (automobile 
 n=64) (overseas holidaying n=41) (meat types n=56). 
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_____ 
Figure 9.  Average instrumental and terminal value preferences for groups 
formed according to the ability of human values and tangible attribute 
importances to predict automobile ownership, overseas holidaying and meat 
consumption (continued). 
 
Notes:  
 Scale of human value preference 1-3, “Least Important” to “Most Important”. 
 HV Group = Human values discriminant analysis correctly predicted their product purchase 
but tangible attribute importances discriminant analysis did not. (automobile ownership n=37) 
(overseas holidaying n=55) (meat types n=129) 
  HV and TAI Group = Both human values discriminant analysis and tangible attribute 
 importances discriminant analysis correctly predicted their product purchase. (automobile 
ownership n=59) (overseas holidaying n=40) (meat types n=129) 
  TAI Group = Tangible attribute importances discriminant analysis correctly predicted their 
 product purchase but tangible attribute importances discriminant analysis did not. (automobile 
 n=64) (overseas holidaying n=41) (meat types n=56). 
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 DISCUSSION 
 
The discussion briefly reviews each finding and their support for the 
propositions, and the next chapter presents a more thorough critique of the 
propositions and findings, and integrates the results of all four studies.   
 
 With Study 2 having shown that individuals tend to prefer the same meanings 
and judgements for both automobiles and sunglasses, Analysis One only examined 
whether individuals also tended to apply their human values through the same route.  
Analysis One found that the Residual Method employed in Study 3 to examine the 
product meaning approach hypothesis did tend to place individuals into the same 
value influence group for Smaller Family Cars, Larger Family Cars and possibly 
sunglasses though the small number of respondents owning both cars and sunglasses 
limited the powers of the tests.  Thus, whilst one could claim that Study 2’s finding 
of cross-product consistency in meaning and judgement preference was due to the 
participant rating the sunglasses meaning and judgement items to appear consistent 
with his or her responses to the automobile meaning and judgement items, such a 
critique could not explain Analysis One’s finding that individuals tended to use the 
same value influence routes because individuals were placed into groups based on 
whether, compared with other individuals, the direct or indirect influence of human 
values more accurately predicted their product ownerships.  The relativity of the 
group formation meant that each respondent had little direct control over which 
group he or she was placed. 
 
As mentioned, the strongest cross-product consistency in value influence routes 
was found when comparing products within the same categories (e.g., Smaller 
Family Cars and Larger Family Cars) and the weakest cross-product consistency was 
found when comparing products in different categories (e.g., Smaller Family Cars 
and sunglasses, and Larger Family Cars and sunglasses).  Whilst the small number of 
respondents owning both cars and sunglasses could have limited the statistical power 
of the tests made across product categories, an alternative explanation, is the fact that 
Smaller Family Cars and Larger Family Cars are similar products and so cross-
product consistency should be high, whereas cars and sunglasses are dissimilar and 
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therefore the low consistency is expected.  Nevertheless, whether the low cross-
product consistency was due to the dissimilarity of cars and sunglasses or to the 
small number of respondents owning both, the cross-product consistency found 
between Smaller Family Cars and Larger Family Cars is certain, as is the cross-
product consistency in meaning and judgement preferences.  Thus, support was 
found for the reasoning that if human values inform consumer choices then the 
abstractness and generality of human values would result in product preferences that 
are relatively consistent across products not only in how they reinforce important 
values but also their meanings, judgements and routes of influence.   
 
 Analysis Two examined the proposition that greater psychological identification 
with a product is a feature of an expressive psychological function and therefore is 
associated with the direct influence of human values.  Red meat consumption was the 
only product investigated due to red meat’s strong tie to gender identity and 
dominance values and Study 1 showing that red meat consumption was strongly and 
directly influenced by human values.  Those individuals who do not identify with red 
meat or do so moderately should consume red meat based on an inspection of its 
tangible attributes such as nutritional qualities, whereas those individuals who 
strongly identify with red meat should consume it based on its symbolic meaning and 
ability to express and reinforce their self-concepts and identities.  As expected, 
tangible attribute importances predicted red meat consumption more strongly for low 
meat identifiers than for high meat identifiers, and the indirect influence of human 
values (via tangible attribute importances) on red meat consumption was stronger for 
low meat identifiers than for high meat identifiers whereas the reverse was true for 
the direct influence of human values.  Despite the finding, evidence that greater 
product identification is a feature of the direct route of value influence is still 
marginal given that only one product was investigated and that a statistical 
replication of the Residual Method and Standard Method regression procedures 
failed to provide thoroughly consistent results.  Specifically, the Residual Method 
replicated the Standard Method results only once the middle third of identifiers was 
removed.  Whilst the Residual Method is superior to the Standard Method because 
the analyses are performed on a single sample and differences among individuals can 
be uncovered even when the absolute magnitude of prediction is low, the multitude 
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of regressions calculated does introduce some level of noise and therefore 
uncovering a pattern may only be possible when comparing the extreme ends of a 
scale. 
 
Analysis Three examined the proposition that greater value relevance is a feature 
of an expressive psychological function and therefore is associated with the direct 
influence of human values.  One index of value relevance was the number of human 
values the respondents listed in two open-ended questions about the human values 
important to themselves or what they believed are important to New Zealanders but 
that are not listed in the Rokeach Value Survey.  The analysis showed that, for both 
automobile and sunglasses meaning and judgement preferences, those individuals 
who scored higher on that index of value relevance also preferred symbolic meaning 
and an affective judgement to utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement, and 
that those individuals who scored lower in value relevance preferred utilitarian 
meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement.   
 
 Nevertheless, an alternative explanation is that the number of human values 
respondents listed in the open-ended questions is not measuring value relevance, but 
rather, those individuals preferring symbolic meaning and an affective judgement 
have human value preferences that are not included in the Rokeach Value Survey, 
and that those individuals preferring utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement 
have human value preferences that are adequately represented in the Rokeach Value 
Survey.  However, those individuals who listed a greater number of values in the 
open-ended questions also tended to prefer terminal values to instrumental values, 
and those individuals who listed fewer values preferred instrumental values to 
terminal values.  Therefore, if the alternative explanation was correct, then a 
preference for terminal values to instrumental values should not be associated with 
any other measure of value relevance.  In contrast, a subsequent analysis showed that 
those individuals preferring terminal values to instrumental values also tended to rate 
all human values (both instrumental and terminal combined) more highly, and that 
those individuals preferring instrumental values to terminal values tended to rate all 
human values as less important.  Thus, a preference for terminal values is associated 
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with a greater importance of the Rokeach Value Survey items and the listing of more 
values in the open-ended questions, which suggests that the number of human values 
listed in the open-ended questions is measuring value relevance, and that greater 
value relevance is associated with a preference for symbolic meaning and an 
affective judgement to utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement, whereas 
lesser value relevance is associated with a preference for utilitarian meaning and a 
piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement.  Given that 
Study 3 showed that meaning and judgement preferences are associated with the 
direct and indirect influences of human values in the direction hypothesised in the 
product meaning approach, the conclusion that greater value relevance is a feature of 
the direct route of value influence seems reasonable. 
 
 Analysis Four examined the propositions that instrumental human values serve 
an instrumental psychological function and therefore a preference for instrumental 
values should be associated with the indirect influence of human values, and that 
terminal human values serve an expressive psychological function and therefore a 
preference for terminal values should be associated with the direct influence of 
human values.  Results showed that whether consumers were indicating their 
meaning and judgement preferences for automobiles or sunglasses, instrumental 
values were associated with a stronger preference for utilitarian meaning and a 
piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement, whereas 
terminal values were associated with a weaker preference for utilitarian meaning and 
a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement.  The results 
also showed that instrumental and terminal values do not appear to influence product 
preference through separate routes.  Rather, individuals with a relative preference for 
terminal values tend to apply all their values (both instrumental and terminal) 
directly and those with a relative preference for instrumental values tend to apply all 
their values indirectly.  Specifically, for those individuals for whom the human value 
discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently purchased product 
class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis did not, terminal 
values were preferred to a greater extent than terminal values are preferred by those 
individuals for whom the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis 
accurately predicted their most frequently purchased product class but the human 
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value discriminant analysis did not.  Conversely, for those individuals for whom the 
tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most 
frequently purchased product class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant 
analysis did not, instrumental values were preferred to a greater extent than 
instrumental values are preferred by those individuals for whom the human value 
discriminant analysis accurately predicted their most frequently purchased product 
class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis did not. 
 
However, the conclusion that individuals with a relative preference for terminal 
values tend to apply all their values (both instrumental and terminal) directly and 
those with a relative preference for instrumental values tend to apply all their values 
indirectly is tentative for two reasons.  First and most important, the discriminant 
analyses did not partial out the direct and indirect influences of human values on 
product ownership.  The discriminant analysis that was meant to represent the direct 
route of human values entered human values to predict each individual’s most 
frequently purchased product class, whereas the discriminant analysis that was meant 
to represent the indirect route of human values entered tangible attribute importances 
to predict each individual’s most frequently purchased product class.  Theoretically 
at least, the relative ability of an individual’s tangible attribute importances and 
human values to predict his or her product preference should be similar, but not 
identical, to the relative ability of his or her indirect and direct influences of human 
values, though verification of such a claim is not possible. 
 
 A second reason the conclusion that individuals with a relative preference for 
terminal values tend to apply all their values (both instrumental and terminal) 
directly and those with a relative preference for instrumental values tend to apply all 
their values indirectly is tentative is that the relationship was found for automobile 
ownership and overseas holidaying, but not for meat consumption.  A possible cause 
for the meat consumption result may have been that the symbolic meaning of red 
meat interacted with instrumental and terminal value preferences.  For automobiles 
and overseas holidaying, instrumental values would likely be associated with the 
indirect route of value influence because instrumental values represent the 
individuals’ preference for a wide range of “actions” and the utilitarian meanings of 
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automobiles and overseas holiday destinations probably refer to each product’s 
ability to control and manipulate the environment.  Thus, the action represented in 
instrumental values is matched with the action in the utilitarian meanings of these 
products.  Red meat, however, cannot manipulate and control the environment 
because it simply satisfies an internal need, and therefore, the control and 
manipulation of the environment instrumental values usually show are not in red 
meat’s utilitarian meaning, but in its symbolic.  Most simply, red meat symbolises 
control and manipulation of the environment because the initial procurement of red 
meat, that is, the killing of animals, requires control and manipulation in the extreme 
senses of the words (e.g., Adams, 1990, 1994; Fiddes, 1989; Twigg, 1983).  Thus, if 
the control and manipulation of the environment that utilitarian meaning usually 
represents is contained in red meat’s symbolic meaning rather than its utilitarian, 
then the usual association between instrumental values and utilitarian meaning (and 
terminal values and symbolic meaning) may be reversed or cancelled.   
 
 Though a definitive statement cannot be made about the legitimacy of that 
explanation of why instrumental and terminal values were not associated with the 
direct and indirect influences of human values on meat consumption, one assessment 
can be made that would shed some light on the interpretation.  If red meat differs 
from the automobile classes, the overseas holiday destinations, and possibly from 
white meat, by its symbolic meaning referring to the control and manipulation of the 
environment to which instrumental values attune, then the owners and consumers of 
the respective products should have specific instrumental and terminal value 
preferences; the groups formed according to their most frequently purchased car 
class should not differ in their instrumental and terminal value preferences, nor 
should the groups formed according to their most frequently visited holiday 
destination.  However, the groups formed according to their meat consumption 
should differ, with heavy consumers of red meat preferring instrumental values more 
than heavy consumers of white meat.   
 
The instrumental and terminal value preferences of the groups are presented in 
Table 29 (on page 262).  As expected, the three automobile class groups do not differ 
in their instrumental and terminal value preferences, nor do the three holiday 
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destination groups.  However, those individuals consuming more red meat than white 
meat prefer instrumental values more than those individuals consuming more white 
meat than red meat.  Similarly, those individuals consuming more white meat than 
red meat should prefer terminal values more than those individuals consuming more 
red meat than white meat.  However, caution is warranted in interpreting the results 
given that the power of the meat type test is much stronger than the power of the 
automobiles and overseas holidaying tests (see final column in table).  Nevertheless, 
it does appear that red meat, or any product with action-oriented symbolic meaning, 
does not make a good specimen for using the instrumental and terminal dichotomy to 
illustrate the instrumental and expressive functions of the indirect and direct routes.  
Beyond the suggestion, however, other implications are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
The pulling together of these diversified findings and those of Studies 1, 2 and 3 
is undertaken in the next chapter. 
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Table 29.  Instrumental and terminal value preferences for groups formed according 
to most frequently purchased product classes. 
 
 
 
    
 Most Frequently Purchased Automobile Class  
 
Value 
Preferences 
 
Smaller Family 
Cars (n=136) 
Larger 
Family Cars 
(n=66) 
 
Luxury Cars 
(n=20) 
 
 
Test of Difference     Power 
     
Instrumental 1.96 1.97 1.97 F(2,219)=.18, p=.84       .08 
Terminal  2.11 2.09 2.12 F(2,219)=.56, p=.57       .145 
     
 
 
    
 Most Frequently Visited Holiday Destination   
 
Value 
Preferences 
 
Major Cities 
(n=137) 
Prestige and 
Structure 
(n=10) 
Safe and 
Tropical 
(n=40) 
 
 
Test of Difference     Power 
     
Instrumental 1.96 1.99 1.95 F(2,184)=.22, p=.80        .088 
Terminal 2.11 2.08 2.11 F(2,184)=.13, p=.88        .071 
     
 
 
    
 Most Frequently Consumed Meat Type  
 
Value 
Preferences 
 
Red Meat  
(n=129) 
 
White Meat 
(n=174) 
  
 
Test of Difference     Power 
     
Instrumental 1.99 1.95  t=2.1, df=301, p<05,        .69 
  one-tail 
Terminal 2.08 2.11  t=-1.8, df=301, p<05,       .49 
  one-tail 
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CHAPTER VIII.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 The current chapter first reviews the main hypotheses of the attribute-mediation 
approach and product meaning approach and their examinations in Studies 1-3, then 
reviews the various propositions and their investigations in Study 4, and finally, 
outlines the conceptual model’s qualifications, limitations and implications for 
human value theory and consumer research. 
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND RESULTS OF STUDIES 1-3 
 
 The traditional approach to the influences of human values on consumer choices 
(e.g., Scott and Lamont’s (1973), Gutman’s (1982) and Lindberg, Garling and 
Montgomery’s (1989) attribute-mediation approach) and the product meaning 
approach were examined over three studies; Study 1 found that the attribute-
mediation approach could not fully account for the influence of human values on 
product preference (Hypothesis 1) and that the inability was greatest for products, 
such as red meat and overseas holiday destinations, that are likely assessed on their 
intangible attributes of symbolic meanings and aesthetics (Hypothesis 2).  The 
second and third studies tested whether the two routes of value influence uncovered 
in Study 1, that is, the route proposed in the attribute-mediation approach and the 
alternative, direct route, result from consumers evaluating different product 
meanings and making different types of judgements.  Study 2 developed scales that 
measure the general publics’ product meaning and judgement preferences, and Study 
3 associated the meaning and judgement preferences with the influence of human 
values on the ownerships of automobiles and sunglasses; confirming the product 
meaning approach hypothesis that a consumer’s preference for utilitarian meaning 
and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement was 
greater when his or her human values have an indirect influence on product 
preference (e.g., via the importance of the product’s tangible attributes) than when 
his or her human values have a direct influence. 
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 Despite Study 3’s support for the product meaning approach hypothesis, the 
overall design of that study rested on the observation from Study 2 that consumers 
tended to prefer the same type of meaning and judgement for both automobiles and 
sunglasses.  Study 3 instructed respondents to indicate their preferred meanings and 
judgements for “products in general”, and therefore to link the preferences to the 
direct and indirect influences of human values on the ownership of cars and 
sunglasses, the general meaning and judgement preferences were assumed to 
translate to specific consumer behaviours.  Thus, a major limitation of Study 3 was 
not obtaining meaning and judgement preferences at the time of actual product 
evaluation and purchase.  One could claim that the meaning judgement preferences 
consumers used when selecting their current cars and sunglasses differ from those 
stated in the survey.  After all, the survey was completed some time after the actual 
purchase.  Consequently, whether meaning and judgement preferences are being 
applied in these specific contexts cannot be certain. 
 
 One way to be satisfied that meaning and judgement preferences affect how 
human values influence product preference is to experimentally isolate and 
manipulate the kind of product meaning to which consumers attend and the kind of 
judgement they make, and then gauge how that manipulation affects the strengths of 
the value influence routes.  As reviewed in Chapter IV, some experimental studies 
have isolated and manipulated the kind of product meaning to which consumers 
attend and examined how that manipulation affected the relationship between 
attribute importances and product preference or affected the relationship between 
attitudes and product preference (e.g., Shavitt, 1990; Shavitt, Lowrey & Han, 1992; 
Snyder & DeBono, 1985; Spivey, Munson & Locander, 1983).  Spivey, Munson and 
Locander’s (1983) experiment, for example, showed that the attention to symbolic 
meaning was associated with the increased influence of intangible attribute 
importances (e.g., each consumer’s preferred product images) on product preference 
whereas the attention to utilitarian meaning was associated with the increased 
influence of tangible attribute importances on product preference.  Thus, given the 
existing experimental evidence, a future study of human values that manipulated the 
kind of product meaning to which consumers attend might show that the attention to 
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utilitarian meaning results in the increased influence of tangible attribute 
importances on product preference and that human values influence those tangible 
attribute importances, and that the attention to symbolic meaning results in the 
increased direct influence of human values given that intangible attributes closely tie 
human values and product preference.   
 
 However, as discussed in Chapter IV, such potential experimental evidence 
would be of limited benefit.  Only the less important issue of whether product 
meaning (or judgement) affects the routes of value influence would be addressed; 
what would not be addressed is whether human values are, in fact, influencing 
tangible attribute importances, product preference and the attention to product 
meaning.  To show that human values cause another component human values must 
be manipulated so that changes in tangible attribute importances, meaning and 
judgement preferences and product preferences can be observed.  The requirement, 
however, is the crux of the problem; few experimental methods can manipulate an 
individual’s human value preferences.  The most well-established of the methods is 
Rokeach’s (1973) value self-confrontation procedure that informs participants that 
two of their important values are logically inconsistent and are different from those 
of an important reference group.  Rokeach argues that the information creates a state 
of self-dissatisfaction, and that consequently participants will alter one of their 
values to make it consistent with the other human value and to the human values of 
the reference group.  Moreover, participants alter specific attitudes and behaviours to 
bring them in line with the new human value importance.  Nevertheless, the value 
self-confrontation procedure is unsuitable for the investigation of the product 
meaning approach to value influence because the motivations aroused in the 
procedure (e.g., social approval and self-consistency) would interact with the value 
influence routes, that is, the value self-confrontation procedure would probably be 
successful in manipulating the values of those individuals attending to symbolic 
meaning, holding an expressive psychological function, and following the direct 
route, but would have little success for those individuals attending to the utilitarian 
meaning, holding an instrumental psychological function, and following the indirect 
route.  Given that Study 1 showed the indirect route was the predominant mode, the 
value self-confrontation procedure can apparently only manipulate the human values 
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of a small subset of participants.  
 
 Thus, future research should develop a method that can experimentally isolate 
and manipulate the human values of most participants, and use that method to test 
the product meaning approach to value influence.  The development of such an 
experimental product to test of product meaning approach is perhaps the most 
important direction for further research because the evidence produced in Studies 1-
3, as correlational evidence, is sound correlational evidence for several reasons.  
Firstly, though Studies 1 and 3 differed in their level of analysis each yielded similar 
results.  Study 1 found that products assumed to be assessed primarily on their 
tangible attributes were most strongly influenced by the indirect route of human 
values whereas products assumed to be assessed on their intangible attributes of 
symbolic meaning and aesthetics were most strongly influenced by the direct route of 
human values.  Similarly, Study 3 found that the preference for utilitarian meaning 
(located in tangible attributes) and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning (an 
intangible attribute) and an affective judgement was greater when human values had 
an indirect influence (via tangible attribute importances) on product preference than 
when human values had a direct influence.  Thus, whether at the level of the product 
or at the level of the individual, Studies 1 and 3 showed that the indirect route 
corresponds to the evaluation of tangible attributes and the direct route to the 
evaluation of intangible attributes such as symbolic meaning. 
 
 A second reason the correlational evidence produced in Studies 1-3 is sound 
correlational evidence is that Feldman and Lynch’s (1988) “consistency” argument is 
not very germane.  Feldman and Lynch argue that an association found between 
attitudes and behaviour could be due to participants completing the behaviour 
measure simply to appear consistent with their responses to the attitude measure.  
However, such a bias is most likely to occur when the behaviour is measured on a 
metric scale, and so is only possible in the meat consumption section of Study 1 and 
the sunglasses section of Study 3.  Respondents listing a make and model of an 
automobile they do not own or holiday destinations they have never visited seem 
implausible.  Moreover, participants responding to the human value and tangible 
attribute importance measures simply to appear consistent with their product 
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ownerships also seems unlikely, for to explain the pattern of results shown in Study 3 
it would have to be concluded that half the participants rated both tangible attribute 
importances and human values to appear consistent with their product ownerships 
whereas the other half rated only human values to appear consistent with their 
product ownerships.  Additionally, the former group would, coincidentally, have 
rated utilitarian meaning and piecemeal judgement more highly and the latter group 
symbolic meaning and affective judgement more highly.  Each of these 
improbabilities implies, though not definitively, that the association found among 
human values, tangible attribute importances, product preference and meaning and 
judgement preferences is not an artefact of the survey method but is instead 
indicative of consumers’ cognitive structures. 
 
 A third reason the correlational evidence produced in Studies 1-3 is sound 
correlational evidence is that unlike an experimental design the survey method 
allowed the broadest range of phenomena to be considered.  The broad range was 
encouraged by using comprehensive lists of human values and tangible attribute 
importances and by indexing product preference as actual product purchase and 
ownership.  The latter not only encouraged a naturalistic investigation but also a 
stringent one by requiring from consumers more than an indication of their product 
attitude or liking, but a commitment of their resources such as money, time to 
purchase, and so on.  Using participants from the general population also encouraged 
a broad range of phenomena, with the demographic characteristics of each sample 
being diverse.  Taken together, Studies 1-3 surveyed 702 members of the public. 
 
 A final reason the correlational evidence produced in Studies 1-3 is sound 
correlational evidence is that most associations were found for more than one 
product.  For instance, in Study 1, the acceptance of the attribute-mediation approach 
hypotheses was due to a consistent pattern of relations emerging across eight product 
classes, and in Study 3 the acceptance of the product meaning approach hypothesis 
was due to the same pattern of relations emerging within each of three product 
classes.  Moreover, most components, that is, human values, tangible attribute 
importances, product preference and meaning and judgement preferences, were 
associated with more than one other component.  The coverage is most plain in the 
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summary figures in Chapter VII (see Figure 6 and Figure 7 on pages 213 and 214).  
For instance, in Study 2, meaning and judgement preferences were associated with 
each other, in Study 3, meaning and judgement preferences were associated with the 
value influence routes, and in Study 4, meaning and judgement preferences were 
associated with preferences for instrumental and terminal values and value relevance.  
Similarly, in Study 1, the value influence routes were examined by themselves, in 
Study 3, the value influence routes were associated with meaning and judgement 
preferences, and in Study 4, the value influence routes were associated with product 
identification and instrumental and terminal value preferences. 
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND RESULTS OF STUDY 4 
 
 Besides modelling the cognitive structure through which human values operate 
when consumers attend to utilitarian and symbolic meanings and make piecemeal 
and affective judgements, several propositions were made that consumers have a 
cross-product tendency to prefer the same meanings, judgements and routes of value 
influence, and that each route of value influence serves a specific psychological 
function.  Concerning the latter, the propositions were made that when consumers 
attend to symbolic meaning and directly apply their human values, the application 
serves an expressive psychological function (e.g., social approval or self-
consistency), and hence should be associated with greater psychological 
identification with the product, greater importance assigned to human values overall 
(e.g., value relevance), and a preference to terminal values to instrumental values.  
Conversely, when consumers attend to utilitarian meaning and indirectly apply their 
human values via tangible attribute importances, the application serves an 
instrumental psychological function (e.g., utility maximisation and control of the 
environment), and hence should be associated with weaker psychological 
identification with the product, weaker value relevance, and a preference for 
instrumental values to terminal values. 
 
 Regarding the cross-product consistency proposition, Study 2 found that 
consumers tended to prefer the same meaning and judgement for both automobiles 
and sunglasses, and Study 4 found that consumers tended to use the same route of 
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value influence for automobiles and sunglasses, though the certainty of that 
conclusion was restricted by the low statistical power of the tests.  Study 4 also found 
that tangible attribute importances and the indirect route of value influence more 
accurately predicted the red meat consumption of weak meat identifiers than high 
meat identifies, whereas the direct route of value influence more accurately predicted 
the red meat consumption of high meat identifiers than weak meat identifiers.  
Nevertheless, support for the proposition that high product identification is a feature 
of the direct route of value influence is still marginal given that only one product was 
investigated and that a statistical replication of the Residual Method and Standard 
Method failed to provide identical results.   
 
 Study 4 also found that higher scores on the value relevance indices were 
associated with preferences for symbolic meaning, an affective judgement, and 
terminal values, and that lower value relevance scores were associated with 
preferences for utilitarian meaning, a piecemeal judgement, and instrumental values.  
Moreover, careful consideration of possible alternative interpretations of the value 
relevance measures suggested that the value relevance measures are indeed 
measuring “value relevance”.  Study 4 also found that a preference for instrumental 
values was associated with a stronger preference for utilitarian meaning and a 
piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective judgement, whereas a 
preference for terminal values was associated with a weaker preference for utilitarian 
meaning and a piecemeal judgement to symbolic meaning and an affective 
judgement.  Additionally, Study 4 found that instrumental and terminal values do not 
appear to operate through separate routes, but that individuals who prefer 
instrumental values to terminal values tend to apply all their values (both 
instrumental and terminal) indirectly whereas those who prefer terminal values to 
instrumental values tend to apply all their values directly.  The pattern was found for 
automobiles and overseas holidaying but contrary to expectations did not emerge for 
meat consumption, possibly due to red meat’s action and dominance symbolism (a 
possibility that will be re-addressed shortly).   
 
 Overall, though psychological function was not the primary focus of the current 
thesis, the support of the propositions does suggest that the indirect route serves an 
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instrumental psychological function and the direct route serves an expressive 
psychological function.  However, the support is only suggestive because the 
investigation was insufficient, not only for the reasons mentioned in the preceding 
paragraphs, but more crucially, because the investigation failed to directly examine 
the needs and motivations that underlie the psychological functions.  The 
instrumental psychological function indicates that the product or other object fulfils 
the user’s need to control his or her environment efficiently and effectively, whereas 
the expressive psychological function indicates that the product fulfils the user’s 
need to express his or her self-concepts and identities, particularly his or her need for 
social-approval and self-consistency.  These needs and motivations were not 
examined directly or comprehensively.  Instead, possible indicators were relied on 
such as product identification, value relevance and instrumental and terminal values.  
Therefore, whether the needs and motivations underlie the indicators and the value 
influence routes cannot be certain. 
 
 As an example of a study that does examine the underlying needs, the readers 
may recall Beggan’s (1991) experiment that induced control deprivation on 
participants and found that those who generally felt in control their environment 
(e.g., had a high internal locus of control) increased the importance of possessions 
that give control, whereas the inducement of control deprivation did not affect the 
importance of possessions for those participants with an external locus of control.  
Thus, that kind of association of the need for control with product preference allows 
the safe conclusion that the increase in the importance of possessions for internal 
locus of control participants shows that the possessions serve an instrumental 
psychological function.  In contrast, the studies in the current thesis merely 
associated product preference with utilitarian meaning, which presumably signals 
that the product serves a need for control (and associated product preference with 
symbolic meaning, which presumably signals that the product serves a need for self-
consistency or social approval). 
 
 Despite exceptional studies like Beggan’s (1991), most previous studies of the 
psychological functions of attitudes or of the value-attitude-behaviour system have 
not directly investigated the underlying needs and motivations.  Instead, researchers 
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tend to assume that the psychological functions underlying attitudes or the value-
attitude-behaviour system are the same as those underlying self-monitoring (e.g., 
Mellema & Bassili, 1995; Snyder & DeBono, 1985), product meanings (e.g., 
Prentice, 1987; Spivey, Munson & Locander, 1983), certain kinds of appeals (e.g., 
Maio & Olsen, 1995) or the individual’s written thoughts (e.g., Maio & Olsen, 1994; 
Shavitt, Lowrey & Han, 1992).  Study 4 is an improvement on those studies for 
several reasons.  The first is that Study 4 assessed the psychological functions with 
constructs that are (somewhat) conceptually related to the functions, such as product 
identification, value relevance, and to a lesser extent, instrumental and terminal 
values.  For instance, the studies of Mellema and Bassili (1995) and Snyder and 
DeBono (1985) used self-monitoring an indicator of psychological function but self-
monitoring is so far removed from the psychological function it presumably 
represents that even the researchers disagree about the psychological functions 
underpinning it. 
 
 A second reason Study 4 is an improvement on previous studies of the 
psychological functions of attitudes or of the value-attitude-behaviour system is 
multiple indicators of the psychological functions were used: value relevance, 
product identification, and instrumental and terminal values.  The relations of the 
indicators to the direct and indirect influences of human values on product 
preference and to meaning and judgement preferences were not only in the 
anticipated directions, they were also consistent with each other.  For instance, a 
stronger preference for terminal values was associated with higher scores on the 
value relevance measures and with the direct route of value influence, the latter of 
which was associated with greater identification with the product.  Thus, greater 
stronger product identification, stronger value relevance and a preference for 
terminal values are probably measuring the same underlying construct, possibly an 
expressive psychological function.  The same consistency was also found for 
instrumental values, weaker value relevance, weaker product identification and the 
indirect route of human values.   
 
 A final reason Study 4 is an improvement on previous studies of psychological 
function and product preference is that an instrumental attitude was operationalised 
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as tangible attribute importances, which consequently is a real representation of the 
attitude object.  The readers may recall that Prentice (1987) was unable to establish 
that the instrumental psychological function spans the breadth of the value-attitude-
behaviour system, possibly because she measured an instrumental attitude on a 
semmantic-differencial scale of the object’s real and unreal attributes, when more 
likely, an instrumental function is founded in consumer concerns about the product’s 
real and tangible rewards and costs. 
 
FURTHER EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND ISSUES FOR CONCEPTUAL AND 
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Notwithstanding the support of the product meaning approach to value influence 
produced in Studies 1-4, before any firm confidence can be held in the approach 
further research needs to address four major methodological limitations of the studies 
carried out in the present thesis;  
 
• Future research should measure consumers’ meaning and judgement preferences 
at the time of actual product evaluation and purchase and determine whether 
these preferences are associated with the direct and indirect influences of human 
values on product preference. 
 
• Future research should associate meaning and judgement preferences more 
definitely with the value influence routes by manipulating the kinds of product 
meanings to which consumers attend and the kind of judgement they make, and 
then gauge the impact on the value influence routes. 
 
• Future research should examine directly the needs and motivations underlying 
the instrumental and expressive psychological functions and determine whether 
the needs underlie the value influence routes. 
 
• Most crucially, future research should establish a causal role for human values, if 
an appropriate method can be devised. 
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 Research addressing the methodological limitations of Studies 1-4 should also 
refine and qualify the conceptual framework of the product meaning approach.  
Given that one aim of the thesis was to develop a conceptual model that was broad 
enough to apply to most contexts, the consequence of that aim is that the model is 
ambiguous and overly simplistic in two areas; 1) the model’s elements and 
operational definitions, and 2) the model’s applicability and performance.  The 
remaining discussion is devoted primarily to these conceptual issues, followed by a 
short section on theoretical development.   
 
Issues for Conceptual Development 
 
 Most in need of clarification are the elements and levels of elements that play the 
pivotal roles in human values influencing product preference through two separate 
routes.  Conceivably, only one or two elements cause human values to operate 
through two routes and the other elements vary as a function of those elements.  For 
instance, the product meanings to which consumers attend may affect how the 
product is judged, the psychological function the product serves and the route 
through which human values operate.  Similarly, the conceptual model is founded in 
an assumption that the levels of the elements always occur together, that is, that 
utilitarian meaning is always located in tangible attributes evaluated with a 
piecemeal judgement and that serve an instrumental psychological function, whereas 
symbolic meaning is located in a particular configuration of tangible attributes 
evaluated in an affective judgement and that serve an expressive function.  The 
assumption is obviously overly general.  For example, whilst symbolic meaning may 
tend to be found on the product-whole and a particular configuration of tangible 
attributes, occasionally symbolic meaning may be found in independent, tangible 
attributes.  For items of jewellery, for example, the attribute of “14-karat gold” may 
have the same symbolic meaning no matter the jewellery’s other features.  The 
prospect, therefore, reveals another oversimplification upon which the conceptual 
model was founded; Holbrook and Moore’s (1981), Keaveney and Hunt’s (1992) and 
McCracken’s (1988) claim that intangible attributes such as symbolic meaning and 
aesthetics violate the assumption in expectancy-value theory that consumers evaluate 
each attribute one at a time.  Generally, when consumers evaluate a product’s 
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intangible attributes the product’s tangible attributes are consequently evaluated in a 
Gestalt-like, holistic judgement, but in instances when symbolic meaning is found in 
independent, tangible attributes, expectancy-value theory may adequately explain 
how consumers decide which products to purchase. 
 
 Due to these possible exceptions in how meaning, judgement and tangible and 
intangible attributes are related, further research should determine which elements 
and levels of elements are essential to the bifurcation of value influence.  Whilst such 
a determination might be made by re-analysing the data collected in Studies 1-4, an 
experimental procedure is preferable because it could more rigorously control the 
levels and presence of the elements and thus more precisely gauge their effect on the 
value influence routes.  The outcome of the experimentation and reduction of 
elements would be a more parsimonious conceptual model, but equally important, 
tighter operational definitions and distinctions among the elements and levels of 
elements would also be advanced.  Concerning these latter points, the rationale that 
formed the basis of much of the product meaning approach was the elements’ 
similarity and conceptual overlap; rationale that is most apparent in Figure 1 (on 
page 21).  The figure illustrates how human values influence product preference via 
tangible attribute importances when consumers attend to utilitarian meaning because 
tangible attribute importances and utilitarian meaning are conceptually similar; both 
are concrete, objective and means-oriented.  Similarly, human values influence 
product preference directly when consumers attend to symbolic meaning because 
symbolic meaning and human values are similar; both are abstract, subjective and 
affective.  However, now that the merit of the general approach has been empirically 
supported by the studies carried out for the thesis, differences among the elements 
and differences between the levels of elements should be more tightly defined.  A 
pertinent example of each is provided. 
 
 Two elements most in need of further differentiation in their operational 
definitions are psychological function and product meaning.  Chapter IV reviewed 
the wide range of research and theories concerning product meaning and attempted 
to draw a firm line with psychological function by emphasising that psychological 
function is a sub-feature of product meaning and that other sub-features were 
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content, location on the product, breath, affectivity, and so on.  Nevertheless, the 
attempt at demarcation was unsatisfactory, and one result was that the measures of 
product meaning preference implicitly measure psychological function preference.  
For instance, the symbolic meaning scale items of “To what extent would you want 
your chosen product to be: Most compatible with the image you have of yourself” 
and “I prefer a product that reflects who I am” not only measure the attention to 
symbolic meaning but also clearly measure an expressive psychological function.  
Thus, conceptual improvement of the model could be achieved by defining and 
measuring psychological function preference separately from product meaning 
preference, perhaps by measuring the needs and motivations underlying the functions 
(e.g., social approval, self-consistency, control of environment) instead of the 
consequences of those needs (e.g., consumers’ preferences for products that are 
consistent with the images they have of themselves or that they wish others to have 
of them). 
 
 The element with levels most in need of further clarification and differentiation 
is product meaning.  The distinction between utilitarian and symbolic meaning can 
be tenuous, not so much when contemplating extreme cases (e.g., family heirlooms 
versus hand tools), but rather when considering the many products with both 
utilitarian and symbolic meanings (e.g., automobiles, overseas holidays, etc.).  
Further conceptual research should address the issue more completely than addressed 
in the thesis, but a useful starting point is Kilbourne’s (1991) discrimination that “the 
term symbolic possession is not intended to imply that there is not symbolism in 
functional possession.  Rather it is intended here to refer to possession in which the 
symbolic takes precedence over the functional” (p.  450).   
 
 One analysis in Study 4 seems to provide a good illustration of Kilbourne’s 
(1991) distinction.  The readers might recall that the discriminant analyses taken to 
represent the direct and indirect influences of human values found that instrumental 
and terminal values do not appear to influence product preference through separate 
routes, but that individuals who preferred instrumental values to terminal values 
tended to apply all their values (both instrumental and terminal) indirectly whereas 
those who preferred terminal values to instrumental values tended to apply all their 
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values directly.  The pattern was found for automobiles and overseas holidaying but 
contrary to expectations did not emerge for meat consumption.  One interpretation 
offered for the meat result was that the action and dominance symbolism of red meat 
interacted with the value influence routes, that is, that the control and manipulation 
of the environment instrumental values usually indicate are not in red meat’s 
utilitarian meaning, but in its symbolic.  Red meat symbolises control and 
manipulation of the environment because the initial procurement of red meat (e.g., 
the killing of animals) requires control and manipulation in the extreme senses of the 
words (e.g., Adams, 1990, 1994; Fiddes, 1989; Twigg, 1983).  However, consumers’ 
procurement of red meat from grocery stores and restaurants does not require the 
control and manipulation of the environment in any substantial way, nor does red 
meat enable consumers to control and manipulate their environments, yet those 
meanings remain with red meat for reasons speculated by Adams (1990, 1994) and 
Fiddes (1989) (these reasons are outside the scope of the present thesis though the 
finding in Study 4 that instrumental values were preferred most by those consuming 
the greatest amount of red meat is consistent with the claim that red meat has action-
oriented symbolic meaning to which consumers attend and evaluate).  The central 
issue is that the reference to control and manipulation in red meat’s symbolic 
meaning, rather than its utilitarian meaning, suggests that red meat is more about 
thinking about action and control than it actually enables action and control.  Thus, at 
the point that “thinking about doing” is more important to consumers than “actually 
doing” the difference between utilitarian meaning and symbolic meaning is most 
visible.  Moreover, though red meat may have symbolic meanings that refer to action 
and control, the essential “state-ness” of symbolic meaning remains.  The readers 
might recall that a unique characteristic of symbolic meaning, in contrast to 
utilitarian meaning, is that symbolic meaning is not tied to product use or 
performance.  States of existence such as possessing, reflecting or displaying are 
enough to reap expressive benefits.  Thus, consumers can purchase red meat for its 
action and control symbolic meanings, but the benefits they obtain, aside from the 
physiological ones, arise from possessing, reflecting and displaying. 
 
 Besides clarifying the model’s elements and operational definitions, conceptual 
development of the product meaning approach should attempt to qualify the kinds of 
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products and consumers for whom the approach is most suited.  Perhaps the most 
critical limitation of the conceptual model and its investigation in Studies 1-4 is that 
the characteristics of the product that affect the direct and indirect influences of 
human values were not adequately taken into account.  For instance, Study 1 
examined the influences of human values on product preferences for a range of 
products, but the tangible and intangible characteristics of those products were only 
assumed from the assertions and findings of other researchers.  Study 2 did measure 
consumer preferences for the utilitarian and symbolic meanings of automobiles and 
sunglasses, but having only two products is insufficient for drawing any firm 
conclusions, and may have affected Study 3’s finding that consumers applying their 
human values through the indirect route did not differ in their overall levels of 
product ownerships from those consumers applying their human values through the 
direct route.  Clearly, more symbolic products exist than sunglasses (e.g., family 
heirlooms, photographs, etc.) and more utilitarian products exist than automobiles 
(e.g., tools, etc.), and therefore to expect that human values never influence 
preferences for some products through a particular route is unrealistic.   
 
 Consequently, an appropriate direction for further research is to define the 
parameters of the products that affect whether human values tend to influence 
product preference directly or indirectly.  One way such conceptual development 
could be achieved is Shavitt’s (1990) product classification procedure in which 
participants are instructed to write advertisements for a specific product.  Shavitt 
categorises the advertisements according to which psychological function they 
represent, but that procedure could be adapted easily to product meanings and 
possibly judgements.  Thus, with the parameters of each product clearly defined, the 
direct and indirect influences of human values on product preference could be neatly 
tied to the specific product characteristics associated with an increase in the strength 
of one route compared with the other, with the increase in the strengths of both 
routes, or with the decrease in the strengths of both routes.  Obviously, that hindmost 
outcome would have the most serious implications for a conceptual model that is not 
adequately context-specific, and would signal the need to investigate whether human 
values influence product preference through routes other than those outlined by the 
product meaning approach, or do not influence product preference at all for some 
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types of products. 
 
 Along with defining the parameters of the product that affect the applicability of 
the conceptual model, differences among individual consumers should be considered 
more fully.  The conceptual model did acknowledge some differences and proposed 
that consumers have a cross-product tendency to prefer the same meaning, 
judgement and route of value influence.  The rationale for that proposition was that if 
human value preferences inform consumer choices, then the abstractness and 
generality of human values would result in product preferences that are relatively 
consistent across products not only in how they reinforce important values but also 
their meanings, judgements and routes of influence.  Though Study 4 found support 
for that proposition, the rationale unpinning the proposition is still weak for it does 
not adequately address what human values are associated with each route, why those 
human values cause individuals to use a particular route, and why individuals differ 
in those human values.  An attempt was made at addressing the first question, such as 
Study 1’s finding that Maturity values (e.g., Inner Harmony, Self-respect, Broad-
minded, etc.) tended to influence product preference directly and were preferred by 
those individuals who tended to use the direct route, whereas security values (e.g., 
Family Security, National Security) were preferred by those individuals who tended 
to use the indirect route.  Likewise, Study 4 found that instrumental and terminal 
values do not appear to operate through separate routes, but rather that individuals 
preferring one type of value to the other, tend to all their values through a specific 
route.  Nevertheless, why maturity values, security values and instrumental and 
terminal values compel individuals to follow a particular route needs to be addressed 
further, both empirically and theoretically, as does why individuals differ in their 
support of those values. 
 
 A similar criticism can be made of the value relevance proposition; why do 
individuals differ in the extent they find human values overall important?  The topic 
is addressed by Wojciszke (1989) who, as discussed in Chapter I, argues that people 
vary in the extent they incorporate human values into their ideal self-concept.  In 
particular, those whom he terms “idealists” are characterised by their claim that they 
use human values more frequently to judge themselves and others and make 
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behavioural choices.  However, Wojciszke does not explain why individuals differ in 
the extent they incorporate human values into their ideal self-concept in the first 
instance.  The construct of value relevance is important for future research to address 
for two reasons.  The first is the fact that the human values measure used in the 
predictions of product ownerships (e.g., the Rokeach Value Survey) had a forced-
distribution response format, and therefore those individuals high in value relevance 
could not express their value relevance in their responses to the Rokeach Value 
Survey any more than those individuals low in value relevance could express their 
general preferences.  Nevertheless, the other indices of value relevance were 
associated with the direct influence of human values, which means that although 
individuals high in value relevance could not manifest that preference in their 
responses to the Rokeach Value Survey, their value ratings still predicted their 
product ownership directly better than individuals low in value relevance.  A second 
reason that the construct of value relevance is important for future research to 
address is that whilst value relevance is a quantitative variable, the effect it has on 
the value influence routes appears qualitative; with the increase of value relevance 
the individual’s preferred route shifts from the indirect route to the direct route.  The 
qualitative difference among individuals that the product meaning approach to value 
influence offers no explanation for, although unlike other consumer choice models 
such as expectancy-value theory, the product meaning approach does at least allow 
for the difference. 
 
 Another area for conceptual development of the product meaning approach to 
value influence is whether individuals can apply their human values through both 
routes simultaneously.  In the investigation of the conceptual model in Studies 1-4, 
an assumption was made that the two routes of value influence are mutually 
exclusive when, more likely, individuals use both routes simultaneously.  Katz’ (196) 
attitude function theory, for instance, suggests that an individual’s attitude can serve 
any number and combination of functions, and the same might be true for the value 
influence routes and their psychological functions.  However, the Residual Method 
employed in Study 3 to measure the direct and indirect influences of human values 
on product preference separated individuals into two groups according to whether 
their DIR or IIR more accurately predicted their product preferences.  The division 
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did not consider those individuals whose DIR and IIR were relatively equal, and 
consequently placed those particular individuals into separate groups based on minor 
differences.  The discriminant analyses performed in Study 4 were more realistic 
because they separated individuals into four groups; those for whom the human 
values’ discriminant analysis correctly predicted their most frequently purchased 
product class but the tangible attribute importance discriminant could not, those for 
whom the tangible attribute importance discriminant analysis predicted their most 
frequently purchased product class but the human values discriminant could not, 
those for whom both analyses predicted their most frequently purchased product 
class, and those for whom neither predicted their most frequently purchased car 
class.  Despite the discriminant analyses allowance for individuals to use any 
combination of the value influence routes, when Study 4 examined instrumental and 
terminal value preferences those individuals who used both routes equally or used 
neither route were excluded.  That kind of exclusion and the Residual Method’s 
separating some individuals based on minor differences probably does not affect the 
major conclusions regarding the sample as a whole, but it does obscure three 
possible reasons why some individuals have minor differences in the strengths of 
their direct and indirect routes of value influence: these individuals may use both 
routes equally, these individuals may use neither route, or alternatively, these 
individuals may use some third route not previously considered.  Therefore, future 
empirical research should investigate each individual’s use of the value influence 
routes in a way that does not force mutual exclusivity and that considers those 
individuals who appear to use both routes equally. 
 
 The extent individuals actually apply their human values through both routes 
equally is difficult to assess from the studies conducted in the thesis.  In some 
analyses that did not force mutual exclusivity, such as the discriminant analyses just 
discussed, the routes were equal in strength for a subset of participants, but in other 
analyses that also did not force mutual exclusivity, the routes were negatively related 
for the sample as a whole.  For example, Study 2 found a negative correlation 
between a preference for utilitarian meaning and a piecemeal judgement and a 
preference for symbolic meaning and an affective judgement.  One explanation 
offered for the negative correlation between the two types of judgements was 
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Mittal’s (1988) and Zajonc’s (1984) claim that although piecemeal judgements (e.g., 
what Mittal terms “Information Processing Mode” or what Zajonc terms a “cognitive 
judgement”) and affective judgements are separate processes, the judgements are 
likely to be negatively related because an affective judgement can be made more 
readily than an IPM/cognitive judgement, making the latter unnecessary when an 
affective judgement is strong. Though Zajonc’s (1984) claim that an affective 
judgement precedes a cognitive judgement has also been made by other researchers 
and approaches (e.g., Mittal, 1988; Smith & Nelson, 1984), the claim has not been 
without criticism (e.g., Lazarus, 1982) and therefore an interesting avenue for further 
research is how and why meaning, judgement and the routes of value influence are, 
or are not, negatively related. 
 
Issues for Theoretical Development 
 
 As the aim of the thesis was to develop a conceptual model of how consumers’ 
choice of products may be influenced by the human values that they endorse, the 
directions suggested for further research are primarily methodological and 
conceptual, such as the establishment of a causal role of human values, and the 
qualification of the model’s elements and operational definitions.  However, the 
product meaning approach to value influence obligates further theoretical 
development, particularly of the needs and motivations that underlie the value 
influence routes and how those needs and motivations compel consumers to apply 
their human values.  Addressing the deeper, psychological motivations and needs 
such as control of the environment, social approval and self-consistency, would 
provide a productive avenue for changing the product meaning approach from a 
conceptual model to a theoretical one as it could harness the already extensive theory 
concerning those specific psychological needs (e.g., Adler, 1929; Seligman, 1975). 
 
 Another topic for theoretical development is one that was a core emphasis of the 
product meaning approach, that is, that the value-attitude-behaviour system is not 
monolithic seems to have at a minimum, two subsystems, one loosely connecting 
human values, tangible attribute importance attitudes, and behaviour, and the other 
tightly connecting human values, intangible attribute importance attitudes and 
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behaviour.  The latter might be so tight that the attitude component (e.g., intangible 
attribute importance) does not need to be measured to evaluate the impact of the 
route.  Nevertheless, as intangible attribute importances were not measured for any 
studies in the thesis, future research should include intangible attribute importances, 
such as a consumer’s preferred product images, to detect whether they mediate the 
influences of human values on product preference when consumers attend to 
symbolic meaning.  Given that the measure of symbolic meaning preference used in 
Studies 2 and 3 explicitly referred to product images (e.g., “To what extent would 
you want your chosen product to be: Most compatible with the image you have of 
yourself” and “The image a product portrays is an important part of my decision 
whether or not to buy it”) any future study that measured and modelled intangible 
attribute importances would probably find that they perform in the way suggested in 
the product meaning approach.   
 
 The emphasis in the product meaning approach that the value-attitude-behaviour 
system is not monolithic concerned how human value preferences are applied in 
behavioural decisions, but that emphasis may hold for how human values are 
acquired, that is, not only may human values be applied through two routes, they 
may also be acquired through two routes.  The readers would recall that Rokeach 
(1968, 1973) and Feather (1975, 1982) suggest that human values are formed 
through the abstraction of positive and negative experiences with specific objects, 
and that the process of abstraction results in a hierarchical network between human 
values and evaluative beliefs about the object.  Moreover, once the human value 
preferences are formed, the values can then be generalised to new human values, 
consequences and attributes, resulting in the expansion of the hierarchical network at 
both the object and human value extremities.  Even Kahle (1983), who does not base 
his contentions on expectancy-value theory, nevertheless suggests that human values 
develop from the abstraction of specific experiences with objects.  However, as 
Rokeach’s and Feather’s theories of value acquisition, in particular, are based on 
expectancy-value theory, then Rokeach’s and Feather’s theories may not fully 
explain value acquisition because theories of value application that are based on 
expectancy-value theory (e.g., the attribute-mediation approach) cannot fully explain 
value application.  Study 1 showed most clearly that the route of value influence 
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based on expectancy-value theory (e.g., via tangible attribute importances) could not 
fully account for influence of human values on consumer choices.   
 
 Thus, the central question is whether the alternative, direct route of value 
application uncovered in Study 1 developed in the product meaning approach is also 
an alternative mode of value acquisition.  The question is for future researchers to 
tackle but in the interest of jump-starting that research, one difference between the 
two routes of value acquisition, if that is what they are, may be the indirect 
acquisition of human values from the abstraction of positive and negative outcomes 
of specific experiences (e.g., the expectancy-value approach) versus the direct 
acquisition of human values from reference groups or the values idealised meanings.  
In the indirect mode, the ability of human values to define long-term goals may 
account for their acquisition from specific experiences with objects, and application 
in a careful and deliberate piecemeal judgement that seeks to maximise the rewards 
and minimise the punishments of interacting with objects (e.g., an instrumental 
function).  In the alternative, direct mode, the ability of human values to define and 
mark groups and refer to general ideals may account for their direct, already 
abstracted, acquisition from groups with which the individual identifies, and their 
application in a spontaneous and affective judgement onto objects that symbolise 
those groups or ideals and which results in product identification. 
 
 As an example of each route of value acquisition and application, consider a 
cellular telephone and the human value of Accomplishment.  Some consumers may 
associate the value of Accomplishment with a cellular telephone because they have 
used a cellular telephone in the past and found that it increased work performance 
and efficiency.  Other consumers, however, may associate the value of 
Accomplishment with a cellular phone because a group with which they identify 
(e.g., Yuppies) are distinct from other groups by 1) their support of the value of 
Accomplishment and 2) their use of cellular phones.  Thus, when the 
Accomplishment value is activated in the evaluation of a new, but similar, product to 
cellular phones, the former group will attend to the product’s utilitarian meaning to 
assess whether the product will increase work performance and efficiency and the 
group will apply the Accomplishment value carefully and in a piecemeal judgement 
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to ensure that the product they purchase has the greatest possibility of providing 
accomplishing rewards.  The latter group, however, will attend to the new product’s 
symbolic meaning to assess whether 1) the symbolic meaning refers to the value of 
Accomplishment, and/or 2) whether the product also marks and defines Yuppies.  If 
the product meets one or both of the criteria, the group will apply the value of 
Accomplishment holistically, spontaneously and affectivity, and will feel a sense of 
identification the product.  Therefore, a fruitful area for theoretical development 
could be the adapting of the product meaning approach to value influence to a 
product meaning approach to value acquisition.  If both routes of value influence 
were also routes of value acquisition, then the conceptual model developed in the 
present thesis to explain the influences of human values on consumer choices might 
be a general framework of how human values influence the evaluations of a wide 
range of mental and physical objects. 
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Appendix One: Cover letter and survey for Study 1. 
 
 
VALUES AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOUR STUDY 
 
 
You are cordially invited to participate in a survey of New Zealanders' values and consumption 
behaviour.  The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between a person's values and 
their product preferences.  The results are expected to uncover both the relationships for specific 
products as well as those that transcend products. 
 
Your voluntary involvement is important for it will help achieve a more balanced and representative 
view.  If you choose to participate, I would be grateful for your completing the enclosed questionnaire 
(allow 20 to 30 minutes).  This questionnaire is not a test and there are no right or wrong answers.  
What matters is your own personal opinion. 
 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed pre-paid envelope, preferably byDecember 
15, 1993.  If your decide not to participate, I would appreciate your passing it along to another 
member in your household who is at least 18 years of age. 
 
This is an anonymous questionnaire so please do not put your name anywhere on it. Your 
responseswill be grouped together with those of other participants for purposes of analysis. 
 
 
If you would like to receive a summary of the results or if you have any questions regarding 
thissurvey, please feel free to ring me at (04) 472-1000 x8229. 
 
 
Thank you for your help. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
     
 
 
Michael W. Allen 
 
PhD Student 
Easterfield Building Room 507 
 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
P.O. Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand, Telephone 0-4-471-5373, Facsimile 0-4-496-5402 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
Te Whare Wanaga o te Upoko o te Ika a Maui 
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Version 1 
This page is a survey of people's value systems.  Therefore, there are no right or wrong answers.  The 
best answer is your own personal opinion.  
 
First, read through the list and select the 13 most important values to you.  Do this by placing an "X" 
in the first column.   
 
Next, read through the list again and pick the 13 least important values.  Do this by placing an "X" in 
the second column.   
 
 13 Most   13 Least     
Important Important   
 
  ______   ______   A comfortable life (a prosperous life)    
  ______   ______   A sense of accomplishment (lasting contribution) 
  ______   ______   A world at peace (free of war and conflict)    
  ______   ______   A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts) 
  ______   ______   Ambitious (hard working, aspiring)          
  ______   ______   An exciting life (a stimulating, active life) 
  ______   ______   Broadminded (open-minded)                
  ______   ______   Capable (competent, effective)                
  ______   ______   Cheerful (light-hearted)                       
  ______   ______   Clean (neat, tidy)                            
  ______   ______   Courageous (standing up for your beliefs)     
  ______   ______   Equality (community, equal opportunity for all)  
  ______   ______   Equity (each person rewarded according to how much contribution  
he or she has made) 
  ______   ______   Family security (taking care of loved ones)    
  ______   ______   Forgiving (willing to pardon others)          
  ______   ______   Freedom (independence, free choice)    
  ______   ______   Happiness (contentedness)             
  ______   ______   Helpful (working for the welfare of others)   
  ______   ______   Honest (sincere, truthful)                       
  ______   ______   Imaginative (daring, creative)                 
  ______   ______   Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)     
  ______   ______   Inner harmony (freedom from inner conflict)    
  ______   ______   Intellectual (intelligent, reflective)        
  ______   ______   Logical  (consistent, rational)                       
  ______   ______   Loving (affectionate, tender)                         
  ______   ______   Mature love (sexual and spiritual intimacy)    
  ______   ______   National security (protection from attack)    
  ______   ______   Obedient (dutiful, respectful)                    
  ______   ______   Pleasurable (enjoyable, leisurely life)       
  ______   ______   Polite (courteous, well-mannered)                    
  ______   ______   Responsible (dependable, reliable)                    
  ______   ______   Salvation (saved, eternal life)          
  ______   ______   Self-controlled (restrained, self-disciplined)        
  ______   ______   Self-determination(ability to determine one's destiny) 
  ______   ______   Self-respect (self-esteem)             
  ______   ______   Social recognition (respect, admiration)       
  ______   ______   Social justice (fairness, no discrimination) 
  ______   ______   Social Power (position of authority and importance) 
  ______   ______   True friendship (close companionship)       
  ______   ______   Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)       
 
  *Please make sure you selected 13 items in each column then go to next page. 
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Below is a list of characteristics which you may or may not believe that products in general should 
have. 
 
First, read through the list and select the 11 most important characteristics to you personally.  Do this 
by placing an "X" in the first column. 
 
Next, read through the list again and pick the 11 least important characteristics to you.  Do this by 
placing an "X" in the second column. 
 
 
 11 Most  11 Least 
Important Important 
    
                            A product should be... 
 
   _____   _____   unique 
   _____   _____   traditional 
   _____   _____   stylish 
   _____   _____   sophisticated 
   _____   _____   simple 
   _____   _____   setting me in a good mood when I use it 
   _____   _____   safe to use 
   _____   _____   quiet 
   _____   _____   prestigious 
   _____   _____   practical/functional 
   _____   _____   popular 
   _____   _____   pleasurable 
   _____   _____   pleasant to my senses 
   _____   _____   of highest reputation 
   _____   _____   of minimal environmental impact 
   _____   _____   new on the market 
   _____   _____   modern 
   _____   _____   innovative 
   _____   _____   inexpensive 
   _____   _____   in a wide variety 
   _____   _____   healthy 
   _____   _____   familiar 
   _____   _____   exciting 
   _____   _____   efficient 
   _____   _____   easy to use 
   _____   _____   durable/long lasting 
   _____   _____   dependable 
   _____   _____   consistent with what friends and family want 
   _____   _____   compatible with how I like to think of myself 
   _____   _____   common/widely used 
   _____   _____   comfortable/secure 
   _____   _____   beautiful 
   _____   _____   an expression of my personality  
   _____   _____   a new experience for me 
 
* Please make sure you checked 11 items in each column then go to the next page. 
 310
 Automobile Purchase Portion 
 
Thinking about automobiles in general, please rate how important each of the following 
characteristics are to you when deciding on a possible automobile purchase. 
 
Please use a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning it is "not at all important" up to 10, meaning it is "very 
important".  Place your answer in the column marked "Importance" and be sure to answer every item. 
 
       Not At All                                       Very 
       Important                                     Important 
   
                       [_____________________________]                        
 
           1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
       Importance 
         ______    style 
         ______    spacious interior 
         ______    smooth riding 
         ______    safety 
         ______    quality workmanship 
         ______    prestigious 
         ______    luxurious interior 
         ______    low pollution emission 
         ______    large engine 
         ______    large body size 
         ______    inexpensive 
         ______    high gas mileage/kilometres per litre 
         ______    high speed capabilities 
         ______    heating 
         ______    road handling 
         ______    few repairs needed/low maintenance 
         ______    reliability 
         ______    compact 
         ______    comfort 
         ______    colour 
         ______    air conditioning (cooling) 
         ______    advanced engineering 
 
 
Q1. What is the make and model of the automobile you own now?  (e.g., "Toyota Corolla" or "Honda 
CRX") (Write "none" if not applicable.) 
 
  ________________________________________________________ 
 
Q2. What were the makes and models of the TWO automobiles you owned prior to the one you own 
now? (Write "none" of not applicable.) 
 
  ________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  ________________________________________________________ 
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Holiday Destination Portion 
 
Thinking about travel holiday destinations, please rate how important each of the following 
characteristics are to you when deciding on possible holiday destination areas. 
 
Please use a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning it is "not at all important" up to 10, meaning it is "very 
important".  Place your answer in the column marked "Importance" and be sure to answer every item. 
 
    Not At All                                           Very 
    Important                                         Important 
   
                            [_____________________________]                        
 
            1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
      Importance 
 
        ______    Wilderness, rugged 
        ______    Tropical 
        ______    Stimulating 
        ______    Sophisticated restaurants & hotels 
        ______    Shopping 
        ______    Scenic 
        ______    Safe 
        ______    Relaxing 
        ______    Refreshing 
        ______    Ordinary 
        ______    Night life 
        ______    Museums, galleries, theatre 
        ______    Many activities/things to do 
        ______    Luxurious/Prestigious 
        ______    Intellectually interesting 
        ______    Inexpensive 
        ______    Historical 
        ______    Has theme park(s) 
        ______    Great beaches 
        ______    Few tourists, non-commercial 
        ______    Exciting 
        ______    Educational 
        ______    Authentic native culture 
        ______    A place for a planned/structured holiday 
        ______    A place to have all your needs attended to 
        ______    A unique place 
        ______    A good place for tramping 
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 Holiday Destination Portion (continued) 
 
 
Over the past 5 years, how many times have you been on holiday to each of the following 
destinations?  Answer by writing your response on the line next to the destination.  Note:  only 
include those places where you actually had some degree of control over where you went.  In other 
words, if your parents or spouse made the decision to go to this place without your input then do not 
include it in this list. 
 
 
 
   _____ Lake Taupo 
   _____ Australia's Gold Coast 
   _____ Bali 
   _____ Brisbane 
   _____ Cairns and area 
   _____ Club Med -- Lindeman Island (Australia) 
   _____ Fiji 
   _____ Great Barrier Reef Islands 
   _____ Melbourne 
   _____ New Caledonia 
   _____ Niue 
   _____ Norfolk Island 
   _____ Northern Territory (Australia) 
   _____ Papua New Guinea 
   _____ Perth and area 
   _____ Rarotonga 
   _____ Sydney 
   _____ Tahiti/French Polynesia 
   _____ Tasmania 
   _____ Tonga 
   _____ Vanuatu 
   _____ Western Samoa 
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Holiday Destination Portion (continued) 
 
Below are two lists.  The first list names 21 holiday destination areas while the second list contains 
attributes that may describe these destinations.  Please indicate which two of the 21 destinations listed 
below you consider to be the best for each of the attributes.  Respond by placing the number that 
corresponds to that destination on the line for first choice or second choice for that attribute.  Please 
be sure to fill in every line. 
 
 
 
1. Australia's Gold Coast     13. Northern Territory (Aus.) 
2. Bali         14. Perth and area 
3. Brisbane        15. Rarotonga 
4. Cairns and area       16. Sydney 
5. Club Med -- Lindeman Island    17. Tahiti/French Polynesia 
6. Fiji         18. Tasmania 
7. Papua New Guinea      19. Tonga 
8. Great Barrier Reef Islands     20. Vanuatu 
9. Melbourne        21. Western Samoa            
10. New Caledonia     
11. Niue       
12. Norfolk Island     
 
 
 
  FIRST    SECOND  
CHOICE   CHOICE 
 
    _____    _____    Wilderness, rugged 
    _____    _____    Tropical 
    _____    _____    Stimulating 
    _____    _____    Sophisticated restaurants & hotels 
    _____    _____    Shopping 
    _____    _____    Scenic 
    _____    _____    Safe 
    _____    _____    Relaxing 
    _____    _____    Refreshing 
    _____    _____    Ordinary 
    _____    _____    Night life 
    _____    _____    Museums, galleries, theatre 
    _____    _____    Many activities/things to do 
    _____    _____    Luxurious/Prestigious 
    _____    _____    Intellectually interesting 
    _____    _____    Inexpensive 
    _____    _____    Historical 
    _____    _____    Has theme park(s) 
    _____    _____    Great beaches 
    _____    _____    Few tourists, non-commercial 
    _____    _____    Exciting 
    _____    _____    Educational 
    _____    _____    Authentic native culture 
    _____    _____    A place for a planned/structured holiday 
    _____    _____    A place to have all your needs attended 
    _____    _____    A unique place 
    _____    _____    A good place for tramping 
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Supermarket Food Purchasing Portion 
 
Thinking about your supermarket food purchase decisions, please rate how important each of the 
following characteristics are to you when deciding on possible food products to purchase. 
 
Please use a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning it is "not at all important" up to 10, meaning it is "very 
important".  Place your answer in the column marked "Importance" and be sure to answer every item. 
 
    Not At All                                             Very 
    Important                                          Important 
   
                                [_____________________________]                        
 
            1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
      Importance 
 
        ______    unusual/not commonly used 
        ______    traditional 
        ______    tasty 
        ______    sweet 
        ______    spicy 
        ______    sour 
        ______    sophisticated/up market 
        ______    simple 
        ______    salty 
        ______    safe to eat 
        ______    popular 
        ______    organically grown 
        ______    nutritious/high in vitamins and minerals 
        ______    nice aroma 
        ______    new product on market 
        ______    made of high quality ingredients 
        ______    low environmental impact to produce 
        ______    low in fat 
        ______    looks appealing 
        ______    inexpensive 
        ______    high in protein 
        ______    gourmet 
        ______    flavoursome 
        ______    exotic/from another culture 
        ______    easy to prepare 
        ______    easy to obtain 
        ______    crunchy 
        ______    bland 
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Food Purchasing Portion (continued) 
 
 
Q1. For each of the items listed below, please indicate approximately how many times over the past 3 
days you ate this food.   
 
           Number Times 
           Last 3 Days 
 
  Red meat (e.g., beef)      ______ 
 
  White meat (e.g., chicken, pork, etc.)   ______ 
 
  Seafood/Fish        ______ 
 
  Dairy products (e.g., milk, eggs, cheese, etc.) ______ 
 
 
 
 
Q2. Using the scale below, how much do you consider yourself a vegan (a person who eats 
vegetables, grains, etc. but no animal or seafood/fish products) versus an omnivore (a person who 
eats vegetables, grains, etc., and most animal and seafood/fish products)?  Please circle your response. 
 
 
 
      Vegan      1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10  Omnivore 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3. Which one of the following types of eaters do you consider yourself to be.  Circle one response. 
 
 
 
  1. Omnivore -- Eats most animal and seafood/fish products in 
   addition to vegetables, grains, etc.. 
 
 
  2. Dairy and Fish Vegetarian -- Eats dairy and seafood/fish but no 
   white or red meat. 
 
 
  3. Ova-Lacto Vegetarian -- Eats dairy products but no 
   seafood/fish, white or red meat. 
 
 
  4. Vegan -- Eats absolutely no animal products including 
   dairy, seafood/fish, white and red meat. 
  
 
  5. Other: Specify _______________________ 
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Food Purchasing Portion (continued) 
 
 
Q4a. [ANSWER THIS QUESTION ONLY IF YOU COMPLETELY EXCLUDE BOTH WHITE 
AND RED MEAT FROM YOUR DIET] Using the scale below, please indicate how important each 
of the following reasons are to you for excluding meat products from your diet. 
 
 
     Not At All                                           Very 
     Important                                         Important 
   
                   [_____________________________]                        
 
           1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
   ______ For health reasons 
   ______ To help the environment 
   ______ To save money 
   ______ Religious reasons 
   ______ To spare the lives of animals 
   ______ Dislike the sight/taste of animal flesh 
   ______ Do not see vegetable/plant life as important 
   ______ Habit/tradition 
   _____ Like the sight/taste of vegetables, etc.  
   ______ Other. Specify: ___________________ 
 
 
 
Q4b.  [ANSWER THIS QUESTION ONLY IF YOU INCLUDE WHITE AND/OR RED MEAT 
PRODUCTS IN YOUR DIET] Using the scale below, please indicate how important each of the 
following reasons are to you for including meat products in your diet. 
 
 
     Not At All                                           Very 
     Important                                         Important 
   
                   [_____________________________]                        
 
           1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
   ______ For health reasons/Need a lot of energy 
   ______ To help the environment 
   ______ To save money 
   ______ Religious reasons 
   ______ Dislike the blandness of vegetables (i.e. wouldn't want to eat  
        exclusively vegetables, grains, etc.) 
   ______ Habit/tradition of eating meat 
   ______ Like the sight/taste of meat 
   ______ To make the best use of the value of animals 
   ______ Other. Specify: ___________________ 
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Demographic Portion 
 
 
 
Q1. Which of the following categories contains your age? (Circle your response) 
 
 
  1.  Under 20 years 
  2.  20 to 29 years 
  3.  30 to 39 years 
  4.  40 to 49 years 
  5.  50 to 59 years 
  6.  More than 60 
 
 
Q2.  What is your gender?  
 
 
  1.  Male 
  2.  Female 
 
 
 
Q3. Which of the following categories contains your highest level of education completed? 
 
 
  1.  No qualifications 
  2.  Higher school or leaving certificate/bursary 
  3.  Technical/Trade certificate 
  4.  Undergraduate work 
  5.  Bachelors degree 
  6.  Postgraduate work  
  7.  Postgraduate degree 
 
 
 
Q4. What is your ethnicity? 
 
  1.  New Zealander (non-Maori) 
  2.  New Zealander (Maori) 
  3.  Pacific Islander 
  4.  Asian 
  5.  Other  (Specify: __________________) 
 
  
 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
 
This questionnaire was naturally limited in scope and in the number of questions that can be asked.  If 
you would like to comment further on any of the matters that have been raised or perhaps ones that 
were overlooked, please feel free to write in the space overleaf.  Thank you once again. 
 
 318
Appendix Two: Automobile Coding Scheme 
 
 
   Utility Vehicles 
Smaller Family Cars Larger Family Cars Luxury Cars & Mini-vans 
    
Austin/Morris 1100  Austin/Morris Maxi  Alfa Romeo 33/Sprint  Falcan Panelvan  
Austin/Morris Maesto  Austin/Morris Monteg  Audi 100  Ford F100 Truck  
Austin/Morris Marina  Chrysler Regal  BMW 3-Series  Holden Ute  
Austin/Morris Mini  Chrysler Valiant VIP  BMW 5-Series  Honda Shuttle  
Austin/Morris Minor  Citroen D/DS  Citroen CX (Turbo)  Jeep  
Citroen ZX  Citroen GS (Wagon)  Diamler  Land Rover  
Daihatsu Charade  Citroen Light 15  Ford Granada/Consul  Mazda E2000 Van  
Datsun 120A OR 120Y  Fiat Croma  Holden Calais  Mitsubishi L300  
Datsun 1600  Ford Corsair  Honda Prelude  Mitsubishi Pajero  
Fiat 124/128  Ford Cortina (Mark I  Jaguar MK1  Mitsubishi Spacewagon 
Fiat Bambino  Ford Courier  Jaguar XJ6  Morris Van  
Fiat Panda  Ford Fairmont  Mazda 929  Toyota Lite Ace van  
Fiat Tipo  Ford Falcon  Mercedes 200D  Toyota Super Hi Ace  
Fiat Uno  Ford Orion  Mercedes-Benz S-Clas  Toyota Truck  
Ford Angila  Ford Sierra  Mitsubishi Sigma  Transit Van  
Ford Escort  Ford Telstar  Nissan Maxima  VW Kombi (1965)  
Ford Laser  Hillman Hunter  Peugeot 505  
Ford Prefect  Hillman Mynx/Super(1  Saab 900  
Hillman Avenger  Holden Camira (Wagon Toyota Cressida  
Holden Barina  Holden Commodore  Volvo 940  
Holden Gemini  Holden HQ/Kingswood  Miscellaneous / 
Honda City  Holden Sunbird   Unclassified Cars 
Honda Civic  Holden Torana    
Hyundai Excel  Honda Accord   Audi Santana  
Lada 2107  Hyundai Stellar  Sports Cars Austin/Morris Ten  
Mazda 323  Lada 1300   Chevy (1939)  
Mazda 808  Lancer  Datsun/Nissan 180ZX  Ford Camira  
Mazda Familia  Mazda 626  Delorian  Humber 80  
Mitsubishi Lancer  Mitsubishi Chariot  Fiat Sport 850 Coupe  Isuzu Ballet  
Mitsubishi Mirage  Mitsubishi Cordia/Ch  Ford Capri  Lada Wagon  
Nissan Sentra  Mitsubishi Galant  Honda CRX  Leyland P76  
Nissan Sunny  Mitsubishi Magna  Honda Integra  Leyland Princess  
Peugeot 106XT  Mitsubishi Tredia  Isuzu Piazza  Mitsubishi Canter  
Peugeot 205  Mitsubishi V3000  Lancia Beta  Mitsubishi Cieneva  
Pontiac LeMans  Nissan Bluebird  MG Midget  Renault H  
Renault 5  Nissan Skyline  MGB GT (Leyland)  VW G sy  
Singer Vogue  Opel Vectra  Mitsubishi Celeste  
Toyota Corolla  Renault 12  Mitsubishi Sapporo  
Toyota Starlet  Renault Fuego  Nissan 300ZX  
Triumph Herald  Toyota Camry  Nissan Pulsar  
Triumph Toledo  Toyota Corona  Pontiac Fiero  
Vauxhall (Chevy) Che  Triumph 2000/2.5  Porsche 911  
Vauxuall Viva HC  Vauxhall Victor  Rover 3500Se  
Volvo 360  Volvo 164  Toyota Celica  
VW Beetle   Triumph Spitfire  
VW Golf    
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Appendix Three: Cover letter and survey for Study 2. 
 
 
Dear Wellington Region Resident, 
 
We invite you to participate in a survey about values and consumer behaviour. Your opinions and 
insights can help us gain a better understanding of how people decide on which products to buy. Since 
your name has been chosen at random from the telephone directory, your voluntary involvement is 
important for it can help achieve a balanced and representative view of the attitudes of 
Wellingtonians.  
 
If you choose to complete the questionnaire it will probably take you about 15 minutes. If you decide 
not to participate, we would appreciate your passing it along to another member in your household 
who is at least 18 years of age. 
 
This is an anonymous questionnaire so please do not put your name anywhere on it. When we look at 
the responses, all of the participants will be grouped together. This questionnaire is not a test and there 
are no right or wrong answers. What matters to us is your own personal opinion. 
 
In your next available moment could you complete the questionnaire and return it in the enclosed pre-
paid envelope, preferably by 28 November 1994.  
 
We have spent a lot of time developing this questionnaire and we hope that you find it interesting. 
There is room on page 5 for you to comment further on any of the points that were raised. If you 
would like to receive a summary of the results or if you have any questions, please feel free to ring me 
at (04) 472-1000 ext. 8095. 
 
 
Thank you for your help. We appreciate your time and effort in completing the survey. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
     
 
 
Michael W. Allen 
 
PhD Student 
Easterfield Building Room 508 
 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
P.O. Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand, Telephone 0-4-471-5373, Facsimile 0-4-496-5402 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
Te Whare Wanaga o te Upoko o te Ika a Maui 
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Version 1 
 
 The purpose of this study is to learn how people decide on what products to buy.  In this part of 
the survey, we are interested in how people decide on an AUTOMOBILE.  Please answer the 
questions below on the assumption that you are about to purchase an AUTOMOBILE.  If you 
strongly agree with a statement, circle the 7, if you strongly disagree circle the 1.  You may choose 
any number between 1 and 7. 
 
  
Before you make your final selection of          Strongly            Strongly 
an automobile, you would:             Disagree              Agree 
 
 
1. Consider the pros and cons for each automobile      1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
2. Think a lot about yourself as a user of the automobile   1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
       (i.e., how you would look, feel, etc.)   
 
3. Seek a lot of information about each automobile    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
Keeping in mind the AUTOMOBILE purchasing  
situation, how much do you agree or disagree with        Strongly            Strongly 
each of the following statements:           Disagree              Agree 
 
 
1. When deciding on whether or not to buy an automobile I   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
         think about how useful it will be 
 
2. The instant I see an automobile I know if I like it    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
3. The image an automobile portrays is an important part of  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
         my decision whether or not to buy it 
 
4. Usually my selection of an automobile is based on a gut feeling 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
5. I believe in exercising self-control and not being impulsive when  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
        deciding on an automobile 
 
6. I want an automobile that is similar to what my friends have  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
7. I believe in selecting an automobile based on a careful   1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
        examination of all its features 
 
8. I believe in making a responsible and well-considered decision 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
9. I prefer an automobile that reflects who I am     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
10. I think it is important to select the most practical automobile 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
11. I believe in being logical and rational when deciding on   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
         an automobile 
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Below are some general goals which you may or may 
not have in mind while selecting the automobile.  
To what extent would you want your chosen         Strongly            Strongly 
automobile to be:               Disagree              Agree 
 
 
1. An automobile that you can proudly display     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
2. Something that feels pleasant to your senses(i.e., sight, feel, etc.) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
3. Known to be expensive         1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
4. In fashion or in vogue        1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
5. Something that puts you in a good mood when you use it  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
6. Most compatible with the image you have of yourself   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 * *  * 
 
 
Below are the same questions you just answered in reference to an automobile.  In this part of 
the survey, however, we are interested in how people decide on a pair of SUNGLASSES.  Please 
answer the questions below on the assumption that you are about to purchase a pair of 
SUNGLASSES.  
 
 
Before you make your final selection of          Strongly            Strongly 
a pair of sunglasses, you would:            Disagree              Agree 
 
 
1. Consider the pros and cons for each pair of sunglasses     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
2. Think a lot about yourself as a wearer of the sunglasses   1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
       (i.e., how you would look, feel, etc.)   
 
3. Seek a lot of information about each pair of sunglasses   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
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Keeping in mind the SUNGLASSES purchasing  
situation, how much do you agree or disagree with         Strongly            Strongly 
each of the following statements:            Disagree              Agree 
 
 
1. When deciding on whether or not to buy a pair of sunglasses I   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
         think about how useful they will be 
 
2. The instant I see a pair of sunglasses I know if I like them   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
3. The image a pair of sunglasses portrays is an important part of  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
         my decision whether or not to buy it 
 
4. Usually my selection of a pair of sunglasses is based on a gut feeling 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
5. I believe in exercising self-control and not being impulsive when  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
        deciding on a pair of sunglasses 
 
6. I want a pair of sunglasses that are similar to what my friends have 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
7. I believe in selecting a pair of sunglasses based on a careful   1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
        examination of all their features 
 
8 I believe in making a responsible and well-considered decision  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
9. I prefer a pair of sunglasses that reflects who I am     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
10. I think it is important to select the most practical pair of sunglasses 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
11. I believe in being logical and rational when deciding on   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
        a pair of sunglasses 
  
 
 
Below are some general goals which you may or may 
not have in mind while selecting the sunglasses.   
To what extent would you want your chosen           Strongly            Strongly 
sunglasses to be:               Disagree              Agree 
 
 
1. A pair of sunglasses that you can proudly display     1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
2. Something that feels pleasant to your senses(i.e., sight, feel, etc.)  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
3. Known to be expensive          1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
4. In fashion or in vogue         1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
5. Something that puts you in a good mood when you wear them  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
6. Most compatible with the image you have of yourself    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
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This page is a survey of people's VALUE SYSTEMS.  Since there are no right or wrong answers, the 
best answer is your own personal opinion.  Please follow the three steps listed below. 
 
FIRST, read through the list below. 
 
 13 Most    13 Least     
Important  Important 
______   ______   A comfortable life (a prosperous life)    
______   ______   A sense of accomplishment (lasting contribution) 
______   ______   A world at peace (free of war and conflict)    
______   ______   A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts) 
______   ______   Ambitious (hard working, aspiring)          
______   ______   An exciting life (a stimulating, active life) 
______   ______   Broadminded (open-minded)                
______   ______   Capable (competent, effective)                
______   ______   Cheerful (light-hearted)                       
______   ______   Clean (neat, tidy)                            
______   ______   Courageous (standing up for your beliefs)     
______   ______   Equality (community, equal opportunity for all)  
______   ______   Equity (each person rewarded according to how much  
     contribution they have made) 
______   ______   Family security (taking care of loved ones)    
______   ______   Forgiving (willing to pardon others)          
______   ______   Freedom (independence, free choice)    
______   ______   Happiness (contentedness)             
______   ______   Helpful (working for the welfare of others)   
______   ______   Honest (sincere, truthful)                       
______   ______   Imaginative (daring, creative)                 
______   ______   Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)     
______   ______   Inner harmony (freedom from inner conflict)    
______   ______   Intellectual (intelligent, reflective)        
______   ______   Logical  (consistent, rational)                       
______   ______   Loving (affectionate, tender)                         
______   ______   Mature love (sexual and spiritual intimacy)    
______   ______   National security (protection from attack)    
______   ______   Obedient (dutiful, respectful)                    
______   ______   Pleasurable (enjoyable, leisurely life)       
______   ______   Polite (courteous, well-mannered)                    
______   ______   Responsible (dependable, reliable)                    
______   ______   Salvation (saved, eternal life)          
______   ______   Self-controlled (restrained, self-disciplined)        
______   ______   Self-determination(ability to determine one's destiny) 
______   ______   Self-respect (self-esteem)             
______   ______   Social recognition (respect, admiration)       
______   ______   Social justice (fairness, no discrimination) 
______   ______   Social Power (position of authority and importance) 
______   ______   True friendship (close companionship)       
______   ______   Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)       
 
SECOND, from the list above select the 13 most important values to you.  Do this by placing an "X" 
in the first column.  
THIRD, read through the list again and pick the 13 least important values.  Do this by placing an "X" 
in the second column.  Remember, when you indicate your least important values you are not 
saying that the values are unimportant, but rather that they are less important than the other values. 
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Referring to the values listed on the previous page, do you feel that there are some values that are 
important to you but do not appear in the list?   If so, what are they?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Can you think of other values that may be important to New Zealanders but are not listed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Demographic Portion 
 
Q1. Which one of the following categories best describes your age? (Circle your response) 
 
  1.  Under 20 years 
  2.  20 to 29 years 
  3.  30 to 39 years 
  4.  40 to 49 years 
  5.  50 to 59 years 
  6.  More than 60 
 
 
Q2.  Are you male or female?       Male  Female 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation! 
 
This questionnaire is naturally limited in scope and in the number of questions that can be asked.  If 
you would like to comment further on any of the matters that have been raised or perhaps ones that 
were overlooked, please feel free to write in the space below.  Thank you once again. 
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Appendix Four: Cover letter and survey for Study 2. 
 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
Te Whare Wanaga o te Upoko o te Ika a Maui 
 
 
Dear Wellington Region Resident, 
 
We invite you to participate in a survey about values and consumer behaviour. Your opinions and 
insights can help us gain a better understanding of how people decide which products to buy. Since 
your name has been chosen at random from the telephone directory, your voluntary involvement is 
important for it can help achieve a balanced and representative view of Wellingtonians.  
 
In your next available moment could you complete the questionnaire and return it in the enclosed pre-
paid envelope.  If you decide not to participate, we would appreciate your passing it along to another 
member in your household who is at least 18 years of age.  
 
As a token of our appreciation for your participation, your name will be entered in a lucky draw for a 
$100 gift certificate at a store of your choosing. 
 
Your responses will be kept anonymous and will not be used for any purpose other than for this study.  
If you would like to receive a summary of the results or if you have any questions, please feel free to 
ring me at (04) 472-1000 ext. 8095. 
 
Thank you for your help. We appreciate your time and effort in completing the survey. 
 
 
Sincerely,    
 
Michael Allen 
PhD Student in Psychology 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
CUT HERE AND RETURN THIS PORTION 
 
To be entered into the draw please fill in the information below and return it in the post-paid envelope 
along with your completed questionnaire. 
 
Also, we will need a small number of participants to interview on a more in-depth basis.  Those who are 
selected will be paid $15 for an approximately 20 minute interview conducted at their convenience.  
Would you like to have your name added to this list of possible participants?  YES or NO 
 
Name:  ______________________________________________________ 
 
Address:  ______________________________________________________ 
 
Phone:  ______________________________________________________ 
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Version 1 
This page is a survey of people's VALUES.  This is not a test and there are no right or wrong answers.  
The best answer is your own personal opinion.  Please follow the three steps listed below. 
 
FIRST, read through the list below. 
 
 13 Most    13 Least     
Important  Important 
______   ______   A comfortable life (a prosperous life)    
______   ______   A sense of accomplishment (lasting contribution) 
______   ______   A world at peace (free of war and conflict)    
______   ______   A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts) 
______   ______   Ambitious (hard working, aspiring)          
______   ______   An exciting life (a stimulating, active life) 
______   ______   Broadminded (open-minded)                
______   ______   Capable (competent, effective)                
______   ______   Cheerful (light-hearted)                       
______   ______   Clean (neat, tidy)                            
______   ______   Courageous (standing up for your beliefs)     
______   ______   Equality (community, equal opportunity for all)  
______   ______   Equity (each person rewarded according to how much 
     contribution they have made) 
______   ______   Family security (taking care of loved ones)    
______   ______   Forgiving (willing to pardon others)          
______   ______   Freedom (independence, free choice)    
______   ______   Happiness (contentedness)             
______   ______   Helpful (working for the welfare of others)   
______   ______   Honest (sincere, truthful)                       
______   ______   Imaginative (daring, creative)                 
______   ______   Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)     
______   ______   Inner harmony (freedom from inner conflict)    
______   ______   Intellectual (intelligent, reflective)        
______   ______   Logical  (consistent, rational)                       
______   ______   Loving (affectionate, tender)                         
______   ______   Mature love (sexual and spiritual intimacy)    
______   ______   National security (protection from attack)    
______   ______   Obedient (dutiful, respectful)                    
______   ______   Pleasurable (enjoyable, leisurely life)       
______   ______   Polite (courteous, well-mannered)                    
______   ______   Responsible (dependable, reliable)                    
______   ______   Salvation (saved, eternal life)          
______   ______   Self-controlled (restrained, self-disciplined)        
______   ______   Self-determination(ability to determine one's destiny) 
______   ______   Self-respect (self-esteem)             
______   ______   Social recognition (respect, admiration)       
______   ______   Social justice (fairness, no discrimination) 
______   ______   Social Power (position of authority and importance) 
______   ______   True friendship (close companionship)       
______   ______   Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)       
 
SECOND, from the list above select the 13 most important values to you.  Do this by placing an "X" 
in the first column.  
THIRD, read through the list again and pick the 13 least important values.  Do this by placing an "X" 
in the second column.  Remember, when you indicate your least important values you are not 
saying that the values are unimportant, but rather that they are simply less important than the other 
values. 
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The aim of the portion of the survey is to determine the style or manner you use when carrying out 
different mental tasks.  Please answer each question about the way you engage in tasks by circling one 
of the four possible responses. 
 
 
Always   Usually   Usually   Always 
  True       True        False      False 
 
     1             2             3             4 I enjoy doing work that requires the use of words. 
     1             2             3             4 There are some special times in my life that I like to relive 
 by mentally “picturing” just how everything looked. 
     1             2             3             4 I can never seem to find the right word when I need it. 
     1             2             3             4 I do a lot of reading. 
     1             2             3             4 When I’m trying to learn something new, I’d rather watch a 
 demonstration than read how to do it. 
     1             2             3             4 I think I often use words in the wrong way. 
     1             2             3             4 I enjoy learning new words. 
     1             2             3             4 I like to picture how I could fix up my apartment or a room 
 if I could buy anything I wanted. 
     1             2             3             4 I often make written notes to myself. 
     1             2             3             4 I like to daydream. 
     1             2             3             4 I generally prefer to use a diagram rather than a written set 
of instructions. 
     1             2             3             4 I like to “doodle”. 
     1             2             3             4 I find it helps to think in terms of mental pictures when 
doing many things. 
     1             2             3             4 After I meet someone for the first time, I can usually 
 remember what they look like, but not much about them. 
     1             2             3             4 I like to think of synonyms for words. 
     1             2             3             4 When I have forgotten something I frequently try to form a 
 mental “picture” to remember it. 
     1             2             3             4 I like learning new words. 
     1             2             3             4 I prefer to read instructions about how to do something 
 rather than have someone show me. 
     1             2             3             4 I prefer activities that don’t require a lot of reading. 
     1             2             3             4 I seldom daydream. 
     1             2             3             4 I spend very little time attempting to increase my 
 vocabulary. 
     1             2             3             4          My thinking often consists of mental “pictures” or images. 
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The purpose of this portion of the survey is to learn about how people decide which products (e.g., 
automobiles, clothing, food items, etc.) to purchase.  We are not interested in how you decide on any 
particular product, but rather, how you generally go about deciding. 
 
If you strongly agree with a statement, circle 7, if you strongly disagree circle 1.  You may choose any 
number between 1 and 7. 
 
  
Before you make your final selection of          Strongly            Strongly 
a product, you would:              Disagree              Agree 
 
 
1. Consider the pros and cons for each product       1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
2. Think a lot about yourself as a user of the product    1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
       (i.e., how you would look, feel, etc.)    
 
3. Seek a lot of information about each product     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
How much do you agree or disagree with          Strongly            Strongly 
each of the following statements:           Disagree              Agree 
 
 
1. When deciding on whether or not to buy a product I    1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
         think about how useful it will be 
 
2. The instant I see a product I know if I like it     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
3. The image a product portrays is an important part of   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
         my decision whether or not to buy it 
 
4. Usually my selection of a product is based on a gut feeling  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
5. I believe in exercising self-control and not being impulsive  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
         when deciding on a product 
 
6. I would look to my friends or family to see if they liked it  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
7. I believe in selecting a product based on a careful    1   2   3   4   5   6   7  
        examination of all its features 
 
8. I believe in making a responsible and well-considered decision 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
9. I prefer a product that reflects who I am      1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
10. I think it is important to select the most practical product  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
11. I believe in being logical and rational when     1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 deciding on a product 
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Below are some general goals which you may or may 
not have in mind while selecting the product.  
To what extent would you want your chosen          Strongly            Strongly 
product to be:               Disagree              Agree 
  
 
1. A product that you can proudly display      1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
2. Something that feels pleasant to your senses(i.e., sight, feel, etc.) 1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
3. Known to be expensive         1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
4. In fashion or in vogue        1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
5. Something that puts you in a good mood when you use it  1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
6. Most compatible with the image you have of yourself   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
 
 
 
Car Selection Criteria 
 
The purpose of this portion of the survey is to learn how people decide on a particular product to 
purchase. Thinking about cars in general, please rate how important each of the following 
characteristics is to you when deciding a possible car purchase. 
 
Please use a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning it is "not at all important" up to 10, meaning it is "very 
important". 
 
 
    Not At All                                           Very 
    Important                                         Important 
   
                            [_____________________________]                        
 
            1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
 Importance      Importance 
 ______    style     ______    high kilometres per litre 
 ______    spacious interior   ______    high speed capabilities 
 ______    smooth riding    ______    heating 
 ______    safety     ______    road handling 
 ______    quality workmanship  ______    few repairs needed/low maintenance 
 ______    prestigious    ______    reliability 
 ______    luxurious interior   ______    compact 
 ______    low pollution emission  ______    comfort 
 ______    large engine    ______    colour 
 ______    large body size   ______    air conditioning (cooling) 
 ______    inexpensive    ______    advanced engineering 
 330
Sunglasses Selection Criteria 
 
The purpose of this portion of the survey is to learn how people decide on a pair of sunglasses to 
purchase. Thinking about sunglasses in general, please rate how important each of the following 
characteristics is to you when deciding a possible pair of sunglasses purchase. 
 
Please use a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning it is "not at all important" up to 10, meaning it is "very 
important". 
 
 
    Not At All                                           Very 
    Important                                         Important 
   
                            [_____________________________]                        
 
            1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9    10 
 
 
 
_____  colour of frame       _____  fits comfortably on face 
_____  darkly tinted lens      _____  engineered design 
_____  suitable for a variety of sunlight conditions _____  high UV protection 
_____  highly functional     _____  inexpensive 
_____  label/brand name printed on lens or frame _____  lenses with a large coverage area 
_____  light-weight      _____  made of highest quality materials 
_____  makes activities safer (e.g., driving)   _____  metal frame 
_____  nylon frame      _____  precision ground optical glass lenses 
_____  reflective/mirrored lenses     _____  scratch-resistant lenses 
_____  shape of frame (e.g., round, square, etc.)  _____  strong, rugged, impact resistant 
_____  reduces glare and increases image clarity  _____  thin frame     
 
 
Q1. What is the brand name of the sunglasses you own now?  (e.g., Ray-Ban, Bill Bass, etc.) 
(Write “none” if you do not own any.  If you own more than one pair, write down the pair 
you use most frequently). 
 
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q2. Where did you buy it? (e.g., Farmers, Unichem, etc.)  ___________________________ 
 
Q3. How long ago did you purchase it? _________________________ 
 
Q4. Approximately how much did you pay for it? _________________ 
 
Q5. What was the main purpose for which you bought it?   (Circle one only)  
 
     1. Sports (skiing, cycling, etc.) 
     2. Driving  
     3. General Use 
     4. Other (Please specify: _____________) 
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Ownership and Demographic Portion 
 
 
Q1. What is the make, model and year of the car you own now?  (e.g., "1993 Toyota Corolla" or 
"1989 Ford Laser") (Write "none" if not applicable.) 
 
 
  ________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q2. What were the makes, models and years of the TWO cars you owned prior to the one you 
own now? 
 
  ________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  ________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Q3. On a scale of  1 to 10, with 1 meaning you “Do not like it at all” to 10 meaning you “Like it 
very much”, how much do you like each of the cars listed below? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Toyota Corolla  _____ 
    Honda Accord   _____ 
    Mitsubishi Sigma  _____ 
    Nissan Pulsar   _____ 
 
  
 
Q4. Which one of the following categories contains your age? (Circle your response) 
 
  1.  Under 20 years 
  2.  20 to 29 years 
  3.  30 to 39 years 
  4.  40 to 49 years 
  5.  50 to 59 years 
  6.  60 or more 
 
 
Q5. What is your occupation? _________________________________________ 
 
 
Q6.  Are you male or female?       Male  Female 
 
 
Thanks for your participation! 
 
 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10
Do not like 
   it at all 
    Like it very 
            much 
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